CourtListener 10671672•People v. Archuleta CA4/3
Testo completo
Filed 9/15/25 P. v. Archuleta CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064185
v. (Super. Ct. No. M-20705)
MARTIN DUET ARCHULETA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Jeannie M. Joseph, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
Martin Duet Archuleta appeals from the trial court’s order
denying his petition to terminate his sex offender registration pursuant to
Penal Code section 290.5.1 After reviewing the evidence, we conclude the
district attorney failed to carry their burden of demonstrating denial of
Archuleta’s petition would significantly enhance community safety, and
therefore, the trial court erred in denying the petition. We reverse and
remand with directions to grant Archuleta’s petition.
FACTS
In 1993, Archuleta was convicted of misdemeanor sexual battery
involving a restrained person (§ 243.4, subd. (d)) for grabbing a stranger’s
buttocks in an elevator. He was required to register as a sex offender
pursuant to section 290. In 1995, Archuleta was convicted of felony indecent
exposure (§ 314.) The details of this registrable offense are unknown. He was
incarcerated and required to continue registration as a sex offender.
In 2023, Archuleta filed a Petition for Termination (the petition)
to terminate his sex offender registration. He stated he was not in custody or
on parole, probation, post-conviction release, or any other form of supervised
release. He further stated he was designated as a Tier 1 – Adult registrant
and had been registered for at least 10 years. The petition was served on the
Santa Ana Police Department and the Orange County District Attorney.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
2
The Santa Ana Police Department certified (1) Archuleta was a
Tier 1 – Adult Registrant; (2) there were no pending charges against him
which would extend the time to complete the registration requirements; (3)
he was not on parole, probation, or supervised release; and (4) he was not in
custody. The Santa Ana Police Department also certified Archuleta had no
failure-to-register convictions, and even when his total incarceration time
was excluded from the relevant period, he still completed the minimum
mandated date of his last registrable sex offense. It determined Archuleta
was eligible for termination from the sex offender registration.
The district attorney objected to the petition on the sole basis
that community safety would be significantly enhanced by Archuleta’s
continued registration. At the hearing on the petition, the district attorney
offered the underlying police reports from the 1993 sexual battery and 1995
indecent exposure convictions, as well as a report of an uncharged rape in
2010. The most recent Static-99 report2 was from 2012 and there were no
other reports regarding Archuleta’s risk of reoffending.3 The district attorney
conceded Archuleta had not committed any registrable offense since 1995.
2 Since January 1, 2007, the State-Authorized Risk Assessment
Tool for Sex Offenders (SARATSO) has been the Static-99 risk assessment
scale. (§ 290.04, subds. (a), (b)(1).)
3 It is unclear from the record where the trial court obtained the
2012 Static-99 report because the district attorney did not present the report
as evidence at the hearing on Archuleta’s petition. Because the 2012 Static-
99 report was not part of the record on appeal, we requested the parties
submit a copy of the report and provide supplemental briefing regarding its
import. We conclude the court took proper judicial notice of the report
pursuant to section 290.5, subdivision (a)(3).
3
The trial court denied the petition on the following grounds: the
victim of the sexual battery was 33 years old and a stranger; Archuleta had
been arrested but not charged for rape in 2010; he had a non-sex offense
criminal history involving drugs, alcohol, and theft; he had a Static-99 score
of 9 in 2012; and he had not completed a sex offender treatment program.
After denying the petition, the court set a period of two years before
Archuleta could refile a termination petition.
Archuleta timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION
We conclude the court abused its discretion in denying the
petition because the district attorney failed to demonstrate Archuleta’s
continued registration would appreciably increase community safety.
A. Legal Standard
Section 290.5, subdivision (a)(1) provides that a “person who is
required to register pursuant to Section 290 and who is a tier one or tier two
offender may file a petition in the superior court in the county in which the
person is registered for termination from the sex offender registry . . . ,
following the expiration of the person’s mandated minimum registration
period . . . .” Unless the district attorney objects by requesting a hearing, “the
petition for termination shall be granted if the court finds the required proof
of current registration is presented in the petition, provided that the
registering agency reported that the person met the requirement for
termination pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 290, there are no pending
charges against the person which could extend the time to complete the
registration requirements of the tier or change the person’s tier status, and
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the person is not in custody or on parole, probation, or supervised release.”
(§ 290.5, subd. (a)(2).)
If the district attorney objects, “the district attorney shall be
entitled to present evidence regarding whether community safety would be
significantly enhanced by requiring continued registration.” (Pen. Code,
§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3).) Stated differently, “the prosecution must produce
evidence establishing that requiring continued registration appreciably
increased society’s safety.” (People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 432
(Thai).) Because Penal Code section 290.5 does not specify the applicable
standard of proof, the prosecutor has the burden of proof by a preponderance
of the evidence. (Evid. Code, § 115 [“Except as otherwise provided by law, the
burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence”].)
“In determining whether to order continued registration, the
court shall consider: [1] the nature and facts of the registerable offense; [2]
the age and number of victims; [3] whether any victim was a stranger at the
time of the offense (known to the offender for less than 24 hours); [4] criminal
and relevant noncriminal behavior before and after conviction for the
registerable offense; [5] the time period during which the person has not
reoffended; [6] successful completion, if any, of a Sex Offender Management
Board-certified sex offender treatment program; and [7] the person’s current
risk of sexual or violent reoffense, including the person’s risk levels on
SARATSO static, dynamic, and violence risk assessment instruments, if
available. Any judicial determination made pursuant to this section may be
heard and determined upon declarations, affidavits, police reports, or any
other evidence submitted by the parties which is reliable, material, and
relevant.” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3).) “If termination from the registry is denied,
the court shall set the time period after which the person can repetition for
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termination, which shall be at least one year from the date of the denial, but
not to exceed five years, based on facts presented at the hearing.” (§ 290.5,
subd. (a)(4).).
We review the trial court’s ruling on a petition for termination
from the sex offender registry for abuse of discretion. (Thai, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 433.) “To establish an abuse of discretion, a defendant must
demonstrate the trial court’s decision fell outside the bounds of reasons, i.e.,
was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.” (Ibid.) “A trial court abuses its
discretion when its factual findings are not supported by the evidence, or its
decision is based on an incorrect legal standard.” (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
The district attorney failed their burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Archuleta’s continued registration would
appreciably increase community safety.
The trial court’s denial of the petition was based almost entirely
on statutory factors 1–3 regarding the facts of the registrable offenses,
including those relating to the victim. However, we have held a petitioner’s
sex offense is insufficient by itself to demonstrate he presents a significant
current risk to community safety. (Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 434
[“Assuming for purposes of argument the 1997 offense [a tier 2 registrable
sex crime] was egregious, those facts alone do not demonstrate Thai was a
risk to the community over 24 years later”].) Here, Archuleta’s 1993
misdemeanor conviction for sexual battery and 1995 conviction for indecent
exposure, tier 1 registrable sex crimes, do not, without more, demonstrate he
is a risk to the community 30 years later. Moreover, the fact the registrable
offenses were committed over several years does not support denial of the
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petition. The evidence does not show the sex crimes were numerous or of
increasing seriousness.
The remaining factors similarly do not support denial of the
petition. The district attorney conceded there were no relevant noncriminal
behaviors before or after the convictions. The only relevant criminal behavior
the district attorney submitted were convictions for low level offenses such as
vandalism, battery, petty theft, and drug possession, all nonsexual crimes
which do not, without more, demonstrate a continued risk to the community
sufficient to require continued sex offender registration. The dearth of
evidence regarding the sixth factor, completion of sex offender treatment, also
does not support denial of the petition. Finally, as to the seventh factor,
current risk of sexual or violent re-offense, Archuleta was last evaluated at a
high risk category of 9 in 2012 and has not been reassessed since. There was
no evidence in the record of the import of the 2012 risk evaluation, including
whether Archuleta’s current age of 53 and lack of additional sex offenses
during the past 30 years might lessen the risk of recidivism. (See People v.
LaBlanc (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1067–1068, fn. 6 [noting more recent
revised version of the Static-99 “takes into account the age of a sexual
offender based on statistics showing the risk of sexual reoffense decreases as
the offender ages”].) Accordingly, the 2012 Static-99 was inadequate, without
more, to demonstrate Archuleta’s current risk of sexual or violent re-offense.
Archuleta has complied with all of the registration requirements
for two sex offenses committed in 1993 and 1995 and has not committed any
further registrable offenses in the last 30 years. None of the risk factors
either singly or in combination demonstrate he poses a continued risk to
public safety. Accordingly, because the district attorney failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that requiring Archuleta’s continued
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registration would significantly enhance community safety, the trial court
erred in denying the petition.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s postjudgment order is reversed, and the matter
is remanded with directions to grant the petition.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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