CourtListener 10673197•People v. Williams CA4/1
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Filed 9/17/25 P. v. Williams CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083922
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD139596)
HENRY LEE WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David J. Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley, and Evan Stele, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Henry Lee Williams appeals from an amended judgment after
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code,1 section 1172.75. Williams contends
the sentencing court erred by denying his motion for resentencing based on
an erroneous dangerousness finding. We reject Williams’s arguments and
affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A jury convicted Williams of seven counts of lewd acts with a child
under 14 years old. (§ 288, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial
court found true that Williams had a felony sex prior (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (c),
& (d)), two prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), a serious felony prior (§§ 667,
subd. (a)(1); 1192.7, subd. (c)(3)), and two prior strike convictions (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12), and that he qualified as a habitual sex offender
(§ 667.71, subd. (a)). The court sentenced Williams to a prison term of 75
years to life plus six years, composed of three consecutive, and four stayed,
Three Strikes terms of 25-years-to-life for each count of lewd acts; a
consecutive five-year enhancement for his serious felony prior; and one
consecutive, and one stayed, one-year enhancements for his prison priors.
The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified
Williams as currently serving a sentence that included at least one newly
invalid prison prior enhancement, rendering him eligible for resentencing
under section 1172.75. In February 2024, Williams filed a motion for
resentencing under section 1172.75. He requested the sentencing court strike
his invalid executed prison prior enhancement under section 1172.75, and
exercise its discretion to strike his five-year serious felony prior enhancement
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The facts of Williams’s conviction are not material to the issues
presented in this appeal.
2
under section 1385. At the resentencing hearing, the court struck both
Williams’s executed and stayed prison prior enhancements. However, it
declined to strike Williams’s serious felony prior enhancement, finding “by
clear and convincing evidence that the lesser sentence would endanger public
safety . . . .” The court’s order reduced Williams’s sentence by one year, to 75
years to life plus five years.3
DISCUSSION
Before 2019, section 667.5, subdivision (b), required trial courts to
“ ‘impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail
term’ served for a felony . . . .” (People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050
1054 (Rhodius).) In 2019, the Legislature amended section 667.5, subdivision
(b), “to eliminate prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except
for ‘sexually violent offense[s] as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code.’ ” (Rhodius, at p. 1054.) The Legislature
then made this change retroactive through the enactment of current section
1172.75, which provides: “Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior
to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for
any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense
3 The original record before us did not contain an amended abstract of
judgment reflecting the sentencing court’s striking of the two prior prison
enhancements. After we ordered supplemental briefing in this matter, the
sentencing court issued an amended abstract of judgment, and the People
attached a copy of the amended abstract as an exhibit to their supplemental
brief. The amended abstract reflects the sentencing court’s striking of the
prison prior enhancements, as well as the resulting reduced sentence of 75
years to life plus five years. The parties agree Williams’s new sentence is 75
years to life plus five years, as reflected in the amended abstract of judgment.
We construe the People’s attachment of the exhibit to their supplemental
brief as a motion to augment the record with the amended abstract of
judgment. We grant the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
3
as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a); Rhodius, at p. 1054.)
“A defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now-invalid
enhancement is entitled to resentencing.” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th, at
p. 1055.) Section 1172.75 mandates that “[r]esentencing pursuant to this
section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a
result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety,” and “shall not result in a longer sentence than the
one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
Williams argues the sentencing court erred by denying his resentencing
petition under section 1172.75 based on a finding of dangerousness.
Specifically, Williams argues the sentencing court erroneously based its
dangerousness finding on the facts of Williams’s past offenses, rather than
his postconviction conduct, and failed to consider the length of Williams’s
sentence or the requirement that any future release would have to first be
approved by the parole board.
Although portions of the record below reflect some ambiguity in the
sentencing court’s analysis, it is apparent from the court’s cumulative orders
and actions that it did not deny Williams’s resentencing petition under
section 1172.75, as Williams contends. Rather, the court granted Williams’s
resentencing petition and conducted a full resentencing hearing, at which it
struck both Williams’s prison prior enhancements and reduced his sentence
by one year. Williams thus obtained resentencing and was sentenced to a
“lesser term,” which is the relief to which he claims entitlement in his
briefing. Because the court reduced Williams’s sentence under section
1172.75, it was not required to make a dangerousness finding under this
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provision. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1) [“Resentencing pursuant to this section
shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of
the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger
public safety.”]; see People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 854, 856
(Garcia) [dangerousness analysis under § 1172.75, subdivision (d), required
only where sentencing court declines to reduce a defendant’s sentence].) And,
because the sentencing court was not obligated to conduct a dangerousness
analysis in connection with its section 1172.75 resentencing decision,
Williams’s arguments regarding the propriety of the dangerousness analysis
under section 1172.75 necessarily fail.
Rather than making a finding of dangerousness with respect to its
consideration of Williams’s resentencing motion under section 1172.75, the
court made its dangerousness finding in relation to its denial of Williams’s
motion to dismiss his five-year serious felony prior enhancement under
section 1385. Williams argues only that he is entitled to a further reduction
of his sentence—beyond the one-year reduction he obtained—as part of his
resentencing under section 1172.75, subdivision (d). But, even if we assume
the sentencing court’s dangerousness finding related to, and was required by,
section 1172.75, Williams has not shown the court abused its discretion in
finding a further reduction in his sentence would endanger public safety.
(Garcia, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 856 [we review for abuse of discretion a
lower court’s finding that reduction in sentence under § 1172.75 would
endanger public safety].)
In considering whether a risk to public safety exists under section
1172.75, subdivision (d), “[t]he court may consider postconviction factors,
including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
5
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects
whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that
continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (Id. at
subd. (d)(3).) “ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to
clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.
[Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to
have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on
review.” ’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377.)
The sentencing court meaningfully considered the postconviction
factors recognized in section 1172.75 and highlighted by Williams here, such
as his lack of a prison disciplinary record, his significant efforts at
rehabilitation, and his current age and the age he would be at the time of his
possible parole. After acknowledging these positive factors, the court
reasonably concluded this progress did not overcome Williams’s substantial
history of dangerous conduct.
Lastly, Williams has not shown the sentencing court was required to
consider factors such as the defendant’s potential release date if the
enhancement is dismissed and the fact that parole release was subject to
review by Board of Parole Hearings and the Governor, as required by this
court’s decision in People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215. In
Gonzalez, we considered the propriety of a sentencing court’s refusal to
exercise its discretion to dismiss a sentencing enhancement under section
1385 based on a finding of dangerousness. (Id. at p. 229.) Williams has not
shown Gonzalez has any application to the sentencing court’s finding here
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that a reduction of Williams’s sentence under the factors recognized in
section 1172.75 would endanger public safety. In any event, the record does
not reflect that the court disregarded Williams’s age or potential release date
when considering dangerousness. As noted, the court considered factors such
as the age Williams would be at the time of his possible parole and generally
conducted a “forward looking-inquiry” with respect to dangerousness. (See
People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1063 [in conducting
resentencing analysis under section 1170.126, court should conduct “forward
looking-inquiry” to determine whether resentencing would pose unreasonable
risk of danger to society]; § 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)4
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
4 In our order for supplemental briefing in this matter, we invited the
parties to address whether the trial court properly struck Williams’s
previously stayed prior prison enhancement. Neither party challenges the
striking of this enhancement, so we do not address this issue.
7
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