People v. McCowen CA4/2

CourtListener 10667786Calctapp8 set 2025

Testo completo

Filed 9/8/25 P. v. McCowen CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E084949

v. (Super.Ct.No. FVA010377)

MARCIL McCOWEN, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Elia V. Pirozzi,

Judge. Affirmed.

Marcil McCowen, in pro. per.; and Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
Marcil McCowen appeals the denial of his Penal Code section 1172.61 petition to

vacate his conviction for murder. After his counsel filed a no-issue brief requesting we

independently review the record following the procedures set out in People v. Wende

(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders),

McCowen filed his own supplemental brief. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 1998 McCowen was at an acquaintance’s apartment when the victim arrived to

drop off a birthday present. McCowen got into an altercation with the victim, and then

shot and killed him. McCowen later claimed he did so in self-defense after the victim

tried to rush him.

McCowen was charged with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). The complaint also

alleged McCowen personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing injury.

(§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1); 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d); 12022.5, subd (a)(1).) At trial, his

jury was instructed on theories of premeditated murder, second-degree murder, and

second-degree felony murder. The second-degree felony murder instruction was based

on a theory that the murder occurred during the crime of assault with a firearm, which is

not one of the Penal Code section 189 felonies that could support a first-degree murder

conviction, but which, at the time of McCowen’s conviction, could have supported a

second-degree felony murder conviction (see generally People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th

1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.

2
1172). The jury found McCowen guilty of first-degree murder, and found true the

allegation that he personally discharged a firearm causing death.

In 2023 McCowen filed a petition under section 1172.6, alleging he was convicted

under a now invalid theory of murder and requesting resentencing. The court found his

petition stated a prima facie case and held an evidentiary hearing. The court heard

evidence and argument from both parties in September 2024, took the matter under

submission, then denied the petition in a written ruling. In this written order, the trial

court said it reviewed the transcripts from McCowen’s trial and concluded “the facts are

uncontroverted that Petitioner personally killed the victim.” In addition to this factual

finding, the court also noted that “[a]lthough the jury was instructed on felony murder,

the record of conviction irrefutably establishes as a matter of law that the jury determined

Petitioner was the actual killer.” Accordingly, the trial court denied McCowen’s petition,

and he appealed.

ANALYSIS

On McCowen’s request, we appointed counsel to represent him on appeal.

Counsel filed a brief declaring they found no arguably meritorious issues to appeal,

setting out a statement of the case, and asking us to conduct an independent review of the

record.

When appealing from a postconviction order a defendant does not have a

constitutional right to independent review under Anders/Wende if appellate counsel

cannot identify any arguable issues. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 231.)

3
However, “[i]f the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court

of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to

issue a written opinion.” (Id. at p. 232.) Here, after appellate counsel filed a brief

notifying us McCowen’s appeal presented no arguable issues, we offered McCowen an

opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, and he did so. We therefore treat that

supplemental brief as an opening brief and address it on the merits.

In 2018, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018, Reg. Sess.)

(Stats. 2018 ch. 1015), effective January 1, 2019, which among other things amended the

definition of felony murder in section 189. This amended felony-murder rule restricted

culpability for murder to actual killers, aiders and abettors, and anyone who was “a major

participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life”

unless the victim was a peace officer. (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)-(3), (f).) Senate Bill No.1437

also added section 1170.95, later renumbered to section 1172.6, which allows “[a] person

convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences

doctrine,” to “file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the

petitioner’s murder . . . conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining

counts,” if, among other things, “[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of

murder” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)), because of the changes to the law wrought by Senate Bill

No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) If the petition makes a prima facie case for relief the

court must hold an evidentiary hearing. At this hearing, the People have the burden to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner could still be convicted of murder

4
under the law as it exists now, with the trial judge sitting as factfinder. (§ 1172.6,

subds. (b), (d)(3).)

We review the trial court’s decision as factfinder for substantial evidence. (People

v. Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 652, 663.) “The scope of our review for substantial

evidence is well settled. The test is not whether the People met their burden of proving

beyond a reasonable doubt that [the petitioner] was ineligible for resentencing, but rather

‘whether any rational trier of fact could have’ made the same determination, namely that

‘[t]he record . . . disclose[s] . . . evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—

such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [as did the superior court].’ ” (Id. at p. 663.)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that McCowen was

the actual killer and is therefore ineligible for relief. McCowen testified in his own

defense and admitted to personally shooting the victim. Eyewitnesses also testified that

McCowen shot the victim, and that he was the only one who had a gun. This is more

than sufficient evidence for a factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that

McCowen was the actual killer, and therefore could still be convicted of first-degree

murder under current California law. In fact, the only first-degree murder theory

presented to his jury was premeditated murder.

Nevertheless, McCowen raises four arguments, two of which contest the trial

court’s factual finding that he is ineligible for relief, and two of which contest alleged

errors in his underlying trial. First, he argues the prosecution could not have met the

beyond a reasonable doubt standard, because it did not present any new evidence for the

5
court to consider. Second, he argues the trial court did not affirmatively address whether

he could be convicted under a still valid theory of murder. Third, he argues there were

errors in his original trial, because a felony murder instruction should not have been

given. Finally, he argues there was improperly admitted evidence in his underlying trial.

Each of these arguments is unavailing. First, the prosecution need not offer new

evidence to prove a fact beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly where the fact they need

to prove, that McCowen was the actual killer, was demonstrated (even admitted in his

testimony) at the trial. The record of McCowen’s trial was sufficient evidence to meet

their burden. Second, the trial court affirmatively addressed whether McCowen could

still be convicted of murder, and concluded he could because even at the time of his

conviction he was convicted on a still-valid theory. Finally, a petition for relief under

1172.6 is not a proper vehicle to challenge errors in McCowen’s trial or conviction.

“Section 1172.6 does not create a right to a second appeal, and [McCowen] cannot use it

to resurrect a claim that should have been raised in his . . . direct appeal.” (People v.

Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865.)

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision denying McCowen’s petition for

resentencing.

6
DISPOSITION

We affirm.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAPHAEL
J.
We concur:

CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.

MENETREZ
J.

7

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.