CourtListener 10664719•In re D.R. CA1/3
Testo completo
Filed 9/2/25 In re D.R. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re D.R., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172373, 172380
v.
D.R., (City & County of San Francisco
Super. Ct. No. JD24-3074)
Defendant and Appellant,
R.S.,
Objector and Appellant,
BY THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on August 29, 2025, be
modified as follows:
The superior court case number, shown as JC24-3074 on the opinion
through clerical error and inadvertence, is ordered modified to reflect the
correct case number of JD24-3074, as shown on the caption above.
Dated:9/2/2025 Tucher, P.J.___
TUCHER, P.J.
1
Filed 8/29/25 In re D.R. CA1/3 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re D.R., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172373, 172380
v.
(City & County of San Francisco
D.R.,
Super. Ct. No. JC24-3074)
Defendant and Appellant,
R.S.,
Objector and Appellant,
D.R. II (Minor) was exposed to methamphetamine before he was born
prematurely in April 2024, and he was removed from his parents’ care. His
paternal grandmother, R.S. (Grandmother) sought to have Minor placed with
her, but the San Francisco County Human Services Agency (the Agency) did
not do so because of her criminal record.
Several months after the dispositional hearing, Grandmother filed a
request that the court change its order placing Minor in foster care and
1
instead place him in her home. After considering the documents the parties
submitted and Grandmother’s statements to the court—but without hearing
testimony—the juvenile court denied her request. By that time, reunification
services had been terminated and a permanency planning hearing had been
set. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)1
Both Minor’s father, D.R. (Father), and Grandmother have appealed
the order denying Grandmother’s request to have Minor placed in her care,
and we have consolidated their appeals. They contend that, by failing to hold
a full evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court abused its discretion and denied
Grandmother her right to due process of law; they also contend the Agency
and the juvenile court failed to evaluate Grandmother appropriately for
emergency placement. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Jurisdiction and Disposition
Minor was born at 30 weeks’ gestation and was hospitalized for several
weeks after his birth. The Agency filed a dependency petition on May 1,
2024, alleging Minor’s mother (Mother) had used methamphetamine
throughout her pregnancy and that she and Father both had a history of
substance abuse and mental health problems that placed Minor, then three
weeks old, at risk of harm.2 (§ 300, subd. (b).)
By the time the petition was filed, Mother had told the social worker
she and Father would like Grandmother to be Minor’s guardian, if one was
necessary, and Grandmother had expressed interest in being assessed for
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 Mother is not a party this appeal, and we need not describe in detail
the allegations and facts pertaining to her.
2
possible placement. Grandmother had notified a social worker that she had a
history with Child Protective Services, as well as a criminal record, and that
she was currently receiving mental health services. Father explained he had
been removed from Grandmother’s care when he was a young child because
she was a minor parent, and then was returned to her care at age 13. The
Agency reported in its detention report that an assessment of Grandmother
for resource family approval (RFA)3 was pending.
At the detention hearing on May 2 and May 3, 2024, the juvenile court
ordered Minor detained in foster care. He was placed with foster parents
when he was released from the hospital in mid-May 2024, and he has
remained in their home ever since.
On July 22, 2024, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional and
dispositional hearing. The court declared Minor a dependent, ordered him
placed in foster care, and ordered reunification services for Father and
Mother.
Agency’s Actions Regarding Relative Placement
In May 2024, the Agency sent Grandmother, as well as other relatives,
letters informing them that Minor had been removed, giving them contact
information for the Agency, and telling them what they would need to do to
be approved as a relative caregiver.
In the report for the July 2024 hearing, the Agency reported that
Grandmother could not be considered for emergency placement because of
her “history.” However, she had been referred for resource family approval.
3 The Resource Family Approval Program replaced previous processes
for licensing foster family homes and approving relative and other placement
providers. (§ 16519.5, subds. (a) & (c)(4)(A).)
3
By October 2024, the Agency reported that, “[w]ith regard to
[Grandmother] being considered to be an RFA Caregiver, there are many
concerns about her history”: She had been clean and sober for one year, she
had a lengthy child welfare and criminal history, and she had a history of
homelessness, having obtained housing only within the last year. The
following month, the Agency reiterated these concerns and explained to the
juvenile court that Grandmother might not be able to pass the necessary
background check for approval as a caregiver.
Agency’s Request for Termination of Reunification Services
During the reunification period, Mother and Father neither visited
Minor regularly nor engaged in other services offered to them. On October
15, 2024, the Agency filed a request that the court terminate reunification
services. (§ 388.) A hearing on the request was set for December 23, 2024.
Grandmother’s Request for Placement
In the meantime, on December 4, 2024, Grandmother filed a request
under section 388 for the juvenile court to change its July 22, 2024 order
placing Minor in foster care. She asserted that she had consistently sought to
have Minor placed in her care, that she had participated in and completed
RFA trainings, that her home had passed inspection as being physically
suitable, and that she had been clean and sober for two years. She sought an
order resuming visits with Minor—visits the court had terminated several
months earlier when it terminated Minor’s visits with his parents—and
providing for a transition plan that would result in him being placed with her
full-time. According to an attachment, Grandmother had completed all
required foster parent classes, a separate eight-hour infant parenting class,
and CPR classes.
4
Grandmother acknowledged she had a criminal history, including
arrests for possession of drugs, possession of stolen property, and using her
sister’s driver’s license. The drug possession charges had taken place as
recently as 2022, but the other convictions were older. Grandmother asserted
that she had been clean and sober since November 2022, that she had had
stable housing for the last year and a half, and that she received regular
therapy and psychiatric treatment to support her sobriety and mental health.
She had been told that her RFA application was denied because her sobriety
was too new, and she had been told she could appeal the denial but had not
yet been sent the appeal form.
Hearings on Section 388 Petitions
The juvenile court stated at a hearing on December 4, 2024 that it
found “enough basis to set [Grandmother’s section 388 request] for hearing,”
and set the matter for a contested hearing on December 23.
Before that hearing could occur, however, there was another important
development in the case. On December 23, 2024, in response to the Agency’s
request, the juvenile court terminated reunification services to both parents
and set a hearing pursuant to section 366.26.4 On the same date, the court
continued the hearing on Grandmother’s request to have Minor placed with
her, directing the Agency to further investigate the length of Grandmother’s
sobriety and mental health treatment, the stability of her housing, and her
criminal history, as well as the suitability of other relatives who had
expressed interest in providing a home for Minor.
The continued hearing, which was before a different judge, was initially
scheduled for January 21, 2025, then continued to January 29, 2025. Before
4 Father filed a petition for an extraordinary writ, which we denied on
the merits on March 4, 2025.
5
the hearing, the Agency provided a progress report addressing the issues the
original judge had raised in December. The social worker assigned to the
case had learned that Grandmother had been denied a criminal record
exemption in 2023 when she applied to the California Department of Social
Services for “ ‘Trust-Line Registration,’ ” that Grandmother had failed to
appeal the denial by the deadline, and that she would not be able to reapply
for a criminal exemption until June 2025, two years after the previous denial.
The report continued, “ ‘Because of the denied criminal record exemption and
pursuant to Written Directive 5-03B(m), the County is mandated to cease
review of her RFA application.’ ” In her RFA application, Grandmother had
stated she had never been denied any exemptions.
In Grandmother’s favor, her therapist had told the social worker he had
been meeting with Grandmother since April of 2023, that she had been sober
for 26 months, and that he had not seen any behavior suggesting
Grandmother would be harmful to Minor’s safety.
At the January 21, 2025 hearing, Grandmother addressed the juvenile
court directly, although she was not under oath. She said that she had been
an addict, but she took part in a 31-day residential “detox” program
beginning in November 2022; she had been working with a navigation center;
she had permanent housing; she had graduated a program for social sector
employment training; and she had worked as a street ambassador. She had
regular sessions with her therapist and her psychologist.
The hearing was continued to January 29, 2025. Before the hearing,
Father submitted additional information in support of Grandmother’s
request, including Grandmother’s certificates of completion of a 40-hour
infant training program and an employment training program, as well as a
letter from her therapist attesting that Grandmother had maintained her
6
sobriety since at least December 2022, that she participated consistently in
her treatment, and that her mental health symptoms neither posed a barrier
to her ability as a caregiver nor caused concerns about her judgment.
At the January 29 hearing, the juvenile court indicated it would first
decide whether Grandmother had shown an entitlement to an evidentiary
hearing on her section 388 petition, that is, whether there were changed
circumstances and whether the change in placement would be in Minor’s best
interest. Grandmother again addressed the court, explaining that she had
continued her sobriety for more than two years and had proper housing, a
good support system, and regular contact with her other grandchildren. She
expressed her love for Minor, her desire to care for him, and the importance
of family bonds.
The juvenile court declined to conduct a full evidentiary hearing, but
stated it had reviewed the Agency’s progress report and the written evidence
that had been provided, and had considered Grandmother’s statement which
it took as true, telling Grandmother that although her statements were not
under oath, “I believe you.”
The court went on to explain that it did not find new evidence or
changed circumstances for purposes of section 388. In any case, even if there
had been such a showing, the court concluded it was not in Minor’s best
interest to be removed from his current foster home and placed with
Grandmother. Taking into account the factors set forth in section 361.3,
which governs preferential consideration of a relative’s request for placement
of a child, the court noted that Minor was very young and needed constant
care and stability; that Grandmother’s RFA application was not approved;
that she had some criminal history; that she had a history, although “very
dated,” with child protective services; that she did not have a day-to-day
7
relationship with Minor; that there were no reported safety concerns in her
home; and that she would be able to provide contact with Minor’s relatives.
On balance, the court found, it was not in Minor’s best interest to move him
from his foster home, the only home he had ever known, to Grandmother’s
care. The juvenile court therefore denied Grandmother’s request.
DISCUSSION
I. Failure to Hold Evidentiary Hearing
Appellants contend that Grandmother was denied due process by the
juvenile court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on her request for
placement under section 388, and that this failure was an abuse of discretion.
To the extent the facts are undisputed, we review a due process claim de
novo. (See In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569, 587–588.) The court’s ruling
on a section 388 petition “is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is
clearly established.” (In re Shirley K. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 65, 71.) Abuse
of discretion is shown if the juvenile court makes an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd decision (ibid.) or applies incorrect legal standards (In re
Shannon M. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 282, 289).
Section 388 authorizes any person with an interest in a dependent child
to petition the court to change a prior order on the grounds of new evidence or
change of circumstance. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) If it appears that the child’s
best interests may be promoted by the proposed change, “the court shall order
that a hearing be held.” (§ 388, subd. (d).) The conduct of a hearing on such
a request is governed by rule 5.570(h) of the California Rules of Court. As
pertinent here, unless “[t]here is a due process right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses,” “proof [at the hearing] may be by declaration and other
documentary evidence, or by testimony, or both, at the discretion of the
8
court.” (Id., rule 5.570(h)(2)(B).) The first question we face is whether
Grandmother had such a due process right.
As a general rule, noncustodial grandparents do not have a substantive
due process right to maintain a relationship with their grandchildren or to
their care and custody. (In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1508,
citing Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, 60, 64–66, 69–73; In re R.J.
(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 219, 225; accord, In re R.M. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
119, 131.) The court in In re C.P. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 17, found an
exception to this general rule when “essentially parental bonds . . . develop
between a child and a caregiver, including a grandparent.” (Id. at p. 28,
citing In re H.K. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1435 [child has no
fundamental right to be placed with relative in absence of bonded, “quasi-
parental” relationship].)
There is no indication that Grandmother has such a relationship with
Minor. We recognize the evidence that she was present at Minor’s birth, that
she has visited him whenever allowed to do so, that she has achieved sobriety
and obtained permanent housing, and that she loves Minor. Nevertheless,
she has seen him only a few times since his birth, during which time he has
been in the care of the foster parents who have been meeting all of his needs.
Appellants make no showing—and indeed, offer no argument—that
Grandmother occupies a parental role in Minor’s life.
Appellants argue that this due process right is not limited to
relationships that are parental in nature and that Grandmother’s efforts to
have Minor placed in her care over the course of the dependency themselves
create a substantive due process right. But they draw our attention to no
authority supporting their view that a substantive due process right exists in
the absence of either a parent-child relationship or a relationship that
9
establishes similar bonds. In the circumstances, we conclude Grandmother
does not have a due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses at
the hearing on her petition. As a result, the juvenile court could properly
conduct the hearing, in its discretion, with documentary evidence rather than
testimony. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(2)(B).)
Appellants argue nonetheless that the juvenile court abused its
discretion in declining to hold a full evidentiary hearing with the opportunity
to cross-examine witnesses. This argument is based on events that occurred
when the original judge on the case, Judge Vedica Puri, was replaced with
the judge who ultimately ruled on Grandmother’s request, Judge Adrienne
Rogers. On December 4, 2024, Judge Puri explained that she found “enough
basis to set [Grandmother’s request] for hearing.” The preprinted form order
signed by Judge Puri indicates that the hearing was ordered because “the
best interest of the child may be promoted by the request.” When the hearing
began on December 23, Judge Puri continued it, directing the Agency to
obtain more information on Grandmother’s background, among other things,
before the court ruled on the request.
By the time the continued hearing took place, Judge Rogers had been
assigned to the case because, appellants inform us, Judge Puri had retired.
Judge Rogers indicated she had read the transcript of the December 23
hearing, as well as Judge Puri’s notes and the case file. She described the
first issue before her as whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on
Grandmother’s petition. As to this issue, at the January 29, 2025 hearing,
Judge Rogers explained that she had listened to Grandmother’s lengthy
statements at the hearing the previous week and had received and
considered the written materials the parties had provided. In light of this
“extensive information” and “the considerable discretion I have to fashion the
10
conduct of the hearing,” Judge Rogers concluded a further evidentiary
hearing was not required.
Appellants contend that Judge Puri’s December 4, 2024 order set an
evidentiary hearing, and that Judge Rogers abused her discretion by
declining to hold one. In refusing to do so, they argue, Judge Rogers
effectively acted as a “ ‘one-judge appellate court,’ ” violating the general
principle that one judge may not vacate an order entered by another judge.
(See In re Alberto (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 427–428.)
We first note that this principle is subject to exceptions in limited
circumstances, among them when the first judge is unavailable. (People v.
Garcia (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 640, 653.) Appellants tell us that Judge Rogers
was assigned the case after Judge Puri’s retirement, suggesting Judge Puri
was no longer available.
Moreover, we are not persuaded that Judge Rogers’s actions amounted
to a reversal of Judge Puri’s order. Although Judge Rogers did not allow
testimony and cross-examination, she did hold a hearing at which she
considered Grandmother’s statements, reviewed the case file and the written
evidence in connection with the motion, and heard extensive argument from
counsel and Grandmother. When considering a hearing conducted in a
similar manner, the court in another case concluded that a proceeding that
included receipt of written evidence and argument from counsel—although no
testimony—constituted a “hearing” under section 388 rather than a summary
denial of a petition. (In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1080–1081;
compare In re Lesly G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 904, 915 [“no hearing” where
court did not take testimony, receive documentary evidence, or allow
argument].) Here the proceedings were consistent with the minimum
requirements for a hearing on a section 388 petition where there is no due
11
process right to cross-examine witnesses; the court, in its discretion, may rule
based on documentary evidence rather than testimony. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.570(h)(2)(B).)
In any event, even if Judge Rogers had improperly reversed Judge
Puri’s order, there is no showing of prejudice. The proper test of prejudice in
this circumstance is the familiar Watson standard, under which we reverse
only if it is reasonably probable the appealing party would have achieved a
more favorable result absent the error. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818, 836; People v. Goodwillie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 695, 716
[applying Watson standard when judge reversed order entered by another].)
The record shows that before denying Grandmother’s petition, the juvenile
court listened to Grandmother recounting her relationship with Minor, the
reasons she wished to have him in her care, and the impressive progress she
had recently made in her recovery from substance abuse, in securing housing
and employment, and in taking child welfare courses, and the court accepted
these facts as true. The court also reviewed the evidence Grandmother
submitted and heard extensive argument from counsel and Grandmother.
Appellants do not identify any further evidence Grandmother would have
presented that might have changed the juvenile court’s view. (See In re
C.J.W., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1081 [rejecting claim of due process
violation from failure to allow testimony and cross-examination because no
showing of what further evidence parents wanted to present].) Appellants
have not shown reversible error on this ground.
II. Failure to Evaluate Grandmother for Placement
Appellants also contend the Agency and the juvenile court failed to
evaluate Grandmother appropriately for emergency placement at the outset
of these proceedings, and that the Agency concluded erroneously it was
12
required to cease review of Grandmother’s RFA application due to her
criminal history. To the extent these arguments raise questions of law, our
review is de novo. (See Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800.) We
review the juvenile court’s determination of a section 388 motion, and of a
child’s best interests, for abuse of discretion. (In re Shirley K., supra, 140
Cal.App.4th at p. 71; In re M.H. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1296, 1305.)
Relative Placement Preference
The Legislature has directed that, when a child is removed from the
parents’ custody, “preferential consideration” must be given to a relative’s
request to have the child placed with him or her. (§ 361.3, subd. (a); see
§ 16000, subd. (a); In re N.J. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 96, 122 (N.J.).)
Consistent with this directive, when a child is taken into temporary custody,
the social worker must assess the suitability of any relative who requests
emergency placement. (§ 309, subd. (d)(1).) In this context, a relative who
seeks placement must be given “ ‘[p]referential consideration,’ ” meaning the
relative requesting placement is “the first placement to be considered and
investigated.” (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).) This is not “ ‘an evidentiary
presumption that placement with a relative is in the child’s best interests’
but it does require the social services agency and juvenile court to determine
whether such a placement is appropriate,” and it “places the relative ‘at the
head of the line when the court is determining which placement is in the
child’s best interests.’ ” (In re R.T. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1295–1296;
accord, N.J., at p. 123.)
Resource Family Approval Process
The Legislature has directed the State Department of Social Services
(DSS) to “implement a unified, family friendly, and child-centered resource
family approval process” to license foster family homes. (§ 16519.5, subd. (a);
13
see In re Charlotte C. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 404, 416.) In response to the
Legislature’s mandate, DSS has issued “Resource Family Approval Written
Directives,” the most recent of which, Version 8, was effective in November
2022 (the Directive).5 (§ 16519.5, subd. (f)(1); Charlotte C., at p. 417.)
Section 5-03B of the Directive establishes procedures counties must use
when reviewing an RFA application. Under those rules, as a general matter
a person with one or more criminal convictions is presumptively disqualified
from serving as a resource family, but an applicant may seek an exemption.
(See Directive, §§ 3-01(29), 6-03B.) And, central to appellants’ contentions,
the Directive requires a county to “cease any further review of an application”
if “[a]n individual has had a[n] exemption denial . . . within the preceding two
years.” (Directive, § 5-03B(m)(1)(B).) However, notwithstanding this
provision, the county may continue its review “if it has determined that the
applicant is not an excluded individual and the reasons for the previous
denial, rescission, or revocation were due to circumstances or conditions
which the applicant shows have either been corrected or are no longer
in[]existence.”6 (Directive, § 5-03B(m)(2), italics added; see Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 16519.5, subd. (c)(7)(A) & (B).)
5 The Directive is found at
<https://www.cdss.ca.gov/Portals/9/RFA/Written%20Directives%20V8.pdf?ver
=2022-11-02-102947-957> (as of Aug. 29, 2025). (Cal. Dept. of Social
Services, Resource Family Approval Written Directives Version 8 (2022).) As
all parties have cited and relied on the it, we take judicial notice of the
Directive. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459.)
6 There is no indication that Grandmother is an excluded individual.
An “ ‘[e]xcluded individual’ ” is one “who is prohibited from residence,
presence, or contact with children or nonminor dependents in the home of a
Resource Family as a result of an order by the Department or an
administrative action.” (Directive, § 3-01(39).)
14
Analysis
At the May 2024 detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered that
Minor be placed in foster care. In its July 2024 disposition report, the Agency
indicated that Grandmother could not be considered for emergency placement
due to her history, but that she had been referred for RFA assessment. At
the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on July 22, 2024, the juvenile
court declared Minor a dependent and continued his placement in foster care.
In the progress report prepared before the January 21, 2025 hearing on
Grandmother’s section 388 petition, the Agency provided more detail. It
informed the court DSS had reviewed Grandmother’s application for “ ‘Trust-
Line Registration’ ” on June 13, 2023 and denied a “ ‘ “criminal record
exemption,” ’ ” and that Grandmother failed to appeal the denial. The
Agency took the position that it was therefore required, under section 5-
03B(m) of the Directive, to cease review of her RFA application.
Appellants argue that the Agency had discretion to place Minor in
Grandmother’s care on an emergency basis regardless of the status of her
criminal record exemption or RFA approval, and that it acted improperly in
failing to do so at the outset of the dependency. For this contention, they rely
on section 361.4, which provides in pertinent part that, before making an
emergency placement pending the detention hearing or dispositional hearing
(§ 309, subd. (d)) or if a foster caregiver becomes suddenly unavailable
(§ 361.45), the county welfare department must carry out certain
investigative tasks, including a criminal records check (§ 361.4, subd. (a)),
and that certain offenses are disqualifying unless an exemption has been
granted (§ 361.4, subd. (b)(2) & (5); see Health & Saf. Code, § 1522,
subd. (g)(2)(B) & (D)). However, notwithstanding these provisions or the
recommendation of the county placing agency, “the court may authorize the
15
placement of a child on an emergency basis in the home of a relative,
regardless of the status of any criminal record exemption or resource family
approval, if the court finds that the placement does not pose a risk to the
health and safety of the child.” (§ 361.4, subd. (b)(6).)
Appellants argue the Agency and the juvenile court failed to evaluate
Grandmother’s home properly under section 361.4, subdivision (b)(6) before
finding she did not qualify for emergency placement and placing Minor
outside the home at the detention hearing. The first problem with this
contention is that section 361.4 applies, on its face, to emergency placement
before disposition, or when a foster parent becomes suddenly unavailable.
(§§ 309, subd. (d)(1); 361.4, subd. (a); 361.45, subds. (a) & (b).) At the
dispositional hearing on July 22, 2024, the juvenile court placed Minor with
his current foster family, and there was no appeal from that order. By the
time Grandmother brought the request that is the subject of the order now on
appeal, emergency placement was not at issue.
However, even if the standards of section 361.4 applied at the time the
juvenile court made the ruling before us on appeal, we would find no
reversible abuse of discretion. Subdivision (b)(6) of that statute allows, but
does not require, the court to authorize emergency placement with a relative
regardless of the status of a criminal record exemption or RFA approval, if it
finds placement does not place the child’s health and safety at risk. The
juvenile court stated expressly at the January 21, 2025 hearing that it was
“aware of [its] discretion under section 361.4,” and that even using that
discretion, it did not consider a change in placement to be warranted. The
court had already explained carefully its reasons for concluding a change in
placement was not appropriate: it accepted and took as truthful
Grandmother’s statements that she loved Minor and visited him whenever
16
possible, that she had well prepared her home for his arrival, and that she
had been sober for two years. Nevertheless, the court explained, Minor was
very young and needed constant care and stability; Grandmother had a
criminal history and a previous criminal exemption had been denied—a fact
Grandmother did not disclose in response to a question on her RFA
application; and she did not have a close relationship with Minor. These
factors are supported by the record and in light of them, we cannot conclude
the court exceeded its discretion in declining to place Minor with
Grandmother under section 361.4 in making the order on appeal.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that Grandmother had sought
Minor’s placement with her since shortly after his birth. We are also aware
of the recent case of N.J., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 96. In that case, the aunt of
a child who was detained immediately after birth had consistently sought to
have her home assessed for placement, but the agency placed the child with a
foster caregiver—an attorney for the Dependency Division of the County
Counsel’s office. Throughout the dependency, the agency inexplicably
dragged its feet in assessing the aunt’s home, although her home ultimately
received approval. (Id. at pp. 103–104, 107.) The appellate court concluded
the agency’s “egregious” delays in fairly evaluating the aunt for placement
and lack of response to the family’s pleas for supportive services compelled
reversal of the order terminating parental rights and designating the foster
caregiver as the prospective adoptive parent. (Id. at p. 104, 131.) The court
explained that the agency “cannot shut a family almost completely out of the
process for over a year and then point to the passage of time and failure to
form a bond as the reasons for denial of placement,” and that the juvenile
court’s failure to apply the relative placement preference under section 361.3
was prejudicial error. (Ibid.)
17
The court in N.J. relied in part on In re Isabella G. (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 708. (N.J., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 125–127.) There, a
child’s grandparents sought custody as soon as the child was detained, but
the agency did not assess their home despite promising to do so, told them
there was a mandatory one-year period before the child could be moved, and
ignored the grandparents’ request a year later to have the child placed with
them—at which point reunification services were terminated. (Isabella G., at
pp. 711–712, 722.) The appellate court concluded that, because the
grandparents requested placement in a timely manner and the agency failed
to assess their home in disregard for the “clear” legislative preference for
relative placement, the statutory standards governing a request for
placement with a relative applied even after reunification services had been
terminated. (Isabella G., at pp. 722–723 [discussing § 361.3].)
Similarly egregious facts are not present here. There is no indication
the Agency abdicated its role in considering Grandmother’s request for
placement of Minor in her care. Rather, it initially referred the matter for
RFA assessment, and it explained throughout the process that
Grandmother’s criminal history, including the denial of an exemption, was a
bar to such placement.
Appellants also argue that, notwithstanding the general rule that a
county must cease review of an RFA application if an applicant has had an
exemption denial in the previous two years, the Agency abused its discretion
in failing to apply the exception that it “may continue to review an
application if [the County] has determined that . . . the reasons for the
previous denial . . . were due to circumstances or conditions which the
applicant shows have been either corrected or are no longer in[]existence.”
(Directive, § 5-03B(m)(2) & (1)(B).) Because Grandmother had achieved
18
sobriety, they contend, the reasons for the exemption denial no longer
existed. But the record shows that the Agency generally requires between
three and five years of sobriety for RFA approval, a measure Grandmother
had not yet achieved at the time of her motion. And Grandmother does not
explain how the evidence might show the Agency to its satisfaction that her
criminal record, which apparently included arrests for possession of stolen
property and using another person’s driver’s license, was based on
circumstances that had been corrected or no longer existed. Under the
circumstances, Grandmother has established neither abuse of discretion nor
prejudice flowing from the Agency’s failure to continue evaluating her RFA
application.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
TUCHER, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
FUJISAKI, J.
GOLDMAN, J.*
In re D.R. (A172373 A172380)
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,
Division Four, sitting by assignment pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
19
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