CourtListener 10670155•In re V.B. CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 9/11/25 In re V.B. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re V.B, a Person Coming Under the B343351
Juvenile Court Law.
_____________________________________
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND Super. Ct. No. CK97904C)
FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MICHELLE R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Robin R. Kesler, Referee. Affirmed.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez and Giselle Marie Achecar, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Courtney Fisher, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
V.B. (born in September 2010) was placed in a permanent
plan of legal guardianship in 2016 after her parents, Michelle W.
(mother) and L.D. (father) failed to reunify. More than eight
years later, in 2024, mother filed a Welfare and Institutions
Code1 section 388 petition seeking to terminate the legal
guardianship and reinstate mother’s reunification services and
unmonitored visitation. The juvenile court denied mother’s
petition without a hearing, and mother appealed.
Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the order of legal
guardianship should be conditionally reversed because the
juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not conduct an
adequate inquiry into V.B.’s possible Indian ancestry as required
by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
and related California law. As we discuss, mother cannot
collaterally attack the order of legal guardianship through this
appeal from an order entered eight years later. We therefore
affirm the order denying mother’s section 388 petition.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The dependency case.
In 2013, two-year-old V.B. was living with mother and her
half-sisters, D.W. (age 12) and E.R. (age 9).2 In February 2013,
DCFS filed a petition alleging that the children were within the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivisions
(a), (b), and (j) because mother physically abused E.R. by striking
her with a belt; drove while under the influence of alcohol with
V.B. in the vehicle; left D.W. and E.R. home without adult
supervision for more than 13 hours; maintained a filthy,
hazardous, and roach-infested home; and abused alcohol. DCFS
subsequently added allegations that mother abused cocaine and
engaged in domestic violence with her boyfriend in the children’s
presence. On February 21, 2013, the children were detained and
placed in foster care.
In February 2013, mother filed an ICWA-020 form denying
that she had Indian ancestry. The court found no reason to know
the children were Indian children.
At father’s first appearance in March 2013, father filed an
ICWA-020 form stating that he may have Cherokee ancestry.
That day, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to interview father
and paternal grandmother regarding the family’s possible Indian
ancestry. DCFS interviewed father, who said he intended to
raise his daughter in the Muslim faith and did not “want her to
have anything to do with [ICWA].” Father did not provide DCFS
with contact information for any paternal relatives. On March
29, 2013, the juvenile court found: “Based on interview of father,
there is no information that any of 4 generations are registered
2 Only V.B. is a subject of this appeal.
3
with a tribe. . . . Previous finding remains that Indian Child
Welfare Act does not apply.”
In October 2013, after a contested adjudication hearing, the
juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petition, declared
the children juvenile court dependents, and granted the parents
reunification services.
Mother received family reunification services for more than
two years. In March 2015, after a two-day contested hearing, the
juvenile court found the children could not safely be returned to
mother and there was no substantial probability they would be
returned within six months. The court therefore terminated
mother’s reunification services and set a permanent placement
hearing for July 2015.
II. The legal guardianship.
In March 2015, DCFS advised the court that due to mother
and maternal grandmother “causing disruptions,” V.B.’s
caregiver of two years had “decided not to proceed any further as
the caregiver or prospective adoptive parent for [V.B.], as she felt
intimidated by the family’s response when reunification was
unsuccessful[.]” V.B. was removed from her caregiver and re-
placed several times.
In April 2016, V.B. was placed with her siblings in the
home of LaTanya G. LaTanya subsequently agreed to become
V.B.’s legal guardian.
At a section 366.26 hearing on November 29, 2016, the
juvenile court appointed LaTanya as V.B.’s legal guardian.
V.B. has remained in a legal guardianship with LaTanya
throughout these proceedings.
4
III. Mother’s section 388 petitions and DCFS’s further
ICWA inquiry.
Between November 2015 and December 2023, mother filed
13 petitions pursuant to section 388 seeking, among other things,
reinstatement of her reunification services, unmonitored visits,
overnight visits, conjoint counseling, termination of the
guardianship, and custody of V.B. Mother was briefly granted
unmonitored visits, but her petitions otherwise were denied.
In August 2022—nearly a decade after these proceedings
began—mother stated at a hearing that her family had Blackfoot
Indian heritage. The juvenile court ordered DCFS to “conduct
[an] ICWA investigation [if] not done already regarding [the]
Blackfeet tribe.” A social worker interviewed the maternal
grandmother, who said that the maternal great grandmother,
Emma Collins, was “ ‘full Blackfoot Native American.’ ” Maternal
grandmother said she had no further information, but suggested
that the social worker speak to maternal great-great-aunt
Maxine. The social worker spoke to Maxine, who was not aware
that the family had any Indian ancestry.
In February 2023, the juvenile court found that DCFS had
completed its ICWA investigation and ICWA notices were not
required.
In March 2024, mother said her grandmother, Edith
Simmons, and her great grandmother, Emma Collins, were
Blackfeet Indians, but she did not know if either was registered
with a tribe. Maternal grandmother said she was not aware of
any documented Indian ancestry.
5
IV. The present section 388 petition.
On December 20, 2024, mother filed another section 388
petition seeking reunification services, unmonitored visits,
educational rights, and termination of the legal guardianship. In
support, mother attached a variety of exhibits, including a lease,
college transcript, employment verification, various certificates of
completion, and letters of support. Mother’s petition did not
address the court’s ICWA inquiry.
The juvenile court denied the petition without a hearing on
December 26, 2024, noting that mother had not demonstrated
that the requested change of court order was in V.B.’s best
interests. Mother timely appealed from the December 26, 2024
order.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, mother does not contend that the juvenile court
abused its discretion by finding that the requested change of
order was not in V.B.’s best interests. Instead, mother’s sole
contention is that the 2016 guardianship order should be
conditionally reversed because the juvenile court and DCFS
failed to comply with ICWA and related state law.
DCFS argues mother has not provided an adequate
appellate record to allow review of her claim and, in any event,
mother forfeited any objection to the legal guardianship order
made more than eight years ago. We agree.
“The appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate
record affirmatively demonstrating error, and when an appellant
fails to supply a record adequate to review a claim, the claim
fails.” (People v. Benson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1084;
see also In re Angel L. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1137
6
[“The appellant has the burden of establishing error and, lacking
an adequate record, a reviewing court will presume the evidence
supports the judgment”].)
Here, the record does not contain the reporter’s transcripts
of any of the juvenile court hearings, including the hearings at
which the juvenile court made ICWA findings. Without the
reporter’s transcripts, we cannot determine whether the parties
provided the court with any additional information about the
parents’ claimed Indian ancestry or DCFS’s ICWA inquiry. It is
mother’s responsibility to provide a record that is adequate for
review of her claims; because she has not done so, we cannot
evaluate her claims of ICWA error. (See In re L.B. (2003)
110 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1424 [where appellant failed to designate
a reporter’s transcript, the record was not sufficient to allow the
court to evaluate claim of ICWA error].)
In any event, even were the record sufficient, we still would
not be able to grant mother the relief she seeks. Mother’s appeal
is from the juvenile court’s order and findings made at the
hearing on her post-permanency section 388 petition. She
nevertheless asks us to conditionally reverse the court’s legal
guardianship order on the ground that the court and DCFS failed
to comply with their duties of inquiry and notice under
section 224.2. But the juvenile court did not order a legal
guardianship in the section 388 order from which mother
appeals. Instead, the legal guardianship was selected as V.B.’s
permanent plan more than eight years earlier, in November
2016.
Mother had the right to appeal from the court’s legal
guardianship order, and in doing so to raise any alleged error in
the juvenile court’s implicit finding that it had no reason to know
7
V.B. was an Indian child and the Department had satisfied its
duty of ICWA inquiry. (See In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 10
[parent could raise ICWA error for first time from order
terminating parental rights because order was “necessarily
premised on a current finding by the juvenile court that it had no
reason to know [the child] was an Indian child]; In re Josiah T.
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401 [juvenile court’s finding that
ICWA does not apply “ ‘ “implies that . . . social workers and the
court did not know or have a reason to know the children were
Indian children and that social workers had fulfilled their duty of
inquiry” ’ ”].) But the time to appeal from that order expired
many years ago. (See § 395, subd. (a)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.406(a)(1).)
As we recently explained, a parent “cannot . . . use her
appeal from her post-permanency section 388 petition to
challenge the legal guardianship order and findings made at the
section 366.26 hearing—including the finding that ICWA did not
apply. (In re Daniel K. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 661, 667
[‘ “An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency
matter may not challenge prior orders for which the statutory
time for filing an appeal has passed” ’].)” (In re N.F. (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 170, 179.) Accordingly, by failing to timely appeal
from the court’s legal guardianship order, mother forfeited her
right to challenge the court’s implied ICWA finding made as part
of that order.3
3 Mother does not contend that the juvenile court was
required to make an ICWA finding when it entered the order
denying her section 388 petition. We therefore do not reach that
issue.
8
DISPOSITION
The order denying appellant mother’s section 388 petition
is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
EGERTON, J.
ADAMS, J.
9
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