People v. McCants CA1/2

CourtListener 10669280Calctapp10 set 2025

Testo completo

Filed 9/10/25 P. v. McCants CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172667
v.
JAMES McCANTS, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 05009332180)
Defendant and Appellant.

In 1993, James McCants was committed to a state hospital after he was
found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity. Eventually he was granted
outpatient status, which was revoked by the trial court after a hearing held
pursuant to a request made under Penal Code section 1608.1
In this appeal from the revocation order, McCants’s primary argument
is that substantive due process requires a finding that he presents a danger
to the health and safety of others for outpatient status to be revoked under
section 1608; that no substantial evidence was presented to support such a
finding; and that the revocation order therefore must be reversed. He also
argues that equal protection requires a finding that he presents a danger to
others before outpatient status is revoked. We will affirm.

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. McCants Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
In September 1993, McCants was charged by information with the
murders with malice aforethought of Donna Carroll and a human fetus
(§ 187; counts 1 & 2). The information alleged the enhancement that
McCants “personally used a vacuum cleaner and telephone a deadly and
dangerous weapon” in the commission of the crimes. (§ 12022, subd. (b).)
McCants pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, and he
denied the enhancement; two experts were appointed to examine him and
report to the court.
In October 1993, the information was amended to reduce both counts to
second degree murder. McCants then withdrew his not guilty plea; and
pleaded no contest to both counts and the enhancement. He was sentenced to
two indeterminate terms of 15 years to life, to be served concurrently; a one-
year enhancement was imposed but stricken. A bench trial on McCants’s
sanity followed, at which the parties submitted the issue based on the
experts’ reports. The court found McCants not guilty by reason of insanity as
to the offenses and the enhancement, and found that he had not regained his
sanity and was presently a danger to himself and others. In November 1993
McCants was committed to a state hospital pursuant to section 1026 for two
concurrent indeterminate terms of 15 years to life, with a one-year
enhancement imposed but stricken.
B. Outpatient Status Granted and Revocation Requested
In October 2022, the trial court found that McCants would not be a
danger to the health and safety of others while under supervision and
treatment in the community, and ordered him released to a Conditional

2
Release Program (CONREP) for community outpatient treatment and
supervision in accordance with section 1026.2, subdivision (h).2
In October 2024, Contra Costa County CONREP requested revocation
of McCants’s outpatient status pursuant to section 1608 and informed the
trial court that McCants had been rehospitalized pursuant to section 1610.3
At a hearing in November 2024, McCants waived time; an evidentiary
hearing was scheduled for January 2025.
In December 2024, CONREP submitted an annual progress report for
McCants recommending revocation of his outpatient status under section
1608 “to allow for an extended stay at” a state hospital. According to the
report it was the consensus of the CONREP treatment team that McCants
could no longer be safely and effectively treated in the community and that
he required additional treatment at a state hospital to regain psychiatric and
behavioral stability.

2 Section 1026.2 sets forth the procedures by which a person who has

been acquitted by reason of insanity and committed to a state hospital can
obtain release on the ground that his or her sanity has been restored.
3 Section 1608 provides that during outpatient treatment, if the

“treatment supervisor is of the opinion that the person requires extended
inpatient treatment or refuses to accept further outpatient treatment and
supervision, the community program director shall notify the superior court
. . . by means of a written request for revocation of outpatient status.” The
court must hold a hearing within 15 judicial days and “either approve or
disapprove the request.” (Ibid.) Section 1610 authorizes a person subject to
revocation under section 1608 to be confined in a facility designated by the
community program director if it is the director’s opinion “that the person
will now be a danger to self or to another while on outpatient status and that
to delay confinement until the revocation hearing would pose an imminent
risk of harm to the person or to another.” (§ 1610, subd. (a).) The facility
“shall continue the patient’s program of treatment.” (Ibid.)

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C. January 2025 Hearing
The evidentiary hearing on CONREP’s revocation request took place on
January 9, 2025. The district attorney called three witnesses (Myra Garcia,
Robert Nosic, and Brigee Jackson) and McCants called one (Hannah Welch).
1. Testimony of Myra Garcia
Dr. Myra Garcia, a clinical psychologist employed as the program
director at Gateways Satellite (Gateways), the CONREP program to which
McCants had been transferred in March 2024, testified as an expert in
psychology and risk assessment. Dr. Garcia characterized Gateways as
“essentially an enhanced board-and-care facility.” She testified that
McCants’s placement there was “tenuous since the beginning,” explaining
that staff told her that he was displaying symptoms of paranoia that made
treatment “incredibly difficult despite medication adjustments.” McCants
denied the paranoid nature of his presentation, offered his own explanation of
events, and was unable to consider an alternative or to reason with the
treatment team. Dr. Garcia testified that in addition, it appeared that
McCants has a “developmental or processing limitation where his memory is
affected,” which meant he had difficulty remembering events or accepting
that he had engaged in problematic behavior. McCants had been referred for
neurocognitive testing for dementia, but the screening had not taken place.
Dr. Garcia opined that “the breadth and depth of [McCants’s] long-
documented mental illness, coupled with cognitive difficulties makes it
impossible for him to recognize the paranoid nature of his presentation [and]
gets in the way of him being able to meaningful[ly] collaborate with his
treatment team and make the gains necessary at this level of care.” She
opined that McCants “lacked a set of coping skills to implement when he was
displaying paranoia”; that staff at Gateways was unable to help him develop

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those skills; and that his inability to “meaningful[ly] collaborate and treat his
illness make him a danger to our clients.” Dr. Garcia stated that McCants’s
“mounting agitation tends to result or follow the paranoia” and that
McCants’s inability to recognize the symptoms made it “increasingly difficult
to treat [him] safely at this level of care,” and opined McCants required an
adjustment to his medication regime to manage his symptoms and also
required extended inpatient treatment in a locked setting that has the
resources to manage his symptoms as they develop during the adjustment
process.
Dr. Garcia had observed McCants being agitated, but had not seen him
behave in a way that was physically dangerous to anyone.
2. Testimony of Robert Nosic
Dr. Robert Nosic, a clinical psychologist employed as the program
coordinator at Gateways, testified as an expert in forensic psychology. He
had met with McCants in October 2024 to discuss reports that McCants had
made an inappropriate remark about his forensic clinician and had made
inappropriate sexually provocative comments about case managers. During
the meeting, McCants identified another patient as a “snitch” and became
agitated. It was difficult for Dr. Nosic to work with McCants on ways to
manage the agitation, because McCants denied that he was agitated. Based
on his interactions with McCants, Dr. Nosic had concerns for the safety of
staff members and other patients at Gateways, explaining that McCants’s
“inability to take in feedback regarding reports that we view as concerning
. . . provides the inability for us to work with him on interventions in order
not to escalate a violent situation.” McCants had not engaged in any physical
violence at Gateways, but his interactions with some of his peers “were not in
line with the rules of the program,” and he often was not willing to meet with

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his clinician in her office, which was significant as a reflection of his failure to
comply with the recommendations of the treatment team.
Dr. Nosic had requested a psychological assessment of McCants to
determine whether he had dementia or other cognitive impairments and
what role psychosis or McCants’s antisocial personality disorder were playing
in his behaviors. Dr. Nosic testified that the assessment would be important
for deciding what level of care McCants needed and “how to address some of
the barriers we ran into.” He testified that McCants appeared to have
memory problems; that the treatment team had discussed the possibility that
McCants was developing dementia; and that some of the behavior McCants
displayed, including unwillingness to believe facts he was told, inability to
recall things, and agitation when told that his views were incorrect, could be
due to cognitive decline, or to schizophrenia, or “it could be more intentional
because of the antisocial personality disorder.”
3 Testimony of Brigee Jackson
Dr. Brigee Jackson, a clinical psychologist employed as the community
program director for Contra Costa CONREP, testified as an expert in
psychology, risk assessment, and California’s Conditional Release Program.
Dr. Jackson was familiar with McCants’s progress and treatment in the
community as a result of her work in coordinating his placement and care in
the years since he had been released to CONREP. She wrote McCants’s
December 2024 annual progress report and the request for revocation of his
outpatient status. Based on collaboration with McCants’s treatment team,
she determined that McCants’s discharge goals, which included anger and
impulsivity management, relapse prevention planning, and developing or
broadening insight into his mental health condition had been largely unmet.
Dr. Jackson’s report incorporated a risk assessment evaluation of McCants

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that she conducted, considering historical factors related to violent behaviors,
clinical factors related to violence, and risk management factors related to
the risk of violence. She opined that McCants would be rated as “high future
violence or case prioritization if released from CONREP, high serious
physical harm risk, and moderate imminent violence risk.” Based on her
interactions with McCants and the risk assessment, it was Dr. Jackson’s
opinion that McCants represented “a danger to the health and safety of the
community that’s elevated above that which can be effectively provided by
community outpatient treatment,” and that he required an extended stay at a
state hospital to address his discharge goals.
Dr. Jackson testified that McCants’s diagnoses include borderline
cognitive functioning, that he was especially weak in auditory
comprehension, and that he appeared to be suffering from memory loss. He
was on a wait list for “the full neuro and cognitive battery of testing.” She
testified that if testing showed McCants to be suffering organic cognitive
decline, a conservatorship could be appropriate for him.
4. Testimony of Hannah Welch
Hannah Welch, a licensed clinical social worker who worked with
McCants at Napa State Hospital since his admission there in October 2024,
testified that McCants initially demonstrated a “decreased frustration
tolerance” and was irritated about his circumstances and unsure of what was
happening, which “impressed as somewhat inpatient behavior.” It was
difficult to tell whether McCants was unwilling to retain new information or
was unable to retain information because of memory problems; his agitation
made it appear that he was unwilling. After about a month, McCants showed
an increased frustration tolerance, but continued to have difficulties

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retaining new information and occasionally demonstrated signs of paranoia
relating to his belief that CONREP was “setting [him] up” for revocation.
Welch stated that the barrier to McCants advancing in his treatment
was his difficulty developing insight into his circumstances; Welch opined
that this could be the result of memory loss and that she would not be
surprised if testing showed that McCants was experiencing some kind of
organic cognitive decline. She testified that neurocognitive testing had been
ordered for McCants and that if he remained at Napa State Hospital, she
would refer him to a geriatric or medical unit.
Welch had not observed McCants yell or act in a threatening manner or
engage in any unsafe behaviors, and she stated that McCants had not
received any incident management reports for behavioral reasons.
5. Argument and Ruling
The district attorney argued that the People had met their burden
under section 1608 to show by a preponderance of the evidence that McCants
required extended inpatient treatment. The district attorney further argued
that “at least a couple” of the witnesses testified they had concerns about the
safety of staff members and other patients at Gateways if McCants were to
remain there.
McCants’s counsel argued that under Foucha v. Louisiana (1992) 504
U.S. 71 (Foucha) a finding of dangerousness is constitutionally required for
the revocation of outpatient status, and because there was no evidence that
McCants was dangerous the revocation request should be denied.
The trial court granted the request to revoke McCants’s outpatient
status under section 1608, stating, “I do understand that that means that we
might be back here very, very soon on a [section] 1026.2 with additional
information as to how Mr. McCants has been doing.” This was apparently a

8
reference to the fact that by statute, McCants or the medical director of the
state hospital might make a subsequent application for McCants to be
released to outpatient treatment. (§ 1026.2, subd. (a).) The court approved
the revocation of McCants’s placement at Gateways, but declined to find that
McCants must remain at the state hospital, stating, “I authorize his
placement in any appropriate treatment facility. And I make no finding that
the hospital is the least restrictive placement. I’m not finding that it is
currently the least restrictive placement.” The court subsequently issued a
written order granting the revocation request and ordering CONREP and the
Department of State Hospitals to consider placing McCants at an Institute of
Mental Disorder or other inpatient facility and report to the court explaining
their opinion as to the appropriate inpatient level of care.
McCants timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
A defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is committed to a
state hospital “ ‘to treat his mental illness and to protect him and society
from his potential dangerousness.’ ” (People v. Dobson (2008) 161
Cal.App.4th 1422, 1432.) A defendant who has been adjudicated not guilty by
reason of insanity and committed for treatment “may be released from a state
hospital upon either (1) the restoration of sanity pursuant to the provisions of
section 1026.2; (2) expiration of . . . ‘the longest term of imprisonment which
could have been imposed for the offense or offenses of which the person was
convicted’ [citation]; or (3) approval of outpatient status pursuant to the
provisions of section 1600 et seq.” (Ibid.)
A two-step process applies to an application for release on the basis of
restoration of sanity. The first step requires the applicant to show by a

9
preponderance of the evidence that he or she would not be “a danger to the
health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder, while
under supervision and treatment in the community.” (§ 1026.2, subd. (e); see
People v. Sword (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 614, 621 (Sword) [discussing burden of
proof].) An applicant who meets that burden is placed in an outpatient
program, and at the end of one year the trial court may discharge the
defendant, or order the defendant confined in a treatment facility, or renew
its approval of outpatient status. (§ 1606; Sword, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p.
621.)
However, the court may revoke outpatient status under section 1608,
the statute at issue in this case, or section 1609, which governs revocation
proceedings initiated by the prosecution.4 Section 1608 governs requests to
revoke outpatient status based on the opinion of the defendant’s outpatient
treatment supervisor “that the person requires extended inpatient treatment
or refuses to accept further outpatient treatment and supervision.” (§ 1608.)
Section 1609, not at issue here, provides for the revocation of outpatient
status based on the opinion of the prosecutor “that the person is a danger to
the health and safety of others while on” outpatient status. (See People v.
DeGuzman (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 414, 419 (De Guzman) [“section 1608
focuses on an outpatient’s well-being, while section 1609 is concerned with
protecting community safety”].)
The revocation of outpatient status under section 1608 “requires a
finding that the patient needs extended inpatient treatment or refuses to

4 Once outpatient status has been revoked, an individual may apply to

be returned to outpatient status under section 1026.2, subdivision (e), which,
as noted above, requires the individual to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he or she would not be “a danger to the health and safety of
others . . . while under supervision and treatment in the community.”

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accept further outpatient treatment. It does not require the court to find that
the patient is a danger to the health and safety of others.” (DeGuzman,
supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 420.) At a revocation hearing under section 1608,
the People bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
(Ibid.)
In reviewing an order revoking outpatient status under section 1608 we
uphold the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial
evidence. (DeGuzman, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 420.) Here, however,
McCants does not dispute that substantial evidence supports a finding that
McCants required extended inpatient treatment. Instead, McCants raises a
constitutional challenge to the interpretation of section 1608 as not requiring
a finding that the patient is a danger to others. We review this challenge de
novo. (See Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 857 [questions of
statutory interpretation reviewed de novo]; California Cannabis Coalition v.
City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 934 [de novo review applies to
“construing constitutional and statutory provisions”].)
B. Due Process
“So-called ‘substantive due process’ prevents the government from
engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ [citation], or interferes with
rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ” (U.S. v. Salerno (1987) 481
U.S. 739, 746.) In accordance with principles of due process, an individual
found not guilty by reason of insanity “ ‘is entitled to release when he has
recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous,’ [citation]; i.e., the acquittee
may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous but no longer.”
(Foucha, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 77.)
McCants contends that to comport with due process, the requirements
for the granting of outpatient status under section 1026.2, subdivision (e),

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and the requirements for revocation of outpatient status must be
“symmetrical,” and that “[d]angerousness must apply in both directions.” He
contends that just as section 1026.2, subdivision (e) required him to show
that he would not be a danger to others due to mental disorder while under
outpatient treatment, to comport with substantive due process, the
revocation of his outpatient status under section 1608 must require the state
to show that he is dangerous to others under outpatient status. Thus,
McCants concludes, his outpatient status could not be revoked under section
1608 absent a finding by the trial court that he currently presents a danger
to others, even though the statute itself does not require any such finding.
We are not persuaded. McCants’s argument fails to account for the
context in which these statutes are applied. A finding that McCants was and
is dangerous to others is implicit in the initial determination that he was not
guilty by reason of insanity. That finding of dangerousness can be negated
by a finding that his sanity has been restored, “which means [he] is no longer
a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or
disorder.” (§ 1026.2, subd. (e) [§ 1026.2 “presumes that [an individual found
not guilty by reason of insanity] is a danger to others”].) However, an order
granting outpatient status under section 1026.2, subdivision (e) is not a
determination that sanity has been restored: it is instead a determination
that the defendant would not be dangerous “while under supervision and
treatment in the community.” (§ 1026.2, subd. (e).) Nor is an order granting
outpatient status under section 1026.2, subdivision (e) a determination that
the defendant is not dangerous: “To say that it has been determined that a
defendant . . . will not be a danger while receiving supervision and treatment
is certainly not to say that he will not be a danger under any circumstances,
regardless of treatment.” (People v. Harner (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1400, 1407

12
[discussing outpatient status for mentally disordered sex offenders]; see
People v. Superior Court (Henry) (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312 [“[a]
person may remain an outpatient as long as he will not be a danger to others
and will benefit from an outpatient program,” italics added].)
Thus, McCants’s release to outpatient treatment in 2022 was not based
on a finding that he was not dangerous; it was based on a finding that he
would not be dangerous under the supervision provided by an appropriate
outpatient treatment program. (See § 1026.2, subd. (e) [directing court to
order placement “with an appropriate forensic conditional release program”].)
In other words, there was a finding that, during a period of restriction to
allow further evaluation, appropriate outpatient treatment would not only
constitute treatment of his mental illness but would “ ‘cause no undue hazard
to the community.’ ” (Sword, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 620.)
Due process “ ‘requires that the nature . . . of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed’ ”
and the purpose for committing an individual found not guilty by reason of
insanity is twofold: “to treat the individual’s mental illness and protect him
and society from his potential dangerousness.” (Jones v. U.S. (1983) 463 U.S.
354, 368 (Jones); see People v. Beck (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1676, 1685 (Beck)
[“[i]n light of the strong public interest in avoiding premature release of
mentally disordered acquittees and the uncertainties in psychiatric
evaluation,” the procedures set forth in section 1026.2, subdivision (e)
comport with due process and Foucha because they “ ‘bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which [McCants was] committed’ ”].)
Section 1608 provides that outpatient treatment can be revoked based
on a finding that outpatient treatment is in fact not appropriate for the
defendant, either because the defendant requires extended inpatient

13
treatment or because the defendant refuses to accept further outpatient
treatment. In such circumstances, outpatient treatment is not serving one of
the two purposes for which an individual found not guilty by reason of
insanity was committed—the treating of the defendant’s mental illness—and
therefore the revocation of outpatient status does not infringe on the
defendant’s constitutional right to due process. (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at p.
368.)
In sum, we see no due process violation in the revocation of McCants’s
outpatient status under section 1608 based on the trial court’s finding that he
required inpatient treatment. And because we conclude that the revocation
of outpatient status under section 1608 does not require a finding by the trial
court that the patient is dangerous to others, we do not reach McCants’s
argument that no substantial evidence was presented to support such a
finding.
C. Equal Protection
For the first time on appeal, McCants argues that revoking his
outpatient status without a finding of dangerousness violated his
constitutional right to equal protection.
McCants asserts that he is similarly situated to an offender with a
severe mental health disorder (often referred to as OMHD) who is subject to
commitment to the Department of State Hospitals (Department) for
treatment as a condition of parole. (§ 2962.) An OMHD individual receives
inpatient treatment unless the Department certifies that “there is reasonable
cause to believe the parolee can be safely and effectively treated on an
outpatient basis.” (§ 2964, subd. (a).) The revocation of outpatient treatment
for such offenders is governed by procedures different from those that apply
to an individual found not guilty by reason of insanity: the community

14
program director “may place the parolee, or cause the parolee to be placed, in
a secure mental health facility if the parolee can no longer be safely or
effectively treated in the outpatient program, and until the parolee can be
safely and effectively treated in the program.” (Ibid.) Within 15 days of such
action, a hearing is to be conducted (by the Department) to determine
“whether the parolee can be safely and effectively treated in the program.”
(Ibid.) McCants argues that because he is similarly situated to an OMHD
individual for purposes of the revocation of outpatient status, and because
safety must be considered in revoking the outpatient status of an OMHD
individual, safety must likewise be considered in revoking his outpatient
status as an individual found not guilty by reason of insanity.
McCants also asserts that he is similarly situated to persons facing
civil commitment under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act.
Although a defendant may forfeit a constitutional claim by failing to
timely assert it in the trial court (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th
589, 593), “we have discretion to consider the claim on the merits if it
presents a pure question of law and it is unclear whether the appellant had
the opportunity to raise the argument below.” (People v. Cannon (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 786, 794, citing In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7.)
McCants’s equal protection argument raises a pure question of law, but he
did not raise it below even though he had the opportunity to do so. We are
not persuaded by his suggestion, unsupported by any citation to authority,
that his counsel’s “raising the due process issue was sufficient to draw the
trial court’s attention to” the equal protection claim.
Further, McCants offers no analysis to support his contentions that he
is similarly situated to OMHD individuals and those facing civil commitment,
stating simply that he “contends that his constitutional equal protection right

15
was violated, because patients found not guilty by reason of insanity should
not have their outpatient status revoked unless the trial court finds the
patient represents a danger to others.” Although McCants “relies on Welfare
[and] Institutions Code section 5325.1, subdivision (a) and [Beck, supra,] 47
Cal.App.4th 1676 in this regard,” he offers no discussion of the statute, and
neither discussion nor a pinpoint citation to Beck, which rejected an equal
protection challenge to the minimum one-year CONREP term that section
1026.2, subdivision (e) imposes on individuals found not guilty by reason of
insanity. (Beck at pp. 1680-1681, 1687.)
Accordingly, McCants has forfeited his equal protection claim not only
by failing to assert it below, but also by failing to provide appropriate
appellate argument to support his contentions. (See Allen v. City of
Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [“citing cases without any
discussion of their application to the present case results in forfeiture”; “[w]e
are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for
the litigants”].) We decline to reach the issue.
DISPOSITION
The challenged order is affirmed.

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_________________________
Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Stewart, P. J.

_________________________
Richman, J.

A172667, People v. McCants

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