People v. Choice CA2/2

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Filed 8/27/25 P. v. Choice CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B337091

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA040471)
v.

BRIAN KEITH CHOICE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jacqueline Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.

Milena N. Blake for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Brian Keith Choice (defendant)
appeals the judgment of resentencing entered after the trial court
recalled his sentence of 115 years to life in prison upon the
recommendation of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR), and resentenced him. He contends the
trial court erred by failing to make a meaningful reduction in his
sentence and by failing to consider required statutory factors. He
also contends the sentence was in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finding no merit
to defendant’s contentions, we affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND
In 1999 a jury convicted defendant of three counts of second
degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),1 with findings he personally
used a firearm during the commission of the crimes (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b)). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted he had
suffered three prior serious felony convictions within the meaning
of the three strikes law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d), 667, subds.
(b)–(i)) (strike convictions), and two prior serious felony
convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
(recidivist enhancements). He was sentenced to a term of 115
years to life in prison, comprised of a third-strike term of 25 years
to life for each of the three robbery counts, plus a 10-year firearm
enhancement for each robbery count, and two 5-year recidivist
enhancements. The judgment was affirmed in People v. Choice
(June 15, 2000, B131004) (nonpub. opn.). We have taken the
procedural information from the opinion affirming the judgment.

1 All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.

2
Prior convictions
The trial court received a letter dated December 21, 2022,
from Kathleen Allison, then Secretary of the CDCR,
recommending the trial court recall defendant’s sentence and
resentence him in accordance with section 1172.1, subdivision
(a)(1).2 Secretary Allison stated she and the Director of the
Division of Adult Institutions thoroughly reviewed and compiled
defendant’s case factors in light of new sentencing authority.
Attached to the letter was a cumulative case summary and
evaluation report containing the case factors applicable to the
recommendation for recall and resentencing.
The summary noted defendant’s criminal history, which
included convictions for robbery in 1986 and another in 1992,
receiving stolen property in 1996, and four drug offenses between
1989 and 1992 and one in 1998. The summary showed poor
performance on parole between 1997 and 1999, including three
instances of absconding and conviction of the crimes for which he
is incarcerated. There have been four reports of defendant’s
violation of rules since his incarceration: possession of a cell
phone in 2020; possession of alcohol in 2019; delaying a peace
officer in the performance of duties in 2004; and disobeying a
direct order in 2002. He received one counseling report in 2004,
after he refused to lock up when given an order.
In addition, the summary indicated between 2000 and
2011, defendant worked as a porter, mostly receiving satisfactory

2 Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) allows the superior court
to recall and resentence a defendant at any time upon certain
conditions, including the recommendation of the secretary of the
CDCR.

3
grades for performance. From 2013 to the present, defendant
worked as a cook, receiving grades for performance ranging from
satisfactory, above average, exceptional and excellent, and
becoming a cook journeyman. Since 2019, defendant has received
numerous laudatory “chronos” from correctional supervising
cooks and a culinary officer acknowledging his hard work, work
ethic, and a willingness to complete assigned tasks.3
The prosecution submitted a brief supporting recall and
resentencing, expressing the opinion defendant did not pose an
undue risk to public safety. Defendant submitted a report by
expert witness Retired Warden Robert Ayers and called Ayers to
testify at the hearing as an expert on prison behavior and release
evaluations.
Ayers did not find defendant’s one-time alcohol possession
to be significant, and the CDCR found no indication defendant
has been required to submit to random urine testing. He
explained inmates who use alcohol are usually caught, and
defendant had just the one violation. Also, defendant’s drug of
choice had been crack cocaine, not alcohol, and although drugs
are usually readily available in prisons, Ayers saw no signs that
defendant had been using drugs while incarcerated. Ayers spoke
with defendant, who acknowledged his criminality was based on
his addiction. Defendant’s crimes were of the type typical of
addicts: theft to support their addiction.
While the job of cooking is an easy job to get, it is hard to
keep, as many inmates are fired for stealing and smuggling food
out. Defendant’s work ethic demonstrated how he took his job

3 A chrono is an evaluation. (In re Gray (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 379, 389.)

4
seriously and was not involved in such activity. Ayers saw a
notation in defendant’s file designating him as a “critical worker,”
a class of inmates with jobs deemed necessary for the basic
functioning of the prison and trusted by staff to come out of their
cells during lockdowns to do their jobs.
Among other things, Ayers summarized defendant’s solid
work performance and rehabilitative progress, his honesty and
good behavior, and his years-long sobriety in prison. Ayers gave
his opinion that defendant would not be a risk to public safety
and noted he had been accepted into an excellent reentry
program.
In making a statement on his own behalf, defendant
acknowledged his lack of formal rehabilitative programming
relating to substance abuse, such as Alcoholics Anonymous (AA)
and Narcotics Anonymous (NA), and said he took responsibility.
He explained that he “really, really” liked his job, and in order to
sign up and to have a record of programming, he would have been
required to give up his job. Instead he participated in AA and NA
as a walk-in, attending when he could. He would sit and listen
and learned a lot about how to deal with sobriety. He added the
sessions of AA and NA helped him a lot, but it is just not on
paper.
The prosecution recommended a reduced sentence of 25
years to life plus two years, as follows: strike the strike
allegations with regard to two of the robbery counts; impose 25
years to life as to the third robbery count and a one-year middle
term for each of the two remaining robbery counts; strike the
five-year recidivist enhancements previously imposed pursuant
to section 667, subdivision (a); stay the 10-year gun enhancement
previously imposed pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b),

5
and strike any remaining enhancements. The prosecution
explained defendant would be considered for early parole due to
his age in 2026.4
Defendant asked to be resentenced to a term that would
result in his immediate release into the Amity Foundation re-
entry program and offered to waive custody credits so he could be
placed on parole.
After the hearing of January 8, 2024, the trial court
recalled defendant’s sentence and resentenced him to a total
prison term of 39 years to life. As to count 1, second degree
robbery, the court struck the two recidivist enhancements but
declined to strike the prior strike convictions and sentenced
defendant to a term of 25 years to life in prison, plus 10 years for
the firearm enhancement. As to each of counts 2 and 3, the court
struck the prior strike convictions and the firearm enhancement
for purposes of resentencing only and struck the five-year
recidivist enhancements.5 The court imposed the middle term of

4 Defendant also understands he will be eligible for elderly
parole consideration in 2026. Neither party discussed section
3055, which governs elderly parole, and states in subdivision (g):
“This section does not apply to cases in which sentencing occurs
pursuant to Section 1170.12, subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, of
Section 667 . . . .” When section 3055 was enacted in 2017, it
contained this subdivision (g) exception to persons serving a
sentence under the three strikes law. (See Stats. 2017, ch. 676,
§ 3 [eff. Jan. 1, 2018].) Section 3055 has been amended twice
since then and subdivision (g) remains in the statute. (See Stats.
2020, ch. 334, § 2 & Stats. 2023, ch. 311, § 15.)
5 The court struck the two strike convictions to comply with
section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(2), which requires the court to
apply “any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for

6
three years as to count 2 and the middle term of one year as to
count 3. Custody credit was calculated at 9,417 days.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the
judgment.

DISCUSSION
I. Resentencing discretion
Defendant first contends the trial court erred by failing to
provide a “meaningful modification” of defendant’s sentence. He
points to section (1)(d) the uncodified statement of legislative
intent in Assembly Bill No. 600 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly
Bill 600), which amended section 1172.1, effective January 1,
2024. Section (1)(d) of Assembly Bill 600 states: “It is the intent
of the Legislature that, in cases where the judge concludes that
recall and resentencing pursuant to Section 1172.1 of the Penal
Code is appropriate, the resentencing result in a meaningful
modification. ‘Meaningful modification’ means it will cause some
actual change in the person’s circumstances, including, but not
limited to, immediate release, earlier release, and newly acquired
entitlement to review by the Board of Parole Hearings or the
advancement of eligibility for a parole hearing.”
Defendant contends his resentencing resulted in none of
the above “meaningful” changes. He reasons that although he
will have been incarcerated for 25 continuous years in 2026 when
he turns 60 and will be possibly eligible for elderly parole, his
new sentence of 39 years to life effectively puts him in the same

judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.”

7
position as his prior sentence of 115 years to life with no
opportunity for parole until the year 2114.
The People point out that uncodified legislative findings are
relevant only where the statute itself is ambiguous, and then only
to the question of statutory interpretation. (Doe v. Superior
Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 40, 69.) Such statements “cannot be
read to expand the scope of the legislation beyond which it was
intended. Statements of intent, contained in the uncodified
section of statutes, ‘“do not confer power, determine rights, or
enlarge the scope of a measure.”’” (People v. Coddington (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 562, 570–571.)
In reply, defendant claims an ambiguity in the statute: that
it is not clear whether the prior sentence may be reimposed
without change, whether the trial court may impose a sentence
that is “functionally” the same, or whether, as defendant asserts,
there is a presumption favoring an “actual change in the person’s
circumstances,” which is more favorable, including immediate
release.
Defendant appears to find support for his presumption
argument in section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(2), which states:
“There shall be a presumption favoring recall and resentencing of
the defendant, which may only be overcome if a court finds the
defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18.”
However, that provision does not apply to the determination of a
new sentence. Although section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(2) created
presumption favoring recall and resentencing when the CDCR
secretary recommends it, once the trial court has recalled a
sentence, as in this case, “the sentence ultimately imposed by the
court is left to its discretion without any further application of

8
the presumption.” (People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809,
820.)
Section 1172.1 is unambiguous with regard to the court’s
discretion. “Under ‘well-settled principle[s] of statutory
construction,’ we ‘ordinarily’ construe the word ‘may’ as
permissive and the word ‘shall’ as mandatory, ‘particularly’ when
a single statute uses both terms.” (Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v.
Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 538, 542.) Section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(1) states in relevant part that under one of the
enumerated conditions, “the court may . . . recall the sentence
and commitment previously ordered and resentence the
defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been
sentenced.” (Italics added.) Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(3)(A)
provides the resentencing court may “[r]educe [the] term of
imprisonment by modifying the sentence,” “provided the new
sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence” (id., subd.
(a)(1)); and section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(3)(B) provides the
court may vacate the sentence and impose a lesser offense that
results in a reduced sentence. Section 1172.1 also uses “shall.”
For example, section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(2) states in
resentencing the defendant, the court “shall apply . . . any
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion”; and subdivision (a)(5) states in resentencing the
defendant, “the court shall consider postconviction factors,
including, but not limited to” the enumerated factors.” (Italics
added.) Thus we agree with the People that when “may” is used
in the statute it is conferring discretion onto the resentencing
court.
Even if we agree there is an ambiguity requiring resorting
to the statute’s preamble, other sections make clear the ultimate

9
sentence imposed after recall is left to the trial court’s discretion.
Assembly Bill 600, section (1)(a) sets forth the Legislature’s
intent that all ameliorative laws and court decisions allowing
discretionary relief should be applied, and section (1)(b) states it
is the Legislature’s intent “courts have full discretion in
resentencing proceedings . . . to reconsider past decisions to
impose prior strikes.” (Italics added.) The trial court here
considered defendant’s 11 prior strike convictions in resentencing
defendant. As there is nothing in the text of section 1172.1 that
obligates a court to impose a sentence less than the initial
sentence, we reject defendant’s contention the court was required
to impose a term that would actually make a favorable “change in
the person’s circumstances.” As the sentence imposed was well
within the court’s discretion, we disagree.
The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to
demonstrate an abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court
(Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977 (Alvarez).) “Where, as here,
a discretionary power is inherently or by express statute vested
in the trial judge, his or her exercise of that wide discretion must
not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.” (People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316.) The
People argue defendant’s burden is difficult to carry, as he has
not claimed the court abused its discretion in dismissing just two
of his three prior strikes. The People also claim that given
defendant is serving a third strike sentence, he will be eligible for
elderly parole in 2026.

10
II. Consideration of postconviction factors
Defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to adequately consider postconviction factors, and instead
relied almost exclusively on his criminal history, in making
findings contrary to the position of the CDCR and Ayers, the
defense expert witness.
In deciding the sentence to impose in a new sentencing
hearing, the court “shall” “consider postconviction factors,
including, but not limited to,” defendant’s “disciplinary record
and record of rehabilitation . . . while incarcerated,” “evidence
that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence,” and “evidence that reflects that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(5).)
As defendant claims an abuse of discretion, he must
“clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary.” (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 977–978.) “It is a
fundamental tenet of appellate review that we presume on a
silent record the court properly exercised its discretion.” (People
v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 868.) Thus, “[a]bsent
evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew
and applied the governing law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58
Cal.4th 1354, 1390; see People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th
305, 310 [“The court is presumed to have considered all of the
relevant factors . . . .”].)
Prior to setting forth its reasons for the modified sentence,
the trial court stated it had considered all the evidence.
Nevertheless, defendant asserts the court “seemingly ignored the

11
letters of recommendation from prison” praising his “work ethic,
maturity and responsibility; lack of disciplinary write-ups . . . ;
lowest-possible security designation; age; professional reentry
plan; and the risk assessment by CDCR.” (Italics added.)
Defendant also asserts “[t]he court appears to have ignored this
significant vocational training and its rehabilitative effects, as
well as his participation in programs such as Alcoholics
Anonymous and Criminal Thinking . . . .” (Italics added.)
Defendant complains that “[i]nstead, the court simply
stated that there had not been ‘much change’” and that there had
been “no efforts at rehabilitation.” The trial court actually stated:
“[A]lthough I would commend [defendant] for the work that he
has done while in prison, the fact that there has been no drug
rehabilitation and no efforts at rehabilitation through any of the
programming over 24 years leads this court to believe that there
is not much change necessarily.” This statement shows the trial
court did address and consider the factors defendant claims were
ignored.
Other parts of the trial court’s statement of reasons for its
sentencing choices also show the court considered postconviction
factors. Specifically, the court considered the report and
testimony of defense expert Ayers, but after Ayers was cross-
examined, the court seemingly gave less weight to this
testimony.6 The court also observed that while there was an

6 For example, the court disagreed that having alcohol
(“pruno”) in prison says nothing about defendant’s sobriety or
Ayers’s opinion that facts concerning defendant’s prior crimes or
the subject crimes had any relevance to defendant’s potential
future risk. The court concluded the only relevant facts Ayers

12
indication defendant had family support, the CDCR noted
defendant had received only seven visits in the last 24 years.
To be sure the court considered defendant’s criminal
history of 11 prior strike convictions and defendant’s past poor
performance on parole, including commission of the crimes
leading to the current incarceration. The trial court noted the
sentence complied with the CDCR’s recommendation to reduce
defendant’s sentence and to strike two of the prior strike
convictions, but explained the reason all of them would not be
stricken was that the strikes were robberies with the use of a
gun, and all three robberies were committed with personal use of
a gun. The court concluded that defendant fell directly inside the
spirit of the Three Strikes law.
Defendant does not argue that in refusing to strike prior
convictions the court relied on factors that were not allowed
under the law or that the factors the court relied on were
unsupported by the record. Defendant’s complaint, in essence, is
the court should have given greater weight to other factors.
Disagreement with the court’s allocation of weight of the factors
does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. (Cf. People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 379–380.) “ ‘[I]t is not enough to
show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to
strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations. . . . ‘[W]here the
record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant
facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the
spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if
we might have ruled differently in the first instance . . . .’” (Id. at

relied on were that defendant was a hard worker in prison and
was older, which the court found not helpful.

13
p. 378, citations omitted.) “[T]he circumstances must be
‘extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can be deemed to
fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he
squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and
continuous criminal record . . .’ [citation], the circumstances
where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls
outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even more
extraordinary.” (Ibid.)
The trial court stated it had considered all the evidence,
and the reasons given for the modified sentences indicated the
court considered the required factors of section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(5). Because the court focused its explanatory
comments on defendant’s crimes does not mean that was the only
factor it considered. (See People v. Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th
at p. 310.) Though defendant argues the trial court “appears to
have ignored” some factors, he has not pointed to any indication
in the record that demonstrates this is so. We thus presume the
court considered all relevant factors. (Ibid.)
Defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing the
court’s sentencing decisions were irrational or arbitrary. (See
Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 977–978.)
III. The Eighth Amendment
Defendant argues his sentence of 39 years to life for second
degree robberies during which no one was injured violates the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments set forth in
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
because it is grossly disproportionate to his offense.
In its brief supporting recall and resentencing filed
August 15, 2023, the prosecution recommended striking two of
the three strike allegations and imposing one of the prior strike

14
convictions under the three strikes law. Between the August
2023 filing and the trial court’s decision in January 2024,
defendant made no claim, orally or in writing, that a reduced
sentence, which includes a life term under the three strikes law,
would violate the Eighth Amendment, and he does not refute or
even mention the People’s claim the issue has been forfeited.
While the issue has not be reserved for appeal (see People v.
Brewer (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 199, 212), we nevertheless review
defendant’s constitutional claim and find it to be meritless.7
Defendant relies on Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277 (Solem) to
assert his sentence violates “clearly established Eight[h]
Amendment precedent.” He claims that Solem requires the court
to determine proportionality by examining at least the following
three factors: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” (Id. at pp. 290–292
(maj. opn. of Powell, J.).) Defendant thus undertakes a
comparison of his sentence with punishment for other crimes in
the same and other jurisdictions.
Solem is not a “clearly” established precedent, as stare
decisis is less rigid as applied to constitutional precedents.
(Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 965; see id. at
pp. 1008–1009 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.) (Harmelin).) Writing
the majority opinion in Harmelin, Justice Scalia characterized
Solem as “scarcely the expression of clear and well accepted
constitutional law,” noting that since it was decided, two high

7 Defendant makes no claim under the California
Constitution. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.)

15
court cases have “explicitly rejected” Solem’s “three-factor” test.
(Harmelin, at p. 965.) Concurring in the majority opinion,
Justice Kennedy wrote, “The Eighth Amendment does not require
strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it
forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’
to the crime.” (Id. at p. 1001.)
Subsequent to Harmelin, United States Supreme Court
decisions have rejected proportionality review in noncapital
cases, holding the Eighth Amendment requires, if at all, a narrow
proportionality review in rare cases where the punishment gives
rise to an inference that it is grossly disproportionate to the
crime. (See, e.g., Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20
(plur. opn. of O’Conner, J.) (Ewing); accord, Lockyer v. Andrade
(2003) 538 U.S. 63, 77 (Lockyer).)
In Ewing, another plurality opinion, the court approved
statutory schemes such as California’s three strikes law that
resulted in life imprisonment upon a conviction for a serious
felony with one or more prior qualifying convictions. (See Ewing,
supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 19–20, 28–30 (plur. opn. of O’Conner, J.).)
In that case, the defendant was convicted of grand theft after
stealing three golf clubs with a value of nearly $1,200. (Id. at
p. 28.) The defendant asked the trial court to dismiss the
allegations of his prior strike convictions to avoid a sentence
under California’s three strikes law. (Id. at p. 19.) The trial
court considered the defendant’s entire criminal history, the fact
that he was on parole when he committed his latest offense and
heard arguments from counsel as well as a statement from the
defendant himself. (Id. at pp. 19–20.) The court ruled the
defendant’s four prior strikes for three burglaries and a robbery

16
should stand and sentenced him under the three strikes law to 25
years to life. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court found the “sentence [was] justified by
[California’s] public-safety interest in incapacitating and
deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by his own long,
serious criminal record.” (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 29–30
(plur. opn. of O’Connor).) The court held California “‘was entitled
to place upon [the defendant] the onus of one who is simply
unable to bring his conduct within the social norms prescribed by
the criminal law of the State’”; and his sentence was “not ‘the
rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed
and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality.’” (Id. at p. 30 (plur. opn. of O’Connor).)
“‘Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges
to the proportionality of particular sentences have been
exceedingly rare.’” (Id. at p. 21 (plur. opn. of O’Connor); see
Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S. at pp. 995–996 (plur. opn. of Scalia,
J.); id. at p. 1001 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)
Defendant’s case is not exceedingly rare. Citing Ewing,
supra, 538 U.S. at page 16 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.), the court
came to a similar conclusion in Lockyer, supra, 538 U.S. at pages
66–68 (maj. opn. of O’Connor, J.), in which two separate thefts of
videotapes each worth less than $100 resulted in two consecutive
terms of 25 years to life. Prior to Ewing, Eighth Amendment
claims were rejected in such cases as Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S.
at pages 961, 995–996 (plur. opn. of Scalia, J.) (mandatory life
sentence without the possibility of parole for possession of 672
grams of cocaine) and Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 266,
285 (life sentence for a nonviolent recidivist whose third
conviction was for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses).

17
Defendant suggests that robbery with a gun is a minor
offense because no one was injured. Any robbery is both a serious
and violent felony offense (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9)), and any violation
of section 12022.53 is both serious and violent (§ 667.5, subd.
(c)(22)). With or without injury or a violation of section 12022.53,
robbery is a serious and violent felony. (Cf. People v. Montalvo
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 597, 624 [robbery by instilling fear].)
Moreover, defendant’s sentence was “amply supported by his own
long, serious criminal record.” (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 30
(plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) As the People note, defendant was
not being punished for a single offense, but for numerous offenses
and recidivism; and “‘the three strikes law punishes not only his
current offenses, but also his recidivism.’” (People v. Panighetti
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 978, 1003.) Furthermore, under the
Eighth Amendment, even a cruel punishment may be
constitutional as long as it is not unusual. (See Harmelin, supra,
501 U.S. at pp. 994–995 (plur. opn. of Scalia, J.).) Sentences like
the sentence in Ewing and in defendant’s case may be harsh and
even cruel, but they are not unusual. (Lockyer, supra, 538 U.S. at
pp. 66–68 (maj. opn. of O’Connor, J.); Harmelin, supra, at p. 961
(plur. opn. of Scalia, J.); Rummel v. Estelle, supra, 445 U.S. at
pp. 266, 285 (maj. opn. of Rehnquist, J.).)
Defendant faults the People for citing such cases as Ewing,
supra, 538 U.S. 11 and Lockyer, supra, 538 U.S. 63 because they
are more than a decade old. Defendant argues that in doing so
the People fail to recognize the “evolving state of California’s
criminal jurisprudence,” which in some cases no longer permits

18
three strike sentences, even where previously legally imposed.8
To illustrate this point defendant cites the more recent appellate
court case of People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1145
(Avila), for its holding a three strikes sentence of 39 years to life
for second degree robbery and attempted extortion violated the
California constitution. Defendant’s illustration fails, as
defendant has limited his constitutional claim to the United
States Constitution, unlike the Avila court that expressly decided
the “case only under the California Constitution.” (Avila, at
p. 1145, fn. 13.) We find no citation to the California Constitution
in defendant’s briefs. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.)
Moreover, the circumstances in Avila were different from
this case. In Avila, the defendant’s prior strikes were committed
when he was under the age of 21, making him a youth offender,
subject to expanded parole opportunities (Avila, supra, 57
Cal.App.5th at p. 1141); the most violent of his crimes occurred
when he was 18 years old, almost 30 years prior to his current
offense; and one of them would be a misdemeanor today (id. at
p. 1148). Furthermore, Avila not only fails to support defendant’s
contention under the Eighth Amendment, it would not support a
claim under the California Constitution if one had been made. In
the course of comparing the defendant’s sentence to sentences of

8 In approving the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, “the
voters found and declared that its purpose was to prevent the
early release of dangerous criminals and relieve prison
overcrowding by allowing low-risk, nonviolent inmates serving
life sentences for petty crimes, such as shoplifting and simple
drug possession, to receive twice the normal sentence instead of a
life sentence.” (People v. Brimmer (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 782,
793.)

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adults, the Avila court stated the defendant could not be placed
“alongside [adult] recidivists for whom a three strikes sentence is
constitutional.” (Avila, at p. 1148, italics added.) Here,
defendant was at least 21 years old when he committed his prior
robberies, and he was 32 years old when he committed the last
three robberies, for which he is currently in prison. Thus,
defendant’s comparison to Avila fails.
As discussed, any robbery is a serious and violent felony.
(§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9).) The personal use of a firearm during its
commission is serious and violent and calls for greater
punishment. (§§ 667.5, subd. (c)(22), 12022.53, subd. (b).) We
conclude defendant’s sentence of 39 years to life, imposed under
the three strikes law does not violate the Eighth Amendment, as
defendant is a recidivist adult offender who was convicted of
three robberies while armed with a firearm and who admitted 11
prior robbery convictions.

DISPOSITION
The January 8, 2024 judgment of resentencing is affirmed.

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

LUI, P. J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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