CourtListener 10667845•Webb v. Alexander CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 9/8/25 Webb v. Alexander CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DENISE WEBB, D084242
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2023-
00044600-CU-HR-CTL)
v.
PAUL ALEXANDER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter Murray, Judge. Affirmed. Request for judicial notice denied.
Briggs Law Corporation and Cory J. Briggs for Defendant and
Appellant.
Peterson Law, Christopher L. Peterson, Michael M. Baker and Megan
V. Baja for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
This case involves a petition for civil harassment restraining order
(Code Civ. Proc.,1 § 527.6) that Denise Webb filed against Paul Alexander.
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Following the evidentiary hearing on the petition, Alexander filed an anti-
SLAPP2 special motion to strike the petition pursuant to section 425.16. The
trial court denied his motion, and Alexander contends this was error. We
disagree with him, and so we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Restraining Order Proceedings
On October 16, 2023, Webb filed her petition against Alexander using
the standard Judicial Council CH-100 form.3 She asserted that he was a
former tenant who had been involved with her in other court cases. She
sought protection for herself as well as several family members, stating she
“fear[ed] for their safety.”
In two attachments, Webb described how Alexander had harassed her.
In the first attachment, she stated: “Paul Alexander is the CEO of Pillars of
the Community. He is aware of the threatening & misconduct of his
employees and is encouraging it instead of telling them to leave us alone. His
parolees keep vandalizing my building, breaking windows, [b]reaking my
cameras, gra[ffiti] my building in retaliation of the eviction paperwork I
filed.”
In the second attachment, she set forth the following six paragraphs:
“By way of history I purchased a property in July of 2021. Mr. Paul
Alexander and La[i]la Azziz of the Pillars of the Community program were
2 SLAPP is an acronym that stands for strategic lawsuit against public
participation.
3 Webb represented herself throughout the restraining order
proceedings, but she retained counsel to represent her after Alexander filed
his anti-SLAPP motion.
2
tenants in the building I purchased. Upon taking over this building there
were items in the lease that the parties were not following, as a result I filed
to have their tenancy terminated. Subsequently they countersued personally
and thus began the harassment. The original lawsuit was granted . . . . I
appealed this decision because I was never properly served.
“As a business owner I have an address that is listed as my agency of
service. Based on their initial service of their lawsuit being served at the
incorrect address, it was subsequently thrown out in court. Now they have
filed a second lawsuit and in ‘attempt to serve me’ are going to all of my listed
properties, despite being provided with my service address at the last court
hearing.
“On Monday October 2, 2023 Mr. Alexander and his attorney Cory
Briggs[ ] sent a very aggressive man from their program[ ] to one of my rental
properties. Despite being given my address of service, this gentleman
knocked on the front door of my tenant and demanded information. He asked
her did I live there, did she know where I lived, and where did she send her
rental payments to, what is her relationship to me. Frightened by this
complete stranger on her door step, she called her son who verbally
demanded this person leave. My tenant called me very shaken up and scared
by this harassment.
“On October 4, 2023 at a different rental property two gentlemen
approached a different tenant and began to harass him with the same
questions regarding my address, where he sent his rental payments to[ ], and
any information he could provide as to my whereabouts.
“I am a single woman with multiple properties[;] Pillars of the
Community is a program created for ex-prisoners, gang members and former
drug addicts. I believe Mr. Alexander and his staff listed above is sending
3
these men in their program to harass my tenants, as well as [in] an attempt
to scare me into dropping the lawsuit. There have been multiple acts of
vandalism to my properties[,] broken windows, unlawful loitering on the
premises.
“As such I am requesting an Order of Protection from Mr. Paul
Alexander, La[i]la Azziz, and any other person employed or associated with
the Pillars of the Community.”
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order pending a hearing
on the petition. The hearing, which was unreported, went forward on
December 5, 2023, before Judge James A. Mangione. Webb was
unrepresented; Alexander was represented by attorney Cory Briggs. Webb
and Alexander testified, as did several other witnesses. After considering the
parties’ presentations, the court found Webb failed to prove her case by clear
and convincing evidence. It dissolved the temporary restraining order,
denied Webb’s request for injunction, and ordered that any costs or attorney
fees would be subject to further motion.
II.
Anti-SLAPP Proceedings
A. Alexander’s Motion
On December 11, 2023, Alexander filed an ex parte application for
permission to schedule an anti-SLAPP motion in lieu of a motion for an
award of attorney fees. In a supporting declaration, Briggs averred that he
had “e-filed” an anti-SLAPP motion “[p]rior to” the December 5 evidentiary
hearing only to learn later that it was rejected because such motions are not
permitted in restraining order cases.4 (Italics added.) Briggs stated the
4 Contrary to this averment, the filed and rejected anti-SLAPP motion
within the record on appeal bears a December 6 file stamp that was
4
rejection was erroneous because although an application for temporary
restraining order is not subject to an anti-SLAPP motion, a petition for an
injunction against civil harassment is. A different judge granted the
application and approved the filing of the anti-SLAPP motion.
Alexander’s operative anti-SLAPP motion was then filed on December
12, 2023. The motion was labeled as a “special motion to strike petitioner’s
request for civil harassment restraining order.” (Capitalization and boldface
omitted.) In his notice of motion and five-page supporting memorandum,
Alexander requested the trial court to strike Webb’s petition in its entirety.
He stated Webb filed her petition (which he referred to as a “lawsuit”) in
retaliation for a lawsuit he filed against her. He asserted her “allegations
make clear that this lawsuit arose from the filing of that lawsuit and that the
alleged misconduct here is protected by the litigation privilege.” As
background, he recited facts from the first four paragraphs of Webb’s second
attachment. He claimed the harassing conduct of which Webb complained
were “attempts to personally serve her,” and argued that “[w]ithout the
allegations about [Alexander’s] constitutionally protected litigation-related
activities, there is nothing left” to support Webb’s claim of harassment. He
argued that he satisfied the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis because his
alleged conduct was protected by the litigation privilege, and asserted that at
the second step, Webb would be unable to prove any likelihood of success.
subsequently cancelled. (Another document in the record appears to reflect
that the motion was transmitted to an e-filing company on December 5 at
1:43 p.m., minutes before the restraining order hearing started, with
directions to file the motion by December 6.) A superior court form indicates
the motion was rejected not only because such motions are not heard in
restraining order matters, but also because of flaws on the face of the motion.
5
In January 2024, the trial court issued a minute order continuing the
hearing on Alexander’s anti-SLAPP motion and soliciting supplemental
briefing on several issues, including whether Alexander’s anti-SLAPP motion
was “still ripe for adjudication notwithstanding that the underlying case
ha[d] been heard [and decided] on the merits,” and if so whether the motion
should be granted and the attorney fees and costs to be awarded in the event
the motion was either granted or denied.
Alexander then filed a supplemental brief. Citing authorities
addressing whether an anti-SLAPP motion filed before case dismissal is
rendered moot by the subsequent dismissal, he argued the opposite sequence
of events—the filing of his anti-SLAPP motion after the resolution of Webb’s
petition—did not render his motion “moot.” Most of his brief, however, was
devoted to advocating for attorney fees. He provided billing records from
Briggs’s law firm and urged the court to award fees and costs of $40,306.94,
enhanced by a multiplier of 1.5, whether under the anti-SLAPP statute,
section 527.6, or both.
B. Webb’s Opposition
Webb, now represented by counsel, filed a brief opposing the anti-
SLAPP motion and addressing the issues in the minute order. She urged the
trial court to deny the motion, arguing the conduct she sought to restrain was
not protected activity. She claimed Alexander had relied on allegations that
merely provided background and had presented her phrase, “ ‘attempt to
serve me,’ ” as an admission when the “entire point” of her allegations was
the harassment of her tenants and attempts to determine her home address
“WERE NOT an ‘attempt to serve me,’ as evidenced by the fact that she puts
that claim in quotes. [¶] ALEXANDER apparently missed the implied air
quotes, and argues that these putative attempts to serve her were the entire
6
basis for the requested [restraining order].” She further contended the
harassment underlying her petition could never arise from valid attempts at
service, because under section 527.6, subdivision (b), “harassment” by
definition requires a “ ‘[c]ourse of conduct,’ ” and “constitutionally protected
activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’ ”
Webb also argued the motion was untimely as well as procedurally
flawed. She asserted that Alexander had filed an “ ‘all-or-nothing’ ” anti-
SLAPP motion that sought to strike her entire petition while addressing only
select allegations and ignoring her claims of vandalism. She cited Paglia &
Associates Construction, Inc. v. Hamilton (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 318, 327
(Paglia), in which the Court of Appeal declined a defendant’s undeveloped
request to strike individual portions of a complaint as an alternative to
striking an entire complaint on the ground “[a]ppellants may not enlist the
court as their legal assistant to develop arguments they merely suggest.”
Relying on Paglia, she urged the court to conclude it was similarly not tasked
with rooting out and striking allegations of protected speech, and argued it
would violate due process for the court to do so absent notice to her. Turning
to the second step, she presented a declaration and argued her petition, even
if based on protected activity, had the minimal merit necessary to proceed.
She also opposed any award of more than nominal costs and fees.
C. Alexander’s Reply
Alexander filed a reply supplemental brief in which he argued “this
lawsuit arose entirely from [Alexander’s] protected service-of-process efforts,”
and even if it did not, under Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 (Baral), an
anti-SLAPP motion “may be directed at particular allegations within a cause
of action.” (Boldface and italics omitted.) He asserted that his motion could
be granted whether the court viewed the allegations of his “service-of-process
7
activities as representing the gravamen of [Webb’s] claims or just a portion
thereof[.]”
In fulfillment of a trial court request, Alexander filed yet another brief
segregating his incurred attorney fees into the following categories:
(1) $20,387.50 for the anti-SLAPP motion; (2) $9,867.50 for a mixture of anti-
SLAPP and petition work “in more or less equal parts”; and (3) $7,125 for
work that was “[n]ot [a]nti-SLAPP.”
D. Ruling
On April 3, 2024, the trial court issued a minute order denying
Alexander’s anti-SLAPP motion and granting in part his request for attorney
fees and costs.5 The court first ruled that the motion was “not rendered
moot” by the fact the petition was dismissed at the conclusion of the
evidentiary hearing. Turning to the merits, the court found that efforts to
serve process are generally a protected activity, and while there “may well be
factual instances where even this generally protected activity could so exceed
the bounds of proper legal process that it would lose this ‘protected activity’
status, . . . there was insufficient evidence in this matter to support the claim
that that happened here.” The court nevertheless denied the motion. Citing
Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1011 (Bonni), it
found Webb’s petition “contained more than the single claim surrounding the
service of process (i.e., vandalism, loitering, etc.),” yet Alexander’s motion
“sought to strike the entire pleading without any more specificity while
addressing only the service of legal process issue.”
Turning to the question of costs and attorney fees, the court found
Alexander prevailed “in this matter” and exercised its discretion to award
5 The motion was decided by Judge Peter Murray.
8
costs and fees. From the requested award of $40,306.94, the court subtracted
$20,387.50 (the amount incurred for the anti-SLAPP motion) and $4,933.75
(50 percent of the $9,867.50 spent on a mixture of tasks). It subtracted
another $2,926.94 (the total cost claim) for failure to segregate between anti-
SLAPP costs and defense costs. The resulting award was $12,058.75.
DISCUSSION
Alexander challenges the denial of his anti-SLAPP motion. He
contends the trial court erred by concluding his motion was overbroad and
lacked specificity. He asks us to “grant the motion[ ] and remand this matter
back to the trial court for determination of the appropriate fee award.” We
decline this request because we conclude he fails to establish the trial court
erred.6
6 Alexander has filed a motion requesting that we take judicial notice of
28 records from superior court cases other than the one that is before us. He
contends the records are relevant to this appeal because they provide “the
procedural and factual background that precipitated the challenged
restraining order at issue here.” He admits, however, that the records to be
noticed were not presented to the trial court and were not made part of the
trial court record. Webb submitted a late opposition which we decline to
consider because she did not show good cause for the delay. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rules 8.54(a)(3) [opposition “must” be filed within 15 days of motion],
8.60(b) [good cause must be shown to excuse delay].)
As for Alexander’s request for judicial notice, it is denied. Alexander
correctly observes that we have discretion to take judicial notice of court
records. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) However, the court records that are
the subject of his motion were not presented to the trial court. Appellate
courts “generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the
trial court” unless exceptional circumstances “justify deviating from that
rule.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434,
444, fn. 3.) Alexander asserts that the “lawsuits” reflected in the records
were discussed during “the hearings in the instant matter.” However, he
does not show this qualifies as an exceptional circumstance that justifies us
in taking judicial notice of new records on appeal.
9
I.
Principles of Law
Section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, “authorizes a special motion to
strike a claim ‘arising from any act of [the moving party] in furtherance of
[the party’s] right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.’
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
871, 884.) “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any
liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It
only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims
arising from protected activity.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.)
“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step process. First,
‘the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged
allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the defendant
has engaged.’ ” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.) “The defendant’s
burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show
how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected
activity.” (Ibid.) “Second, for each claim that does arise from protected
activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has at least ‘minimal merit.’ If the
plaintiff cannot make this showing, the court will strike the claim.” (Ibid.
[cleaned up].)
We review the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion de novo, using the same
two-step process as the trial court. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California
State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park); Castleman v. Sagaser
(2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 490.) Although our standard of review is de
novo, the appellant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error.
(Luo v. Volokh (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1312, 1322.)
10
II.
Alexander Fails To Demonstrate Error
It is apparent from the progression of the parties’ briefs to the ruling on
the anti-SLAPP motion that the trial court was persuaded by Webb’s
contention Alexander failed to meet his burden because he filed an overly
broad “all-or-nothing” motion that sought to strike her entire petition while
neglecting to address all allegations in the petition.
Alexander contends the trial court’s ruling was erroneous for several
reasons, including that it was inconsistent with case law in mixed cause of
action cases.7 We disagree. As we will explain, the ruling was not only
consistent with but was directedly supported by Baral, Bonni, and
subsequent cases like Paglia, on which Webb’s opposition argument relied.
Paglia is one of several recent published cases holding that a court may
properly decline to provide the analysis necessary to support striking
individual allegations or claims within a mixed cause of action when the anti-
SLAPP movant has failed to do so. (Paglia, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 327;
Park v. Nazari (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1107–1109 (Nazari); Young v.
Midland Funding LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 63, 95–100 (Young); Littlefield
v. Littlefield (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 815, 825–827 (Littlefield).) These cases
7 “ ‘[C]ause of action’ ” has different meanings depending on context.
(Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 381.) It may refer to the counts pleaded in a
complaint (e.g. “ ‘first cause of action,’ ” “ ‘second cause of action’ ”). (Ibid.) It
may also refer to an injured person’s legal claim, regardless of whether a
lawsuit has been filed. (Ibid.) Section 425.16 uses “cause of action” in a
particular way to target claims based on protected activity, regardless of how
the complaint is framed. (Baral, at p. 382.)
A pleaded count is sometimes called a “ ‘ “mixed cause of action” ’ ”
when it “rests on allegations of multiple acts, some of which constitute
protected activity and some of which do not.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 1010.)
11
are based on familiar principles of forfeiture, such as “[t]he duty to present
legal analysis belongs to the parties” (Paglia, at p. 327) and “litigants who
want courts to consider something are generally expected to identify it”
(Littlefield, at p. 826), and on the burden our Supreme Court placed on anti-
SLAPP movants in Baral and Bonni to identify and analyze the allegations
targeted by the motion (see Nazari, at pp. 1107–1108 [discussing Baral and
Bonni]; Young, at pp. 99–100 [same]; Littlefield, at pp. 825–827 [same]).
These cases were issued before Alexander filed his opening brief on appeal;
all but Littlefield were issued before he filed his anti-SLAPP motion; and all
of them support affirming the denial of his motion.
The forfeiture principles underlying the holdings of these cases are
familiar and require no explanation. We therefore begin by briefly
summarizing the recent high court decisions on which the cases are
predicated. In doing so, we draw in part from Nazari.
In Baral, our high court held that “an anti-SLAPP motion, like a
conventional motion to strike, may be used to attack parts of a count as
pleaded.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 393.) However, the movant’s ability
to challenge parts of a pleading comes with an attendant burden. “At the
first step, the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all
allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them.”
(Id. at p. 396.) Complying with this obligation is “crucial” “because
complaints frequently include claims arising from protected activity
alongside claims arising from unprotected activity, as well as ‘so-called
“mixed cause[s] of action” that combine[ ] allegations of activity protected by
the statute with allegations of unprotected activity.’ ” (Nazari, supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at p. 1107, quoting Baral, at p. 381.)
12
Following Baral, most Courts of Appeal took “a claim-by-claim
approach to the anti-SLAPP analysis, rather than attempting to evaluate a
cause of action as a whole.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.) “In Bonni,
our Supreme Court considered the minority view that courts need not follow
this approach—and may instead analyze whether the ‘gravamen’ of a pleaded
cause of action concerns protected activity—‘when a defendant has moved to
strike an entire cause of action rather than individual claims within a
pleaded count.’ (Id. at p. 1011.) The court rejected this view, holding that
Baral’s claim-by-claim analysis is required ‘even though [the defendants]
sought to strike [an] entire cause of action, rather than merely parts of it.’
(Ibid.)” (Nazari, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1107–1108.)
“Bonni did not hold, however, that every invocation of the anti-SLAPP
statute, however broad, requires plaintiffs or courts to perform the claim-by-
claim analysis prescribed in Baral. To the contrary, Bonni recognizes a
‘nonmovant should not be put to the burden of parsing the cause of action in
the moving party’s stead’ and explains that ‘well-established anti-SLAPP law’
provides a solution when an anti-SLAPP movant seeks to impose burdens on
the nonmovant or the trial court by filing an overbroad or nonspecific motion:
‘attention to the allocation of the applicable burden of proof.’ (Bonni, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) ‘If a cause of action contains multiple claims and a
moving party fails to identify how the speech or conduct underlying some of
those claims is protected activity, it will not carry its first-step burden as to
those claims.’ (Ibid.)” (Nazari, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1108.)
Nazari applied these principles from Baral and Bonni to an anti-
SLAPP motion targeting a complaint asserting multiple claims based on
fraudulent promissory notes underlying liens recorded against real
properties. (Nazari, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1103–1104.) The
13
defendants argued in their motion that the entire complaint arose from
protected litigation-related activity and should be stricken. (Id. at p. 1105,
citing § 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) At the hearing, the defendants suggested the
trial court could strike a limited set of the plaintiffs’ allegations even if it did
not strike the complaint in its entirety. (Nazari, at p. 1105.) The trial court
declined the request, ruling that while courts may grant a motion to strike
individual allegations of protected activity within a complaint or cause of
action, no authority requires such an analysis “ ‘where the movant has taken
the position that the entire complaint arises from protected activity and
requests that the entire complaint be stricken.’ ” (Id. at p. 1106.) The trial
court emphasized the burden is on anti-SLAPP movants to undertake the
analysis required to support striking individual allegations, and courts have
no “ ‘freestanding obligation . . . to cure defects in an overbroad motion.’ ”
(Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal held the trial court’s approach to the anti-SLAPP
motion was correct. (Nazari, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1106.) It explained
the Supreme Court’s guidance in Baral and Bonni demonstrates that “while
courts may strike less than the entirety of a complaint or pleaded cause of
action, the trial court is not required to take on the burden of identifying the
allegations susceptible to a special motion to strike. If a defendant wants the
trial court to take a surgical approach, whether in the alternative or not, the
defendant must propose where to make the incisions.” (Nazari, at p. 1109.)
This requires, at a minimum, that the defendant identify in the initial motion
each challenged claim, and explain “ ‘the claim’s elements, the actions alleged
to establish those elements, and wh[y] those actions are protected.’ ” (Ibid.)
“Because [the defendants] moved to strike only the entire complaint, and did
not identify in their motion individual claims or allegations that should be
14
stricken even if the entire complaint were not, the trial court was permitted
to deny the anti-SLAPP motion once it concluded—correctly—that the
complaint presented at least one claim that did not arise from anti-SLAPP
protected conduct.” (Id. at p. 1106.)
A similar conclusion was reached in Young. There, the defendants had
filed an anti-SLAPP motion challenging all of a plaintiff’s causes of action.
They briefly noted the right to challenge specific allegations within a cause of
action but did not directly request the striking of specific allegations in the
motion itself. (Young, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 72.) After the trial court
granted the motion, the Court of Appeal reversed on the ground the plaintiff
established her causes of action had minimal merit. Defendants argued in
their respondents’ brief that certain “ ‘derivative claims’ ” alleged by the
plaintiff did not have minimal merit and should be analyzed separately. (Id.
at pp. 95–96.) The appellate court disagreed. It observed that under Bonni,
“ ‘[t]he nonmovant is not faced with the burden of having to make the moving
party’s case for it,’ ” and added, “on appeal, the reviewing court should not be
put to that burden either.” (Young, at p. 100, quoting Bonni, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 1011.) The defendants had failed to carry their moving burden,
including because they “failed to dissect each of the . . . legal theories
presented, element-by-element” and establish how the derivative claims met
the required elements. (Young, at p. 97.) Their appellate briefing was also
deficient because their request to strike the subset of derivative claims was
“highly general” and directed at “all ‘derivative claims’ as an aggregate.” (Id.
at p. 100.) “Thus, whether we describe what we have here as a failure to
meet the initial first-step burden or a forfeiture on appeal, the [defendants’]
. . . request has not been properly framed.” (Ibid.; see ibid., fn. 15 [describing
15
the steps an anti-SLAPP movant should take to present a Baral-style
challenge properly].)
In Littlefield, the defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike a
petition with three causes of action, each predicated on factual allegations
asserting the breach of cotrustees’ obligations. (Littlefield, supra, 106
Cal.App.5th at pp. 819–822.) In their motion, the defendants sought to strike
the entire petition, or alternatively “all causes of action and the prayer for
relief.” (Id. at p. 822.) However, within their motion they only addressed a
subset of purportedly protected allegations relating to a request for
injunction. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the motion on the ground the
defendants failed to address all allegations of protected activity relevant to
the request for injunction, and failed to identify the elements of that claim or
the actions supplying each element. (Id. at p. 823.) The Court of Appeal
affirmed, holding Nazari and Young “control the outcome here.” (Littlefield,
at p. 827.) “Although [defendants] moved ‘in the alternative’ to strike all
causes of action in their entirety, they did not show that the petition or any
cause of action asserted in it was based solely on protected activity, and they
did not identify individual allegations or claims that they believed should be
stricken even if the petition or entire causes of action were not.” (Ibid.)
Finally, as for Paglia, there the defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion
that asked the court to strike the entire complaint but “did not ask the court
to strike particular parts.” (Paglia, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 322.) On
appeal, the court declined to grant an alternative request to strike portions of
the complaint. (Id. at p. 327.) The defendant’s appellate brief listed 22
alleged defamatory statements but did not supply legal arguments,
authorities, facts, or record citations for each statement. This was
16
insufficient because “[a]ppellants may not enlist the court as their legal
assistant to develop arguments they merely suggest.” (Ibid.)
Turning back to this case, on our independent review of Alexander’s
anti-SLAPP motion, we find it has the same deficiencies as the motions in the
foregoing cases. Although Webb’s petition at best stated only a mixed cause
of action, Alexander did not seek to strike only the allegations that were
assertedly protected. Instead, he stated in his notice of motion and in his
motion that he sought to strike the petition in its entirety. The proposed
order he provided to the trial court stated, “the special motion to strike
Petitioner’s operative pleading is granted.” (Italics added.) Yet within his
motion, he addressed only a subset of Webb’s allegations, characterizing them
as describing legitimate, protected attempts to serve her with process, while
ignoring her allegations of loitering, vandalism, “breaking windows,
[b]reaking my cameras, [and] gra[ffitiing] my building”—activities that could
not possibly be protected. As in Young, Alexander briefly noted the right to
challenge specific allegations within a cause of action but did not directly
request the striking of specific allegations. (Young, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
p. 72.) Nor did he identify allegations to be stricken in the event the trial
court declined to strike the entire petition, or dissect, element-by-element,
how Webb’s legal theory of harassment arose from them.8 (Id. at p. 97.)
8 The elements of unlawful harassment, as defined by section 527.6, are
“(1) a knowing and willful course of conduct (2) directed at a specific person;
(3) which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person; (4) which serves
no legitimate purpose; (5) which would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress and actually causes substantial emotional
distress to the plaintiff; and (6) which is not a constitutionally protected
activity.” (E.G. v. M.L. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 688, 699, italics added.)
Within the factual and procedural background section of his motion,
Alexander made a passing reference to the first, second, and fourth elements,
but only as part of a broad, descriptive assertion that without the allegations
17
Given the manner in which Alexander framed and argued his motion,
we agree with the trial court that he failed to carry his burden as an anti-
SLAPP movant. Alexander moved to strike the entire petition but “did not
show that the petition . . . was based solely on protected activity, and [he] did
not identify individual allegations or claims that [he] believed should be
stricken even if the petition . . . were not.” (Littlefield, supra, 106
Cal.App.5th at p. 827.) He “failed to dissect each of the . . . legal theories
presented, element-by-element.” (Young, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 97.)
“Because [Alexander] moved to strike only the entire [petition], and did not
identify in [his] motion individual claims or allegations that should be
stricken even if the entire complaint were not, the trial court was permitted
to deny the anti-SLAPP motion once it concluded—correctly—that the
[petition] presented at least one claim that did not arise from anti-SLAPP
protected conduct.” (Nazari, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1106.)
Alexander similarly fails to articulate and justify particularized relief
in his appellate briefs. He contends the trial court erred because he
addressed “ ‘the service of legal process issue’ ” and therefore did sufficiently
identify the allegations to be stricken. (Boldface and italics omitted.) He
points out that he cited Baral in his trial court briefs and suggests his
repeated references to his “ ‘attempts to serve [Webb]’ ” should have been
considered sufficient to support granting targeted relief. We disagree, for the
reasons we have already discussed. We also observe that even on appeal
of protected service of process activities, there was “nothing left” in the
petition to establish these elements of harassment. He did not acknowledge
any of the remaining requirements for a claim of unlawful harassment,
including that the statutory definition of “ ‘[c]ourse of conduct’ ” excludes
constitutionally protected activity (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1)), and he did not
address whether legitimate efforts to serve process could satisfy this element
so as to support a claim of harassment.
18
Alexander never directly states which specific text should have been stricken
from the petition and does not analyze how any particular allegation satisfied
the elements of a claim for injunctive relief. He concludes his opening brief
by asking us to simply “grant the motion” and remand for the trial court to
determine an appropriate fee award. Setting aside that this request is
misplaced because an appellate court reviews, rather than issues, rulings on
trial court motions, these aspects of the briefs suggest Alexander’s goal is
simply to get the anti-SLAPP motion granted—whatever that might entail in
the mind of the court—so he can have the chance to obtain the attorney fees
available for prevailing on an anti-SLAPP motion.
The problem with this approach, of course, is that the burden is on the
anti-SLAPP movant, not this court, to provide the analysis necessary to grant
relief. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1011; Young, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
p. 100; Paglia, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 327.) Even if we could surmise on
our own which allegations Alexander probably believes should be stricken
and how they “probably align, element-by-element, with the legal theories
[Webb was] pursuing, . . . we have no obligation to do so on appeal.” (Young,
at p. 98.) Alexander filed his anti-SLAPP motion long after Baral was issued,
yet he did not move for particularized relief, provide the developed arguments
required to justify particularized relief, and cannot now be heard to complain
he should have received particularized relief. In short, his arguments are
deficient “whether we describe what we have here as a failure to meet the
initial first-step burden or a forfeiture on appeal.” (Young, at p. 100.)
Moreover, even if not forfeited, Alexander’s appellate arguments lack
merit. He asserts that under Baral “ ‘unprotected activity is
disregarded’ ” at the first step (see Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396), and
suggests the trial court violated this rule by considering at the first step that
19
Webb’s petition included allegations of unprotected activity his motion failed
to address. Alexander’s reliance on this aspect of Baral is misplaced.
Although he is correct that Baral stated “unprotected activity is disregarded”
at the first step of the anti-SLAPP procedure (ibid), he is incorrect insofar as
he interprets this to mean courts must ignore allegations of unprotected
activity when determining whether the movant is justified in seeking to have
all of the plaintiff’s allegations stricken. Baral dealt with the opposite
scenario from the one we have here: an anti-SLAPP motion that sought to
strike specific allegations from a complaint, and a ruling holding the motion
was not broad enough because it did not seek to strike an entire cause of
action or the complaint as a whole. (Id. at p. 384.) Baral does not stand for
the proposition that a trial court errs by considering at the first step whether
an anti-SLAPP motion directed at an entire pleading is overly broad because
the pleading alleges both protected and unprotected activities. (See
American Federation of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1996) 13
Cal.4th 1017, 1039 [cases are not authority for propositions not considered].)
Alexander also notes that in Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82,
92, our high court stated, “The anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is not
the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s activity
that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity
constitutes protected speech or petitioning.” He relies on this statement to
quarrel with Webb’s contention that the trial court could properly consider
whether all allegations in her petition constituted protected activity. His
point appears to be that the trial court should have considered activities and
not allegations. Setting aside that he overreads Navellier, the trial court did
this. It found the petition described unprotected activity (loitering and
vandalism) that Alexander did not acknowledge or address, and reasoned the
20
motion was therefore overbroad because it did not seek to carve out only the
protected activity.
Next, Alexander asserts that in an anti-SLAPP motion, “The essential
inquiry is . . . whether, but-for the anti-SLAPP movant’s prior litigation,
would there have been a factual or legal scenario giving rise to a subsequent
lawsuit.” He identifies Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 1064, as the source of
this rule. He then argues at length that the trial court should therefore have
granted his motion because “without the prior litigation history” between the
parties, “there would be no claims by respondent.” Alexander’s argument
fails at the outset, however, because his purported rule badly misstates the
holding of Park. Park addressed the nexus that must exist “between a
challenged claim and the defendant’s protected activity for the claim to be
struck.” (Park, at p. 1060.) It held that “a claim may be struck only if the
speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just
evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability
is asserted.” (Ibid.) Alexander’s purported rule, and the arguments that
stem from it, assume incorrectly that the opposite is true.
Finally, Alexander appears to contend that Webb, by defending the
trial court’s ruling, is adopting the gravamen approach rejected in Bonni. We
disagree. Under the gravamen approach, a court issues an up-or-down ruling
on a challenge to a mixed cause of action based on the court’s view of the
cause of action’s “ ‘essence.’ ” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) Webb has
not advocated such an approach. Instead, she argues in her respondent’s
brief that “[w]hen an anti-SLAPP motion is directed at an entire claim, the
burden is on the party making an anti-SLAPP motion to demonstrate that
each factual allegation that supports the claim constitutes protected activity.”
21
For all the reasons we have discussed, Alexander fails to show this position is
incorrect.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. Webb is
entitled to recover her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
22
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.