CourtListener 10663194•People v. Glover CA1/1
Testo completo
Filed 8/29/25 P. v. Glover CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169605
v.
LATEEFAH MIRIAM GLOVER, (Mendocino County
Super. Ct. No. 22CR02352)
Defendant and Appellant.
After the trial court found defendant Lateefah Miriam Glover violated
the terms and conditions of her probation by committing two counts of
battery against a security officer, the court reinstated her probation with the
additional condition that she participate in a San Francisco treatment
program. She raises two claims on appeal—that the prosecution did not
present sufficient evidence she committed battery against a security officer,
and even if the evidence was sufficient, the additional requirement that she
enroll in a treatment program in San Francisco violates her right to due
process and is contrary to public policy. We agree with defendant’s first
assertion and therefore do not reach her second.
1
BACKGROUND1
In September 2022, Sergeant James Elmore of the Mendocino County
Sherriff’s Office responded to a call at a motel where employees were
attempting “to get [defendant] to give up the room phone because she had
been repeatedly dialing 911 for the entire day.” Defendant had also opened
one of the windows and thrown an open folding knife at one of the workers,
striking him in the stomach. The worker was uninjured.
After a mental health specialist, who had been called to the scene to
“de-escalate the situation,” could not calm defendant, Sergeant Elmore
attempted to speak to her through the open window. Defendant ran toward
where Elmore was standing—by the window—“and pushed [his] arm
attempting to close the window.” She was holding a “metal pole from a, like,
a clothes hanger” and saying, “ ‘Get away from my window. You guys aren’t
coming in here. I have been kidnapped.’ ”
Unable to close the window, defendant retreated back into the room,
only to be met by deputies who had entered the room and were attempting to
approach her. Defendant “redirected her attention” to the entering deputies
and struck one, Deputy Christian Denton, with the metal pole. At that point,
officers deployed a taser to effectuate an arrest.
About a month before the September incident, Deputy Denton had been
called to the same location and had spoken with a woman employed there
who had a “black right eye lid” and swollen “eyebrow area.” The woman told
Denton defendant had struck her when she attempted to stop defendant from
taking bed sheets.
1The following factual background is taken from the preliminary
hearing transcript.
2
Following the September incident, the Mendocino County District
Attorney filed an information alleging two counts of felony assault with a
deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)—counts 1 & 2);2 one count of
felony resisting an officer by force (§ 69, subd. (a)—count 3); felony second
degree robbery (§ 211—count 4); and felony assault by means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)—count 5).
Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant pleaded no contest to
counts 1, 2, and 3, in exchange for a sentencing lid of three years eight
months, with execution of sentence suspended and placement on probation.
At the change of plea hearing, counsel stipulated the preliminary hearing
transcript provided a factual basis for the plea. The court then found
defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of her rights and granted
the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the remaining counts pursuant to a
Harvey waiver.3 The court also found defendant had violated the terms and
conditions of her probation in a trailing misdemeanor case (case No. 21-
02721).
Before sentencing, the probation department submitted a presentence
investigation report and recommendation. During an interview, defendant
expressed her desire to engage in services via the Bay Area Community
Services program and provided her probation officer with contact information
for the representative at the program. The program provides “wrap-around
services, including assistance with housing, substance abuse and mental
health treatment.” Defendant also expressed her desire to leave Mendocino
County and move to the Bay Area. She had been living with her foster
2All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.
3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.
3
mother, but “she could not bear to stay there much longer.” Defendant stated
she had been diagnosed with and suffered from “insomnia, schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar disorder, and paranoia” and admitted she used “controlled
substances” such as methamphetamines “as a coping mechanism.” She had
“ ‘5150’d’ herself” eight times over the years. She had been prescribed
“Depakote, Zyprexa, Trazadone, and Seroquel” during her recent
incarceration but stopped taking the medication upon her release from
custody because she did not trust the “Redwood Quality Management
Company.” She also believed she was “being stalked” and had been
kidnapped by the Mendocino County Sherriff’s Office.
The probation department observed defendant had “demonstrated a
consistent pattern” of failing to follow directives and refusing mental health
services—“exacerbated by her drug use” and “jeopardizing her own safety and
the safety of others.” This, in turn, led to intervention by law enforcement,
“who have very little recourse.” Although “a prison commitment could easily
be justified,” the department recommended a grant of probation on condition
defendant engage in the Bay Area Community Services program. The
department had submitted a referral to the program, with the expectation
defendant would be accepted by the time the court imposed sentence. This
would allow defendant to enter the program, remain in the Bay Area, allow
probation to transfer jurisdiction, and place defendant in “an environment
where she is willing to engage in services, but also offer her dual-diagnosis
treatment options that are not available in this county; with the hope of
reducing her overall risk of recidivism.”
The court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement
and placed defendant on two years’ probation, subject to several terms and
4
conditions, including that she obey all laws and be evaluated by a substance
abuse specialist and a mental health specialist.
Less than two weeks later, the probation department filed a petition
alleging a violation of probation, specifically that defendant had committed
two counts of felony battery (§ 243, subd. (d)).
At the violation hearing, Alfredo Acevedo, a hospital security guard,
testified he had been called to defendant’s room to “help restrain” her so the
staff could administer medication. Upon arrival at the room, defendant “tried
fighting” staff, including four security guards. She was getting into an
“aggressive stance,” “ready to attack [them] with her fists,” and saying she
was “going to kick all our . . . asses” in an “aggressive tone of voice.” Once
Acevedo saw defendant take an “aggressive stance,” the security personnel
formed a plan to restrain her. Each was supposed to grab one of defendant’s
limbs, but one guard slipped. Defendant was “trying to swing at one of the
other guards with her free arm.” Once a guard was able to grab her right
arm, defendant bit Acevedo. This broke the skin on Acevedo’s arm, leading to
bleeding, bruising and a scar, which Acevedo still had as of the time of the
hearing.
Benjamin Harpe, another security guard, was called in to restrain
defendant who was being “really combative” so that “medical staff could issue
pharmaceutical restraints.” Defendant was physically resisting by
“throwing” her hands “around and, like, punches and scratching and biting.”
She scratched Harpe on the side of his face, making it bleed, and bit his
shoulder, which left bruising but no permanent mark.
Both Acevedo and Harpe were in uniform, wearing blue button-up
shirts with patches and badges identifying them as security officers.
5
On cross-examination, Acevedo stated he did not know why defendant
was at the hospital. Harpe, in turn, stated he was not aware of why
defendant was at the hospital “other than . . . being on, like, a behavioral
health court hold.” The prosecutor objected to Harpe’s statement as hearsay
and lacking foundation, and the trial court ruled it would not consider the
statement for the truth of the matter but to explain Harpe’s conduct in trying
to restrain defendant.
The trial court subsequently observed that the petition alleged a
violation of section 243, subdivision (d) (battery resulting in “serious bodily
injury”), “but the evidence shows it’s a [subdivision] (b)” (battery of a
“security officer”) case. Neither the prosecutor, nor defense counsel, took
issue with the court’s pronouncement and implicit finding that the battery
had not resulted in “serious bodily injury” and thus did not come within
section 243, subdivision (d), and that defendant’s conduct, instead, appeared
to fall within the ambit of section 243, subdivision (b), battery of a “security
officer.”
Defense counsel then argued section 243, subdivision “(b) requires that
the individual is in the performance of their duties” and there was
insufficient evidence of that. Counsel maintained that “[w]ithout knowing
what was going on there, how [defendant] got there, why she was there, what
medications were being legally administered, how can I say that these two
individuals were in the performance of their duties without knowing that
underlying. I mean, did somebody off the street drop her off there? Did law
enforcement deliver her there? Did some social service agency deliver her
there? I don’t know any of that. [¶] And the reports are very silent on it. I
saw a report in one instance where it said, well, it could have been . . . a
[Welfare and Institutions Code section] 5150 situation. And then I also saw
6
that the [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 5150 hold was dropped. So I
don’t know why she’s there and being restrained and being administered
drugs. What it sounds like to me is she feels like she’s being unlawfully
restrained and is seeking to be not be restrained by any means possible. [¶]
You can’t, granted, use violence against words, and you’re limited on the kind
of violence you can use when violence is being applied to you. And being
restrained is a violent act. And if she’s responding in kind by the best she
can. . . . She’s 5’ tall[4] and weighs 100 pounds on a good day.”
The court responded, “I don’t have any evidence that they were acting
in excess or outside of their duties. What I have is both of them testifying
that they work in hospital security. They were identified as hospital security
by the clothes that they were wearing. And the evidence that I have is that
they were assisting to restrain” defendant. Admittedly, the court did not
“know why they were doing it. You’re right, I don’t have that information.
But I do have that they were acting within their—the scope of their duties as
security when they were injured in attempting to restrain [her].” The court
closed by stating, “I appreciate your argument”; however, there was no
evidence presented defendant was brought to the hospital “against her will”
and the court could not speculate either way. Rather, the court had two
“private security at a local hospital who, by the testimony I received today,
were engaged in the performance of their duties when they were injured by
[defendant]. . . . I don’t have any evidence that they were acting outside of
what their duties were.”
The court then reinstated defendant’s probation, subject to the
additional condition that she participate in behavioral health court in San
Francisco.
4 Defendant interjected that she was 4’9” tall.
7
DISCUSSION
There are many different categories of battery. Here, we are dealing
with three: simple battery (§ 242); battery inflicting serious bodily injury
(§ 243, subd. (d)); and battery on a security officer (§ 243, subd. (b)).
Simple “battery is ‘any willful and unlawful use of force or violence
upon the person of another.’ (§ 242.) ‘If, however, the batterer not only uses
unlawful force upon the victim but causes injury of sufficient seriousness,
then a felony battery is committed. For this second category of battery,
“serious bodily injury” is required. (§ 243, subd. (d).)’ ” (People v. Wade
(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1147 (Wade).)
Subdivision (b) of section 243 prescribes a third category—battery
against a peace officer or other specified person, including a “security officer.”
This subdivision provides, “ ‘If what would otherwise be a simple battery . . .
is committed against, e.g., a peace officer engaged in the performance of
his/her duties, then the offense is punishable by one year in county jail and a
$2,000 fine.’ ” (Wade, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1148, italics omitted;
§ 243, subd. (b).)
Here, the probation department filed a violation petition alleging
defendant committed two counts of battery under subdivision (d) of section
243—that is, battery causing serious bodily injury. As we have recited, the
trial court impliedly found there was insufficient evidence to support this
allegation, but there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of battery
under section 243, subdivision (b)—that is, battery of a security officer.
Battery Causing Serious Bodily Injury
“ ‘Serious bodily injury’ ” is defined in section 243 as “a serious
impairment of physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following:
loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or
8
impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring
extensive suturing; and serious disfigurement.” (§ 243, subd. (f)(4).)
Although Acevedo and Harpe testified defendant bit, punched, scratched, and
kicked them, there was no evidence of any impairment of the sort identified
in the statute. Acevedo testified defendant broke the skin on his shoulder,
leading to bleeding, bruising and a scar, which Acevedo still had. Harpe
testified defendant scratched the side of his face, making it bleed, and bit his
shoulder, which left bruising but no mark. While this evidence could suffice
to support simple battery, the trial court correctly found it did not support a
finding that defendant committed battery causing serious bodily injury under
section 243, subdivision (d).
Battery of a Security Officer
Section 243, subdivision (b) prohibits battery against, among others, a
“security officer” “in the performance of their duties” when the “person
committing the offense knows or reasonably should know” the victim is a
security officer “engaged in the performance of their duties.”
What the trial court, prosecutor, and defense counsel all overlooked is
that section 243 also expressly defines “ ‘[s]ecurity officer,’ ” and it does not
mean any person wearing insignia that he/she/they is part of a “security”
detail. Rather, section 243, subdivision (f)(14) defines “ ‘[s]ecurity officer’ ” to
mean “any person who has the responsibilities and duties described in
Section 831.4 and who is employed by a law enforcement agency of any city,
county, or city and county.”5
Neither Acevedo nor Harpe testified they were employed by a law
enforcement agency or had the responsibilities and duties described in
5 Section 831.4 provides, in pertinent part: “A sheriff’s or police
security officer is a public officer, employed by the sheriff of a county, a police
9
section 831.4. Indeed, Harpe testified he was employed by “Allied Universal
Security Services” at Adventist Health Hospital Ukiah Valley.
In short, the trial court, without objection by either the prosecutor or
defense counsel, went down the wrong analytical road in finding defendant
committed battery on a “security officer” under section 243, subdivision (b).6
Simple Battery
Given the state of the record and the error by the trial court in finding
defendant committed battery on a “security officer,” we requested
supplemental briefing as to the impact thereof on defendant’s appeal.
chief of a city police department, or a police chief of a police division that is
within a city department and that operates independently of the city police
department commanded by the police chief of a city, whose primary duty is
the security of locations or facilities as directed by the sheriff or police chief.
The duties of a sheriff’s or police security officer shall be limited to the
physical security and protection of properties owned, operated, controlled, or
administered by the county or city, or any municipality or special district
contracting for police services from the county or city pursuant to Section
54981 of the Government Code, or necessary duties with respect to the
patrons, employees, and properties of the employing county, city, or
contracting entities.” (§ 831.4, subd. (a)(1).)
6 We note that as of January 1, 2025, section 243, subdivision (b) also
prohibits battery against a “health care worker” and provides, in pertinent
part: “When a battery is committed against . . . a physician or nurse, other
health care worker of a hospital engaged in providing services within the
emergency department, and the person committing the offense knows or
reasonably should know that the victim is . . . a physician, nurse, or other
health care worker of a hospital engaged in providing services within the
emergency department, the battery is punishable by a fine note exceeding
two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not
exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.” Pursuant to
section 243, subdivision (f)(15), “ ‘Health Care Worker’ ” is defined as “a
person, who in the course and scope of employment, performs duties directly
associated with the care and treatment rendered by the hospital’s emergency
department or the department’s security.” However, there is no evidence in
the record that defendant was in the emergency department.
10
The Attorney General urges that even if the evidence is insufficient to
establish a violation of section 243, subdivision (b), it is sufficient to establish
simple battery (§ 242) or simple assault (§ 240), lesser included offenses of
battery on a security officer that suffice to sustain the finding that defendant
violated the terms and conditions of her probation. (See People v. Bechler
(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 373, 378–379; People v. Yonko (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d
1005, 1010 [“[W]here the evidence is insufficient to sustain the offense
charged but shows that the defendant is guilty of a lesser included offense
. . . , the court may reduce the crime rather than reverse outright.”]; see also
People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692 [“ ‘where an offense cannot be
committed without necessarily committing another offense, the latter is a
lesser included offense’ ” within the former], disapproved other grounds in
People v. Reed (2008) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1228–1229, 1231.)
Defendant maintains—as she did in her opening and reply briefs—that
“there was insufficient evidence presented . . . that [she] did not act in lawful
self[-]defense.” Specifically, given the absence of any evidence as to why she
was hospitalized, let alone, of authority for hospital medical staff to
involuntarily medicate her, she was entitled to raise the issue of self-defense.
And “[u]nder those circumstances,” defendant asserts, she “had the right to
use proportional force to defend herself from that attack” and thus did not
commit “even a simple battery.”
The prosecution always bears the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, an allegation that a defendant has violated
the terms and conditions of their probation. (People v. Buell (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 682, 687.) The threshold elements the prosecution was
required to prove here were whether defendant employed “any willful and
unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.” (§ 242.) “Only
11
a slight unprivileged touching is needed to satisfy the force requirement of a
criminal battery.” (People v. Ausbie (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855, 860, fn. 2,
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999,
1011, fn. 6.) There is no question that the record here amply supports the
“slight touching,” i.e., the force, requirement.
However, as defendant argues, there is an additional aspect of battery
as to which the record here is wholly silent, namely self-defense, which is a
legal justification for the commission of a battery. (CALCRIM No. 3470
[instructing on self-defense as a defense to battery].) CALCRIM No. 3470
spells out the defense as follows: “Self-defense is a defense to [battery]. The
defendant is not guilty of battery . . . if (he/she) used force against the other
person in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another). The defendant acted
in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) if: 1. The defendant
reasonably believed that [she] was in imminent danger of suffering bodily
injury [or was in imminent danger of being touched unlawfully]; [¶] 2. The
defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of force was necessary
to defend against that danger; [¶] AND [¶] 3. The defendant used no more
force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger.”
Thus, “[t]o justify conduct that would otherwise be an assault on
grounds of self-defense, a defendant ‘ “must have an honest and reasonable
belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted on him [or her].” ’ (People v.
Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064. . . .) ‘In other words, the defendant’s
belief must both subjectively exist and be objectively reasonable.’ (People v.
Brady (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1014. . . .) ‘The threat of bodily injury
must be imminent.’ (Minifie, at p. 1064.) Moreover, ‘ “any right of self-
defense is limited to the use of such force as is reasonable under the
circumstances.” ’ (Id. at p. 1065, citing Civ. Code, § 50 [‘Any necessary force
12
may be used to protect from wrongful injury the person . . . of oneself’].)”
People v. Cruz-Partida (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 197, 212 (Cruz-Partida).)
And where the defendant legitimately raises the issue, “[i]t is the
prosecution’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt [or, as here, by a
preponderance of the evidence] that the defendant did not act in lawful self-
defense. (People v. Lee (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1429. . . .)” (Cruz-
Partida, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 212.)
We understand that defendant’s apparent mental illnesses or
impairments are not to be taken into account in determining whether she
had an objectively reasonable belief that bodily injury was about to be
inflicted on her. (See People v. Brady, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1017–
1018; People v. Jefferson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 508, 519; Cruz-Partida,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 212.) Rather, the “reasonable person is an
abstract individual of ordinary mental and physical capacity who is as
prudent and careful as any situation would require.” (Jefferson, at p. 519.)
Here, the only evidence in the record is that defendant was in a
hospital room, medical personnel were attempting to medicate her, defendant
was resisting, and the two security guards were called into the room to hold
defendant down so the medical personnel could complete their mission. In
the absence of any other evidence, we can only conclude any reasonable
person would, in these circumstances, have concluded they were about to
suffer “bodily injury,” namely, they were about to seized and forcibly
medicated. The evidence fell short, in other words, because there was zero
evidence defendant could lawfully be involuntarily medicated or had, herself,
authorized the medical treatment to which she was about to be subjected.
(Cf. In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 14 [the constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment “clearly extends to the right to refuse antipsychotic
13
drugs”]; Riese v. St. Mary’s Hospital & Medical Center (1987) 209 Cal.App.3d
1303, 1320 [“absent a judicial determination of incompetence, antipsychotic
drugs cannot be administered to involuntarily committed mental patients in
nonemergency situations without their informed consent”], abrogated by
statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lewis (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1104.)
In sum, neither the prosecution nor the defense raised any objection to
the trial court’s misdirected assessment of the probation violations alleged
against defendant, which resulted in the court erroneously finding that she
committed two counts of battery on a security officer under section 243,
subdivision (b), a statutory provision which is simply inapplicable to the
incident that occurred here. Nor did the prosecution introduce any
evidence—namely, evidence that defendant could be forcibly medicated—to
support a finding that she was not acting in self-defense and thus allowing
this court to conclude that, while the evidence is insufficient to support a
finding that she committed battery on a security officer under section 243,
subdivision (b), it is sufficient to support a finding that she committed the
lesser offense of simple battery.
We are therefore left with no choice but to reverse the trial court’s
order that defendant violated the terms and conditions of her probation.7
DISPOSITION
The order is REVERSED.
7 We therefore need not, and do not, reach defendant’s claim that
requiring her to participate in the San Franciso treatment program violated
her constitutional rights.
14
_________________________
Banke, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Humes, P.J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
A169605, People v. Glover
15
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