Rodriguez v. Netflix CA2/2

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Filed 8/28/25 Rodriguez v. Netflix CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

FRANCISCO FERRERAS B338932
RODRIGUEZ,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 23STCV08993)

v.

NETFLIX, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Bruce G. Iwasaki, Judge. Affirmed.
Rufus-Isaacs Acland & Grantham, Alexander Rufus-Isaacs;
and Rodney Smolla for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Latham & Watkins, Marvin S. Putnam, Laura R.
Washington, Sakina J. Haji; Jenner & Block and Peter E. Davis for
Defendants and Respondents.
____________________
Plaintiff Francisco Ferreras Rodriguez (Ferreras1) appeals
the trial court’s orders granting a Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.162 special motion to strike, granting a motion to quash
service of summons, and making certain evidentiary and discovery
rulings in this defamation action. We conclude the trial court did
not err in granting the anti-SLAPP motion. We also conclude
California courts lack personal jurisdiction over Belgian company
Versus Production SRL (Versus). Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ferreras is a professional no limit freediving champion who
set 21 world records over the course of his career, the most recent
in 2003. Freedivers hold their breath while underwater and do not
use a breathing apparatus. Freediving comprises several categories
with different equipment and rules, including no limit, CNF
(constant weight no fins), and CWF (constant weight with fins). In
no limit freediving, the diver is attached to a sled that is lowered
underwater to a specified depth; the diver then inflates a lift bag,
which fills with air to return the sled and the diver to the surface.
Ferreras was married to Audrey Mestre, herself a world
record setting no limit freediving champion who learned the sport
under his tutelage. Mestre died in an accident on October 12, 2002,
while attempting a new world record no limit freedive of
171 meters in the water off the Dominican Republic. This appeal
arises from a lawsuit Ferreras filed in April 2023 for defamation
and false light invasion of privacy in the French film,

1 Plaintiff is called by several different names in the briefs and
record, but we adopt the name he used in his complaint.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2
Sous Emprise (Netflix, Inc. 2022) (in English, No Limit) (the Film).
Ferreras claimed that while the Film “present[s] itself as a
fictional work,” it was a thinly veiled portrayal of his life with
Mestre and the events of her death, and that it falsely implicated
him in causing her death.
Defendant David Rosenthal wrote and directed the Film.
Defendant Netflix, Inc. (Netflix, and with Rosenthal, the Netflix
Defendants) acquired the streaming rights to the Film in 2021 and
released the Film to its customers worldwide in 2022. Defendant
Versus is a Belgian limited liability company that produced the
Film and licensed it to Netflix.
I. The Film
Netflix promoted the Film as a “ ‘romantic drama’ ” about a
“ ‘young woman [who] finds deep, destructive love with her record-
holding freediving instructor.’ ”3 As the Film begins, a message
appears after the opening credits stating “inspired by real events.”
(Capitalization omitted.)
The Film’s main female character is Roxana Aubry,
“a beautiful, athletic young French woman in her 20’s.” Roxana
attends a diving course taught by “2015 world champion Pascal
Gautier” in Porquerolles, France in May 2016. (Capitalization
omitted.) She becomes romantically involved with Pascal and joins
his diving team. They live together in Porquerolles and attend
international diving competitions. In August 2016, Pascal sets a
new world record freedive of 172 meters.
Pascal stops freediving competitively on his doctor’s advice
after he suffers underwater blackouts. He teaches the sport to

3 The facts in this part are derived from the complaint and our
review of the copy of the Film included in the record on appeal.

3
Roxana, who begins to compete internationally and sets a French
women’s CWF record at her first competition in Italy in 2016. At
the same competition, a blonde female American diver sets a new
world record in no limit freediving for both men and women.
Roxana’s relationship with Pascal deteriorates over the
remainder of the Film. They argue frequently and both become
romantically involved with third parties.
The climax of the Film occurs at a diving competition in
Guadeloupe in 2017, where Roxana will attempt a new world
record no limit freedive of 180 meters. After a teammate checks
Roxana’s dive equipment, Pascal is shown hunched over the air
tanks, doing something with his left arm. When he is confronted,
he confirms he was checking the tanks; the team lowers Roxana’s
equipment into the water.
Roxana successfully dives to the target depth of 180 meters,
but when she tries to ascend, the lift bag will not inflate to return
the sled to the surface. Roxana loses consciousness and releases
the sled, which ascends without her. Roxana’s body is retrieved
and brought to the surface after more than eight minutes. The
team’s attempts to resuscitate her are unsuccessful, and she dies.
When a dive team member is questioned by the police about
the incident, he tells them the air tank was “full and functional.”
An officer asks him, “What do you think happened to all that air?”
He does not respond, and his face is replaced on screen by Pascal’s;
Pascal also remains silent.
Before the closing credits, an in memoriam page appears
with a photograph of Mestre, stating: “In memory of Audrey
Mestre, 1974–2002. Audrey tragically died on October 12, 2002 in
the Dominican Republic while attempting to beat the world record
at 171 meters.” (Capitalization omitted.) Immediately afterward,

4
another message appears stating “This film remains a work of
fiction. Any resemblance to reality is purely coincidental.”
II. The Complaint and Anti-SLAPP Motion
Ferreras filed his complaint for defamation and false light
invasion of privacy on April 21, 2023, against the Netflix
Defendants, Nolita Cinema,4 and a number of Does. He claimed
the Film was “a thinly disguised portrayal of Ferreras and [Mestre]
and the events leading to [Mestre’s] death.” To that end, he alleged
a list of similarities between Ferreras and the character Pascal,
between Mestre and the character Roxana, and between the
circumstances surrounding Mestre’s and Roxana’s deaths.
Moreover, Ferreras claimed the Film defamed him by “falsely
stat[ing] or impl[ying] that [he] intentionally caused his wife’s
death.”
The Netflix Defendants moved to strike the complaint
pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. (See § 425.16; Rusheen v.
Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055 (Rusheen) [defining anti-
SLAPP].) They argued Ferreras’s claims arose from their protected
activity of creating and distributing the Film, and Ferreras could
not demonstrate the requisite probability he would prevail. Among
other things, they argued no reasonable viewer of the Film could
understand it as conveying actual facts about Ferreras.
Ferreras moved to conduct limited discovery pertaining to
the actual malice element of his defamation cause of action in
order to oppose the anti-SLAPP motion. The Netflix Defendants
opposed on the ground Ferreras had no good cause for discovery
because he could not make out the other elements of defamation.

4 Ferreras later dismissed Nolita Cinema with prejudice.

5
On February 21, 2024, the trial court denied Ferreras’s
discovery motion. It determined Ferreras had not made a prima
facie showing the Film “made a provably false statement of fact
about him.” That is, the court concluded Ferreras failed to show “a
reasonable person would understand that the fictional character of
[Pascal] was in fact [Ferreras] acting as depicted.” For that reason,
even assuming the Film implied Pascal killed Roxana, the Film did
not make “a provably false factual assertion that Plaintiff Ferreras
murdered his wife.” Because Ferreras did not make out those
elements of his defamation cause of action, he did not show good
cause for discovery regarding actual malice.
Ferreras later filed his opposition to the Netflix Defendants’
anti-SLAPP motion, and he acknowledged the trial court’s
February 21, 2024, order “went to the heart of [his] two critical
dispositive assertions on the underlying merits of the suit,”
including that “reasonable viewers of the Film would have
understood that it was intended to depict Ferreras and [Mestre].”
Ferreras’s motion further recognized if the court’s conclusion that
the Film is “a pure work of fiction” were left standing, his lawsuit
was “dead on arrival.” Thus, Ferreras’s opposition brief sought to
convince the trial court to reconsider that conclusion.
Ferreras submitted evidence in support of his opposition,
including: (1) WhatsApp messages between Ferreras and the actor
who played Pascal; (2) Instagram messages received by Ferreras
after the Film’s release; and (3) declarations of two Film viewers,
Jorge Hazoury and Magali Lebel. The Netflix Defendants objected
to the evidence on several grounds. The trial court ultimately
excluded it as irrelevant.
The trial court then granted the Netflix Defendants’ anti-
SLAPP motion. First, the court agreed with the parties that the

6
Netflix Defendants had met their burden to show Ferreras’s claims
arose from their protected activity. Second, it reiterated its earlier
conclusion Ferreras “had not demonstrated that the Film made
provable false statements about [him],” and Ferreras’s opposition
to the anti-SLAPP motion was “no more persuasive than [its]
motion seeking leave for limited discovery” because “no reasonable
viewer would find that the Film portrayed [Ferreras].” The
similarities between his life and Pascal’s were “generic” and
“largely inconsequential,” and “the Film does not mention
[Ferreras] by name or identify any other real life individuals that
could tie [Ferreras] to [Pascal].” Thus, the trial court concluded
Ferreras had “not shown . . . a reasonable person would
understand that the fictional character of [Pascal] was in fact
[Ferreras] acting as depicted,” which was fatal to his defamation
claim. The trial court also determined the Film did not make “a
provably false factual assertion that [Ferreras] murdered his wife,”
and Ferreras failed to show actual malice by the Netflix
Defendants.
III. Versus Is Named as a Defendant and Moves to
Quash Service
While the Netflix Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion was
pending, Ferreras amended his complaint to add Versus as a
defendant. On February 20, 2024, Versus specially appeared to file
a motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction. It argued that
as a Belgian company with no employees or offices in California, it
was not subject to general or specific personal jurisdiction in
California. Ferreras opposed, arguing the trial court had specific
personal jurisdiction over Versus because Versus had entered into
a contract (the License Agreement) with Netflix, a California
company, to distribute the Film.

7
The trial court concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over
Versus. First, it decided the License Agreement was not sufficient
to show Versus had purposefully availed itself of the California
forum in the circumstances of this case, which arose from a tort
claim. Second, it decided this tort lawsuit did not arise out of or
relate to Versus’s contacts with California–which were limited to
the License Agreement with Netflix. The trial court therefore
granted Versus’s motion to quash.
IV. Ferreras’s Appeal
On April 15, 2024, Versus and the Netflix Defendants served
a notice of entry of the order granting both the anti-SLAPP motion
and the motion to quash. Ferreras timely appealed. (See § 904.1,
subd. (a)(3), (13); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).)
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Anti-
SLAPP Motion
The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion because it
determined Ferreras’s claims arose from protected activity and he
failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing upon them.
Ferreras argues that was error because his claims had sufficient
merit. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and General Principles of
Anti-SLAPP Law
“We review a trial court’s ruling on a special motion to strike
under section 425.16 de novo.” (Zhang v. Jenevein (2019)
31 Cal.App.5th 585, 592.)
The anti-SLAPP statute “provides a procedure for weeding
out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected
activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384, italics
omitted (Baral); see also § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) A court’s analysis

8
of an anti-SLAPP motion proceeds in two steps. (Baral, at p. 384.)
“First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim
arises from activity protected by section 425.16.”5 (Ibid.)
If the defendant succeeds in that first step, “the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by
establishing a probability of success.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 384; see also Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002)
29 Cal.4th 53, 61.) At that step, a court undertakes “a ‘summary-
judgment-like procedure’ ” in which “[i]ts inquiry is limited to
whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made
a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable
judgment.” (Baral, at pp. 384–385.) The plaintiff’s evidence is
accepted as true. (Id. at p. 385; see Oasis West Realty, LLC v.
Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) “However, speculative
inferences not supported by the evidence proffered need not be
considered.” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781,
795 (Monster).)
B. A Defamation Plaintiff Is Constitutionally
Required to Show the Allegedly Defamatory
Statements Were “Of and Concerning” Him
Like the parties, we focus on Ferreras’s defamation cause of
action, which is also dispositive of his false light cause of action.
(See Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1264
(Jackson).) “The tort of defamation ‘involves (a) a publication that
is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a
natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.’ ” (Taus
v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720; see also Civ. Code, § 44.)

5 Ferreras does not challenge the trial court’s determination
that his claims arise from protected activity.

9
“ ‘The sine qua non of recovery for defamation . . . is the existence
of a falsehood.’ ” (Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner (1986)
42 Cal.3d 254, 259.)
For a statement to be actionable, it must be a “statement of
fact,” not “a constitutionally protected statement of opinion.”
(Brodeur v. Atlas Entertainment, Inc. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 665,
680; see also Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 688, 701.) “ ‘[E]ntertainment is entitled to the
same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas.’ ”
(Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 387, 398; see also Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc. (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 47, 58 [First Amendment “extend[s] to all forms of
expression, including written and spoken words (fact or fiction),
music, films, paintings, . . . entertainment,” and video games].)
When the plaintiff is a public figure, he must also “ ‘show, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the defamatory statement was
made with actual malice–that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.’ ” (Sanchez v.
Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 750, 763, fn. 4 (Sanchez).)
In addition to those requirements, any plaintiff bringing an
injurious falsehood claim–including defamation–is constitutionally
required to show “the statement on which the claim is based . . .
specifically refer[s] to, or [is] ‘of and concerning,’ [him] in some
way.” (Blatty v. New York Times Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1033, 1042
(Blatty); see also Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution,
Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 277, 292, 293 (Hartford).) That is, the
plaintiff must be “identified . . . expressly or by clear implication.”
(Blatty, at p. 1044; see also Ferlauto v. Hamsher (1999)
74 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404 [libel].)

10
This appeal crucially turns on that “of and concerning”
requirement.
“Whether defamatory statements can reasonably be
interpreted as referring to plaintiff[] is a question of law for the
court.” (Tamkin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th
133, 146 (Tamkin).) In resolving that question, we “consider the
totality of the circumstances,” which includes “the ‘nature and full
content of the communication . . . .’ ” (Dickinson v. Cosby (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1160 (Dickinson); see also Balzaga v. Fox
News Network, LLC (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1338
[“ ‘Defamation actions cannot be based on snippets taken out of
context.’ ”].)
Ferreras concedes he is not named in the Film, and he does
not argue he is expressly identified therein. The United States and
California Constitutions thus require he show he is identified by
“clear implication” (Blatty, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1044) or, put
another way, by “reasonable implication” (id. at p. 1046). Our
Supreme Court explained what that means in the context of a
product disparagement claim, which is a species of injurious
falsehood. (Hartford, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 292–294.)
“Disparagement by ‘reasonable implication’ [citations] requires
more than a statement that may conceivably or plausibly be
construed as derogatory to a specific product.” (Id. at p. 295.)
Rather, “[a] ‘reasonable implication’ . . . means a clear or necessary
inference.” (Ibid.)6

6 Ferreras’s reply brief takes issue with requiring him to
demonstrate a “ ‘clear implication’ ” instead of a “ ‘reasonable
implication.’ ” As explained above, that is a distinction without a
difference.

11
We find that explanation helpful when considering the
required showing here. It is not enough for Ferreras to show the
Film “ ‘may conceivably or plausibly be construed as’ ” referring to
him; instead, he must show it refers to him by “ ‘a clear or
necessary inference.’ ” (Hartford, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 295.)
In the specific context of a defamation cause of action
premised upon a work of fiction, fellow Courts of Appeal have
developed a test for the “of and concerning” concept. “In actions
based on the identification of a fictional character with the actual
plaintiff, ‘[t]he test is whether a reasonable person . . . would
understand that the fictional character therein pictured was, in
actual fact, the plaintiff acting as described.’ ” (Tamkin, supra,
193 Cal.App.4th at p. 146; see also Aguilar v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 384, 387 (Aguilar).)
C. Ferreras Did Not Show the Film Is a Docudrama
Purporting to Describe Historical Events or Real
People
Ferreras’s opening brief largely ignores the “of and
concerning” test for fictional works and basically proceeds on the
assumption the Film is not fiction. Ferreras repeatedly refers to
the Film as “a docudrama,” which he defines (without citation) as a
“dramatization[] based on real events.” A “docudrama” is
essentially “historical fiction” (Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc. (1991) 501 U.S. 496, 513) or “a ‘dramatized retelling of
history.’ ” (De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 845, 852; see also Merriam-Webster Unabridged
Dict. (Online 2025) <https://unabridged.merriam-
webster.com/unabridged/docudrama> [as of Aug. 22, 2025]
archived at <https://perma.cc/C2BE-9UU5> [“docudrama noun:
[¶] a drama made for . . . motion pictures . . . dealing freely with

12
historical events”].) A common feature of the docudrama genre is
its fictionalized portrayal of real people as characters. (See, e.g.,
De Havilland, supra, at p. 851 [“docudrama [Feud: Bette and Joan
(FX 2017)] portrays the rivalry between actresses Joan Crawford
and Bette Davis”].)
Of course, if a docudrama character shares the name of a
real plaintiff who participated in the historical events depicted
therein, the “ ‘of and concerning’ ” element of defamation could be
easily satisfied: the plaintiff is “identified . . . expressly” in the
work. (Blatty, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1044.) Many of the cases relied
upon by Ferreras arise in just that context, and thus do not
analyze the “ ‘of and concerning’ ” element at any length. (See
Partington v. Bugliosi (9th Cir. 1995) 56 F.3d 1147, 1149–1150;
Gaprindashvili v. Netflix, Inc. (C.D.Cal. Jan. 27, 2022, No. 2:21-cv-
07408-VAP-SKx) 2022 WL 363537, at p. *6 (Gaprindashvili);
Fairstein v. Netflix, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2021) 553 F.Supp.3d 48, 59
(Fairstein); cf. Aguilar, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at pp. 386–387 [film
was not “of and concerning” the plaintiff, even though she shared a
first name with one character].) Because Ferreras has already
conceded he is not named in the Film, those cases are not helpful
to show the Film is “of and concerning” him.
Ferreras does not explain the basis for his assumption the
Film is a docudrama, nor is it apparent to us from the record. The
complaint does not make that allegation and instead alleges “[t]he
Film seeks to present itself as a fictional work.” Moreover, the
evidence supports the conclusion the Film is presented as fiction
and does not purport to describe any historical events or real
people, let alone Ferreras. Netflix promoted it as a “ ‘romantic
drama.’ ” The Film told its audience it was “inspired by real
events,” and “remains a work of fiction.” It also informed them

13
“any resemblance to reality is purely coincidental.” Rosenthal
stated the Film “is a work of fiction.” Ferreras has not identified
any characters whose names are the same as any real individuals,
let alone his own name.7 He neither claims he attended the 2016
and 2017 diving competitions and events depicted in the Film, nor
asserts the Film depicts actual incidents occurring at those
historical events or competitions. Indeed, Mestre’s tragic death in
2002 occurred approximately 13 to 14 years before the events
depicted in the Film, which were set in 2016 and 2017.
Ferreras seems to argue that two statements at the
beginning and end of the Film essentially transformed it into a
docudrama “of and concerning” him. Those are: (1) “inspired by
real events,” which appears after the opening credits; and (2) “In
Memory of Audrey Mestre, 1974–2002,” appearing before the
closing credits. Neither shows the Film is a docudrama “of and
concerning” Ferreras.
First, we reject Ferreras’s contention that “inspired by real
events” means “viewers [were] told . . . the Film is based on fact
and is not entirely fictional.” The statement speaks for itself: it
says “inspired by,” not “based on.” Merriam-Webster provides
multiple definitions of “inspire,” including “to have an animating,
enlivening, or exalting effect upon.” (Merriam-Webster Unabridged
Dict. (Online 2025) <https://unabridged.merriam-
webster.com/unabridged/inspire> [as of Aug. 22, 2025] archived at
<https://perma.cc/PSA5-6HBE>.) Ferreras has cited no authority
indicating “inspired by” actually means “based on.”

7 In fact, the lead male character’s name, Pascal Gautier,
shares the last name of a different freediver, Julie Gautier, by
whom Rosenthal claimed to have also been inspired.

14
Second, Ferreras argues “[t]he only logical reason for the film
makers to have included the In Memoriam Page . . . was to create a
connection in the minds of viewers . . . between the Film and the
actual events leading to [Mestre’s] death.” (Underscoring omitted.)
But Ferreras points to no evidence suggesting that was the
motivation to include the in memoriam page. On the contrary, the
evidence submitted was that Rosenthal included it “to honor
[Mestre’s] life, given the impact she left on the free-diving world
and her story’s personal impact on [him].” Ferreras has cited no
authority suggesting the presence of an in memoriam page
indicates a fictional work is actually a docudrama. Nor is it
otherwise apparent to us. We decline to credit Ferreras’s
speculative inferences from those two statements, which have no
support in this record. (See Monster, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 795.)
Finally, Ferreras argues the two statements amount to “self-
serving disclaimers” courts have routinely rejected. But many of
the cases he relies upon do not analyze disclaimers in the context
of whether a particular work is “of and concerning” the plaintiff,
which is the issue we are concerned with here. Instead, they
consider disclaimers in the context of whether the work “present[s]
a statement of fact that is provably false.” (Gaprindashvili, supra,
2022 WL 363537, at pp. *5–*6; Fairstein, supra, 553 F.Supp.3d at
pp. 60, 63–82.) Those cases do not discuss the “of and concerning”
element, presumably because the plaintiffs were “identified . . .
expressly” in the works at issue. (Blatty, supra, 42 Cal.3d at
p. 1044.) When a work expressly identifies a specific person by
name, a disclaimer may have a very different impact than when it
is presented as a work of fiction. But as we have already explained
and Ferreras has conceded, he was not expressly identified in the
Film.

15
Ferreras’s repeated assertion the use of disclaimers and
fictitious names does not necessarily insulate a defendant from
defamation liability misses the point. While disclaimers and
fictitious names may not be dispositive, they are part of the totality
of the circumstances we consider. (See Dickinson, supra,
37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1160.) Thus, we cannot and do not ignore the
Film’s disclaimers, fictitious names, and other elements in
considering whether the Film refers to Ferreras by a clear or
necessary inference.
D. Ferreras Did Not Show a Reasonable Viewer
Would Understand the Fictional Pascal Was
Actually Him
Because Ferreras did not show the Film is a docudrama
depicting real people or historical events, we apply the “of and
concerning” test used by our fellow Courts of Appeal in cases where
the plaintiff claims he is defamed by a fictional character:
“ ‘whether a reasonable person . . . would understand that the
fictional character therein pictured was, in actual fact, the plaintiff
acting as described.’ ” (See Tamkin, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at
p. 146; see also Aguilar, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 387.)
Tamkin is the seminal case in this area. In that case,
married real estate agent plaintiffs Scott and Melinda Tamkin
failed to show a probability of prevailing on their defamation
claims arising from an episode of the popular television program,
CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (KCBS-TV broadcast, Feb.12,
2009), set in Las Vegas, Nevada. (Tamkin, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 137, 146.) The Tamkins had been involved in a failed real
estate transaction in Los Angeles with one of the writers of the CSI
program, who later used their names for characters in preliminary
drafts of a CSI episode; their names were also used in casting

16
synopses to recruit actors, but the characters’ names were
eventually changed to Scott and Melinda Tucker in the broadcast
episode. (Id. at pp. 137–138.)
The Tamkin court determined that despite the identical
name, similar occupation (real estate business), age (late 30’s),
physical characteristics (attractive), and a wife with the same
name (Melinda Tamkin), a reasonable person would not conclude
the casting synopsis referred to the real Scott Tamkin. (Tamkin,
supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at pp. 137, 146–147.) The court explained
there was nothing uniquely identifying in the character’s physical
description or otherwise, nor any biographical details (e.g.,
birthplace, parents, children, schooling) in common with the real
Scott Tamkin. (Id. at pp. 137, 147.) In addition, no reasonable
person who read the casting synopses and saw the broadcast would
understand the fictional characters in the episode to be the real
Tamkins, because the additional descriptive characteristics in the
episode (such as Scott’s use of high fluoride toothpaste) were not
sufficiently unique, and the episode included other differences–
such as being set in Las Vegas and the characters having no
children. (Id. at pp. 137, 148.)
Considering the record as a whole and for the reasons we
describe below, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting
the anti-SLAPP motion because Ferreras failed to show a
reasonable viewer “ ‘would understand that [Pascal] was, in actual
fact, [Ferreras] acting as described.’ ” (Tamkin, supra,
193 Cal.App.4th at p. 146.)

17
1. The Existence of Certain Similarities
Between the Character Pascal and Ferreras
Is Not Persuasive When the Film Is Viewed
as a Whole
In an effort to show reasonable viewers would understand
Pascal was actually him, Ferreras relies upon a number of
“similarities between the Film and the story of the death by
drowning in 2002 of [Mestre], and of [their] life together.” While
that includes a long list of ostensible similarities between himself
and Pascal, as the trial court determined, “many of the material
overlaps between [Ferreras’s] life and the Film’s portray[al of]
[Pascal] are limited to similarities that would be generic to any
film about freediving.” For example, the characters are elite
competitive freedivers who are young, athletic, and attractive. But
similar traits like age, physical characteristics, and occupational
fields are not sufficient to show a reasonable person would believe
a fictional character was actually the real plaintiff, even when they
share the same name. (See Tamkin, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 146–147; Aguilar, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at pp. 387–391; see
also Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. (1997)
67 Cal.App.4th 318, 321, 323 (Polydoros) [“similarit[ies] in names
and attire, the enjoyment of baseball and swimming, and the brash
nature of the . . . character” were only “rudimentary”].) Even more
so here, since Ferreras is not named in the Film, the fact Ferreras
is a freediver who shares a handful of generic similarities with the
freediver character of Pascal that would be typical amongst
freedivers—such as age, athleticism, and competing in diving
events in locations around the Caribbean—falls short of creating a
clear or necessary inference that Pascal is, in fact, Ferreras.

18
Moreover, Ferreras essentially ignores the myriad
differences between himself and the character Pascal, which are
part of the totality of the circumstances we consider. (See
Dickinson, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1160.) Those include
differences in national origin (Ferreras is Cuban, Pascal is French);
residence (Ferreras met Mestre in Mexico and they lived together
in Miami; Pascal and Roxana meet and live in Porquerolles,
France); marital status (Ferreras was married three times,
including to Mestre in 1999, Pascal was unmarried); time period
and geographic setting (Ferreras’s last record-breaking dive
occurred in 2003 and Mestre died in the Dominican Republic in
2002, while the Film is set in Europe in 2016 and 2017 and Roxana
dies in Guadeloupe in 2017). And in the Film, Pascal sets his last
world record in August 2016, before Roxana begins her own
freediving training. By contrast, Ferreras and Mestre were
simultaneously elite freedivers for several years, even making a
record-setting tandem dive together in 1998, and according to
Ferreras, he continued diving and even set a record after Mestre’s
death.
Likewise, Ferreras’s relationship with Mestre did not
resemble the relationship between the characters of Pascal and
Roxana in the Film. He and Mestre “were a happy couple who were
very much in love.” By contrast, the relationship between Pascal
and Roxana is shown as “deeply troubled,” with tempestuous
arguments and infidelity by each.
Those differences, combined with generic similarities shared
by other freedivers and athletes, indicate no reasonable person
would conclude Pascal was actually Ferreras, acting as described.
(See Tamkin, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 148; see also Polydoros,
supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 323.)

19
As a fallback, Ferreras argues that even setting aside the
generic similarities between himself and the character Pascal,
there are several “core and indisputably unique similarities” that
are nevertheless determinative: (1) he and Mestre were romantic
partners and “co-world champions”; (2) Mestre pursued “break[ing]
the world record once [Ferreras] was medically sidelined”; and
(3) Mestre died “due to a bag not inflating while [Ferreras] was
supervising the dive.”8 But those simply reinforce what the Netflix
Defendants have already admitted: Ferreras and Mestre—along
with other freedivers, athletes, and various sources—inspired the
Film. Rosenthal explained he drew inspiration from: (1) his own
experiences with scuba diving and freediving; (2) films and books
about freedivers, including a 1998 French movie about rival no
limit freedivers and a diver’s tortured relationship with his
girlfriend that resulted in his death during a dive; (3) fictional
stories about dangerous romantic entanglements; (4) the lives of
top freedivers, including Ferreras and Mestre, as well as two other
freediving couples; (5) “real-world couples who are also world-class
athletes”; and (6) “numerous couples from the entertainment
industry” who have “toxic and destructive relationships.” That
certain aspects of Ferreras’s life may have partially inspired the
Film does not show a reasonable person would understand Pascal
was actually Ferreras, acting as described. (See Khodorkovskaya v.
Gay (D.C.Cir. 2021) 5 F.4th 80, 85 [“[A] fictional play, even if

8
We question those ostensible similarities because:
(1) Roxana’s character was never a “co-world champion[]” with
Pascal; and (2) according to Ferreras, his medical condition did not
end his competitive diving career, because he set a record in 2003
(after Mestre’s death). By contrast, Pascal’s last competitive dive in
the Film occurs before his doctor advised him to stop.

20
inspired by historical events, by definition is not—and does not
purport to be—a historical documentary . . . .”].)
2. Bindrim Is Not Persuasive
Ferreras’s reliance on Bindrim v. Mitchell (1979)
92 Cal.App.3d 61(Bindrim), disapproved on other grounds by
McCoy v. Hearst Corp. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 835, 846, footnote 9, is
misplaced. In that case, a jury found an author liable for libel for
her portrayal of the plaintiff in a novel as the character Herford.
(Id. at p. 68.) Plaintiff “used the so-called ‘Nude Marathon’ in
group therapy,” which the author attended, and her novel depicted
“ ‘Dr. Simon Herford’ ” leading “a nude encounter session.” (Id. at
pp. 69, 70.) In that case, “the only differences between plaintiff and
the Herford character . . . were physical appearance and that
Herford was a psychiatrist rather than a psychologist.” (Id. at
p. 75, italics added.) Moreover, “the similarities between Herford
and [plaintiff] [were] clear, and the transcripts of the actual
encounter weekend show a close parallel between the narrative of
[the] novel and the actual real life events.” (Id. at p. 76.) The court
therefore concluded “[t]here [was] overwhelming evidence that
plaintiff and ‘Herford’ were one.” (Ibid.; see also Tamkin, supra,
193 Cal.App.4th at p. 146.)
Bindrim is inapposite here for multiple reasons. First, we
have already explained the numerous differences between the
character Pascal and Ferreras, which are more extensive and
substantial than the mere differences in physical appearance and
professional credentials identified in Bindrim. Second, the
similarities between Pascal and Ferreras are largely generic and
common to many other elite divers and athletes. Third, there is no
evidence the Film’s screenplay closely parallels any real
transcripts or dialogue from historical events in Ferreras’s life.

21
Moreover, the jury in Bindrim had evidence before it that
after the author signed a publishing contract for the novel, she told
someone “she was worried because she had signed a contract and
painted a devastating portrait of [the plaintiff].” (Bindrim, supra,
92 Cal.App.3d at p. 69.) Similar incriminating evidence from a
work’s creator connecting a character to the real-life plaintiff was
present in other cases upon which Ferreras relies. (See Fetler v.
Houghton Mifflin Co. (2d Cir. 1966) 364 F.2d 650, 651 [the novel’s
author told the plaintiff “the book . . . ‘was about our father, the
family concerts and me’ ”]; Harvey v. Netflix (C.D.Cal. Sept. 27,
2024, No. 2:24-cv-04744-RGK (AJRx)) 2024 WL 4536639, *1–*2,
*6, appeal filed (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2024, No. 24-6151) [writer and star
“stated that he ‘disguised’ his real stalker [e.g., the plaintiff] as
Martha in the [s]eries”].) But there is no evidence like that here.
On the contrary, Rosenthal has categorically denied the Film
depicts Ferreras (or Mestre).
3. The Totality of the Circumstances Shows
No Reasonable Person Would Understand
Pascal to Actually Be Ferreras
Considering the entire context of the Film and all the
evidence in the light most favorable to Ferreras, the handful of
similarities between him and Pascal does not provide a “clear or
necessary inference” the Film refers to him. (See Hartford, supra,
59 Cal.4th at p. 295.) On this record, no reasonable person would
understand Pascal was actually Ferreras, acting as described. (See
Tamkin, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 146.) In fact, a person could
conclude as much only by disregarding the Film’s express
statements that it was a work of fiction, inspired by real events,
where “any resemblance to reality [was] purely coincidental.”
Ferreras has not shown a reasonable viewer would do so.

22
Because “[t]here is no law providing relief for defamation by
a fictional work which does not portray the plaintiff at all,”
Ferreras cannot show a probability of prevailing on his claims.
(Polydoros, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 326; see Jackson, supra,
10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1264 [defamation is dispositive of false light
claim].) The trial court properly granted the Netflix Defendants’
anti-SLAPP motion.
E. We Need Not Address Several of Ferreras’s Other
Arguments
In light of our conclusion the Film is not “of and concerning”
Ferreras, we need not consider whether the alleged defamatory
statement in the Film was an actionable false statement or
whether Ferreras showed the Netflix Defendants acted with actual
malice. (See Sanchez, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 763, fn. 4.) And
because Ferreras failed to make a prima facie showing on his
defamation claim, the trial court properly denied his motion for
discovery regarding actual malice. (See John Doe 2 v. Superior
Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1300, 1311–1312.)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Sustaining the Netflix Defendants’ Objections to
Certain Evidence Offered by Ferreras
When it decided the anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court also
sustained the Netflix Defendants’ objections to several pieces of
evidence proffered by Ferreras: (1) WhatsApp messages between
Ferreras and the actor who played Pascal; (2) Instagram messages
received by Ferreras; and (3) declarations of Film viewers Hazoury
and Lebel. Ferreras argues the trial court should not have
excluded the Instagram messages and the Hazoury and Lebel
declarations because they were relevant to how actual viewers
would interpret the Film, and thus relevant to whether a

23
reasonable viewer would believe Pascal was Ferreras, acting as
described. Solely for purposes of this opinion, we assume Ferreras
is correct that evidence from “real-world” viewers could amount to
some evidence a reasonable person would understand the
character Pascal was actually Ferreras.9 (Cf. Aguilar, supra,
174 Cal.App.3d at p. 391 [identification must be reasonable].)
“We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion.” (Sanchez, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 763.) Under that
standard, “as long as there exists ‘a reasonable or even fairly
debatable justification . . . for the [trial court’s decision], such
action will not be here set aside.’ ” (Gonzales v. Nork (1978)
20 Cal.3d 500, 507; see also People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th
197, 270–271 [an abuse of discretion is “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd” ’ ”].) There was no abuse of discretion here.
As to the Instagram messages, Ferreras submitted no
evidence indicating the individuals who sent them had even seen
the Film. Thus, the trial court properly determined their messages
were irrelevant.

9 We are not convinced that is the rule in California. Ferreras
cites three federal district court cases in support of that notion, one
of which discusses the issue in the context of whether the
statement had a defamatory meaning, and the other two do not
apply California law. (See Gaprindashvili, supra, 2022 WL 363537,
at p. *7 [not addressing the “of and concerning” requirement];
Vazquez v. Whole Foods Market, Inc. (D.D.C. 2018) 302 F.Supp.3d
36, 62, 64 [District of Columbia law]; Tah v. Global Witness
Publishing, Inc. (D.D.C. 2019) 413 F.Supp.3d 1, 7–8, 11–12
[same].)

24
Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the declarations from Hazoury and Lebel. Hazoury is
“developing a documentary on the sport of freediving and
[Ferreras’s] life . . . for years, in close collaboration with him.”
Lebel is a cousin of Mestre. Both Hazoury and Lebel were given a
“list of similarities between the Film . . . and the real life story of
[Ferreras] and [Mestre]” by Ferreras’s counsel. Both also “watched
the film . . . and formed the strong opinion that it was the story of
[Ferreras] and [Mestre].” Neither declaration indicates if Hazoury
or Lebel viewed the Film before or after receiving the list from
Ferreras’s counsel. Two viewers acquainted with the Film’s
ostensible subjects, who received a list of similarities between the
Film and Ferreras’s life from Ferreras’s counsel, are not “real-
world viewers” whose impressions could meaningfully bear upon
whether the Film is “of and concerning” Ferreras. (See Aguilar,
supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 391.) The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding their declarations.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Motion to
Quash
The trial court concluded it lacked specific personal
jurisdiction over Versus because Ferreras did not show Versus
purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the California forum or
that its action arose out of Versus’s California contacts. We agree
Ferreras failed to carry his burden to show the exercise of
jurisdiction was appropriate.
A. Standard of Review
Where, as here, the facts in the record regarding jurisdiction
are not conflicting, “ ‘ “the question of jurisdiction is purely one of
law and [we] engage[] in an independent review of the record.” ’ ”
(Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054,

25
1062 (Snowney); see also Rivelli v. Hemm (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
380, 393 (Rivelli).)
B. Principles of Personal Jurisdiction
“California courts may exercise personal jurisdiction on any
basis consistent with the Constitutions of California and the
United States.” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262,
268 (Pavlovich), abrogated on another ground as stated in David L.
v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 359, 369–370, 373; see
also § 410.10.) We are particularly cautious when considering the
exercise of jurisdiction over a company from outside the United
States. (Rivelli, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 393.)
Whether a state’s courts may exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant depends upon “the nature and extent of ‘the defendant’s
relationship to the forum State.’ ” (Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court (2021) 592 U.S. 351, 358 (Ford Motor).) In that
regard, there are “two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general
(sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes
called case-linked) jurisdiction.” (Ibid.; see also Pavlovich, supra,
29 Cal.4th at pp. 268–269.) The parties agree only specific
jurisdiction is at issue here.
Specific jurisdiction “covers defendants less intimately
connected with a State” than those over whom the State has
general jurisdiction, “but only as to a narrower class of claims.”
(Ford Motor, supra, 592 U.S. at p. 359.) “A court may exercise
specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) ‘the
defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum
benefits’ [citation]; (2) ‘the “controversy is related to or ‘arises out
of’ [the] defendant’s contact with the forum” ’ [citations]; and
(3) ‘ “the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair
play and substantial justice.’ ” ’ ” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at

26
p. 269.) “ ‘[T]he plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating
facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.’ ” (Snowney, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 1062.) Because Ferreras failed to show his action
against Versus is related to or arises out of Versus’s contacts with
California, we conclude the trial court properly declined to exercise
jurisdiction over Versus.10
C. Ferreras Failed to Show His Claims Arise Out of
or Relate to Versus’s Contacts in California
Ferreras argues his lawsuit is “ ‘related to’ Versus’ act of
entering into the License Agreement” with Netflix because “the
lawsuit concerns defamatory content” in the Film, and Versus
entered the License Agreement so Netflix would distribute the
Film in California and elsewhere. We are not persuaded his claims
against Versus arise out of or relate to the License Agreement.
For a state to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, there must be “a connection between the forum and the
specific claims at issue.” (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court (2017) 582 U.S. 255, 265 (Bristol-Myers); Jayone Foods,
supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 562, quoting Bristol-Myers, at p. 265.)
However, “a strict causal relationship between the defendant’s in-
state activity and the litigation” is not required. (Ford Motor,
supra, 592 U.S. at p. 362; see Jayone Foods, supra, at p. 561.)
In evaluating whether there is a connection between the
claim and the forum, we examine the defendant’s “ ‘relevant

10 For purposes of this opinion, we assume without deciding
Ferreras satisfied the first element of the specific jurisdiction test
by showing Versus purposefully availed itself of the California
forum when it entered into the License Agreement with Netflix, a
California company. (See Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial
Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 558 (Jayone Foods).)

27
conduct’ ” and where it occurred. (Bristol-Myers, supra, 582 U.S. at
p. 265; Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 285 (Walden) [“[I]t is
the defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary connection
with the forum State”].) If “all the conduct giving rise to the
[plaintiffs’] claims occurred elsewhere,” courts of that state “cannot
claim specific jurisdiction.” (Bristol-Myers, supra, at p. 265; see
also Walden, supra, at p. 291.)
Here, the paucity of the complaint’s allegations against
Versus seriously handicap Ferreras’s attempts to demonstrate this
element. When Ferreras amended his complaint to substitute
Versus’s name for “Doe 1,” he simply added Versus to a paragraph
alleging “that each of the fictitiously named defendants engaged in,
or is in some manner responsible for, the wrongful conduct alleged
herein.” The complaint (as amended) scarcely mentions Versus, let
alone describes the conduct Versus allegedly engaged in to defame
Ferreras or where that conduct supposedly occurred. (Cf. Rivelli,
supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 400–402 [analyzing the specific
misconduct alleged for each cause of action and its relation to the
forum].)
In connection with his opposition to Versus’s motion to
quash, Ferreras relied upon the License Agreement between
Netflix and Versus. The License Agreement indicates Versus
agreed to produce and complete the Film, subject to certain
specifications by Netflix, which would in turn license the Film and
distribute it worldwide. Even if that means Versus, as the Film
producer, had some role in creating the allegedly defamatory
statement in the Film, nothing in the License Agreement suggests
any of Versus’s conduct took place in California. And the record
indicates “Versus did not provide any services in connection with
[the Film] within the State of California.” It has “its only

28
two offices in . . . Belgium,” and “does not now maintain, and has
never maintained, an office or any employees within the United
States, including within the state of California.” Thus, “ ‘ “the
operative facts of the controversy [e.g., the defamation] are not
related to [Versus’s] contact with [California].” ’ ” (Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 455.)
Ferreras argues that because Versus contracted with Netflix
to distribute the Film, and because “the lawsuit concerns
defamatory content in the very same Film,” the lawsuit is related
to the License Agreement. But the License Agreement provides
Netflix had “the right and license to copy, reproduce, transmit,
exhibit, distribute, sublicense, and communicate to the public the
Titles [including the Film] within the Territory . . . in any and all
formats and versions.” “Territory” was defined as “The Universe.”
(Underscoring omitted.) The License Agreement does not indicate
Versus had any role in disseminating or distributing the Film, in
California or anywhere else. Netflix did. But a California court
cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Versus based on Netflix’s
conduct, particularly where it was neither “alleged that [Versus]
engaged in relevant acts together with [Netflix] in California,” nor
“that [Versus] is derivatively liable for [Netflix’s] conduct in
California.” (Bristol-Myers, supra, 582 U.S. at p. 268; see also
Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 286 [“a defendant’s relationship with
a . . . third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for
jurisdiction”].) “The bare fact that [a foreign defendant] contracted
with a California distributor is not enough to establish personal
jurisdiction . . . .” (Bristol-Myers, supra, at p. 268; see also Walden,
supra, at p. 286 [“Due process requires that a defendant be haled
into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the
State.”].)

29
And even if Ferreras is correct the License Agreement shows
Versus has some affiliation with California, that affiliation is
based in contract. (See Rivelli, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 404.) It
therefore does not help Ferreras, whose claims against Versus
sound in tort and “do not arise from, or relate to the contractual
relationship” between Netflix and Versus. (Ibid.) Ferreras’s tort
cause of action for defamation relates “to alleged misconduct that
bears no particular affiliation to the forum” of California. (Ibid.)
Moreover, this is not a case where a California plaintiff suffered
harm in California. (Cf. Jayone Foods, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at
p. 563 [California residents alleged harm suffered in California
from a product purchased in California].) The complaint does not
allege Ferreras is a citizen or resident of California.
The trial court correctly determined it lacked specific
personal jurisdiction over Versus.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. Defendants are entitled to costs on
appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)–(2).)

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

GOORVITCH, J.*

* Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

30

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