CourtListener 10675485•Sevilla v. Sandoval CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 9/22/25 Sevilla v. Sandoval CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
JOSE SEVILLA, B343678
Plaintiff and Appellant (Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No.
24STRO08185)
RAMIRO SANDOVAL,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura Cohen, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Jose Sevilla, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
******
A residential tenant petitioned the trial court to enter a
civil harassment restraining order against his landlord. The trial
court declined to do so. The tenant appeals. We affirm because
the tenant has provided a woefully inadequate record on appeal
and because the tenant’s declaration, even if considered on its
own, does not compel the issuance of the type of restraining order
he seeks.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Landlord-Tenant Relationship
Ramiro Sandoval (the landlord) rented a house to Jose
Sevilla (Sevilla) and his family. Sevilla lives in the residence
with his adult brother and his parents. The lease is not in the
record on appeal.
According to Sevilla, the landlord pressured Sevilla’s
mother to cede use of a garage parking space associated with the
rental house and repeatedly entered the yard around the rental
house, without advance notice, to water the lawn because he had
taken away the watering hose; Sevilla considered these acts to be
“a targeted form of harassment” that made him feel “unsafe and
disrespected.”
II. Restraining Order Petition
On November 7, 2024, Sevilla filed a request for a civil
harassment restraining order against the landlord1 pursuant to
1 The next month, Sevilla also filed requests for civil
harassment restraining orders against the landlord’s wife and
against a neighbor. The trial court dismissed those petitions due
to lack of service, and we affirmed those dismissals in the
separate and concurrently filed opinion, Sevilla v. Perez et al.
(B344357, consolidated with B344358).
2
Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6.2 Sevilla sought protection
for himself, his adult brother, and his parents. Sevilla requested
that the trial court restrain the landlord from entering the rental
property without consent, order the garage parking space
returned, and require the landlord to accept electronic rent
payments to avoid in-person interaction between the parties.
The landlord opposed the petition and submitted a
declaration in support of the opposition. The opposition and
accompanying declaration are not included in the record on
appeal.
After multiple continuances, the trial court held a hearing
on the petition in January 2025. The minute order from that
hearing indicates that both Sevilla and the landlord testified.
However, neither a reporter’s transcript nor a settled statement
from that evidentiary hearing is included in the record on appeal.
After considering the petition, the opposition, and both
parties’ testimony, the trial court denied the petition, finding that
Sevilla failed to sustain his burden of proof. The court then
granted the landlord’s request for attorney fees under section
527.6, subdivision (s) and ordered Sevilla to pay the landlord
$2,000 in fees.3
2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
3 Because Sevilla does not present any argument regarding
the attorney fees award in his briefing on appeal other than in
passing, we do not discuss it. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B) [appellant must “support each point by argument”];
Utility Consumers’ Action Network v. Public Utilities Com. (2010)
187 Cal.App.4th 688, 697 [failure to do so constitutes waiver].)
3
III. Appeal
Sevilla filed this timely appeal.4
DISCUSSION
Sevilla argues the trial court erred in denying his request
for a civil harassment restraining order.
A civil harassment restraining order will issue only if there
is “clear and convincing evidence” of “unlawful violence, a
credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of
conduct” that “alarms, annoys, or harasses” to such a degree that
it would “cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress” and which “serves no legitimate purpose.” (§
527.6, subds. (a)(1), (b)(3) & (i); Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248
Cal.App.4th 484, 496.) We review the denial of a restraining
order for an abuse of discretion (Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 413, 420), but review any subsidiary factual findings
made by the trial court for substantial evidence (Harris, at p.
497; R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188), and review de
novo any subsidiary issue of whether the facts found meet the
definition of civil harassment as a matter of law (ibid.). Where,
as here, the trial court finds that the party seeking a restraining
order has not carried his burden of proof, we reverse only if the
4 Although the trial court’s minute order denying Sevilla’s
petition directed the landlord to “prepare the written Order After
Hearing” for the court’s signature, the landlord never did so.
Because that defect is attributable to the landlord (and not
Sevilla), we will consider Sevilla’s appeal rather than dismiss it.
(Compare § 904.1, subd. (a)(6) [denial of injunction, which
includes restraining order, appealable] with In re Marriage of
Lechowick (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1410 [“[a]n unsigned
minute order can form the basis of an appeal, unless it
specifically recites that a formal order is to be prepared”].)
4
evidence in the record compels a finding in favor of that party.
(Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 972,
978-979; Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838.)
Sevilla has failed to show that the evidence compels a
finding that he was entitled to a civil harassment restraining
order against the landlord. To begin, Sevilla has waived the
evidence-based challenge he seeks to make on appeal by not
supplying an adequate appellate record. A trial court’s decision
is presumed to be correct, so we must “indulge all intendments
and presumptions to support the judgment or order on matters as
to which the record is silent” and the appellant bears the burden
of furnishing an adequate record that demonstrates error. (Eagle
Fire & Water Restoration, Inc. v. City of Dinuba (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 448, 470; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d
557, 564.) When an appellant renders review impossible by
failing to furnish an adequate record, we must affirm. (See Rhule
v. WaveFront Technology, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1223, 1228-
1229 & fn. 5; Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5
Cal.App.5th 476, 483; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b).)
Here, Sevilla has not supplied us with the landlord’s opposition
or accompanying declaration or any record of what happened at
the evidentiary hearing beyond the minute order reflecting the
trial court’s finding that Sevilla did not carry his burden of proof.
Because there is no way for us to evaluate the evidence and
determine what factual findings (if any) it compels, Sevilla has
not demonstrated reversible error on the record before us. And
even if we were to ignore the mandate that we evaluate the
record before the trial court as a whole (Hansen v. Volkov (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 94, 104 [court reviews “‘record, viewed as a
5
whole’”]; § 527.6, subds. (g), (i) [trial court makes independent
inquiry only after holding a hearing]) and look only at the only
part of the record Sevilla does provide on appeal (namely, his
declaration), that declaration explains that the landlord denied
him access to a parking space and entered the rental property to
water the lawn, which he claims breaches the lease Sevilla never
provided.5 That is not enough to constitute civil harassment
under the statute. (Accord, Hansen, at p. 106 [opposing counsel
entered office without legitimate reason, refused to leave, and
recorded petitioner without consent; insufficient evidence of
harassment]; Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762-763
[neighbors bounced basketballs during daylight hours;
insufficient evidence of harassment]; cf. Brekke v. Wills (2005)
125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1405-1407, 1413-1414 [petitioner’s
daughter’s boyfriend wrote letters threatening a physical conflict,
denigrating petitioner, and advocating “torture-murder” of
petitioner; sufficient evidence of harassment].)
Sevilla also argues that the trial court failed to consider the
landlord’s purported violations of (1) various tenant protections
(Civ. Code, §§ 1940-1954.1), (2) the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ.
Code, § 51), and (3) the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, §
52.1). Whether the landlord violated these other statutes is
irrelevant to whether Sevilla is entitled to a civil harassment
restraining order.6
5 Sevilla’s allegations in his briefing on appeal that landlord
“mock[ed] . . . appellant at his rental unit” are not supported by
(or even mentioned in) the record on appeal.
6 Sevilla asserts that the trial court’s “misconduct was the
sole instigator of the retaliatory conduct established,” but we fail
to see how the trial court’s denial of an order instigates the
6
DISPOSITION
The order denying Sevilla’s request for a restraining order
is affirmed. The landlord is entitled to his costs, if any, on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
MOOR
conduct that prompted the application for the order in the first
place.
7
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