CourtListener 10673294•People v. Li CA2/4
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Filed 9/17/25 P. v. Li CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B340902
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. GA113540)
v.
JAMES LI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from postconviction order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Donna Hollingsworth, Judge. Affirmed.
Yisrael Gelb, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
In August 2024, a jury convicted defendant and appellant
James Li of two counts of felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594,
subd. (a))1 for graffitiing a residential property and damaging a
garage door with an axe. On appeal, defendant challenges the
sufficiency of evidence of malicious intent and proof that for each
vandalism count he caused property damage exceeding $400.
(§ 594, subd. (b)(1)). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Evidence
After purchasing the subject property around 2013, Lin Lin
Yang transferred title to her ex-husband, Ziqiang Zhang, but
continued to manage it. Four tenants lived at the property.
From the time she first met defendant around 2013, Yang
was aware that defendant claimed a partial ownership interest in
the property. Yang and Zhang were involved in litigation over
the subject property with defendant and a man named Mr. Chui.
When the litigation ended in 2022, Zhang held full ownership
interest in the property.
In April 2022, tenants reported graffiti on the property’s
garage door, driveway, and several outdoor walls. The graffiti, in
Chinese characters, stated: “‘Victim of Fraud;’” “‘Everything
Comes From a Fraud;’” “‘Know How to Protect Yourself;’” “‘You
Don’t Have Enough Knowledge or You Were Cheated or You are
Cheating Others;’” “‘Ziqiang Zhang, are You a Cheater or Being
Cheated.’” Yang called a repairman to remove the graffiti. When
shown a receipt, Yang testified she paid $5,525 to fix the damage.
1 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the Penal
Code.
2
On April 21, 2022, Yang’s coworker saw defendant
“hacking” at the garage door with an axe. When Yang arrived at
the property, she saw defendant inside a police car. While
detained, defendant told an officer he had spray-painted the
messages and damaged the garage door. Defendant also stated
he was “owner or co-owner of the property.”
Yang searched the internet to estimate how much it would
cost to repair the garage door. Estimates for the door were “quite
expensive. Maybe a few hundred. And there are several
different kinds. And [she] also need[ed] someone to install it.”
Based on her search, Yang believed the repair would cost “at
least 500 or 600” dollars in total.
B. Defense Evidence
When defendant testified at trial, he discussed the prior
litigation involving the property. In 2009, Chui retained
defendant (then an attorney) to represent him in the underlying
property dispute. When he ran out of money and could not pay
defendant, Chui executed a series of promissory notes secured by
deeds of trust to his ownership interest in the property.
Defendant admitted he became a litigant of record
(defendant-in-intervention) in the prior litigation. Defendant
recognized that in 2016, a trial court entered a judgment
reconveying deeds of trust and holding that defendant “‘has no
right, title, estate, interest, or lien whatsoever on the property.’”2
He acknowledged the judgment stated that “no one” may enforce
the deeds of trust “by foreclosure or any other method.” In an
opinion filed in 2019, the court of appeal held that defendant (the
2 Defendant was paid $300 as a junior lienholder.
3
appellant) had “no protectable interest in being paid specifically
from the judgment proceeds, the sale of the property.”3
Notwithstanding the 2016 judgment and 2019 appellate
decision, defendant testified he believed he could foreclose on
Chui’s ownership interest because Chui was dismissed from the
litigation before entry of judgment. He said he consulted with
two attorneys who confirmed his “interest from Mr. Chui would
not be affected” by the judgment or appeal.
In 2021, defendant conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale
of the same deed of trust identified in the 2016 judgment and
conveyed Chui’s interest to himself. Following the sale, several
tenants agreed to pay defendant rent, but most did not.
Defendant testified that after he received no rent payments
in April 2022, he believed the tenants “had been defrauded.”
Defendant spray painted messages on the property, “inviting
them to consult an attorney to see if there had been fraud
involved.” Later that month, defendant used a small axe to open
the garage door so he could use it to “practice” social distancing
during COVID-19.
C. Verdict and Sentencing
By amended information, defendant was charged with two
counts of vandalism causing $400 in damages or more (§ 594,
subds. (a), (b)(1)) for defacing the subject property with graffiti
(count 1) and damaging the garage door and side entrance with
an axe (count 3). Defendant was also charged with misdemeanor
battery of Yang (§ 242).
3 Following the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the court admitted the
2016 judgment and 2019 court of appeal decision into evidence.
4
Following trial in August 2024, a jury acquitted defendant
of battery but convicted him of both counts of felony vandalism.
The court sentenced defendant to 120 days in county jail, two
years of formal probation with imposition of sentence suspended,
and various fines, fees, and assessments.
DISCUSSION
A. Admission of Court Documents
Defendant contends the court erred by admitting the 2016
judgment and the 2019 appellate decision for the truth of the
matter stated in each document. The Attorney General contends
defendant forfeited his contention by failing to object properly at
trial. While this may be true,4 we exercise our discretion to
consider the contention on the merits. We discern no abuse of
discretion in the admission of each court document or resulting
prejudice. (See People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106, 120
[admission of records reviewed for abuse of discretion].)
Defendant does not challenge the foundational
requirements of each court document as a public record. (See
Evid. Code, § 1280; see also AO Alfa-Bank v. Yakovlev (2018) 21
Cal.App.5th 189, 205 [admission of signed court file]; People v.
4 Defendant does not challenge any statement of fact appearing in
the judgment or decision. He challenges a portion of the prosecution’s
closing argument suggesting the jury review the documents “for the
truth of what they assert.” Defense counsel did not object to this
argument and, despite the court’s pretrial suggestion when admitting
the documents for a limited purpose, did not request an instruction
limiting their use. (See In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 819
[appellant must identify and state cognizable objection to portions of
evidence he avers are inadmissible], overruled on another ground in In
re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622.)
5
Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1071 [official abstract of
judgment].) Instead, he avers the court erred by admitting the
documents for the truth of the matters asserted.
The 2016 judgment did not include factual averments. The
judgment declared a formal ruling—that defendant had “‘no
right, title, estate, interest, or lien whatsoever on the property.’”
The “truth of results reached” in such document is admissible.
(Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort
(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.)
The 2019 appellate decision did contain factual averments,
but the court did not admit this document “to prove that
defendant did precisely those things, . . .” (People v. Woodell
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 460.) The court admitted the appellate
decision for its legal effect—that defendant held no ownership
interest in the property and had knowledge of the prior litigation.
This too was a valid basis for admitting the decision. (Ibid.; see
Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC
(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117–1118.)
In any event, any arguable error in admitting the court
documents without limitation was harmless under any standard.
(See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837.) The key facts appearing in
the prior appellate decision were cumulative to the witness
testimony discussed ante.5 Yang summarized the prior litigation
and its result. In his own testimony, defendant admitted the
judgment stated he held no ownership or lien rights over the
property as a result of the litigation.
5 We recite the factual background above from witness testimony.
6
B. Sufficiency of Evidence
Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports both
counts of felony vandalism. Vandalism—maliciously defacing
with graffiti, damaging or destroying real or personal property
not the actor’s own (§ 594, subd. (a))—may be either a felony or
misdemeanor depending on the value of property destroyed. If
the value is four hundred dollars ($400) or more, vandalism is
punishable as a felony. (§ 594, subd. (b)(1).)
Defendant raises three arguments in support of this
contention. We evaluate each for substantial evidence—
“‘evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from
which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Edwards (2013) 57
Cal.4th 658, 715.) We resolve neither credibility issues nor
conflicts in the evidence. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1149, 1181 (Young).) Unless testimony is “physically impossible
or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to support a conviction.” (Ibid.)
1. Malicious Intent
Defendant argues there is insufficient evidence of malice
because he reasonably believed he owned the property. We
disagree.
“[T]he vandalism statute itself does not require any intent
besides the intent to do the proscribed acts of defacing, damaging,
or destroying property, . . .” (People v. Moore (2018) 19
Cal.App.5th 889, 895 (Moore).) “Thus, the vandalism statute
defines a general intent crime with no specific knowledge or
mental state requirement.” (Id. at p. 896.) Section 594(a) does
state it applies to persons who “maliciously” graffiti, which
7
imports “a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an
intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or
presumption in law.” (Id. at pp. 894–896; see § 7, subd. (b)(4).)
However, this does not convert section 594 into a statute that
requires anything more “than a general intent to willfully—as
opposed to accidentally—commit the proscribed, and statutorily
wrongful, act.” (Moore, supra, at p. 896.)
Substantial evidence supports the finding that defendant
maliciously graffitied the property. Defendant admitted he
willfully, not accidentally, vandalized the property with spray
paint and an axe. The graffiti consisted of messages asserting
that Yang, Zhang, and perhaps tenants of the property were
involved in “‘Fraud,’” “‘Being Cheated,’” or “‘Cheating Others.’”
This evidence, combined with defendant’s ongoing animus toward
Yang and Zhang, amply demonstrates malice.
Defendant argues he negated this showing of malice by
presenting evidence that he held a good faith belief “to protect
and to use what he believed to be his property.” This argument
does not negate the evidence indicating that he wished to annoy
others or do a wrongful act. (See People v. Hayes (2004) 120
Cal.App.4th 796, 804; People v. Rodarte (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
1158, 1171 [intent to vex, injure, or annoy “is likely to be present
even when one acts in reasonable self-defense”].) We decline to
weigh the evidence defendant cites in his favor, as this exercise
contravenes the appropriate standard of review. (See Young,
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181.)
2. Permission to Graffiti the Property
Without any supporting legal authority or analysis,
defendant next contends the prosecution failed to meet its burden
8
to prove the property owner (Zhang) “did not permit [defendant]
to graffiti on the property.” Defendant has forfeited this
contention. (See People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1029;
People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 150.)
We further discern no error on the merits. The jury was
properly instructed on both counts of vandalism, which burdened
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
(1) defendant maliciously graffitied or damaged real property;
(2) he “did not own the property, or co-owned the property with
another person;” and (3) the amount of damage caused by
vandalism was $400 or more. (CALCRIM Nos. 2900, 2901.)
These are accurate statements of law. (See § 594, subd. (a).)
Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, section 594 “does not
now and did not before [ ] make lack of permission an element of
vandalism.” (In re Rudy L. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1013.)
While “the actor still could prove permission—and thus lack of
malice—as a defense” (id. at p. 1012), defendant did not request
an instruction on this defense. Thus, the premise on which
defendant’s argument is based fails. (See People v. Anderson
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 996, 998 [pinpoint instructions used to
rebut element of crime are not required sua sponte and are given
upon request].)
3. Value of Damages
Defendant contends insufficient evidence established
damages exceeding $400, as required to sustain his convictions
on each count of felony vandalism. Section 594 does not specify a
method of valuing damages. Absent statutory guidance, courts
have applied a cost-of-repair approach in restitution cases. (See
In re Kyle T. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 707, 713–714 (Kyle T.); In re
9
A.W. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 941, 949.) This approach “need not
ascertain the exact dollar amount” but must have some “factual
nexus” to the damage caused by the defendant. (Luis M. v.
Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 309; see id. at pp. 306–
307.)
At trial, Yang testified that defendant caused extensive
damage on and above the property’s garage door, a connecting
door to the garage, side wall, and driveway. The jury was shown
various pictures of the damage. After reviewing an invoice, Yang
testified she paid $5,525 to “clear the graffiti and do the paint
job.” After conducting an online search for garage repair, Yang
estimated it would cost “at least 500 or 600” dollars to repair the
garage door. This testimony constitutes ample evidence from
which the jury could find damages on each count exceeded $400.
Defendant argues Yang’s testimony cannot be considered
because the values were derived either from (1) hearsay
statements in the invoice, or (2) improper secondary evidence of
Yang’s online searches. (See Evid. Code, § 1523, subd. (a)
[“Except as otherwise provided by statute, oral testimony is not
admissible to prove the content of a writing”].)
Defendant did not object to Yang’s testimony on secondary
or best evidence grounds. He has forfeited this argument on
appeal. (People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal. 5th 897, 972 [like here,
defendant forfeited secondary evidence claim despite “making a
‘hearsay’ objection” below].) The argument is also meritless.
Yang recalled paying $5,525 to repair the graffiti damage.
That recollection was either independent of the invoice (and
therefore based on her personal knowledge), or it was refreshed
by reviewing the invoice at trial. Under either scenario, Yang’s
testimony was admissible. (See Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a);
10
People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 40 [refreshing recollection];
People v. Parks (1971) 4 Cal.3d 955, 961 [same]; see also People v.
Lee (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 829, 840 [hearsay may refresh witness
recollection].) Admission of the invoice in addition to Yang’s
testimony was thus harmless.6
Yang also testified it would cost “at least 500 or 600”
dollars to repair the garage door damage. Her testimony was
based on online searches she had personally conducted. Her
memory “is not rendered incompetent by the fact” the estimates
were calculated based upon what she saw on the Internet.
(People v. Kulwin (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 104, 109.)
In sum, we discern no prejudicial error in the admission of
the prior judgment or appellate opinion. We further conclude
substantial evidence supports both counts of vandalism and, as a
result, reject defendant’s remaining claim under section 1118.1.
(See People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1214; People v.
Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496, fn. 2.)
6 For the first time in reply, defendant argues that under Kyle T.,
supra, 9 Cal.App.5th 707, Yang’s repair estimate “was not exact and
should be disregarded.” Defendant forfeited this argument by raising
it anew in his reply brief. (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936,
1017, fn. 26.) Kyle T. is also inapposite, as the only evidence of value
in that case was a “graffiti cost removal list” that did not correlate any
cost to remove the specific acts of graffiti. (Kyle T., supra, at p. 714;
see id. at pp. 714–715 [list provided “flat rate of $400 per incident” to
remove graffiti].)
11
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
COLLINS, Acting P. J.
VAN ROOYEN, J. **
** Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.
12
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