CourtListener 10676357•People v. Grigoryan CA2/2
Testo completo
Filed 9/23/25 P. v. Grigoryan CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B334465
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. BA475142)
ARSEN GRIGORYAN et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, George G. Lomeli, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Arsen Grigoryan.
Alan Siraco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Hrachya Azatyan.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael
Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_______________________
This criminal appeal arises from two shootings in October
2018. On October 13, Suren Tahmazyan was shot and killed
outside the Ararat Restaurant in Glendale. On October 17,
Rafik M.1 was shot in the underground parking garage of an
apartment complex in Studio City. Defendants Arsen Grigoryan,
Hrachya Azatyan, and Vahagn Mkhitaryan were charged with
both crimes. Mkhitaryan pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter
and attempted murder, and he is not a party to this appeal.
Grigoryan and Azatyan proceeded to trial and were convicted in
May 2023.
Grigoryan appeals his conviction for the murder of
Tahmazyan. Azatyan appeals his convictions for the murder of
Tahmazyan and the attempted murder of Rafik. They argue the
evidence was insufficient to support their convictions and to
support the jury’s special finding Tahmazyan was murdered by
means of lying in wait. Because ample evidence supports the
verdicts, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Tahmazyan Is Murdered on October 13, 2018
On October 13, 2018, Tahmazyan attended a friend’s party
at the Ararat Restaurant.2 He arrived at the party around
7:15 p.m. or 7:20 p.m. Rafik arrived at the same restaurant just
before 8:00 p.m. to meet some friends. Around 8:00 p.m.,
Tahmazyan walked to the parking lot with a friend, Hrant
Khachikyan, to smoke. The restaurant is located on the corner of
1 We refer to the surviving victim by his first name and last
initial. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
2 In reciting this summary, “we ‘view the facts in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict.’ ” (People v. Navarro (2021)
12 Cal.5th 285, 302.)
2
San Fernando Road and Ruberta Avenue in Glendale, and the
parking lot is in front of the restaurant, bordering those streets.
Tahmazyan stood with his back to the wall, facing the street,
while Khachikyan stood with his back to the street. Several other
party attendees were also in the parking lot.
Unbeknownst to Tahmazyan, while he was in the parking
lot, two vehicles circled the restaurant. First, at 8:15 p.m., a
white minivan, later identified as a Chrysler Pacifica model, with
distinctive dark-colored rims and trim drove past the restaurant
parking lot eastbound on San Fernando Road. There was a glow
in its windshield consistent with a Lyft sign. It also appeared to
have a paper license plate. The minivan proceeded to circle an
adjacent block before parking at a 7-Eleven one block away from
the restaurant. It stayed there until just after the murder
occurred.
Second, about four minutes after the white minivan
initially drove past the restaurant, at approximately 8:20 p.m., a
black sports utility vehicle (SUV), later identified as a Hyundai
Santa Fe model, slowly drove past it as well. The vehicle
appeared to have a paper license plate. It slowly proceeded past
the parking lot and Tahmazyan, circled the block via the alley
behind the restaurant, and turned right onto Ruberta Avenue. It
stopped at the corner of Ruberta and San Fernando, next to the
restaurant parking lot, at 8:21:46 p.m.
Fourteen seconds later, at 8:22 p.m., the shooting occurred.
Khachikyan heard footsteps approaching quickly from behind
him. A man ran up, pointed a gun at Tahmazyan, and started
shooting. The shooter was short, very skinny, wore dark clothing,
and had unkempt facial hair. At trial, Khachikyan identified
Azatyan as the shooter.
3
Khachikyan heard three gunshots. He was hit in the arm.
Tahmazyan was fatally struck in the head three times. The
autopsy determined he was shot from close range at a distance of
about two feet.
After the shooting, Azatyan ran back toward San Fernando
Road. Security footage showed a person entering the passenger
side of the waiting black SUV. Another witness in the parking lot
saw a man dressed in black getting into the rear passenger’s seat
of the black SUV, which drove away on San Fernando, turning
right at the next street (Justin Avenue). Likewise, a passing
motorist heard gunshots and saw a slim man, dressed in black,
running with a gun in his hand. She saw him enter the back
passenger seat of a medium-sized black SUV, which drove off.
The motorist followed the SUV for the rest of the block and saw it
turn right at Justin.
A few minutes later, the white minivan slowly drove past
the crime scene, westbound on San Fernando.
At 8:23 p.m., one minute after the murder, security footage
showed the black SUV driving eastbound on Glen Oaks
Boulevard, away from the restaurant. Ninety seconds later,
footage showed the white minivan heading in the same direction.
II. Rafik Is Shot on October 17, 2018
A few days later, Glendale police investigating
Tahmazyan’s murder learned Rafik was shot in Studio City.
Rafik is an Armenian national who had been in Los Angeles for
several weeks and was staying in an apartment complex on
Bluffside Drive in Studio City. He planned to return to Armenia
on October 17, and he arranged for two friends, Edik Egoyan and
Sargis Akliyan, to drive him to the airport.
Egoyan and Akliyan arrived at Rafik’s apartment complex
to pick him up around 12:30 p.m. on October 17. Rafik opened the
4
driveway security gate and directed them to an underground
parking garage. While they parked, Akliyan saw a white minivan
drive past. Egoyan also saw the minivan, which ultimately
parked next to his car.
Surveillance footage showed the white minivan had
initially entered through one of the complex’s security gates at
12:03 p.m., left at 12:06 p.m., drove by the complex at 12:08 p.m.,
and reentered through a gate at 12:11 p.m. At 12:29 p.m., the
minivan parked next to Egoyan’s car and the sliding door opened.
The minivan’s appearance in the footage was consistent with the
minivan at the scene of Tahmazyan’s murder.
When Egoyan parked the car, Akliyan alighted to greet
Rafik and was approached by a man in a white hoodie sweatshirt.
He heard a voice say “That’s not him,” and the man passed
Akliyan, headed toward Rafik, and shot him. Rafik said “It hit
me,” and Akliyan heard the shooter say, “He did not die.” Egoyan,
who had ducked down inside the car to hide, also heard the
shooter say something to that effect as he went into the minivan.
The shooter was about 15 feet away from Egoyan, and Egoyan
could see him through the rear window of his hatchback car. The
shooter was very skinny, had a beard, and wore a cap. Police
later showed Egoyan a photo lineup, and he identified Azatyan as
the shooter.
Rafik was eventually transported to a hospital and treated
for his injuries. Rafik believed he had been followed by the
shooter, so Vahe Meliksetyan, who had been Rafik’s driver during
his stay in Los Angeles, took his car to a repair shop. A GPS
(global positioning system) tracker was found affixed to the
underside of the car. Police were called, and they recovered the
tracker.
5
III. The Police Uncover Evidence Linking Defendants to
Both Crimes
In the course of their investigation, police developed and
pursued the theory Tahmazyan’s murder was a botched attempt
to kill Rafik. Police ultimately uncovered abundant evidence
supporting that theory and connecting defendants to both crimes.
A. The Black SUV
Before the crimes, Grigoryan had been seen driving a black
Hyundai Santa Fe SUV with a “sport” trim package, consistent
with the vehicle used in Tahmazyan’s murder. In December 2017,
a private investigator in an unrelated case filmed Grigoryan
driving it.
Evidence also connected Azatyan to the black Santa Fe.
The Santa Fe was impounded on January 14, 2019, as an
abandoned vehicle less than a block from Azatyan’s residence.
Police recovered it on March 7, 2019, from a tow yard. Police had
found keys to the Santa Fe in the Kia vehicle Azatyan was
driving at the time of his February 13, 2019, arrest. They also
found Azatyan’s DNA on the right front roof handle of the Santa
Fe.
B. The White Minivan
Grigoryan was also seen on multiple occasions, before and
after the attempted murder of Rafik, with a white Chrysler
Pacifica minivan. It had black wheels and rims, consistent with
the vehicle involved in both crimes.
On October 15, 2018, surveillance footage from the
SpyShop in Sherman Oaks showed Grigoryan purchasing a GPS
tracker.3 The footage also showed a white minivan driving away
3 Grigoryan conceded at trial that he was the person depicted
in the surveillance video buying the tracker.
6
from the shop. Other witnesses testified that on the same day,
they saw Grigoryan, Mkhitaryan, and some other men at a coffee
shop in Glendale.4 They stood next to a white minivan without a
license plate, and later, Mkhitaryan drove the group away in the
minivan.
After the crimes, on November 1, 2018, police installed a
GPS tracker on the white Pacifica Grigoryan was driving. They
observed him driving the vehicle multiple times between
November 1, 2018, and mid-January 2019. On January 13, 2019,
the vehicle was towed to a repair shop in Van Nuys. Three people
dropped it off, one of whom was Armen Azatyan, Defendant
Azatyan’s brother. Although the shop owner testified at trial that
neither defendant had been with Armen Azatyan at his shop, he
previously told police Grigoryan was one of the three men who
dropped off the minivan, and the third man looked so similar to
Armen Azatyan, he believed it was his brother.
When police seized the white Pacifica after Grigoryan’s
arrest, they found a piece of paper inside with the name Art
LaLunc. They also found two water bottles in the front center
console with Grigoryan’s fingerprints.
The white Pacifica was leased and registered to Elesa
Amirjanyan at an address on Darby Avenue in Reseda. Her sister
told police Amirjanyan had died several years earlier in Armenia.
The Kia Azatyan was driving at the time of his arrest was leased
to himself and Amirjanyan at the same address.
4 Cellphone evidence corroborated Grigoryan’s location in the
vicinity of the coffee shop.
7
C. The Recovered GPS Tracker and Grigoryan’s
Alias
Police also connected the GPS tracker recovered from
Meliksetyan’s car to Grigoryan. They determined he had
purchased it from the SpyShop on October 15, 2018. The shop
owner helped Grigoryan connect the tracker to a phone number
associated with Grigoryan, which allowed Grigoryan to follow the
tracker’s movements.
At the time he made the purchase, Grigoryan used the alias
“Art LaLunc.” Grigoryan had a California driver’s license in that
name, which he also gave to Fresno police when he was ticketed
for tinted windows in November 2018.5 As noted, that alias was
written on a piece of paper recovered from the Pacifica.
D. Cell Phone Evidence
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assisted with
the analysis of cellular data records for the GPS trackers6 and a
number of cell phones related to the investigation.7
5 Art LaLunc testified that was his license, and he had not
given Grigoryan permission to use it, his name, or his identity.
He knew Grigoryan as “Levon,” the brother of his coworker,
Argam Yeghiazaryan. Yeghiazaryan’s name was found on a AAA
insurance card police recovered from the black Santa Fe.
6 For simplicity, we refer to relevant phone numbers by their
last four digits.
The SIM cards inside GPS trackers are assigned cell phone
numbers. The number associated with the SIM card in the
tracker recovered from Meliksetyan’s car was -8609.
7 Mkhitaryan was associated with two phones: -0003 and
-3456.
8
On the night of Tahmazyan’s murder, phones associated
with all three defendants were in the Hollywood area and
communicated with each other between 6:45 p.m. and 6:54 p.m.
Likewise, around the time of the murder, they were all in the
vicinity of the restaurant and were communicating with each
other. Specifically, Grigoryan’s phone connected with Azatyan’s
phone at 8:17 p.m., about four minutes before the murder, in the
vicinity of the restaurant. Between 8:30 p.m. and 8:45 p.m., the
phones contacted one another in the vicinity of Azatyan’s
residence.
Grigoryan’s phone was also in the vicinity of the SpyShop
around the time the GPS tracker was purchased on October 15.
The tracker and Grigoryan’s phone were then in the vicinity of
the Glendale coffee shop between 11:30 a.m. and 11:57 a.m. that
day, as well as later in the evening. By the following morning,
October 16, the tracker was at the Meliksetyan residence and
thereafter, traveled separately from Grigoryan’s phone. During
the rest of October 16, Grigoryan’s and Mkhitaryan’s phones
were near the tracker. Mkhitaryan’s phone followed the same
path as the tracker toward the area of the Bluffside complex, and
there was “quite a bit” of contact among the relevant phone
numbers just after the tracker arrived at the Bluffside complex.
When the tracker returned to the Bluffside complex just after
6:00 p.m., Grigoryan’s and Mkhitaryan’s phones were also in that
Azatyan was associated with three: -9723 (recovered from
his bedroom and associated with the crime scenes); -7511 (found
in the car he was driving when arrested); and -6077 (also found
at his arrest).
Grigoryan was also associated with three: -8785 (not
recovered); -7225 (not recovered); and -3427 (recovered from his
pocket upon his arrest).
9
general area; an hour later, they were together in the vicinity of a
friend’s house on Rhodes Avenue in the Valley.
On October 17, the morning of the attempted murder of
Rafik, phones associated with the trio were all in the vicinity of
Rhodes Avenue between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m. Between 11:30 a.m.
and 12:17 p.m., the phones were all in the vicinity of the Bluffside
complex, sometimes calling each other.
E. The Wiretap Operation
On February 7, 2019, police received authorization to
conduct a wiretap investigation into Grigoryan (-3427) and
Azatyan (-7511). Because so much time had passed since the
crimes were committed, police conducted a wiretap stimulation
on February 12. They went to Azatyan’s residence around
3:30 p.m., spoke with an older lady who lived there, told her they
wanted to speak with Azatyan, and left Detective Krivak’s
business card. The card stated Detective Krivak’s name,
“Glendale Police Department,” and “Robbery-Homicide.” On
February 13, police went to the home of Azatyan’s child’s mother,
told her they were investigating the murder at the restaurant,
showed her some composite sketches, and asked her about
Azatyan.
Those visits precipitated a flurry of calls by Azatyan and
Grigoryan, including to each other and to Mkhitaryan, which
police were able to intercept. Even though police had implicated
only Azatyan during the stimulation, the wiretapped
conversations discussed Grigoryan’s plans for both Azatyan and
himself to quickly flee to Mexico.
IV. Azatyan and Grigoryan Attempt to Flee and Are
Arrested
All three defendants were arrested on February 13, 2019.
Grigoryan was arrested after he left his home in Fresno with two
10
suitcases around 11:50 p.m., driving away at high speed. He tried
to evade police by driving onto a sidewalk, but police were
ultimately able to apprehend him when he crashed into a police
vehicle. He was carrying credit cards in the names of several
individuals, including Art LaLunc and Elesa Amirjanyan, and he
had a California driver’s license in the name of yet another
individual. Grigoryan was carrying $1,840 in cash, two suitcases,
and had a Lyft sign on the floorboard.
Azatyan was arrested in south Orange County while
driving southbound on Interstate 5 toward Mexico. The Kia
vehicle he was driving was leased to him and Elesa Amirjanyan.
Azatyan had $536 in cash, a bag of clothes, a SIM card holder
with one of Azatyan’s phone numbers written on it (-6077), and
the keys to the black Santa Fe.
V. Grigoryan and Mkhitaryan Make Incriminating
Statements in Custody During a Recorded
Conversation
Police informed Grigoryan he had been arrested for murder
and attempted murder. They told him they believed he had
organized the crimes and Azatyan had carried them out as the
shooter. They said they had cell phone evidence placing him at
the scenes of both crimes and showed him photographs of his
minivan at the SpyShop and Rafik’s apartment complex.
After giving Grigoryan that information, police transported
him and Mkhitaryan to their arraignment on February 15, 2019,
in an unmarked car wired with a recording device. Grigoryan and
Mkhitaryan both made a number of incriminating statements.
Grigoryan told Mkhitaryan, “[Azatyan] will take the
responsibility for everything, bro. You will get out for sure.” But
Grigoryan lamented he would be “gone . . . for minimum 10-
15 years,” in part because “[t]hey consider me the organizer of
11
this all.” He also regretted not leaving “a couple of hours earlier”
because he “would have made it.” Grigoryan said police had “the
white car” with “[a]ll the locations that I have been” as well as
“a picture of me driving it.” When Mkhitaryan asked him about
the white car and the black car, Grigoryan responded that police
“don’t know who was driving the black one and did what,” but
rather were “going on the second incident.” Grigoryan also
admitted “it’s been so many months since” he drove the black car.
Mkhitaryan stated that “your thing . . . the white one . . . has
been at [7-Eleven].”
Because police had photos of Mkhitaryan and Grigoryan
“together when [they] were buying the [tracking] device,”
Grigoryan believed it was futile for them to tell police they did
not know each other. Rather, Grigoryan suggested they tell police
they had planned to meet Azatyan at the restaurant to “have
some food,” but when they arrived “and saw that there were cops
outside[,] we didn’t go inside” and instead “drove to [Azatyan’s]
store” next to his residence. Mkhitaryan told Grigoryan he had
“made a good plan.” Grigoryan also suggested they tell police they
purchased the GPS tracker for Azatyan so he could follow his
wife; later, they concluded Mkhitaryan could plausibly deny
knowledge of what Grigoryan had purchased at the SpyShop.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 21, 2021, Grigoryan, Mkhitaryan, and Azatyan
were charged with the murder of Tahmazyan (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a);8 count 1) and the attempted premeditated murder of
Rafik (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a); count 2). It was further
alleged Tahmazyan’s murder was committed by means of lying in
wait. (See § 190.2, subd. (a)(15).) The information also alleged,
8 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
12
with respect to both counts, Azatyan had used and personally
discharged a firearm and had caused great bodily injury. (See
§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d).) Finally, it was alleged Grigoryan had
previously been convicted of two serious felonies (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)) and two serious or violent felonies (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12, subd. (b)).
Mkhitaryan pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and
attempted murder pursuant to a plea agreement. He is not a
party to this appeal.
Grigoryan and Azatyan were tried by a jury. They were
convicted on both counts, and the jury determined they
intentionally killed Tahmazyan by means of lying in wait.
However, the jury returned “not true” findings on the firearm
allegations against Azatyan for both counts. The court heard and
rejected Grigoryan’s and Azatyan’s motions for new trials, in part
on the ground the verdicts were supported by substantial
evidence.
In a bifurcated proceeding, Grigoryan admitted his prior
felony convictions. The court granted in part his motion to strike
those for sentencing purposes, but denied the motion with regard
to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). (See §§ 667, subds. (b)–(j),
1170.12, subd. (b), 1385.) On September 11, 2023, Grigoryan and
Azatyan were each sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole on count 1 and to a consecutive term of life in
prison on count 2. In addition, Grigoryan received a determinate
term of ten additional years in prison, five for each count,
because of his prior convictions. (See § 667, subd. (a)(1).)
Both defendants timely appealed. (See § 1237, subd. (a);
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a).)
13
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supported the Defendants’
Convictions
A. Standard of Review
When we assess the sufficiency of the evidence, “we review
the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime or special
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [W]e review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. . . .
A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it
appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict.” (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357, citation omitted (Zamudio);
see also People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 278 [court does not
“resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts”].)
B. Substantial Evidence Supported Both of
Azatyan’s Convictions
1. Azatyan Shot Both Victims
In general, “ ‘the testimony of a single witness is sufficient
for the proof of any fact.’ ” (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680,
703; cf. People v. Najera (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, 1136–1137
[listing exceptions not relevant here].) An eyewitness to
Tahmazyan’s murder and an eyewitness to Rafik’s attempted
murder each identified Azatyan as the shooter. That amounts to
substantial evidence Azatyan was the direct perpetrator of both
crimes. (See People v. Miranda (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 398, 406–
14
407 (Miranda) [identification by one witness was sufficient].)
Azatyan does not argue otherwise.9
Because sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict
finding Azatyan guilty of both crimes as a direct perpetrator, we
need not and do not consider whether the evidence was also
sufficient on an aiding and abetting theory. (See People v. Bolin
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331 [reversal warranted only if no
substantial evidence supports the conviction on any theory].)
2. The Jury’s “Not True” Findings on the
Gun Use Enhancements Do Not Change
Our Analysis
Azatyan’s argument the evidence was insufficient on both
counts is squarely premised upon his assumption the jury
convicted him solely as an aider and abettor. In short, he argues:
(1) the jury’s “not true” findings on the gun use enhancements
mean it necessarily determined “the People did not prove . . .
Azatyan personally shot the victims”; (2) there is no dispute the
victims were shot, so the jury must have found him guilty of
aiding and abetting an unknown shooter; and (3) because the
9 Because the testimony of one witness is sufficient, we need
not and do not discuss at length the rest of the evidence
supporting the verdicts, which we have already described in the
factual summary. Nevertheless, a surfeit of evidence supported
the reasonable inference Azatyan shot both victims, including:
(1) cell phone records placing him in the vicinity of both crimes;
(2) evidence connecting Azatyan to the vehicles used in the
crimes; (3) other eyewitness accounts of the shooter consistent
with Azatyan’s appearance;(4) incriminating statements Azatyan
and others made in recorded conversations; and (5) Azatyan’s
apprehension while attempting to flee.
15
evidence was not sufficient to show he aided and abetted the
crimes, his convictions must be reversed.
We reject Azatyan’s assumption we are “bound by” the “not
true” gun enhancement findings in analyzing whether
substantial evidence supports his convictions. First, we have
already explained “ ‘[s]ufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves
assessment by the court of whether the evidence adduced at trial
could support any rational determination of guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 656,
italics added; see also Miranda, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 405–406.) Here, the evidence was sufficient to support
Azatyan’s guilt of both crimes beyond a reasonable doubt on a
direct perpetrator theory. Our Supreme Court has cautioned us
that our sufficiency of the evidence “ ‘review should be
independent of the jury’s determination that evidence on another
count was insufficient.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 656.) Thus, we do not
consider the jury’s not true finding on the gun enhancements
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for the underlying
crimes.
Second, Azatyan is wrong when he suggests the “not true”
findings on the gun enhancements necessarily imply the jury
must have convicted him of murder and attempted murder as an
aider and abettor.10 Our Supreme Court long ago rejected that
notion. (People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 918–919
(Santamaria).) It is not our place to speculate about the theory
underlying Azatyan’s convictions because in California, “the jury
need not decide unanimously whether defendant was guilty as
10 We also note the jury was not presented with an aiding and
abetting theory of culpability for Azatyan; the People argued he
was guilty because he shot the victims.
16
the aider and abettor or as the direct perpetrator.” (Santamaria,
at p. 918; see People v. Quiroz (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 65, 74
[same].) And even assuming there was “a reasonable doubt in the
minds of [some] jurors that defendant specifically used a [gun,]
[that] does not show the reverse, that the jury specifically found
defendant was an aider and abettor.” (Santamaria, at p. 919.)
That is, even if these verdicts could mean one (or more) jurors
harbored reasonable doubt about who fired the gun at
Tahmazyan and Rafik, that does not warrant Azatyan’s
conclusion “that the jury specifically found [he] did not use the
[gun].” (Id. at p. 920.)
Azatyan’s reliance upon cases reviewing jury instructions
for harmless error is misplaced. (See People v. Aledamat (2019)
8 Cal.5th 1, 7–8 [jury was instructed on two theories of guilt, only
one of which was correct]; see also Carella v. California (1989)
491 U.S. 263, 270–271 (conc. opn. of Scalia J.) [discussing
harmless error analysis for instructional error].) Azatyan’s appeal
neither challenges the jury instructions nor any issue to which
harmless error review applies.
What we do know from the guilty verdicts on counts 1 and
2 is all jurors were unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of Azatyan’s guilt for both murder and attempted murder.
(See Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 920.) For purposes of
substantial evidence review, our task is simply to determine
whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support
that conclusion on any valid theory. (See Zamudio, supra,
43 Cal.4th at p. 357.) As we explained above in the Discussion,
part I.B.1., it was.
17
C. Substantial Evidence Supported Grigoryan’s
Conviction for the Murder of Tahmazyan
(Count 1)
The parties agree Grigoryan was convicted of Tahmazyan’s
murder on an aiding and abetting theory. Grigoryan argues his
conviction must be reversed because the evidence did not prove
he was present at the scene, assisted the shooting, or instigated
or advised the crime. Because we conclude substantial evidence
supported the verdict, we reject his challenges.
1. Principles of Aiding and Abetting
Culpability
Grigoryan repeatedly cites to People v. Durham (1969)
70 Cal.2d 171, 181, for the proposition an aider and abettor
“ ‘must have instigated or advised the commission of the crime or
been present for the purpose of assisting in its commission.’ ” To
the extent he is arguing those are the only circumstances in
which a defendant can aid and abet a crime, we disagree. Rather,
“a person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or
she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, and (2) the intent or purpose of committing,
encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by
act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the
commission of the crime.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d
547, 561; see also People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 445 [aiding
and abetting murder].)
“[P]roof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three
distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime
committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s
mens rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent
and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and
(c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider and
18
abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.” (People
v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.) Grigoryan argues the
evidence of his own actus reus was insufficient to show he
assisted the murder.11
2. There Was Substantial Evidence
Grigoryan Assisted Tahmazyan’s Murder
Grigoryan’s briefing essentially ignores the plethora of
evidence introduced at trial showing he assisted the shooting of
Tahmazyan by acting as a scout for the shooter, Azatyan.
First, evidence connected Grigoryan to the white minivan
used as scout vehicle. He was seen driving it or riding in it on
multiple occasions after Tahmazyan’s murder, and he used it in
the shooting of Rafik (the originally intended victim) several days
later. His fingerprints were found on water bottles inside it.
Second, between 8:17 p.m. and 8:23 p.m. on the night of the
murder, Grigoryan’s phone connected to cell towers in the general
vicinity of the restaurant. That was during the period the white
Pacifica and the black Santa Fe were also in that area, circling
the restaurant while Tahmazyan stood in the parking lot.
Specifically, the Pacifica passed the restaurant about 8:15 p.m.
About two minutes later, Grigoryan’s phone connected with
Azatyan’s phone in the vicinity of the restaurant.12 And two to
three minutes after that, the Santa Fe passed the restaurant,
11 Because Grigoryan has not challenged the People’s
evidence supporting the other two required areas, we assume
that evidence was sufficient. (See Tukes v. Richard (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 1, 12, fn. 5 [“A contention not appropriately raised
in the opening brief . . . may be deemed forfeited.”].)
12 During the same period, multiple calls were made among
all three defendants.
19
circled the block, stopped while Azatyan shot Tahmazyan, and
sped off with him afterward.
From that evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude
Grigoryan drove the white Pacifica that night to reconnoiter the
scene for the purpose of helping Azatyan to identify an opportune
time to shoot the victim. (See People v. Sedillo (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1066 [surveillance supported an inference
of aiding and abetting murder].) Grigoryan points out there was
no evidence he was in the parking lot at the moment shots were
fired, and he reiterates that mere presence at the scene is not
enough to show aiding and abetting. But that does not undermine
our conclusion the jury could reasonably infer Grigoryan was in
the Pacifica, surveilling the scene on Azatyan’s behalf for the
purpose of facilitating the murder. (See People v. Nguyen (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055 [among other things, jury could infer the
defendant aided shooter by spotting potential targets]; People v.
Sawyer (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 66, 76 [“[a]n inference of aiding
and abetting may reasonably be drawn from acting as a lookout”];
cf. People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1168, fn. 12 [a getaway
driver is an aider and abettor].)
Moreover, the jury could reasonably infer the three
defendants discussed their murderous scheme in their many
phone calls before, during, and after the crime. (See People v.
Lopez (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1028, 1070–1071 [jury could reasonably
infer the conversation between the defendant and confederate
prior to the killing was about the murder], abrogated on other
grounds by People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216.)
Grigoryan argues that conclusion is speculative because there is
no evidence of the content of their conversations. Nevertheless,
the constellation of calls—made both in the vicinity and around
the time of the murder—combined with the trio’s surveillance of
20
that scene and later of Rafik (and their subsequent attempt to
murder him), plus incriminating statements they made in many
conversations that were recorded, do more than “ ‘merely raise[] a
possibility’ ” the trio was discussing the murder on the evening of
October 13. (People v. Bell (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 153, 180
[distinguishing a “reasonable inference” from “speculation”]; see
People v. Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 307 [“[s]uspicion is not
evidence”].)
All of that amounted to substantial evidence supporting
Grigoryan’s conviction as an aider and abettor of Tahmazyan’s
murder.
II. Substantial Evidence Supported the Jury’s Lying-in-
Wait Special Circumstance Finding on Count 1
A. Standard of Review
“We analyze a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a
special circumstance finding under the same standard applied to
a conviction. . . .” (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 420
(Mataele); see also Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.)
B. There Was Substantial Evidence Azatyan Killed
Tahmazyan by Means of Lying in Wait
“The ‘ “lying-in-wait special circumstance requires ‘ “ ‘an
intentional murder, committed under circumstances which
include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of
watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) . . . a
surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of
advantage. . . .’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 58;
see also § 190.2, subd. (a)(15).) It equally applies to an aider and
abettor of such a murder. (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th
600, 630 (Johnson); see also § 190.2, subds. (a)(15) & (c).)
21
We conclude there was abundant evidence supporting each
required circumstance to show Tahmazyan was shot by means of
lying in wait.
1. Azatyan Concealed His Purpose
Grigoryan13 suggests the shooter did not lie in wait because
he “did not conceal his presence” or “lur[e] [the victim] to an
isolated or secluded location under false pretenses.” But the
lying-in-wait special circumstance does not require that conduct.
(See Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 631 [“[P]hysical
concealment . . . is not required.”].) Rather, “ ‘ “[i]t is sufficient
that a defendant’s true intent and purpose were concealed by his
actions or conduct.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 632.) The element may be shown
“by either an ambush or by the creation of a situation where the
victim is taken unawares even though he sees his murderer.’ ”
(People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 555, disapproved on
other grounds by People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459;
see also People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022)
12 Cal.5th 719, 786 [victims were unaware of assailants hidden
in bushes, who initially shot from bushes and then jumped out
and fired].)
That is precisely what happened here. Azatyan arrived at
the scene in the black Santa Fe about 8:20 p.m., several minutes
after the white Pacifica scout vehicle and several minutes before
the shooting. The Santa Fe circled the block, stopped in front of
the restaurant, and Azatyan alighted and directly approached
Tahmazyan on foot. No evidence suggests Tahmazyan knew he
was being surveilled. (See People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 22
(Moon) [the defendant concealed his presence inside victim’s
13 Azatyan joins Grigoryan’s arguments on this issue. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).)
22
home].) Nor is there any indication Tahmazyan noticed Azatyan’s
approach in light of the crowd in the parking lot, let alone
understood Azatyan’s purpose in being there was to kill him.
Thus, there was substantial evidence Azatyan’s murderous intent
and purpose were concealed from Tahmazyan, even after Azatyan
had alighted from the Santa Fe and approached him. (See
Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 632 [victim “did not necessarily
expect that the execution would occur when he left the party with
defendant to obtain drugs”]; Mataele, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 421
[the defendant shot victim by surprise when he got out of the car
they were riding in with others on the pretext of going to a club].)
2. Azatyan Sufficiently Watched and Waited
“[T]he purpose of the watching and waiting element ‘ “ ‘is to
distinguish those cases in which a defendant acts insidiously
from those in which he acts out of rash impulse. [Citation.] This
period need not continue for any particular length “ ‘of time
provided that its duration is such as to show a state of mind
equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 749 (Flinner).) “[A] few minutes
can suffice.” (Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 23.)
There was substantial evidence from which the jury could
reasonably infer Azatyan watched and waited to determine the
best time to attack his victim. The evidence showed the three
defendants were surveilling the scene starting at least from
8:15 p.m.; they communicated with each other thereafter to
ultimately conclude it was an opportune time to attack; and
Azatyan personally surveilled the victim’s location when he was
slowly driven past the scene once, before returning to shoot him a
few minutes later. (See Flinner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 750
[victim’s failure to try to evade the attack suggested the
defendant watched and waited for best time to strike].)
23
Grigoryan argues there was insufficient evidence the killer
watched and waited for an opportune time to strike because the
shooter simply “spotted the victim standing outside of a
restaurant, . . . turned his car around and parked . . . , got out of
the car and approached the victim face to face in the middle of a
large crowd . . . , and then shot the victim in front of
20 eyewitnesses.” But that ignores Azatyan’s reliance upon a
scout car to surveil the scene in advance, and it also ignores
Azatyan’s vehicle slowly driving past the victim, circling the
block, passing the location again, and stopping before he
launched his attack. The jury was not required to credit
Grigoryan’s exculpatory interpretation of those facts. (See People
v. Byrd (1954) 42 Cal.2d 200, 208–209 [jury need not credit the
defendant’s exculpatory story], overruled on other grounds by
People v. Green (1956) 47 Cal.2d 209, 232.)
Thus, this is not a case like People v. Nelson (2016)
1 Cal.5th 513, where the court determined there was inadequate
evidence of lying in wait. That defendant arrived at the location
“where he had reason to believe the victims would be waiting to
go to work[,] . . . came up behind [them] on foot to take them by
surprise,” and shot them. (Id. at p. 551.) The defendant
committed the crime alone and did not surveil the scene
beforehand. (Id. at p. 522.) Likewise, in People v. Carter (2005)
36 Cal.4th 1215, 1261–1262, there was evidence the defendant
forced his entry into the victim’s apartment, but no evidence he
either did so before the victim returned home or lay in wait for
her there. By contrast, this jury could reasonably infer from the
evidence before it that Azatyan and his confederates
reconnoitered the victim’s location several times, over the course
of at least several minutes, communicated their observations to
each other, and jointly determined the time was ripe to attack.
24
3. Azatyan Attacked Tahmazyan by Surprise
from a Position of Advantage
“ ‘[A] mere concealment of purpose’ is not sufficient to
establish lying in wait, since ‘many “routine” murders are
accomplished by such means.’ ” (Flinner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 750.) But critical here is that the jury could infer Azatyan did
more than simply conceal his purpose. Rather, the jury could
conclude all three defendants knew the intended victim, Rafik,
was at the restaurant, planned to be in that vicinity at that time
in two separate cars (one to reconnoiter the scene on behalf of the
shooter), and then circled the location in order to identify the best
time to “launch[] ‘ “ ‘ “a surprise attack” ’ ” ’ on [the victim] from
an advantageous position”: while he was preoccupied speaking to
a friend outside the restaurant in a large group and would not
notice Azatyan’s approach. (Id. at p. 751.) Attacking the victim
outside the restaurant also facilitated Azatyan’s unobstructed
escape from the scene. The jury could reasonably infer the trio’s
actions were “part of the . . . plan to take the victim by surprise”
by putting Azatyan “in a position of advantage.” (People v.
Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 448.) And as already explained in
the Discussion, part II.B.1, the jury could reasonably conclude
Azatyan and his confederates were concealed from Tahmazyan
(in their vehicles traveling on public roadways and alleys) while
they surveilled him, putting them in an advantageous position.
(See Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 630, 633 [the victim was
aware of assailants’ presence in the alley, but assailants were in
a position of advantage because the defendant concealed the
purpose of going to the location].)
Moreover, even if Tahmazyan belatedly became aware of
Azatyan’s presence when Azatyan directly approached him and
shot him at close range, that “does not defeat the inference” that
25
Azatyan’s concealment of purpose put him in a position of
advantage by which to take the victim by surprise. (See Johnson,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 633.) Indeed, the evidence shows “the
shooting occurred shortly after” Tahmazyan would have realized
Azatyan was in the parking lot, which implies a surprise attack
from a position of advantage. (See ibid.; see also Moon, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 22 [the defendant concealed his purpose by
refusing to answer the victim and then “suddenly pushed her
down the stairs” in a surprise attack].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.*
* Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
26
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.