CourtListener 10669288•People v. Collins CA3
Testo completo
Filed 9/10/25 P. v. Collins CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C102048
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 98883)
v.
JAMES COLLINS,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant James Collins guilty of multiple sexual assault charges.
The trial court sentenced him to 120 years in state prison, including a one-year term
under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).1 On appeal from his resentencing under
section 1172.75, Collins argues the trial court erred in resentencing him to the upper term
on the principal count and denied his right to have a jury determine the facts, thereby
violating his due process rights, Sixth Amendment rights, and right to equal protection.
We shall affirm.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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BACKGROUND
In 1990, a jury found Collins guilty of 13 counts of oral copulation (§ 288a, subd.
(c)); one count of sexual battery (§ 243.4); five counts of penetration with a foreign
object (§ 289, subd. (a)); one count of rape (§ 261, subd. (2)); and one count of sodomy
(§ 286). The jury also found true several enhancements under sections 12022.3, 12022.7,
and 12022.8. The trial court found true a serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a))
and a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced Collins to 120 years in state prison, which included, as
relevant here, the upper term of eight years on the oral copulation count (count seven)
(§ 288a, subd. (c)), and a one-year sentence for the prior prison term enhancement
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified Collins as eligible for
resentencing under section 1172.75 based on his one-year section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancement. The prosecution agreed the trial court should dismiss the prior prison term
enhancement but otherwise argued the court should leave the rest of the sentence intact.
Collins asked the trial court to strike the enhancements under sections 667, subdivision
(a); 667.5, subdivision (b); 12022, subdivision (b); 12022.3, subdivision (a); 12022.7; and
12022.8. Collins also argued that under section 1170, subdivision (b), he could be
sentenced to no more than the middle term for count seven and the middle term for its
enhancement.
The trial court held a resentencing hearing and dismissed the one-year prior prison
term enhancement but did not otherwise change Collins’s sentence. Collins filed a timely
notice of appeal in September 2024. His opening brief was filed in March 2025, and this
case became fully briefed on May 20, 2025.
2
DISCUSSION
Collins argues he was deprived of the right to have a jury decide whether he
should be sentenced to the upper term under section 1170, subdivision (b), and thus was
deprived of due process, equal protection, and his Sixth Amendment rights. He
acknowledges this court has already decided the issue against him in People v. Brannon-
Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, but asks us to reject that decision in favor of
People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312. We decline to do so.
Under section 1172.75, a person currently serving a term for a prior prison term
enhancement imposed before January 1, 2020 (with exceptions not relevant here), is
entitled to recall of the sentence and resentencing, as such enhancements have been
declared legally invalid. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a)-(c).) Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2),
provides that the resentencing court “shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), provides that in resentencing
proceedings pursuant to this section, “[u]nless the court originally imposed the upper
term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are
circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment
exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.”
In Brannon-Thompson, a different panel of this court concluded section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4) “carves out an exception to the general rule that all ameliorative
changes to the law must be applied at a section 1172.75 resentencing and does not require
aggravating factors to be found true beyond a reasonable doubt if the upper term was
previously imposed.” (People v. Brannon-Thompson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 458.)
The court explained that, giving this provision’s language its plain meaning, “it is evident
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the Legislature intended the new burden of proof amendments to section 1170,
subdivision (b) apply only if the trial court is imposing the upper term for the first time at
a section 1172.75 resentencing.” (Id. at pp. 466-467.)
Under Brannon-Thompson, the trial court here could reimpose the upper term for
the oral copulation conviction at the section 1172.75 resentencing without relying on
aggravating circumstances, because the upper term had already been imposed.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sentencing Collins to the upper term based on
aggravating circumstances not proven in accordance with section 1170, subdivision (b).
Collins urges us to find that Brannon-Thompson was wrongly decided and to
instead follow People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312.2 In Gonzalez, the court
acknowledged “that the plain language of section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), on its face,
could be interpreted as not requiring proof of aggravating factors before reimposing an
upper term sentence.” (Id. at pp. 328-329.) But the court ultimately adopted a different
interpretation, reasoning that Brannon-Thompson’s plain language understanding of the
statute would violate the Sixth Amendment. (Gonzalez, at pp. 329-331.) The court
explained that “reading an exemption into section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) . . . and
thereby allowing a court to resentence a defendant to an upper term sentence without
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravating factors, would run afoul of the Sixth
Amendment implications identified in [People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768].”
(Id. at p. 330.)
2 Our Supreme Court has granted review in People v. Eaton (2025) (Mar. 14, 2025,
C096853) [nonpub. opn.], review granted May 14, 2025, S289903, to resolve the split
between Brannon-Thompson and Gonzalez: whether section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4),
permits a trial court to reimpose an upper term sentence where the facts underlying one or
more aggravating circumstances were neither stipulated to by the defendant nor found
true beyond a reasonable doubt by the factfinder.
4
We respectfully disagree with the Gonzalez court’s analysis. Under the Sixth
Amendment, “any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be
found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281.) There is no dispute that, under
Lynch, the additional factual determinations required to impose the upper term under
section 1170, subdivision (b) implicate the Sixth Amendment jury trial right. As our
Supreme Court explained, “under the current statute the aggravating facts used to
‘justify’ an upper term sentence are ‘necessary to [its] imposition,’ [citation] and
effectively function like elements of a crime.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730,
760, 768.) But Brannon-Thompson interpreted section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) as
carving out an exception to the factfinding requirements of section 1170, subdivision (b).
And because those requirements do not apply when reimposing the upper term at a
section 1172.75 resentencing, the Sixth Amendment is not implicated. (See Lynch, at
p. 759 [“It is the requirement of additional factfinding that brings the Sixth Amendment
into play”]; see also id. at p. 756 [“[I]n this context, what the Sixth Amendment requires
is necessarily informed by what the state statutory scheme requires”].)
Collins also contends the statute must be read to require jury findings in order to
avoid a violation of equal protection principles. In his view, the People’s reading of the
provision impermissibly discriminates against defendants resentenced under
section 1172.75, while giving defendants resentenced under other statutes—such as
sections 1172.1 and 1170.18—the benefit of section 1170’s factfinding requirements. He
nowhere explains, however, why the Legislature could not rationally limit section 1170’s
5
requirements to certain classes of defendants. Accordingly, we do not further consider
the argument.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
MAURO, Acting P. J.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
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