Sabi v. Leonard CA2/6

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Testo completo

Filed 9/16/25 Sabi v. Leonard CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

KENDRA SABI et al., 2d Civ. No. B337916
(Super. Ct. No. 23PR-0079)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

DENNIS LEONARD,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant, Dennis Leonard, appeals from the trial court’s
order denying his anti-SLAPP motion. He contends the conduct
giving rise to respondent Kendra Sabi’s causes of action is
protected activity. We disagree and will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
2012 Trust Documents
The late Janice Pankey Tannehill (“Janice”) held a sizeable
estate, including two LLCs “holding title to multiple large parcels

1 “As we are deciding the appeal under the first step of the

anti-SLAPP analysis, we derive the facts primarily from the
of real property.” Janice had four children: Lora, Chadburn,
James, 2 and Sabi.
Appellant Leonard is an attorney. He began working with
Janice in 2012 to update her estate planning documents.
Leonard prepared a Durable Power of Attorney for Assets naming
Sabi as Janice’s attorney-in-fact, effective upon incapacity (“2012
DPOA”). Incapacity would be decided either by a finding of a
court or “upon certification by two physicians . . . that [Janice is]
unable to properly care for [herself or her] property, which
certification shall be made by each physician in a written
declaration under penalty of perjury.”
The 2012 DPOA specified “[t]he authority given to my
agent has no expiration date and shall expire only in the event
that I revoke the authority in writing . . . .” It designated Sabi as
agent and granted her authority to deal with financial
institutions, employ and remove others (including an attorney),
“take custody of all my important documents,” litigate, and
initiate court proceedings. The 2012 DPOA gave Sabi “full power
and authority to perform all necessary acts on my behalf as fully
as if I were personally present and able to act . . . .”
Disagreements Arise About Janice’s Capacity
Janice’s health changed dramatically after a fall in 2020
left her paralyzed. She moved to a skilled nursing facility so she
could receive 24 hour care. In April 2021, nursing home staff

allegations of [Sabi’s] petition and refer to declarations and other
evidence presented only to determine what conduct is being
challenged.” (Starr v. Ashbrook (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 999, 1006.)

2 We use some of the family members’ first names for

clarity. No disrespect is intended.

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found Janice unresponsive and transferred her to a hospital. She
presented with an “altered mental status.” Thereafter, she
remained dependent on others for all daily living activities,
including toileting, bathing, dressing, and eating.
Sabi emailed Leonard in May 2021, stating Janice “is . . .
unable to make medical and financial decision[s] related to her
cognition.” Leonard emailed two invoices to Sabi with an “invoice
for the last two months, which I am sending to you as the agent
under [Janice’s] power of attorney.” Sabi obtained a physician’s
letter in August of 2021 attesting that Janice could not properly
care for herself or her property. Sabi sent this letter to Leonard
five days later. Leonard responded that Janice “explicitly”
instructed him to not share her estate planning documents with
anyone. Sabi’s attorney emailed Leonard on February 16, 2023.
He referred to Sabi as Janice’s “attorney-in-fact” and requested
Leonard send Janice’s estate planning documents. Leonard
responded he still represented Janice and she had instructed him
not to share the documents.
A second physician attested to Janice’s incapacity on
February 28, 2023. Sabi’s attorney notified Leonard by email and
stated Sabi would now act as Janice’s attorney-in-fact. It
directed Leonard to “immediately cease and desist any further
direct communications with [Janice]” because she “lacks capacity
and therefore you no longer have a client to represent.” A week
later, Leonard prepared amended trust documents naming
Chadburn and Lora as co-trustees. He met with Janice,
Chadburn, James, and two of the brothers’ acquaintances on
March 10 at Janice’s health care facility. There he helped Janice
execute amendments to two LLC operating agreements, naming
Chadburn and Lora as co-managers. She also executed a new

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DPOA appointing Chadburn and Lora as co-attorneys-in-fact.
Leonard arranged for a different physician to evaluate Janice,
who later opined she retained “capacity to make testamentary
and simple contractual decisions.”
Leonard emailed Sabi’s counsel on March 13, 2023
asserting the new DPOA “expressly revoked” the 2012 DPOA. He
claimed to still represent Janice.
Current Action
Sabi filed this action individually and in her capacity as co-
trustee of Janice’s trust. She alleged five “causes of action”:
(1) the March 2023 documents were invalid for lack of capacity
during execution; (2) relief from undue influence; (3) financial
elder abuse; (4) removal of her brothers as co-trustees; and (5)
suspension of her brothers as co-trustees while the petition for
removal was pending. Sabi amended the petition to name
Leonard as a respondent in the first three causes of action.
Leonard’s Anti-SLAPP Motion
Leonard moved for an order striking Sabi’s amended
petition pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 425.16.)3 Leonard argued the three causes of action against
him arose from “his representation of [Janice] ‘in matters that
are intimately intertwined and connected with this probate
litigation.’” The court denied the motion after concluding
Leonard failed to meet his burden to show his actions arose from
protected activity. It viewed Leonard’s preparing and facilitating
the execution of the March 2023 documents—not his
representation of Janice in anticipation of litigation—as the basis

3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedures.

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of the claims. As such, Sabi did not bear the burden to show a
likelihood of prevailing on the merits.
The court rejected Leonard’s argument that Sabi named
him as a defendant in retaliation for representing Janice. It
found the protected activities Leonard referred to “postdate[d] the
events in the complaint on which [Sabi’s] claims arose.”
DISCUSSION
Anti-SLAPP Statute
“A SLAPP suit—a strategic lawsuit against public
participation—seeks to chill or punish a party’s exercise of
constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the
government for redress of grievances.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006)
37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055). “The anti-SLAPP statute authorizes a
special motion to strike a claim ‘arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue . . . .’ (Code Civ.
Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” (Dignity Health v. Mounts (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 113, 119 (Dignity).)
“Deciding whether to grant an anti-SLAPP motion to strike
requires the court to conduct a two-step inquiry. At the first step,
the moving defendant has the burden to establish that the claims
alleged against it ‘arise from’ one or more of the statutorily
defined categories of protected activity. [Citations.] [¶] At the
second step, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate ‘a
probability that [he or] she would prevail on the particular claim’
. . . [¶] In conducting this inquiry, the court does not weigh
evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. [Citation.] The
court ‘accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the
defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s

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claim as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]” (Dignity, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 119.)
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion. [Citation.] We exercise independent judgment in
determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the
challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Park v. Board
of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057,
1067 (Park).)
Sabi’s Claims Against Leonard
Do Not Arise From Protected Activity
The anti-SLAPP statute protects: “(1) any written or oral
statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body . . . .” (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
An anti-SLAPP motion “may only target claims ‘arising
from any act of [the defendant] in furtherance of the [defendant’s]
right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue . . . .’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b).)” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at p. 1062.) “A claim arises from protected activity when that
activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.]
Critically, ‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of
action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of
petition or free speech.’” (Id. at pp. 1062-1063 [quoting City of
Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78].) Activity that is
“just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act
for which liability is asserted” is not subject to a motion to strike.
(Park at p. 1060.) “[T]he focus is on determining what ‘the

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defendant's activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted
liability —and whether that activity constitutes protected speech
or petitioning.’” (Id. at p. 1063.)
As the moving party, it is Leonard’s burden to show his
challenged conduct arose from protected activity. (Moore v. Shaw
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, 194.)
The conduct forming the basis for each of the three causes
of action against Leonard is that he assisted Chadburn and
James in “implement[ing] a scheme to take advantage of
[Janice’s] incapacity and have [Sabi] removed as [Janice’s]
attorney-in-fact and as a Co-Trustee of the Trust through the
preparation and execution of a new DPOA and Trust
amendment.” The petition alleges Leonard assisted by refusing
to give Sabi copies of Janice’s estate planning documents despite
knowing of Janice’s incapacity, and by drafting amendments to
Janice’s estate planning documents removing Sabi from all
positions, at the behest of Chadburn and James, who then
“unduly influenced” Janice to partially sign the documents. The
trial court determined these actions were not taken “in
preparation of anticipated litigation.” We agree.
Sabi’s claims arise from Leonard’s activities undertaken to
change Janice’s estate plan—not “‘in furtherance of the right [to]
petition.’” (Moore v. Shaw, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 195
[drafting an agreement terminating a trust did not occur or arise
in connection with pending or imminent litigation and therefore
was not “‘an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free
speech’”].) Leonard’s conduct, instead, is “just evidence of
liability.” The fact that Sabi filed suit in response to Leonard’s
conduct does not transform this conduct into protected activity.
(See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1061, 1063. [“‘[T]he mere fact

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that an action was filed after protected activity took place does
not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of
the anti-SLAPP statute.’”]; City of Cotati v. Cashman, supra, 29
Cal.4th at p. 78 [“[t]hat a cause of action arguably may have been
triggered by protected activity does not entail that it is one
arising from such”].)
Leonard contends his conduct was in furtherance of
litigation because he presented evidence his motive was to avoid
litigation. First, we cannot see how assisting Chadburn and
James in altering Janice’s estate planning documents after
knowing Sabi believed Janice lacked capacity would avoid
litigation and not foment it. Moreover, Leonard’s contention that
“[i]t cannot be disputed that litigation was anticipated between
[Sabi] and Janice if [Sabi] did not get her way” finds no support
in the record. Second, and more to the point, even if one broadly
construes section 425.16, subdivision (a), estate planning qua
estate planning is not in furtherance of any litigation, even if its
motive is to avoid litigation. (See White v. Davis (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 270, 290, fn. 18.)
Leonard also contends the trial court erred when it did not
consider that Sabi named him as a Doe respondent due to his
continued representation of Janice in the pending litigation. This
does not matter. “[A] party’s subjective intent or motivation for
filing a lawsuit is not relevant to determining whether that
lawsuit arose from an act in furtherance of the right to petition
for free speech.” (Callanan v. Grizzly Designs, LLC (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 517, 529.)
Leonard has failed to carry his burden to show his
challenged conduct arises from protected activity. As such, we

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need not consider whether Sabi has shown a probability of
prevailing on the merits.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Leonard’s anti-SLAPP
motion is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Tana L. Coates, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
____________________________

Nemecek & Cole, Michael W. Feenberg, Mark Schaeffer,
and Vikram Sohal, for Leonard.
Gokal Law Group, Ronald V. Larson, Abbas K. Gokal, and
Nicholas D. Porrazzo, for Respondent.

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