People v. Washington CA4/1

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Filed 8/29/25 P. v. Washington CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083542

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN447135)

TONY WASHINGTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniel F. Link, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Sarah S. Sanger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Melissa Mandel and James Spradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Tony Washington of burglary, grand theft, unlawfully
taking and driving a vehicle, and receiving a stolen vehicle. Washington
challenges the burglary and grand theft verdicts on appeal, claiming the trial
court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury on aiding and abetting, and
insufficient evidence supported that he directly perpetrated the offenses. The
People concede, and we agree, the trial court erred by only partially
instructing the jury on aiding and abetting. However, under the
circumstances here we find the error harmless. We also find sufficient
evidence that Washington aided and abetted the burglary and grand theft.
We reject Washington’s claim that the court’s aiding and abetting
instructional error limits our review of the evidence’s sufficiency to a direct
perpetrator theory. Finally, without first imposing a sentence, the trial court
improperly stayed the grand theft and unlawfully taking and driving a
vehicle counts. We therefore modify the judgment to impose a sentence for
the stayed counts and affirm the judgment as modified.
II. BACKGROUND
On August 28, 2023, Washington, his girlfriend Khadijah Young, and
Shauniece Morris drove to a Lululemon clothing store in a stolen car.
Leaving the car running in the parking lot, Washington and Young entered
the store together, with Morris following behind.
Carrying a blue bag that she brought into the store, Young walked
around grabbing another bag and various items of clothing. Washington
initially stayed close to his two companions, but then meandered through the
store. Washington occasionally watched Young and Morris, scanned the store
and its exit, left briefly to discard trash, and talked to two different
salespeople.
Washington reunited with Young and Morris at the back of the store,
where both Young and Morris grabbed additional items and placed some
merchandise on a table. Watching Young talk to a salesperson, Washington

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awkwardly took some of the clothing that was already on that table and
moved it to a nearby shelf. The salesperson disappeared down a back
hallway, and a moment later, Washington walked down that hallway and
looked in both directions. The salesperson emerged and Washington spoke to
her as the two rejoined Young and Morris.
Young took the items she collected and her blue bag into a dressing
room. Washington joined Young in the dressing room, where the two
remained behind a closed door for approximately 90 seconds. When they
emerged, Young carried her bag as well as a few Lululemon items that she
returned to the store displays. Washington and Young walked out together,
having no reaction to the store alarm triggered by their departure.
Approximately 15 minutes later, a police officer stopped Washington
while he was driving the stolen car. Both Young and Morris were in the
vehicle, along with $1,386 of stolen Lululemon merchandise.
The San Diego County District Attorney’s Office charged Washington

with burglary (Pen. Code,1 § 459; count 1), grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a);
count 2), unlawfully taking and driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851,
subd. (a); count 3), and receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d; count 4).
At Washington’s trial, the trial court admitted footage from
Lululemon’s surveillance cameras depicting Washington, Young, and Morris’s
actions in the store. Washington testified, stating he was not “completely
sure” if Young or Morris were going to steal anything from Lululemon, but he
“didn’t want to be involved” in anything.
At the end of the trial, the court instructed the jury that “[t]o be guilty
of burglary as an aider and abettor, the defendant must have known of the
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and must have formed the intent to aid,

1 All undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
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facilitate, promote, instigate, or encourage commission of the burglary before
the perpetrator finally left the structure.” (CALCRIM No. 1702.) However,
outside this burglary-specific instruction the trial court did not otherwise
explain aiding and abetting and how it applied in other contexts. This
additional information, contained in CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401 (see post),
explains aiding and abetting generally, and opens those concepts to crimes
like grand theft. Neither party requested these other instructions.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that “the first two
crimes of burglary and the grand theft are under an aiding and abetting
theory, right. I’m not saying that Mr. Washington was the one who took the
clothes. Although, I think it’s pretty clear from the video that he didn’t take
the clothes.” The prosecutor then explained aiding and abetting liability,
giving several examples. He argued that Washington aided and abetted
burglary and grand theft by acting as a lookout in the store, distracting
employees by talking to them and moving clothes, helping Young fill her bag
inside the dressing room, and escorting Young out of the store.
Washington’s counsel highlighted that burglary and grand theft are
specific intent crimes, reiterating that counts 1 and 2 were based on aiding
and abetting. Defense counsel argued that Washington’s actions in the
dressing room were unknown, and that walking around the store and moving
items was insufficient to prove Washington’s guilt because “mere presence is
not enough.”
The jury found Washington guilty of all four counts. Washington
admitted three prior strike convictions (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i)), that he
was on probation when the crimes were committed (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(4)), and that he served a prior prison term (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(3)).

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The trial court struck Washington’s prior strikes as to the vehicle
related counts and sentenced Washington to four years in prison.
Washington received two years for the burglary, doubled to four for his strike
priors, plus a concurrent two years for unlawfully taking and driving a
vehicle. The trial court stayed the grand theft and receiving a stolen vehicle

counts pursuant to section 654.2 The trial court did not impose a sentence
for the stayed counts, stating that doing so was “barred by [section] 654.”
Washington appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court’s Failure to Fully Instruct the Jury on Aiding and
Abetting Was Harmless
“[I]nstructions delineating an aiding and abetting theory of liability
must be given when such derivative culpability ‘form[s] a part of the
prosecution’s theory of criminal liability and substantial evidence supports
the theory.’ ” (People v. Delgado (2013) 56 Cal.4th 480, 488.) The People’s
sole theory for counts 1 and 2 was aiding and abetting, but the trial court
only partially instructed on that theory. It used CALCRIM No. 1702,
describing the required intent for aiding and abetting a burglary, but it did
not instruct on the parameters of aiding and abetting in general or for grand
theft. As the People concede, the trial court erred.
Nonetheless, the error was harmless even under the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
(See People v. Delgado, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 490 [“[w]hen an instruction
tells the jury it may convict the defendant on a theory he or she aided and

2 Pursuant to section 654, “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in
different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of
such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under
more than one provision.”
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abetted in commission of the offense, but omits one or more of that theory’s
necessary findings, the error may be deemed equivalent to omitting an
element of a charged offense,” an error evaluated under the Chapman
standard].)
First, the crux of the burglary and theft charges was whether
Washington knew Young was stealing and whether he intended to help her.
The trial court correctly instructed the jury on these issues, stating, “[t]o be
guilty of burglary as an aider and abettor, the defendant must have known of
the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and must have formed the intent to aid,
facilitate, promote, instigate, or encourage commission of the burglary before
the perpetrator finally left the structure.” Although these instructions were
burglary specific, the intent to steal which underpinned the burglary
encompassed the theft activity which occurred in the Lululemon store. It was
the same conduct, and both the prosecutor and defense counsel informed the
jury that the theft count was based on an aiding and abetting theory. The
trial court also told the jury to “[p]ay careful attention to all of the[]
instructions and consider them together.”
Second, counsel’s argument filled in the gaps from the trial court’s
oversight. The standard instructions for aiding and abetting are set out in
CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401. CALCRIM No. 400 states, “[a] person may be
guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she may have directly committed
the crime. I will call that person the perpetrator. Two, he or she may have
aided and abetted a perpetrator, who directly committed the crime. [¶] A
person is guilty of a crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided
and abetted the perpetrator.”
CACLCRIM No. 401 instructs, “[t]o prove that the defendant is guilty
of a crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must prove

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that: [¶] 1. The perpetrator committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew
that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or during the
commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the
perpetrator in committing the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The defendant’s words or
conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.
[¶] Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s
unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid,
facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of
that crime.” If relevant, the instruction also states, “[i]f you conclude that
defendant was present at the scene of the crime or failed to prevent the
crime, you may consider that fact in determining whether the defendant was
an aider and abettor. However, the fact that a person is present at the scene
of a crime or fails to prevent the crime does not, by itself, make him or her an
aider and abettor.” (CALCRIM No. 401.)
In closing argument, the prosecutor covered the general aiding and
abetting principles stated in CALCRIM No. 400, as well as the elements in
CALCRIM No. 401. He argued, “the law allows for individuals to also be held
accountable for their actions when they act in ways that aid and abet. . . . So
there’s a perpetrator, which is the one who directly commits the crimes. . . .
[¶] . . . The aider and abettor is the other person . . . someone who assists
with the commission of the crime, whether before or during the commission of
that crime. . . . [¶] . . . The perpetrator is the one who commits the crime. The
aider and abettor is someone who knows that the perpetrator is intending to
commit the crime. And then either before or during the commission of that
crime, the defendant intends to aid or abet that person by assisting in some
way.” The prosecutor then gave several examples of aiding and abetting,

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including being a lookout, helping a perpetrator avoid detection, or smashing
a window to allow another to burglarize a house.
Defense counsel also clarified that “mere presence is not enough” for
aiding and abetting liability. The jury was therefore informed of the
principle that Washington characterizes as “the most critical part of the
aiding and abetting instructions.”
Accordingly, counsel on both sides explained in detail to the jury all
relevant aspects of aiding and abetting. Although argument is not the
equivalent of a jury instruction, it carries weight here because neither
attorney objected to the other’s explanation of the law, which was correct and
did not conflict with the trial court’s instructions. (People v. Young (2005)
34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202 [we consider “the arguments of counsel in assessing”
the harmlessness of instructional error].) Finally, significant evidence
showed Washington’s guilt as an aider and abettor. Washington arrived at
Lululemon with Young and Morris in a stolen car that they kept running in
the parking lot. Washington’s actions throughout the store, where he
watched Young and Morris, surveyed the surroundings, occupied salespeople,
and awkwardly moved clothes, were consistent with an intent to help Young
accomplish her theft. Washington then joined Young in the dressing room for
approximately 90 seconds, which is where the stolen merchandise must have
been concealed in Young’s bag. Washington did not react to the store’s alarm
that Young triggered on their departure, demonstrating he was not surprised
by the theft. And approximately 15 minutes later, police caught Washington
driving the stolen vehicle with Young, Morris, and the Lululemon items
inside.
In sum, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the disputed
knowledge and intent aspects of aiding and abetting burglary, the grand theft

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charge was based on the same conduct, and counsels’ arguments explained
the remaining requirements of aiding and abetting liability. Based on these
circumstances, as well as the surveillance footage that captured the crimes,
we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the instructional error did
not contribute to the verdict. The error was therefore harmless and does not
warrant reversal.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Guilty Verdicts for Burglary
and Grand Theft
Washington argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him as
the direct perpetrator of burglary or grand theft. He further contends that
based on the trial court’s incomplete aiding and abetting instructions, we
may not review the sufficiency of the evidence under an aiding and abetting
theory. We disagree.
1. Effect of the Instructional Error on Our Substantial Evidence
Review
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
a conviction, “ ‘ “we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th
719, 780.) “ ‘A reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it
appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ ” (People v. Penunuri (2018)
5 Cal.5th 126, 142.)
Washington does not cite any authority to support his claim that our
substantial evidence review is limited based on the trial court’s instructions.

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There is such a rule in civil cases, where “ ‘[w]e review the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a verdict under the law stated in the instructions given,
rather than under some other law on which the jury was not instructed.’ ”
(Mazik v. Geico General Ins. Co. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 455, 465.) We are not
aware of any cases applying this rule in the criminal context, and we
nonetheless find it inapplicable.
The civil rule applies when there is no asserted instructional error.
(Null v. City of Los Angeles (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1528, 1535.) That is not
the case here.
Additionally, part of the reason for the civil rule is that “ ‘ “ ‘[i]n a civil
case, each of the parties must propose complete and comprehensive
instructions in accordance with his theory of the litigation; if the parties do
not do so, the court has no duty to instruct on its own motion.’ ” ’ ” (Null v.
City of Los Angeles, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1534.) Accordingly, without
the rule, a party could “withhold a theory from the jury, by failing to request
instructions, and then to obtain appellate review of the evidence and reversal
of the judgment on a theory never tendered (or tendered in a different form)
to the jury.” (Id. at p. 1535.)
That concern does not arise in criminal cases, where “even in the
absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law
that are commonly or closely and openly connected to the facts before the
court and that are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.”
(People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047.) Nor is that concern
implicated here because neither side withheld the aiding and abetting theory.
The prosecutor expressly stated that aiding and abetting was the sole theory
of liability for the burglary and grand theft, which Washington’s counsel
acknowledged and against which she argued.

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Finally, we cannot characterize aiding and abetting as “ ‘some other
law on which the jury was not instructed.’ ” (Mazik v. Geico General Ins. Co.,
supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 465.) The trial court partially instructed on
aiding and abetting, and the prosecutor and defense counsel filled in the gaps
in their closing arguments as explained above.
Accordingly, because aiding and abetting was the People’s sole theory
of liability and its parameters were conveyed through trial court instruction
and the attorneys’ closing arguments, we will review the sufficiency of the
evidence under that theory.
2. The Evidence Supports the Verdicts
“The elements to prove grand theft are ‘ “the taking of personal
property [valued at more than $950] from the owner . . . into the possession
of the criminal without the consent of the owner . . . [and] the asportation
of the subject matter [with] the specific intent to deprive the owner of his
property wholly and permanently.” ’ ” (People v. Portillo (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 577, 587.) “The elements of burglary include entry into a
building, along with the intent to commit a felony or theft.” (People v. Lujano
(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 184.) And “ ‘under direct aiding and abetting
principles, an accomplice is guilty of an offense perpetrated by another . . . if
the accomplice aids the commission of that offense with “knowledge of the
direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in
achieving those unlawful ends.” ’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 463.)
By limiting his argument here to a direct perpetrator theory,
Washington effectively concedes the evidence sufficiently shows he aided and
abetted burglary and grand theft. Further, from the surveillance footage and
Washington’s arrival and departure with Young in the stolen car where the

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stolen items were found, the jury could reasonably infer that Washington
knew Young intended to steal more than $950 of property from Lululemon
and intentionally aided her in that crime. We therefore find sufficient
evidence that Washington aided and abetted burglary and grand theft.
C. Washington’s Sentence Must Be Corrected Regarding the Stayed Counts
“[W]hen a trial court determines that section 654 applies to a
particular count, the trial court must impose sentence on that count and then
stay execution of that sentence.” (People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th
1463, 1466.) Failure to do so “results in an unauthorized absence of
sentence.” (Id. at p. 1472.)
As Washington notes, the trial court improperly stayed but did not
impose sentences for grand theft (count 2) and the receipt of a stolen vehicle

(count 4).3 To correct the trial court’s mistake and avoid the unnecessary
expense of producing Washington for a sentencing hearing that will not
change his actual prison time, we exercise our authority to modify the
judgment. (People v. Alford, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1473.)
We impose a midterm sentence of two years for count 2 (§§ 489,
subd. (c)(1); 1170, subd. (h)), doubled to four years due to the strikes (§ 667,
subd. (e)(1)), and a midterm sentence of two years for count 4 (§ 496d,
subd. (a)). We stay execution of the sentences in counts 2 and 4. (§ 654.)

3 It is not clear what the trial court here intended. A court stays a
sentence, not a count.
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IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified by imposing and staying sentences on the
grand theft and receiving a stolen vehicle counts as described above. The
trial court shall amend the abstract of judgment accordingly and forward
copies of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

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