People v. Castillo CA1/5

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Filed 9/11/25 P. v. Castillo CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A170641
v.
EARL RAY CASTILLO, (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Appellant. CR2302849)

Earl Ray Castillo appeals from his conviction for driving
under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury to
another within 10 years of a previous conviction for driving under
the influence. (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a).)1 He argues that
his conviction must be reversed due an erroneous jury instruction
concerning an inference that may be drawn based on evidence of
his blood alcohol concentration. (See § 23610, subd. (a)(1).)
Because he forfeited his challenge, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

A.

In September 2023, shortly after 1:30 pm, Castillo struck
and killed a pedestrian, Stephen Ray, while driving on a stretch
of Highway 101 that runs through Richardson’s Grove, a hiking

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle

Code.
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destination in Humboldt County. Ray had been walking several
feet ahead of his wife, who witnessed the accident. Upon impact,
Ray flew into the air and landed face down on an embankment
approximately 10 feet from the road, dying instantly. Castillo’s
pickup truck sustained significant front-end damage, leaving part
of a broken fog light, broken glass, and other debris in the
roadway. Based on subsequent analysis of airbag control module
data, Castillo was likely travelling between 43 and 47 miles per
hour at the time of the collision, although his speed could have
ranged from around 35 to 50 miles per hour; the speed limit was
35 miles per hour. Castillo did not stop his car, and Ray’s wife
did not hear any sounds of braking.

After the crash, Castillo continued driving, stopping at one
point to go to the post office, where a witness saw his “wrecked”
car in the parking lot. California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers
then spotted Castillo’s damaged truck on Highway 101 and began
pursuing him with lights and sirens. Castillo accelerated to
speeds of up to 98 miles per hour and turned onto a dirt road but
ultimately had to stop because the road was blocked by a gate.
The officers observed that Castillo’s truck had sustained damage
to its hood, windshield, and headlight, there was dried blood on
the right front bumper, and the right fog light was missing,
consistent with the debris found at the accident scene. The right
side of the hood was “crumbled up” and pushed up against the
windshield, the lower right portion of the windshield was
cracked, and the right front quarter panel was bent.

Once stopped, Castillo complied with the CHP officers’
commands. Officers Schmitt and Hayslett detained and
handcuffed him with his hands behind his back. The officers
observed that Castillo’s eyes were red and watery, he smelled of
alcohol, his speech was mumbled, his gait was unsteady, and he
had poor balance. Castillo was swaying from front to back by

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about three inches and Schmitt was concerned that he was at
risk of falling over.

When Schmitt administered a field sobriety test, the
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, he observed that Castillo’s eyes
were not tracking smoothly and were jerking involuntarily,
potential signs of intoxication. At trial, however, a defense
expert, Ed Barley, opined that the test was conducted improperly.
After observing a video of the test, Barley noted that the test was
not performed at Castillo’s eye level; rather than having Castillo
look horizontally at the stimulus, his head was tilted upwards,
thus making the results scientifically unreliable.

The officers also administered two breath tests using a
Preliminary Alcohol Screening device. The first test, performed
at 2:53 p.m., measured Castillo’s blood alcohol concentration at
0.05 percent. The second test, performed at 2:55 pm, measured
his blood alcohol concentration at 0.049 percent.

Based on his observations, Schmitt concluded that Castillo
was under the influence of alcohol, and that it was not safe for
him to continue driving at that point.

The officers then transported Castillo to a hospital, where a
chemical analysis was done based on a blood draw taken at 4:31
p.m., approximately three hours after the collision. The analysis
indicated that Castillo’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.012
percent.

At trial, a prosecution expert, Anthony Valerio, opined that
based on the Preliminary Alcohol Screening and chemical
analysis results, Castillo’s blood alcohol level at the time of the
accident was 0.06 percent. Barley, the defense expert, estimated

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based on the same test results that Castillo’s blood alcohol
concentration was 0.04 percent at the time of the crash.2

B.

For purposes of the crime of driving under the influence of
alcohol under section 23153, subdivision (a), a “ ‘person is under
the influence if, as a result of drinking or consuming an alcoholic
beverage, his or her mental or physical abilities are so impaired
that he or she is no longer able to drive a vehicle with the caution
of a sober person, using ordinary care, under similar
circumstances.’ ” (People v. Stockman (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
1093, 1097-1099 (Stockman); see CALCRIM No. 2100.)

As relevant here, section 23610, subdivision (a)(1), provides
that for purposes of section 23153, subdivision (a), the amount of
alcohol in the defendant’s blood “shall give rise to the following
presumption[]”: “[i]f there was at th[e] time [of the test] less than
0.05 percent, by weight, of alcohol in the person’s blood, it shall
be presumed that the person was not under the influence of an
alcoholic beverage at the time of the alleged offense.” (Italics
added.) A contrary presumption, favoring the prosecution,
applies under section 23610, subdivision (a)(3), if the defendant’s
blood alcohol concentration is tested at 0.08 percent or higher: in
that circumstance, “it shall be presumed” that the defendant was

2Barley opined Castillo was still absorbing alcohol at the
time of the Preliminary Alcohol Screening test results, so his
blood alcohol concentration would have been lower than 0.05
percent at the time of the accident. However, Barley
acknowledged that the test results indicated that Castillo’s blood
alcohol concentration was decreasing. Barley testified that he
believed Castillo’s alcohol absorption was increasing because the
spread in the test results (from 0.05 percent to 0.012 percent)
suggested an elimination rate that was too high to fit the
numbers. However, he did not explain how an assumption that
Castillo’s blood alcohol levels were increasing at the time of the
accident accounts for that pattern.
4
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the charged offense.
Notwithstanding the applicability of either presumption, section
23610 “shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any
other competent evidence” as to whether the defendant had
ingested or was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the
alleged offense. (§ 23610, subd. (c).)

Section 23610, subdivision (a)(1), establishes a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the defense that “affect[s] the burden of
proof.” (§ 23610, subd. (a); see also People v. Gallardo (1994) 22
Cal.App.4th 489, 496 (Gallardo) [addressing identical wording in
a predecessor statute, § 23155, subd. (a)(1)].) Section 23610,
subdivision (a)(1), shifts the burden of proof to the prosecution by
placing a “further burden” on the People to come “forward with
sufficient proof to defeat the presumption.” (Gallardo, at p. 496.)
Gallardo rejected the argument that the statutory language was
a “conclusive presumption,” explaining that otherwise the
language allowing “ ‘any other competent evidence’ ” relevant to
whether the defendant was under the influence of alcohol would
be superfluous. (Ibid.; see also People v. Andersen (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250 (Andersen) [explaining that a predecessor
statute, “Vehicle Code section 23155, subdivision (a)(1), . . .
creates a rebuttable presumption . . . that a tested blood alcohol
level of less than 0.05 percent means the defendant was not
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the offense”].)

In People v. Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491 (Roder), our
Supreme Court discussed the difference between a rebuttable
presumption (or “mandatory presumption”) and a permissive
inference. Roder explained that, when a rebuttable presumption
applies, the jury is “require[d]” to draw the assumption if the
basic facts are proved, unless the party bearing the burden of
proof puts forth “sufficient evidence to rebut the presumed fact.”
(Id. at pp. 501-502, italics omitted; see also id. at p. 498.) In
contrast, a permissive inference is one that the jury may, but

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need not, draw from the basic facts. (Id. at pp. 502-503; see also
Evid. Code, § 600 [distinguishing between a “presumption” and
an “inference”].) Unlike a rebuttable presumption, a permissive
inference leaves the jury “ ‘free to credit or reject the inference
and does not shift the burden of proof.’ ” (Roder, at p. 498; see
also People v. Beltran (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 235, 242 (Beltran).)
A jury instruction on a permissive inference informs the jury that
“if it found the basic facts it [can], but [i]s not required to” draw
the inference, whereas a jury instruction on a rebuttable
presumption informs the jury that if it finds the basic facts, it “
‘shall’ ” draw the presumption unless it is rebutted by other
evidence. (Roder, at p. 503.)

At issue in Roder was a rebuttable presumption, adverse to
the defendant, concerning the knowledge element of the offense of
receipt of stolen property. (Roder, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 494,
495-496.) The trial court had instructed the jury in that case
that, if specified facts were found, then the jury “ ‘shall
presume’ ” that the defendant knew the property in question was
stolen “ ‘unless from all the evidence ’ ” the jury had a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant’s knowledge. (Id. at pp. 495-496.)
Roder explained that a mandatory or rebuttable presumption –
which shifts the burden of proof onto the defendant – “improperly
relieve[s] the prosecution of its burden of proving all elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 499.) Roder
concluded that the instruction given in that case may have been
understood by the jury as a rebuttable presumption, rather than
a permissive inference, and therefore held that the giving of the
instruction was constitutional error. (Id. at pp. 503-504; see also
Beltran, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 241.)

As Roder explained, “[u]nder Evidence Code section 501,
any statute which assigns the burden of proof in a criminal case
is made subject to the overriding rule that the prosecution bears
the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Roder,

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supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 506.) In light of Evidence Code section 501
and the constitutional limits on the use of rebuttable
presumptions in a criminal case, it is “in keeping with the overall
legislative intent [of such statutes] for courts to pare down
existing statutory presumptions to constitutionally permissible
limits, rather than to abrogate them altogether.” (Ibid.) As a
result, Roder held that, on retrial, the trial court should construe
the knowledge of stolen property presumption as “only a
permissive inference, not a mandatory presumption.” (See id. at
p. 507; see also Beltran, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 244
[explaining that permissive inferences “do not operate in an
unconstitutionally pernicious manner”].) Following Roder, courts
have treated statutory presumptions favoring the prosecution,
such as the one in Vehicle Code section 23610, subdivision (a)(3),
as establishing a permissive inference. (See People v. Milham
(1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 505; see also People v. McNeal (2009)
46 Cal.4th 1183, 1199 (McNeal); Judicial Council of Cal., Crim.
Jury Instns. (2025 ed.) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 2111.)

C.

Castillo was charged with gross vehicular manslaughter
(count one; Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1)); driving under the
influence (DUI) of alcohol causing injury within 10 years of a
previous DUI (count two; Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)); leaving
the scene of an accident (count three; id., § 20001, subd. (a));
fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle, a misdemeanor
(count four; id., § 2800.1, subd. (a)); driving at an unsafe speed,
an infraction (count five; id., § 22350); driving with a blood
alcohol level of 0.01 percent or more while on DUI probation, an

7
infraction (count seven; id., § 23154, subd. (a)); and unlawful
turning movement, an infraction (count eight; id., § 22107).3

At trial, in connection with the DUI charge, Castillo
requested a jury instruction based on section 23610, subdivision
(a)(1). His proposed instruction read: “In evaluating the results
of any evidentiary chemical analysis, if as a result defendant's
blood alcohol level was a 0.05 percent or less at the time of the
chemical analysis, you may, but are not required to, conclude
that the defendant was not under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage at the time of the alleged offense.” Defense counsel
explained to the court that the proposed wording was based on
the model jury instruction applicable when the defendant’s blood
alcohol concentration is tested at 0.08 percent or higher, which
reflected a permissive inference. (See CALCRIM No. 2100.) The
trial court granted Castillo’s request with a minor modification,
such that the jury was instructed: “In evaluating the results of
any evidentiary chemical analysis, if you find that the
defendant’s blood alcohol level at the time of the chemical
analysis was a 0.05 percent or less, you may, but are not required
to, conclude that the defendant was not under the influence of an
alcoholic beverage at the time of the alleged offense.”

Ultimately, the jury found Castillo not guilty of gross
vehicular manslaughter, but it convicted him of the lesser
included offense of vehicular manslaughter with ordinary
negligence. In addition to finding him guilty of driving under the
influence of alcohol within 10 years of a DUI, the jury found true
a great bodily injury enhancement. Further, the jury found
Castillo not guilty on count eight but issued guilty verdicts on the
remaining counts.

3 Castillo was also charged with driving while using a cell

phone, an infraction (count six; § 23123, subd. (a)), but the court
dismissed that count on the prosecution’s motion.
8
The trial court sentenced Castillo to a total of seven years
in prison.

DISCUSSION

Castillo asserts that, although he did not object to the jury
instruction on blood alcohol concentration, he has not forfeited
his challenge because the error affected his substantial rights.
(See Pen. Code, § 1259; People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561,
586 [holding that an unpreserved challenge to a jury instruction
is not forfeited if, assuming the challenge has merit, the
defendant’s substantial rights would be affected]; see also
Andersen, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1249.) To determine
whether Castillo’s substantial rights were affected, we assume
the trial court erred and assess whether the error prejudiced him.
(See Andersen, at p. 1249.)

Castillo contends that the jury instruction on blood alcohol
concentration was erroneous because it substituted a mere
permissive inference for what should have been a rebuttable
presumption under section 23610, subdivision (a)(1). Assuming
Castillo’s challenge has merit, the trial court should have instead
instructed the jury that, if it found that his blood alcohol
concentration was tested at less than 0.05 percent, it was
required to presume that he was not under the influence of
alcohol, unless it concluded that the presumption was rebutted by
other evidence. (See Gallardo, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 496;
see also Roder, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 502-503.) Based on the
evidence at trial, however, we conclude that any instructional
error would have been harmless.4

4 In light of our conclusion, we need not address the

People’s contention that Castillo forfeited his instructional
challenge by inviting the error.
9
1.

As an initial matter, we reject Castillo’s argument that the
standard for prejudice is whether the error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18 (Chapman). (See People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 755
(Lynch).) The proper standard is found in People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, under which the defendant is not
prejudiced unless, in the absence of the error, a different outcome
is “ ‘reasonably probable.’ ” (Lynch, at p. 755.)

Castillo relies on cases holding that, where the jury was
improperly instructed with a rebuttable presumption or
permissive inference that shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant, the Chapman standard applies because shifting the
burden to the defendant unconstitutionally diminishes the
prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
(See, e.g., Beltran, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 247; People v.
James (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1360-1362.) Unlike in those
cases, however, the terms of the instruction given here never
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, so at all times the
prosecution bore the burden of proving Castillo’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Because the error was only one of state law (§
23610, subd. (a)(1)), we apply the Watson test for harmless error.
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 755.)

2.

Even had the jury been instructed that Castillo was
entitled to a rebuttable presumption that he was not intoxicated
with a blood alcohol concentration of less than 0.05 percent, a
different outcome was not reasonably probable on the record
here. Because the prosecution presented abundant evidence that
Castillo was too intoxicated to safely operate a vehicle and there
was hardly any evidence indicating that he was sober, the jury
would have reached the same verdict.

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Regardless of Castillo’s precise blood alcohol level at the
time of the crash, the question for the jury was whether he was
“ ‘so impaired that he . . . [was] no longer able to drive a vehicle
with the caution of a sober person, using ordinary care, under
similar circumstances.’ ” (Stockman, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp.
1097-1099; see CALCRIM No. 2100.) The evidence that Castillo
was not exercising ordinary care in driving his vehicle was one-
sided. He was driving over the speed limit around a blind curve
in an area frequented by hikers when he struck the victim. (See
Stockman, at p. 1098 [explaining that the defendant's manner of
driving is relevant in determining whether the defendant was
under the influence of alcohol].) Moreover, he did not stop or
even brake after the crash, even though the force of the collision
“crumbled up” the hood of his car, cracked his windshield, and
bent his front quarter panel. According to the defense, Castillo
did not stop because he did not realize that he had hit anyone.
Whether he failed to stop because he knew he was driving under
the influence or because he was oblivious to the accident despite
the obvious wreckage to his car, either alternative indicates his
driving was impaired. Castillo drove on in his wrecked car, ran
an errand at the post office, and eventually led the authorities on
a high speed chase before being arrested. (See Gallardo, supra,
22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 493-494 [defendant’s actions in running
away after the car crash indicated consciousness of guilt of
driving while under the influence of alcohol].) Indeed, based on
the evidence of his driving, the jury found Castillo guilty of
vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence, meaning that
the jury necessarily found that he was driving negligently—
without ordinary care—at the time of the crash.

In addition to the evidence that Castillo was driving
without the ordinary care of a sober person, CHP officers’
observations of him overwhelmingly pointed to a conclusion that
his negligent driving was due to intoxication. Although Castillo
followed the officers’ commands when he was apprehended, he
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also exhibited numerous signs of impairment, including red,
watery eyes, mumbled speech, and an odor of alcohol on his
breath and person. Castillo’s gait was unsteady, he was swaying
back and forth by about three inches, and he had poor balance.
At one point, Schmitt had to put his hand on Castillo’s shoulder
to keep him from falling over. (See McNeal, supra, 46 Cal.4th at
p. 1198 [“[E]vidence of actual impairment may include the
driver’s appearance, an odor of alcohol, slurred speech, impaired
motor skills, slowed or erratic mental processing, and impaired
memory or judgment.”].)

Valerio, the prosecution expert, testified that extrapolating
backwards from the test results, and assuming his blood alcohol
levels were decreasing, Castillo’s blood alcohol concentration
would have been approximately 0.06 percent at the time of the
accident. Alcohol causes impairments that affect judgment,
memory, decision-making, motor coordination, balance, and
speech. For example, Valerio explained that as a person’s blood
alcohol level increases, large muscle groups are affected, which
leads to difficulty maintaining balance. Signs of impairment can
be seen when a person’s blood alcohol concentration is at 0.03
percent, when reaction time and visual tracking can be affected.
At a 0.04 percent blood alcohol concentration, the facilities a
person uses to drive can start to be affected. According to
Valerio, at 0.04 percent, “if a person is faced with new
information or something unexpected [that] happens [while]
driving, that may just be enough impairment to put that person
in an unsafe position.” At a 0.05 percent blood alcohol
concentration, muscle coordination, decision making, tracking
objects, reaction time, and paying attention to signals can be
affected.

The defense did not dispute that Castillo had ingested
alcohol prior to the crash, but it sought to undermine the
prosecution’s case by presenting expert testimony that each

12
symptom of intoxication he exhibited did not necessarily mean he
was too impaired to safely operate a car. Barley, the defense
expert, estimated that Castillo’s blood alcohol concentration was
likely 0.04 percent at the time of the crash, and he opined that at
that level a person would not be too impaired to drive. However,
Barley acknowledged that when a person’s blood alcohol
concentration is less than 0.08 percent, “more information would
be needed” to determine whether or not the person is impaired
for the purpose of driving. Barley testified that red and watery
eyes, the odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and unsteady gait are
objective signs of intoxication, but he maintained that “by
themselves,” they are not necessarily correlated with impairment
for purposes of driving. The defense also put on persuasive
evidence countering the reliability of the Horizontal Gaze
Nystagmus field sobriety test administered to Castillo.

Viewing the record in its entirety, and without relying on
the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test results, it is not reasonably
probable that a jury instructed on a rebuttable presumption
arising out of a blood alcohol concentration of less than 0.05
percent would have reached a different verdict. Although
Barley’s testimony suggested possible innocent explanations for
each symptom of intoxication Castillo exhibited by itself, there
was no reasonable view of the evidence that would account for
the record as a whole. Regardless of Castillo’s precise blood
alcohol concentration during the crash, his negligent driving, his
failure to stop, his (alleged) obliviousness, and his decision to flee
the authorities strongly support a conclusion that his judgment
was impaired before he was apprehended, and once stopped he
exhibited not one but several signs of mental and physical
impairment due to alcohol. (Cf. Gallardo, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th
at p. 494 [holding that the presumption that the defendant was
not under the influence of alcohol based on a blood alcohol
concentration of 0.05 percent was rebutted where the defendant
tested at 0.03 percent and exhibited symptoms including a red
13
appearance, watery eyes, poor balance, unsteady gait, and an
alcoholic odor on his breath].) Further, apart from the evidence
that Castillo followed the officers’ instructions once stopped,
there was no indication in the record that he was sober. Under
these circumstances, any presumption arising from a blood
alcohol concentration of less than 0.05 percent would have been
rebutted by the overwhelming evidence that, due to intoxication,
Castillo was unable to drive with the ordinary care of a sober
person at the time of the crash.

We therefore conclude that Castillo’s substantial rights
were not affected by the jury instruction given by the trial court.
Because his instructional challenge is forfeited as a result, we do
not reach the merits of his challenge.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P. J.
SIMONS, J.

People v. Castillo (A170641)

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