CourtListener 10670151•People v. Kha CA4/3
Testo completo
Filed 9/11/25 P. v. Kha CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064830
v. (Super. Ct. No. C-82263)
TUE THANH TRI KHA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Andre Manssourian, Judge. Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
Tue Thanh Tri Kha (Defendant) appeals from an order denying,
at the prima facie stage, his petition for resentencing made pursuant to Penal
Code section 1172.6.1 Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo) to inform us that
counsel had found no arguable issues and to request that we exercise our
discretion to conduct an independent review of the record. Counsel also
suggested one issue for our consideration.
Defendant was given the opportunity to file a supplemental brief
on his own behalf and was given notice pursuant to Delgadillo that if no
supplemental brief was filed, the court might dismiss the appeal as
abandoned. Defendant has filed three supplemental briefs dated,
respectively, March 10, 11, and 12, 2025.
We have evaluated the arguments presented by Defendant in his
supplemental briefs and conclude none has merit. (Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 232.) We have also conducted an independent review of the
record and find no arguable issues on appeal. We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. UNDERLYING FACTS
The following summary of facts is taken from our opinion in
People v. Kha (Jul. 10, 1992, G011640) [nonpub. opn.]. We provide the
summary solely to provide context. (See People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
1164, 1170; People v. Davenport (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1160, fn. 5.)
“[Defendant], while detained at Los Pinos Juvenile Camp in the
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
summer of 1990, got into a fight with other residents. When Canh Tran
refused to get involved, [Defendant] accused Canh of cowardice and promised
to ‘kick his ass’ if they ever met on the street.
“Canh was shot in the back twice with a .22 caliber pistol on
August 24 while attending a party at the Boys and Girls Club in Huntington
Beach. He died there on the dance floor. Witnesses told police they saw a man
running from the scene wearing all black and carrying a gun.
“Shortly after the killing, Richard Hooper, the investigator in
charge of the case, was contacted by Thanh Nguyen, who agreed to cooperate
with him. Nguyen telephoned [Defendant] and their conversations were
recorded by the police. During the course of one of their discussions,
[Defendant] admitted to Nguyen that he shot Canh.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“Later, at the station, Hooper interviewed [Defendant].
[Defendant] told Hooper that Canh had threatened to kill his family. He
confirmed he had worn black clothes to the club that evening and admitted
shooting Canh. A subsequent search of [Defendant]’s home uncovered black
clothes, a box of .22 caliber bullets and a newspaper article describing the
murder of Canh.” (People v. Kha supra, G011640 at pp. 2-3.)
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 1991 a jury convicted Defendant of one count of second
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subdivision (a)). The jury found to be true
the allegation that Defendant personally used a firearm at the time of the
commission of the offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced
Defendant to a term of 19 years to life in prison. In People v. Kha, supra,
G011640, we affirmed the judgment.
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In March 2024, Defendant filed a form petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. He checked the boxes for the standard allegations
that (1) a complaint, information, or indictment had been filed against him
which allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder,
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or another
theory of imputed malice; (2) he was convicted of murder following a trial;
and (3) he could not presently be convicted of murder due to changes made to
sections 188 and 189. Defendant was appointed counsel.
The District Attorney filed an opposition to Defendant’s
resentencing petition. With the opposition, the District Attorney submitted
copies of: (1) the abstract of judgment; (2) minutes for the trial court docket;
(3) the felony information; (4) the jury verdicts; (5) People v. Kha supra,
G011640; and (6) the jury instructions given at trial.
The trial court denied the petition and issued a statement of
decision in which the court found: “There has been no showing of a prima
facie case that petitioner was convicted under any now-void legal theory of
Murder as described in section 1172.6 of the Penal Code. [¶] Petitioner was
found guilty of Second-Degree Murder by jury verdict on May 22, 1991. The
jury also found it to be true that petitioner personally used a firearm in the
commission of the offense, under PC section 12022.5. He was sentenced to 19
years to Life in prison. [¶] A review of the record of conviction, including the
instructions presented to the jury at trial, makes clear there was no felony
murder doctrine or natural and probable consequences theory upon which the
jury could have convicted petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner would still be
guilty of Murder under currently valid law.”
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ISSUE PROPOSED BY COUNSEL
Defendant’s counsel has proposed the following issue for our
consideration: “Whether the superior court properly denied appellant’s
section 1172.6 petition.” Our review of the record leads us to conclude the
issue has no merit.
DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
In his supplemental brief, Defendant argues: (1) his jury trial in
1991 was “unfair, inadequate and defect[ive]”; (2) his trial counsel was
ineffective by failing to obtain full discovery and conduct a complete
investigation; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to warn
Defendant he potentially could receive an indeterminate life sentence; (4) his
trial counsel was ineffective by failing to advise Defendant of CALCRIM
No. 570 “to negate second degree murder”; (5) his trial counsel “was
intimidated by the prosecution”; (6) the Huntington Beach and Westminster
police departments kidnapped Defendant by using a jailhouse informant to
lure Defendant out of his home, then beat up Defendant and forced him to
confess; (7) the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence; (8) the jury was
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine; and
(9) Defendant is entitled to resentencing relief pursuant to People v. Pittman
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400 (Pittman) and People v. Keel (2023) 84 Cal.App.5th
546 (Keel).
Defendants’ arguments one through seven are not grounds for
relief under section 1172.6 but rather are issues which should have been
raised on direct appeal or by petition for writ of habeas corpus. Section 1172.6
affords relief only if the petitioner was convicted of murder or attempted
murder based on felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
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consequences doctrine, or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(1).) Section 1172.6 “does not permit a petitioner to establish eligibility on
the basis of alleged trial error” (People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428,
438) “‘does not create a right to a second appeal,’” and cannot be used “‘to
resurrect a claim that should have been raised in his . . . direct appeal’”
(People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173).
In his supplemental brief dated March 12, 2025, Defendant
asserts he is entitled to resentencing based on the involuntary manslaughter
instruction given to his jury. That instruction (CALJIC No. 8.45), after
defining the crime of involuntary manslaughter, stated: “A killing is unlawful
within the meaning of this instruction if it occurred: [¶] In the commission of
an act, ordinarily lawful, which involves a high degree of risk of death or
great bodily harm, without due caution and circumspection.” The instruction
then defined the term “without due caution and circumspection.” Defendant
focuses his attention on the following part of that definition: “The facts must
be such that the consequences of the negligent act could reasonably have been
foreseen. It must also appear that the [death] was not the result of
inattention, mistaken judgment or misadventure, but the natural and
probable result of an aggravated reckless or grossly negligent act.” (Italics
added.)
The natural and probable consequences doctrine that was
eliminated as the basis for a murder conviction (People v. Reyes (2023) 14
Cal.5th 981, 984) was a theory by which the mens rea of a perpetrator could
be imputed to an aider and abettor or coconspirator (People v. Chiu (2014) 59
Cal.4th 155, 161, 164). Defendant’s jury was not instructed on the natural
and probable consequence doctrine. The term “without due caution and
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circumspection” found in CALJIC No. 8.45 is not the same thing. Rather, the
term “without due caution and circumspection” is the definition of criminal
negligence, which is the mental state a defendant must have had in order to
be convicted of involuntary manslaughter. (People v. Mohammed (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 152, 161; People v. Evers (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 588, 596.)
Besides, Defendant was not convicted of involuntary manslaughter.
In his supplemental brief, Defendant states he was 15 years old
at the time of the offense and therefore, under Pittman, supra, 96
Cal.App.5th 400 and Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 546, the trial court should
have granted his section 117.6 petition based on age. Pittman and Keel do not
support granting Defendant resentencing relief. In Pittman, the defendant
and two others attacked and killed the victim. (Pittman, pp. 403, 404-405.)
The defendant was 21 years old at that time. (Id. at p. 416.) The jury, which
had been instructed on the natural and probable consequences theory of
imputed malice, convicted the defendant of second degree murder. (Id., p.
409.)
The defendant later brought a resentencing petition under
section 1172.6. (Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th a p. 411.) After conducting an
extensive evidentiary hearing on the petition, the trial court concluded the
defendant was guilty of implied malice murder either as a principal or as an
aider and abettor. (Id. at p. 415.) On appeal from the order denying the
petition, the Attorney General did not contend the defendant was guilty as a
principal, and the undisputed testimony had established the defendant was
not the actual killer. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the
defendant’s youth was a factor that should have been considered in
determining whether, in participating in attack of the victim, the defendant
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acted with conscious disregard for life—the requisite mental state for implied
malice murder. (Id. at p. 417-418.)
In Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 546, the defendant was convicted
of first degree murder for participating, at age 15 years, in an armed robbery
which led to the victim’s murder. (Id. at p. 550.) In response to the
defendant’s section 1172.6 petition, the trial court conducted an extensive
evidentiary hearing at which the defendant testified. (Keel, pp. 552-554.) The
trial court found that the defendant was not the actual killer but was
ineligible for resentencing because he was a major participant in the robbery
and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Id. at pp. 554-555.) The
Court of Appeal reversed on the ground substantial evidence did not support
the trial court’s finding that the defendant acted with reckless indifference to
human life. (Ibid.) In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeal
considered the defendant’s youth at the time of the offense to be a relevant
consideration and found it diminished any inference the defendant had acted
with reckless disregard for human life. (Id. at pp. 558, 562.)
Here, in contrast to Pittman and Keel, the record of conviction
established that Defendant was tried and convicted as the sole perpetrator
and actual killer. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 47-48, 53
[actual killer is ineligible for § 1172.6 relief].) The jury was not instructed on
the felony murder rule, the natural and probable consequences theory of
imputed malice, or any other theory of imputed malice. Defendant was not
“convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is impute. . . .”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
because, unlike Pittman and Keel, the record of conviction conclusively
8
established he was ineligible for relief. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708.)
Defendant argues his counsel appointed to represent him on the
resentencing petition was ineffective for not citing Pittman and Keel. Because
Pittman and Keel are inapplicable to Defendant’s situation, either his counsel
was not ineffective for failing to cite those cases to the trial court, or any
ineffective assistance was harmless. (See In re Crew (2011) 52 Cal.4th 126,
150.)
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying Defendants resentencing
petition is affirmed.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
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