People v. Sanchez CA2/3

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Filed 9/15/25 P. v. Sanchez CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B330862

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA059880)
v.

DONALD GEORGE SANCHEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jacqueline Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

In 2004, a jury convicted Donald George Sanchez of second
degree murder. Sanchez now appeals from the trial court’s order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
concluded the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Sanchez was guilty of second degree implied malice murder as a
direct aider and abettor. The court denied the petition for
resentencing. We affirm the trial court order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Underlying crime
On September 19, 2002, Daniel Zamorano went to Edwin
Moreno’s home. Zamorano had fought with Moreno’s younger
brother earlier that day and wanted to fight Moreno. The two
men exchanged a few punches and Moreno kicked Zamorano once
in the face. Zamorano started to leave, but continued taunting
Moreno. Moreno followed him across the street and they hit each
other a few more times. Zamorano started to run away again
when Sanchez, Robert Ramirez, Marco Salazar, and Eduardo
Cabello approached. Moreno went inside his house.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6 with no change in text.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the law formerly codified
at section 1170.95 as section 1172.6 for the remainder of this
opinion.
2 We take the facts from the evidence admitted at the
section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, including the original trial
transcripts.

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Ramirez, Sanchez, Salazar, and Cabello attacked
Zamorano. Ramirez was armed with a folding knife. Edward
Sanchez, who lived nearby, came out of his house and yelled,
“ ‘That’s enough’ ” at the group. Sanchez, Salazar, and Cabello
stopped attacking Zamorano and ran to an alley behind
Ramirez’s house. Ramirez remained behind and arrived in the
alley after the others.
Zamorano was bleeding badly from wounds on his chest
and neck. Edward Sanchez remained with him until the
paramedics arrived. Zamorano died of multiple stab wounds.
Testimony about Sanchez and his involvement
A gang expert testified that Sanchez and Ramirez were
members of the Azusa 13 gang, the predominant gang in the city
of Azusa. The expert believed Salazar was also an active member
of Azusa 13.
Moreno testified that he was returning to his house as
Sanchez and the others were trying to get to Zamorano. Moreno
heard Sanchez say “ ‘Come over here, homes,’ ” and “ ‘Get the
filero,’ ” meaning knife. Moreno did not hear any of the other
men say anything. Immediately after Sanchez said “ ‘Come over
here, homes,’ ” Moreno saw one of the four men grab Zamorano
by the shirt and then saw Zamorano on the ground.
Carlos Sardinas was a friend of Moreno’s and was at
Moreno’s house on the day Zamorano was killed. He saw Moreno
and Zamorano fighting and then saw three or four individuals
chasing Zamorano. Sardinas identified Sanchez, Ramirez, and
Salazar as part of the group that chased Zamorano.
Cabello testified that Sanchez punched and kicked
Zamorano.

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Trial and postconviction proceedings
In 2004, the People charged Sanchez, Ramirez, and Salazar
with the murder of Zamorano (§ 187). The People alleged that
the murder was committed for the benefit of, in association with,
or at the direction of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(A)), and that Ramirez personally used a deadly
weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
In October 2004, a jury convicted Sanchez of second degree
murder committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. In
November 2004, the trial court sentenced Sanchez to a term of 15
years to life with a 10-year gang enhancement. In December
2004, the trial court struck the gang enhancement and sentenced
Sanchez to 15 years to life.
In 2006, a panel of this Division affirmed Sanchez’s
conviction on direct appeal.
Petition for resentencing
In January 2019, Sanchez filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition on the
ground that Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill No. 1437) was unconstitutional. In March 2020, a panel of
this Division reversed the trial court’s order and concluded that
Sanchez was entitled to have his petition considered on the
merits.
In January 2022, the parties stipulated that a prima facie
case for relief had been established and the trial court issued an
order to show cause.
In May 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing.
Prior to the hearing, the court had reviewed the abstract of
judgment, charging document, trial transcripts, jury instructions,

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verdict forms, and Court of Appeal opinion. The court admitted
those items into evidence.
Sanchez testified at the evidentiary hearing. According to
Sanchez, prior to the crime, he had been drinking and smoking
marijuana with Ramirez, Salazar, and Cabello at Ramirez’s
house. He and the others went on a walk and saw an altercation
taking place involving Moreno. Moreno’s brothers and their
friends were present. Sanchez, Salazar, and Cabello also went to
the defense of Moreno. There was “a good crowd” of people
present. Sanchez tried to hit Zamorano but could not because
there were “too many people on him already.” Moreno and his
brothers and friends ran back to Moreno’s house. Edward
Sanchez then came out with a stick in his hands, saying, “ ‘Leave
him alone. That’s enough.’ ” Sanchez took off running, but
Ramirez remained behind and caught up a few minutes later.
Sanchez testified that he said nothing to the people around him
and was just trying to keep up with the others running away
because he was the most heavyset of the group. He denied saying
or hearing anyone say “dame el filero” (give me the knife). He
also denied knowing that Ramirez had a knife.
Sanchez testified that he participated in jumping Zamorano
because, as he explained it: “I was into the gangs, and I wanted to
be cool, and I followed suit. You know, they started jumping him,
so I just did what I did many times I did before. I fought in many
fights. I jumped people before. I just did what I knew.” He did
not try to help Zamorano or try to stop others from beating him.
He explained: “I wasn’t trying to help the guy. You know, I was
there to jump the guy, not there to help him. [¶] . . . [¶] I never
stopped anybody. [¶] . . . [¶] I wanted to jump him.”

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In May 2023, the trial court denied the petition for
resentencing. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court
found that Sanchez aided and abetted the stabbing of Zamorano
by grabbing Zamorano by the shirt, saying “ ‘Come over here,
homes,’ ” and later saying “ ‘Get the filero’ ” while he and the
others were beating Zamorano up. That Sanchez never
attempted to stop the attack and fled the scene after the stabbing
provided further evidence that he had aided and abetted the
murder of Zamorano. The trial court further found that the
People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Sanchez had acted
with implied malice, as he was “aware that his cohorts were
willing and able to commit acts of violence against rival gang
members”; he accompanied fellow gang members to attack
Zamorano; he called out to Zamorano and grabbed his shirt,
physically attacking Zamorano; he called for a knife, which he
knew Ramirez had in his possession; and he admitted he was
there to jump Zamorano.
Sanchez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 significantly narrowed accomplice
liability for murder by eliminating the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
murder and by limiting the scope of the felony murder rule.
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708; People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile), superseded by statute on other
grounds by Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 775); Stats. 2021, ch. 551.)

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The bill amended section 188 by adding the requirement
that, except as stated in section 189, “in order to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.
Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) It amended the
felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e), which
provides that a participant in the perpetration of certain
enumerated felonies in which a death occurs is liable for felony
murder only if the person (1) was the actual killer, (2) was not the
actual killer but, with the intent to kill, “ ‘aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first
degree,’ ” or (3) the person was a “ ‘major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life,’ ” as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 842; § 189, subd. (e).)
“[A] principal in a murder, including an aider or abettor,
may still be criminally liable if that individual personally
possesses malice aforethought, whether express or implied.”
(People v. Harris (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 623, 631; People v. Silva
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 632, 639–640; People v. Offley (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 588, 595–596 [Sen. Bill No. 1437 did not “alter the
law regarding the criminal liability of direct aiders and abettors
of murder because such persons necessarily ‘know and share the
murderous intent of the actual perpetrator’ ”].)
Section 1172.6 sets forth a procedure that allows a person
convicted of a qualifying offense under the former law to petition
for resentencing if the person could no longer be convicted of the
offense under amended sections 188 or 189. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847; see also

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Sen. Bill No. 775, § 2 [further amending statutory procedures in
§ 1172.6].) If the court determines the petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief, the court must issue an order to show
cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
Within 60 days, “ ‘the court must hold an evidentiary
hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of proving,
“beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder” under state law as amended by
Senate Bill No. 1437 . . . .’ ” (People v. Njoku (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 27, 41; § 1172.6, subd. (d)(1), (3).)
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court determines
whether “the petitioner committed [the underlying crime] under
a still-valid theory . . . .” (People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 294 (Clements).) The trial court serves as “a
fact finder tasked with holding the People to the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard . . . .” (Id. at pp. 294–295.) It “ ‘must
impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was
received throughout the entire trial’ and determine whether that
‘proof . . . leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is
true.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 295.) Under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), “[a] finding that there is substantial evidence
to support a conviction for murder . . . is insufficient to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); Clements, at pp. 294–297.)
II. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s findings after an evidentiary
hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), for substantial
evidence. (People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022
(Owens).) “Under this familiar standard, ‘ “we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine

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whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Vargas
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951; Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th
at p. 298.) We do not resolve credibility issues or evidentiary
conflicts. (Owens, at p. 1022.) “ ‘Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn
from that evidence.’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.)
Before we may set aside a trial court’s order, it must be clear that
“ ‘ “upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support [it].” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Zamudio (2008)
43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
III. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
Finding that Sanchez was Guilty of Implied Malice
Second Degree Murder as an Aider and Abettor
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express or
implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) “It is express when there is a
manifest intent to kill (§ 188, subd. (a)(1)); it is implied if
someone kills with ‘no considerable provocation . . . or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart’ (§ 188, subd. (a)(2)).” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th
at p. 844.) “The primary difference between express malice and
implied malice is that the former requires an intent to kill but
the latter does not.” (People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 976.)
Implied malice murder instead requires that the killing be
proximately caused by an act, “ ‘ “ ‘the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed
by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of

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another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).)
Proximate causation requires the act to have been a substantial
factor contributing to the death. (Ibid.)
The guilt of an aider and abettor to a crime, including
murder, is “based on a combination of the direct perpetrator’s
acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts and own mental state.”
(People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.) “A person aids
and abets the commission of a crime when [the person], (i) with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and
with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or
encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.)
Accordingly, for aiding and abetting liability on a theory of
implied malice murder to be imposed, a direct aider and abettor
must, by words or conduct, aid the perpetrator’s commission of a
life-endangering act with the “knowledge that the perpetrator
intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the
commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to
human life,” and the aider and abettor must act “in conscious
disregard for human life.” (People v. Powell (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 689, 713, italics omitted, cited with approval by
Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991 [implied malice murder
requires proof of aider and abettor’s “knowledge and intent with
regard to the direct perpetrator’s life endangering act”].) In other
words, under current law, “a direct aider and abettor of the
killing who knew that his (or her) conduct endangered the life of
another and acted with conscious disregard for life, may be guilty

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of second degree murder.” (People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
972, 979.)
Viewing the evidence here in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s order, the record contains substantial evidence that
Sanchez aided and abetted the murder of Zamorano with implied
malice. The trial evidence and Sanchez’s testimony at the
evidentiary hearing establish that Sanchez participated in the
group attack on Zamorano. Trial testimony further establishes
that Sanchez knew Ramirez was armed with a knife and
encouraged him to use the weapon. Cabello testified that he
observed Ramirez playing with a folding knife when he, Ramirez,
Sanchez, and Salazar were hanging out prior to the attack, and
Moreno testified that Sanchez said “ ‘Get the filero’ ” as the four
men approached Zamorano. Sanchez claims on appeal that he
could have called for the knife “merely [to] intimidate the victim.”
However, the trial court could reasonably infer that there was no
need to use a weapon to intimidate an outnumbered and
apparently unarmed opponent, and that Sanchez called for the
knife with the intent that Ramirez use it to stab Zamorano. The
evidence is sufficient to support the conclusion that Sanchez
knew that his conduct endangered Zamorano’s life and that
Sanchez acted with conscious disregard for life.
Other factors, such as the “victim’s vulnerability, the
number of assailants, the ferocity and duration of the attack, and
the unusualness or unexpectedness of the victim’s death,”
support the malice finding. (People v. Superior Court
(Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485, 502.) Zamorano was
vulnerable in that he was alone, Moreno had already punched
and kicked him, and four men attacked him. One man was
armed with a knife. And based on the medical examiner’s

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testimony, the attack was ferocious because Zamorano died as
the result of multiple stab wounds and suffered blunt force
injuries.
The evidence also establishes that no one, including
Sanchez, tried to help Zamorano, but instead they all fled from
the crime scene. Failing to assist a wounded victim manifests “a
callous indifference to human life.” (People v. Palomar (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 969, 978; see also People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 576, 599 [“It is well settled that the presence at the
scene of the crime and failure to prevent it, companionship and
conduct before and after the offense, including flight, are relevant
to determining whether a defendant aided and abetted in the
commission of the crime.”].)
On appeal, Sanchez observes that a defendant’s act of
traveling with an armed fellow gang member into rival gang
territory does not satisfy the proximate causation requirement of
implied malice murder, citing Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 981. In
Reyes, the Supreme Court explained such an act merely created a
dangerous situation in which death was possible, depending on
how circumstances unfolded, and standing alone did not satisfy
the proximate causation requirement of implied malice murder.
(Id. at pp. 988–989.) There was no evidence that Reyes’s “acts
precipitated or provoked the shooting.” (Id. at p. 989.) While
Reyes’s act of traveling with fellow gang members into rival
territory could result in a gang confrontation during which it was
possible someone could get hurt or killed, the act did not by itself
“give rise to a high degree of probability” death would result.
(Ibid.) And if the act of shooting was the dangerous act, there
had to be evidence Reyes knew the shooter intended to shoot,
intended to aid him in shooting, knew shooting was dangerous to

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life, and acted in conscious disregard for life. (Id. at pp. 991–
992.)
Here, Sanchez was not merely with fellow gang members
when someone else attacked and stabbed Zamorano. Sanchez
called Zamorano over, personally kicked and punched him, and
encouraged Ramirez to use the knife. Stabbing someone is a life
endangering act, as is the act of participating in a group beating
of one person. (People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 443
[evidence sufficient to support implied malice where defendant
knew he was aiding violent group attack on victim and knew bat
and shovel were being used against victim]; People v. Cravens
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 510–511 [violent force of defendant’s
punch to victim’s head was predictably dangerous to human life].)
Sanchez contends that substantial evidence fails to support
the trial court’s ruling because the ruling was based on “a cluster
of facts,” including that Sanchez was the person to grab
Zamorano’s shirt to prevent him from fleeing. Sanchez claims
there was no evidence to support this specific finding. Moreno
testified that one of the men grabbed Zamorano by the shirt
immediately after Sanchez said “ ‘Come over here, homes.’ ”
Even if Sanchez did not personally grab Zamorano, Sanchez’s
statement establishes that he wanted Zamorano to stop so the
group could attack him. Moreover, and contrary to Sanchez’s
claim, the evidence does not support that the stabbing was
“separate from the group assault.” Moreno’s testimony indicates
that Sanchez called for the knife while the group was pursuing
Zamorano and that Sanchez intended for Ramirez to use it
during their attack.
In sum, Sanchez’s argument that the evidence was
insufficient to show he aided and abetted an implied malice

13
murder amounts to little more than an improper request that we
reevaluate the evidence, something the substantial evidence
standard of review forbids. (Owens, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1022.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Donald George Sanchez’s Penal Code
section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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