People v. Cook CA2/6

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Filed 9/4/25 P. v. Cook CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B331904
(Super. Ct. No. 2021030746)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

KEITH ERIC COOK,

Defendant and Appellant.

Keith Eric Cook appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of second degree robbery with a true finding of
personal firearm use (Pen. Code,1 §§ 211, 12022.53, subd. (b);
count 1); false imprisonment with violence (§ 236; count 2); and
unlawful possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3).
Cook admitted that he was on bail when he committed the
offenses (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)) and admitted two prior serious
felony convictions and strikes under the “Three Strikes” law

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
(§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1)).
The trial court sentenced Cook to 42 years to life in state prison.
Cook contends there was insufficient evidence that he aided and
abetted false imprisonment. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Cook and Jason Hoyland entered the Wild Tobacco and Gift
Shop in Ventura. They were both masked, dressed in black, and
armed. They approached the store owner, M.T. Hoyland had a
“bag” on him. As Hoyland approached the register, Cook pointed
a “short gun” at M.T. and said, “Don’t fuck with us.” Hoyland,
holding a rifle, pushed M.T. into a chair and zip tied his hands.
Cook pointed his firearm at M.T. while Hoyland put zip ties on
him. Hoyland then emptied the cash register and moved
throughout the store, taking items from the shelves and putting
them inside a duffle bag.
L.C., a patron, entered the store at approximately 11 p.m.
When he walked inside the store, L.C. stood in the pathway of the
“only one way in and out.” L.C. had his head down when
someone told him, “Hey, buddy, why don’t you have a seat over
there.” L.C. looked up and saw a “gun.” It looked like an “assault
rifle.” He said the man “had a mask” and was “kind of like
pointing, gesturing me to go sit down over there.” L.C. “instantly
knew [the store] was getting robbed.” L.C. sat down behind the
display counter. He could see M.T. “zip-tied” next to him.
L.C. was “almost positive there were two people” in the
store. The second person said, “We need to go.” While he “didn’t
see a second person,” he could “tell that there was more than one
person moving around.” He explained there was “more than one
person moving around” “[b]ecause from the movements there
would be like one person here and then I think another person

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ran across again to the other side of the store.” L.C. complied
with the directive to “move over and sit down on the floor”
because he “didn’t want to start any problems.” He said, “I
figured if I just keep my head down and comply and do whatever
they want, then there wouldn’t be an issue.”
Cook and Hoyland eventually fled the store. Law
enforcement found a duffle bag “full of black zip ties and some
duct tape” inside a vehicle linked to Cook and Hoyland.
During closing, defense counsel argued that it was Hoyland
who perpetrated the false imprisonment and that “[t]here is no
evidence that the second person by words or conduct did anything
to help effectuate that.” In rebuttal, the prosecutor said Cook
“was holding the handgun as Hoyland was zip-tying” M.T. Thus,
Cook and Hoyland “went into [the] store with the intention to
detain, imprison everybody in there” and “were working in
concert.”
The jury convicted Cook of second degree robbery with the
personal use of a firearm (§§ 211, 12022.53, subd. (b)), felony
false imprisonment (§ 236), and unlawful possession of a firearm
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). In a bifurcated proceeding, Cook admitted
he was on bail when he committed the offenses (§ 12022.1, subd.
(b)). Cook also admitted two prior serious felony convictions and
strikes under the Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1),
(e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1).)
The trial court denied Cook’s motion to dismiss the prior
strike allegations pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 and sentenced him to an aggregate term of
42 years to life in state prison: 25 years to life under the Three
Strikes law for robbery, plus 10 years for the personal firearm
use enhancement; five years for a prior serious felony

3
enhancement; two years for the on bail enhancement; six years
concurrent for false imprisonment; and six years concurrent for
the unlawful possession of a firearm.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the evidence
Cook contends there is no evidence that he aided and
abetted the direct perpetrator Hoyland’s false imprisonment of
L.C. We are not persuaded.
A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when
“acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing,
encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by
act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the
commission of the crime.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d
547, 561.) Neither presence at the scene of a crime nor
knowledge of, but failure to prevent a crime, is sufficient to
establish aiding and abetting its commission. (People v.
Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409.) But a court may
nonetheless consider presence at the scene, companionship, and
conduct before and after the offense when determining whether a
defendant is guilty of aiding and abetting the perpetrator. (Ibid.)
Aiding and abetting may be committed “on the spur of the
moment.” (People v. Eskew (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 205, 207.) A
person may aid and abet a criminal offense without having
agreed to do so prior to the act. (People v. Durham (1969) 70
Cal.2d 171, 181.) Thus, it is not necessary that the direct
perpetrator expressly communicate their criminal purpose to an
abettor since that purpose may be apparent from the
circumstances. (People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518,
531–532.)

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“[W]e review the whole record to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]
The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the
verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value . . . . In applying this test, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of
the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably
have deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43
Cal.4th 327, 357.) “We ‘must accept logical inferences that the
jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’ ”
(Ibid.) “ ‘We do not reweigh evidence . . . .’ ‘Resolution of conflicts
and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of
the trier of fact.’ ” (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 106.)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s
finding that Cook aided and abetted Hoyland in the false
imprisonment of L.C. Regarding Cook’s knowledge that Hoyland
would restrain potential intervenors, including patrons, both
Hoyland and Cook were armed and wearing masks. Hoyland had
a bag with him that contained zip ties and duct tape. Cook
helped Hoyland rob the store owner by pointing his firearm at
him while Hoyland put zip ties on him. Zip ties were later
located in a car linked to Cook and Hoyland. Based on this
evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Cook knew
Hoyland would restrain patrons, including L.C., through menace
or violence. “ ‘ “Menace” ’ is defined as “ ‘ “a threat of harm
express or implied by word or act.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Wardell (2008)
162 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1490.) “Violence” is defined as “ ‘ “where
the force used is greater than that reasonably necessary to effect
the restraint.” ’ ” (People v. Dominguez (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th

5
1351, 1357.) And here, restraint was accomplished by Hoyland
and Cook wearing masks, carrying firearms, carrying zip ties,
and using them if necessary. (Dominguez, at p. 1360 [essential
element of false imprisonment is restraint of the person].)
We also conclude there was substantial evidence that Cook
intended to facilitate restraint and encouraged it by moving
across the store while masked and armed. L.C. “instantly” knew
there was a robbery in progress when he entered the store. He
believed there were two people in the store because he could hear
the movement of a second person running to the other side of the
store. L.C. said he complied with the direct perpetrator’s
directives to do “whatever they want,” which supports the
prosecutor’s argument that Hoyland and Cook “were working in
concert.” (Italics added.)
There was also “only one way in and out” of the store. L.C.
knew there was a second person present, and he complied to
avoid “any issues.” Had Cook not been moving around the store,
L.C. may have had a means of escape. The jury could reasonably
conclude that Cook facilitated and encouraged the restraint of
persons who might interfere with the robbery, including patrons
such as L.C. Collectively, the evidence reasonably supports the
judgment because Cook essentially acted as an armed “lookout”
who blocked the only egress out of the store. Acting as a lookout
can constitute aiding and abetting behavior. (See, e.g., People v.
Campbell, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 409 [blocking one’s view,
diverting suspicion, and watching for others who might approach
are textbook examples of aiding and abetting behavior]; People v.
Dyer (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 176, 180 [aider-and-abettor liability
attached because the defendant’s “presence [during the attack on
the victim] lent support and encouragement to his companions

6
and created a greater threat in the mind of the victim”].) The
jury rejected the defense theory that there was “no evidence that
[Cook] did anything.” Substantial evidence supports the
conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

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David R. Worley, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and David F. Glassman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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