CourtListener 10663300•People v. Thomas CA2/4
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Filed 8/29/25 P. v. Thomas CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B335759
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A979607
v.
DENNIS WAYNE THOMAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gustavo N. Sztraicher. Affirmed.
Steven Schorr, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1989, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an
amended information charging defendant and appellant Dennis
Wayne Thomas and co-defendant Anthony Lamont Taylor with
murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)), rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)),
and kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)). The amended information
further alleged as special circumstances that each defendant
committed the murder while engaged in the crime of kidnapping
(former § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(ii)) and while engaged in the crime
of rape (former § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(iii)).
A mistrial was declared at Thomas’s first trial because the
jury could not reach a verdict. At Thomas’s second trial, the jury
informed the court that it was deadlocked on the murder charge.
In an effort to resolve the impasse, the court granted the
prosecution’s motion to dismiss first-degree murder as a theory of
liability in the interest of justice and reinstructed the jury on
second-degree murder. Specifically, the court instructed:
“Murder in the first degree is no longer yours to consider. It has
been removed from this case. [ ] So all you’ve got left is murder
in the second degree.” With respect to second-degree murder, the
court instructed that a killing that occurs during the commission
or attempted commission of a kidnapping is murder in the second
degree. The jury thereafter convicted Thomas and co-defendant
Taylor of second-degree murder and kidnapping. The jury did
not return a verdict on the rape charge. Nor did it make any
determination on the special circumstance allegations, because
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
the trial court’s dismissal of first-degree murder had rendered the
special circumstance allegations inapplicable.
In 2021, Thomas petitioned the trial court for relief under
former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). In 2023, after
issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary
hearing,2 the trial court denied Thomas relief under section
1172.6, subdivision (d), concluding beyond a reasonable doubt
that he is guilty of murder under current law. Specifically, the
court found that Thomas is guilty under a still-valid theory of
first-degree felony murder because he was a major participant in
kidnapping the victim, and acted with reckless indifference to
human life in the commission of the kidnapping.
On appeal, Thomas does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that he was a major
participant in the kidnapping who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.3 Instead, he contends the trial court
committed three errors in denying him relief under section
1172.6. First, he argues the trial court’s dismissal of first-degree
murder as a theory of homicide liability and the attached special
circumstance allegations constituted “an implied acquittal.” As
such, the trial court was precluded from finding him guilty of
2 Thomas’s jury was instructed on the felony murder rule
and natural and probable consequences doctrine, and the People
conceded in the trial court that Thomas was prima facie eligible
for section 1172.6 relief. We grant the Attorney General’s motion
to augment the appellate record to include portions of the record
from Thomas’s direct appeal, including the jury instructions
given at his trial.
3 Because Thomas does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence, we omit recitation of the facts surrounding the
kidnapping and murder.
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first-degree felony murder under current law notwithstanding
the fact that Thomas’s kidnapping conviction supports first-
degree felony murder under current law. (§ 189, subds. (a) &
(e)(3).) Second, Thomas argues that, in light of the trial court’s
dismissal of first-degree murder as a theory of liability at trial,
double jeopardy principles prohibited the trial court from finding
him guilty of first-degree murder under current law. Lastly,
Thomas argues the trial court erred in denying him relief under
section 1172.6 because second-degree felony murder is no longer
a viable theory of homicide liability. We address each contention
in turn, and affirm.
In addition, we deny Thomas’s request for relief under
Senate Bill No. 136, as it is unclear on this record whether the
trial court had, and declined to exercise, jurisdiction to strike his
one-year prior prison term enhancement. In the event Thomas’s
case is on the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) list of cases giving the trial court
jurisdiction to grant him relief under Senate Bill No. 483,
Thomas may seek that relief as appropriate in a later proceeding.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
In 2018, the Legislature, through Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), amended section
188 to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine
as it applies to murder. Under the amended law, subject to
certain exceptions under the felony murder rule, a defendant
must act with actual malice to be convicted of murder. (§ 188,
subd. (a)(3).) One such exception applies where the defendant
was a major participant in a felony listed in section 189,
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subdivision (a) (which list includes kidnapping) and acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).)4
Senate Bill No. 1437 also added section 1172.6, “which
provides a procedure for defendants convicted of murder to seek
resentencing if they are able to establish they could not be
convicted of murder under the amendments to sections 188 and
189 effective January 1, 2019.” (People v. Williams (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1244, 1250 [citing Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4].) Under
section 1172.6, a defendant convicted of felony murder may file a
petition to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any
remaining counts. To state a claim for relief under section
1172.6, a defendant convicted of imputed-malice murder first
must attest to the following: “(1) A complaint, information, or
indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under [an imputed-malice theory of
murder liability] . . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of
murder . . . following a trial . . . at which the petitioner could
have been convicted of murder . . . . [¶] [and] (3) The petitioner
could not presently be convicted of murder . . . [under current
law].” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3).)
Once a facially sufficient petition is filed, the trial court
must determine whether the petitioner is prima facie eligible for
relief. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) If the trial
court determines that the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing of such eligibility, the court must issue an order to show
4 In 2021, through Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551), the Legislature clarified that the
amendments made by Senate Bill No. 1437 were also intended to
apply to attempted murder and manslaughter. (People v. Hin
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 441–442.)
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cause and hold an evidentiary hearing (unless waived). (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) At that hearing, the prosecution has the burden “to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder” under current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court did not err in denying Thomas
section 1172.6 relief
Thomas argues three bases for finding the trial court erred
in denying him section 1172.6 relief. We address each in turn.
A. Thomas’s contention that the trial court erred
under subdivision (d)(2)
Thomas argues the trial court erred in denying him relief
under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2) based on its finding,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was a major participant in a
kidnapping who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
We disagree.
Under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2), Thomas is entitled
to relief “[i]f there was a prior finding by a court or jury that [he]
did not act with reckless indifference to human life or was not a
major participant in the felony.” The record of Thomas’s
conviction contains no indication that the jury made any finding
to support relief under this provision. Rather, as discussed
above, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss
first-degree murder as a theory of homicide liability to avoid a
hung jury. This dismissal did not involve a finding by the court
or jury as to whether Thomas was a major participant in the
kidnapping or acted with reckless indifference to human life. Nor
did the court base the dismissal on the insufficiency of the
evidence as a matter of law. Thus, we conclude that the
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resentencing court did not err in denying relief under section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(2). (People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260,
273 [“Because section 1385 dismissals often are not based on the
insufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law, we believe these
dismissals should not be construed as an acquittal for legal
insufficiency unless the record clearly indicates that the trial
court . . . concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”].)
B. Thomas’s Double Jeopardy argument
Thomas contends that, because the trial court dismissed
first-degree murder as a theory of liability at his trial, the
resentencing court violated double jeopardy principles by denying
him section 1172.6 relief based on a finding that he is guilty of
first-degree murder under current law. Again, we disagree.
Under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and
California Constitutions, a person may not be twice placed in
jeopardy for the same offense. (People v. Anderson (2009) 47
Cal.4th 92, 103.) But evidentiary hearings under section 1172.6
do not implicate double jeopardy because section 1172.6
“ ‘involves a resentencing procedure, not a new prosecution.’ ”
(People v. Hernandez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 94, 111; ibid. [“The
retroactive relief provided by section [1172.6] is a legislative ‘act
of lenity’ intended to give defendants serving otherwise final
sentences the benefit of ameliorative changes to applicable
criminal laws and does not result in a new trial or increased
punishment that could implicate the double jeopardy clause”];
People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 588 [a section
1172.6 proceeding is “the opposite of a criminal prosecution”
because it “can only help the defendant and can never hurt”
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(original italics)].) Indeed, the trial court here made the correct
inquiry under the plain language of the statute – whether
Thomas is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder under
current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Thus, Thomas’s argument
has no merit.
C. Thomas’s contention regarding second-degree
felony murder
Thomas argues the trial court erred in denying him relief
because second-degree felony murder is no longer a viable theory
of homicide liability. Once again, we disagree.
Thomas’s statement of the law with respect to the
invalidity of second-degree felony murder as a theory of homicide
liability is correct. (See In re White (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 933,
937, fn. 2.) The trial court was not precluded, however, from
finding, as it did, that Thomas was guilty of first-degree murder
under a still-valid theory of liability, i.e., as a major participant
in a kidnapping who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (See §§ 188, subd. (a)(3); 189, subd. (e)(3).) As discussed
above, the trial court made “no prior finding that [Thomas] did
not act with reckless indifference to human life [in the
commission of the kidnapping] or was not as major participant”
in the kidnapping. (See Section I.A., ante [quoting section 1172.6
(d)(2)].) Nor, as analyzed in Section I.B., ante, does the trial
court’s finding under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2) that
Thomas is liable under current law for first-degree murder
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Thus, the court did not err in denying Thomas relief based
on its finding that, notwithstanding the invalidity of second-
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degree felony murder under current law, he presently could be
convicted of first-degree murder.5
II. Thomas’s one-year prior prison term
enhancement
Lastly, Thomas asks this court, in the interest of justice
and judicial economy, to strike his one-year prior prison term
enhancement pursuant to Senate Bill No. 136 (Senate Bill 136).
Senate Bill 136, which became effective January 1, 2020,
eliminated one-year prior prison term enhancements unless the
prior term was served for a sexually violent offense. (People v.
Choi (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 753, 769.) Senate Bill No. 483
(Senate Bill 483) added section 1171.1, later renumbered to
section 1172.75, to the Penal Code. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3;
Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12, eff. June 30, 2022.) Section 1172.75,
subdivision (a), states that “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior
conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.”
Section 1172.75 instructs the CDCR to identify those persons in
its custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes
5 Thomas does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred
in denying his section 1172.6 motion to vacate his second-degree
murder conviction by finding beyond a reasonable doubt that, as
a major participant in a kidnapping in which he acted with
reckless indifference to human life, under current law he could be
convicted of first-degree murder. Thus, we do not reach this
issue. (See People v. Didyavong (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 85, 96 &
fn. 4 [finding section 1172.6 “treats all murder as a single,
generic crime and requires resentencing when a defendant could
not now be convicted of murder, generically” and “does not limit
the prosecution to any particular theories of liability”].)
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an enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b) (excluding
sexually violent offenses). (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Once identified,
the CDCR is to provide the case information to the sentencing
court that imposed the enhancement. (Ibid.) Subsequently, the
sentencing court “shall review the judgment and verify that the
current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described
in subdivision (a).” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) “If the court
determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement
described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence
and resentence the defendant.” (Ibid.)
Here, Thomas’s sentence includes a one-year term imposed
under section 667, subdivision (b). Under the plain language of
section 1172.75, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to
consider Thomas’s Senate Bill 483 claim unless his case is on the
CDCR’s list. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b) & (c).) Thomas does not
assert, and the record does not indicate, that Thomas was on the
CDCR list. Likewise, this court lacks jurisdiction to resolve the
claim at this juncture.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Thomas section
1172.6 relief.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
GARCIA UHRIG, J.*
We concur:
COLLINS, Acting P.J.
MORI, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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