CourtListener 10661799•People v. Shi CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 8/27/25 P. v. Shi CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B338116
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA453092)
v.
DEYUN SHI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jared D. Moses, Judge. Affirmed.
Alan S. Yockelson and John Bishop, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kim Aarons and Louis W. Karlin, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Defendant Deyun Shi appeals from his conviction for two
counts of first degree murder and one count of injuring a spouse.
Defendant argues the trial court’s directed verdict on his insanity
defense violated his right to a jury trial under the Sixth
Amendment and Due Process Clause. He also contends that he
presented sufficient evidence in support of his not guilty by
reason of insanity plea to submit the issue to the jury. We
conclude that where a defendant fails to present substantial
evidence to support his insanity defense, the trial court may
direct a verdict on sanity without violating the defendant’s
constitutional rights. As defendant did not present evidence to
support a finding that he was incapable of (1) knowing or
understanding the nature and quality of his acts or
(2) distinguishing right from wrong when he committed the
crimes, the court did not err in granting the directed verdict on
sanity. We thus affirm defendant’s convictions.
BACKGROUND
On the evening of January 21, 2016, defendant attacked his
wife, Amy,1 with a hammer while she was asleep in bed. The
bludgeoning was interrupted by the couple’s teenage son, and
defendant fled. Hours later, in the early morning of January 22,
2016, defendant murdered his teenage nephews, William and
Anthony.
1
We refer to the victims and witnesses by their first or
commonly used names throughout the opinion as these were the
names generally used at trial.
Defendant and Amy are no longer married.
2
Subsequently, a grand jury indicted defendant for the
murders of his nephews (counts 1 and 2) in violation of Penal
Code2 section 187, subdivision (a), with special circumstance
allegations that defendant personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon (a bolt cutter) to commit the offenses (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)). The indictment’s third count charged defendant
with injuring a spouse in violation of section 273.5, subdivision
(a), with special circumstance allegations that he personally
inflicted great bodily injury upon her (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) and
used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a maul, to do so (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)). Defendant pled not guilty and not guilty by reason
of insanity.
Defendant’s trial was divided into guilt and sanity phases.
After the jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of
his nephews and of injuring his spouse, the court then held the
insanity phase of the trial.
Below, we describe the evidence introduced at each phase
of trial, the court’s directed sanity verdict, and sentencing.
I. The Prosecution’s Evidence During the Guilt Phase
of Trial
The People presented testimony from Amy, Amy’s brother
(David), Amy’s sister-in-law (Vicki), defendant’s eldest son
(Torres), law enforcement, airline employees, and experts during
the guilt phase of the trial establishing the following events.
Defendant and his wife, Amy, moved to Southern California
from China in 2014, with their two sons. Defendant had a long
history of physically abusing Amy in China, and the abuse
2
All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
3
continued when the family moved to California. In 2015, the
family moved to a home in La Canada.
Amy’s older brother, David, his wife Vicki, and their two
children—the murder victims—William and Anthony, lived
nearby in Arcadia. Defendant disliked Amy’s family, and was
often angry with Amy for spending time with David and other
family members.
In November 2015, defendant became enraged and
attempted to suffocate Amy with a pillow when he saw messages
to David on Amy’s cellphone expressing her unhappiness with
her life. Later that month, defendant told Amy he was angry
about the amount of time David spent helping her. On another
occasion, defendant spat in Amy’s face and cursed her family.
When David asked him not to spit on Amy, defendant responded
that he was “going to harm [Amy] even more in the future.”
Defendant also cursed at David and threatened to fight him.
The following month, Amy and her mother went grocery
shopping together. When defendant found out they were
together, he became angry and called Amy’s cellphone, asking
where she was and what she was doing. Defendant then
demanded that Amy accompany him to a dental appointment.
Amy refused because she feared defendant, who sounded irate.
When Amy, her mother, and David later encountered defendant
at her mother’s home, defendant grabbed Amy and attempted to
force Amy into his car, a GMC Yukon. David called 911, and
defendant punched David in the face. Defendant then pushed
Amy’s mother to the ground, grabbed her by the legs, and began
dragging her into the street.
Although the police responded, both Amy and her family
declined to press charges. Amy’s mother was transported to the
4
hospital by ambulance for her injuries. Defendant, claiming he
was injured, had Amy drive him to the hospital as well.
Afterward, she drove him back to her mother’s house to retrieve
his car. That night, Amy stayed with her mother because she
was too afraid to return home with defendant. This angered
defendant, who began angrily shouting. When the landlord came
outside and threatened to call the police, defendant left.
Defendant later returned to his mother-in-law’s home with their
two children and tried to use them to gain entry.
The next day, David took Amy to the Pasadena courthouse
and obtained a temporary restraining order against defendant,
which required him to move out of their home. After the order
was served on defendant, Amy moved back into her home,
changed the locks, and with David’s assistance, sought legal
advice about divorcing defendant. Despite the restraining order,
defendant continued to send Amy emails and text messages
attempting to reconcile with her.
On January 21, 2016, when at court for the restraining
order, defendant learned that Amy had filed for divorce. That
evening, Amy and their nine-year-old son slept in Amy’s
bedroom, while their 16-year-old son, Torres, was in his own
room studying. Defendant appeared at Torres’s window and
asked to be let in through a door or window to talk with Amy.
When the teen opened a door, the home alarm sounded and
defendant fled. Torres told Amy that he opened a window by
accident. She reset the alarm and went back to sleep.
At 11:00 p.m., the alarm sounded again. Amy awoke to
defendant standing in front of her, holding a hammer. Defendant
struck Amy’s head with it five or six times, before Torres entered
the bedroom and pulled defendant away from Amy. Amy called
5
911. Defendant told Torres that defendant needed to get away
fast, before the police arrived. Throughout Torres’s encounter
with defendant, defendant appeared coherent and not under the
influence of a delusion or hallucination. An ambulance
transported Amy to the hospital, where doctors treated her for a
broken nose and multiple lacerations to her scalp and neck.
David and Vicki went to the hospital to see Amy, leaving
their teenage sons at home. The gate to their house was locked
with a padlock. Anthony was sleeping; William was studying.
While at the hospital, David checked on William by text message.
Between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m., William responded, “Don’t worry,
Daddy. Take your time.” When Amy was discharged at
approximately 3:10 a.m., David and Vicki drove Amy back to
their home.
Upon arriving at David and Vicki’s home, they observed
defendant’s Yukon parked nearby with its license plates missing.
Vicki called 911. While she was on the line, a person dressed in
black walked around the back of the Yukon. He appeared to
change clothes before entering the vehicle and driving away.
Before entering the home, the trio drove to Amy’s mother’s
home to check on her, then to a drug store to pick up Amy’s
medication, and finally back to David and Vicki’s home, arriving
between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m. David and Vicki went to their
bedroom without checking on their sons; Amy rested on the living
room couch. A few hours later, David drove Amy to her mother’s
house, then to meet with an attorney, and finally to the Sheriff’s
station. Upon waking, Vicki went looking for her sons. She
found William’s dead body wrapped in a sheet and called David
and 911.
6
Police officers found the two brothers’ bodies in their
separate bedrooms. Both were covered by sheets or blankets and
their rooms were in disarray. A bloody pipe was on the floor.
Two walls of 15-year-old Anthony’s bedroom were covered in
blood spatter. He had suffered four to five fatal blunt force
injuries consistent with bolt cutters to the head and face, and
innumerable lacerations to his back. Sixteen-year-old William’s
fatal wounds were similar, although he had also received blunt
force trauma to his forearms and hand, indicative of defensive
wounds.
Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) parking lot
footage showed defendant’s Yukon without license plates
entering at 5:12 a.m. on the morning of the killings. Police
discovered the license plates, a plastic bag of men’s clothes, paper
towels stained with blood and human tissue, a bloodstained pair
of shoes, and bolt cutters wrapped in a towel inside the vehicle.
The Yukon’s driver side interior was blood-stained. DNA testing
connected all the items and interior blood stains to defendant,
Amy, and/or William. LAX security camera footage also showed
defendant passing through airport security without incident.
The airline employee who sold defendant a one-way
$10,000 business class ticket to Hong Kong testified that
defendant paid cash and he appeared “put together,” if “a little
nervous.” During their hour-long interaction, defendant did not
appear to be suffering from a delusion, hallucination, or paranoia.
When the employee asked about cuts on his face, defendant said
he cut himself in the bathroom. Thinking something “was off,”
the employee sought approval from her supervisor and her
manager to make the ticket sale. Her supervisor spoke to
defendant, determined that he was safe to fly, and persuaded
7
defendant to check his carry-on bag. When the supervisor asked
about the cuts on his face, defendant said that he fell. The flight
control officer also interviewed defendant. When asked about his
facial scratches, defendant told the flight control officer that he
cut himself shaving. During all of his interactions with the
airline personnel during ticketing and check-in, defendant acted
normally and answered questions and directions logically and
coherently.
Defendant then took a nonstop flight to Hong Kong. If he
had travelled from Hong Kong to mainland China, he would not
have been subject to extradition to the United States. However,
Hong Kong police detained defendant upon arrival, having been
alerted by Los Angeles detectives. Hong Kong police seized
defendant’s personal belongings, which included a computer,
multiple forms of identification, currency for multiple countries,
credit cards, two cell phones, and $13,148 in United States
currency. The cellphone associated with defendant’s number
contained an Internet search history that included queries from a
week before the murders about committing a crime in the United
States and fleeing to China to avoid punishment. One of the
searches was: “ ‘Can a Chinese citizen who returns to China
after committing a crime overseas with the victim being a local
citizen avoid punishment.’ ”
Police also discovered that hours before defendant attacked
Amy on January 21, 2016, he went to the local branch of
EastWest Bank and wired $392,000 to an account in China from
his joint account with Amy. Defendant spent over an hour filling
8
out nine separate transfers forms in the amount of $49,000 to
avoid China’s $50,000 limit.3
II. Defense Evidence During the Guilt Phase
The defense presented evidence of defendant’s history of
mental health issues and expert testimony about his
compromised ability to reason due to mental illness.
Pan, a resident of China and defendant’s longtime business
associate, testified he worked closely with defendant for many
years. Defendant sometimes unexpectedly lost his temper. On
one occasion, defendant threw a box at and started a physical
fight with a customer. In 2013, the Chinese Communist Party
took defendant away from his office and held him in custody for a
month-long investigation. When released, defendant was
withdrawn and appeared paranoid that the phones were tapped.
The Chinese Communist Party took defendant into custody again
the following year. Upon his release, defendant secretly arranged
to flee to the United States, where he started a new business.
At defendant’s insistence, Pan travelled to Los Angeles on
January 18, 2016. Defendant, who was in poor spirits, asked Pan
to talk to Amy to help save their marriage. Pan stayed at a hotel
with defendant in the days leading up to the murders. Pan
testified that defendant talked continuously either on the phone
to friends and family or to Pan, and that defendant believed
David was secretly monitoring him and turning Amy against
him. During their three days together, Pan did not see defendant
sleep or eat more than one meal.
Pan accompanied defendant to the January 21, 2016 (the
day of the attack on Amy) court hearing but stayed outside the
3
One of the transfers was not completed because the form
was missing information.
9
courthouse. Although defendant appeared to be in good spirits
before the hearing, he was very downcast and quiet when he
returned to the car. While driving Pan away from the
courthouse, defendant ran a red light. When Pan told him to
stop, defendant replied that someone had instructed him to go.
They then drove to a rental car company to arrange
transportation to attend a business-related trade show.
Defendant told Pan that the people there had strange looks in
their eyes.
Defendant’s niece, Jane, who lived in Australia, testified
about their family’s history of serious mental illness. Her mother
(defendant’s half-sister) suffered from extreme mood swings and
episodes of violent conduct, including threats to kill Jane’s father
and to commit suicide. Jane’s uncle, defendant’s half sibling,
likewise suffered from mental illness since childhood and had
been repeatedly hospitalized and institutionalized after
committing acts of violence against his mother. That uncle’s son
(defendant’s nephew and Jane’s cousin) was also institutionalized
for endangering family members. Jane’s grandmother suffered
from mental illness, including chronic hallucinations. Jane
further testified that in late 2015 or early 2016, defendant
unexpectedly and repeatedly contacted Jane to talk about
difficulties with his marriage to Amy and his overriding desire to
reconcile with her.
Forensic psychologist Richard Romanoff opined as to
defendant’s ability to form the requisite mental state for murder.
Romanoff conducted 195 hours of interviews over three years
with defendant, and interviewed Pan, Jane, and defendant’s
sister. He also reviewed the police reports for the underlying
crimes, interviews of Amy, David, Vicki, and Torres, defendant’s
10
medical records from China, and considered defendant’s family
history of serious mental health illnesses. Based on his
interviews and review, Romanoff diagnosed defendant with
schizoaffective disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder.
Symptoms of schizoaffective disorder include: (1) hallucinations—
perceiving things, such as hearing voices, that aren’t actually
present in the external world—and (2) delusions—holding
irrational or highly unusual beliefs that are not based in reality.
The intensity of these symptoms is very individual and can
fluctuate over time.
Defendant’s medical records from China showed that he
was hospitalized twice for psychiatric treatment. As a 15-year-
old and again in his mid-20’s, he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia based on hallucinations, delusions, and manic
episodes, along with acts of violence, emotional outbursts, and
self-destructive acts, including suicide attempts. He was treated
with anti-psychotic medications and electroconvulsive therapy.
Defendant was first committed for treatment when he became
paranoid and delusional after an adolescent love interest spurned
him. His bouts of self-loathing included hearing voices that told
him he was useless and would go to hell. After defendant cut
himself in a suicide attempt at age 15, he was hospitalized for a
month.
Dr. Romanoff testified that defendant’s posttraumatic
stress disorder resulted from his two detentions by the Chinese
Disciplinary Committee, which exacerbated his schizoaffective
disorder. During those detentions, defendant reported being
interrogated and tortured with loud noises. Dr. Romanoff found
that in the weeks leading up to the assault and murders,
defendant suffered increasingly from insomnia and delusions
11
that his children were in danger of being kidnapped, that David’s
family was trying to take his money, and that David was using
equipment to monitor him. His behavior was self-destructive and
indicative of “an active psychotic illness.” As a result,
Dr. Romanoff opined that defendant’s ability to deliberate and
make rational choices was “significantly impaired.”
Dr. Romanoff also testified defendant’s decision to flee to
China was not rational. He explained, “I would say it strains my
understanding to think that a person with posttraumatic stress
disorder who had been tortured twice and fled and left behind an
awful lot of resources and assets there, would go back to a place
where his sister had been begging him not to return to, and then
he still goes back where he’s certain to be arrested.· There’s a
warrant for his arrest at this point. And so he’s going back to a
place where arrest is a certain thing for him having violated the
terms of his essentially parole monitoring in China.”
III. The Prosecution’s Rebuttal Evidence During the
Guilt Phase
In rebuttal, the People presented testimony from forensic
psychologist Carl Edward Osborn. Based on 5 two-hour
interviews with defendant, interviews with Amy and Torres, and
a review of thousands of pages of medical and criminal records,
Dr. Osborn concluded that defendant was not psychotic and did
not suffer from any psychiatric disorder. Rather, defendant had a
“severe personality disorder” with “very strong borderline and
narcissistic features.” Referencing testimony from Amy and
Torres,4 Dr. Osborn found no reliable basis to believe that
4
At trial, Amy testified that during their marriage from
1999 to 2016, defendant never had psychological or psychiatric
treatments, did not take medications to treat psychological or
12
defendant experienced hallucinations or delusions to support
diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder or posttraumatic stress
disorder. He explained that the evidence of defendant’s normal
conduct at LAX after the killings was inconsistent with psychosis.
Dr. Osborn found that defendant was untruthful when he
described symptoms of psychosis, explaining that the story
defendant told people became increasingly exculpatory over time.
He testified that defendant’s “explosive temper” did “not include
any psychotic process at all” and there was no basis for
concluding that it emanated from hallucinations or delusions.
Dr. Osborn was also skeptical about the reliability of the Chinese
medical records because they lacked the extensive documentation
typical of such reports in the United States. In short, Dr. Osborn
found no basis to conclude that defendant was psychotic at the
time of the crimes.
IV. Insanity Phase
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder of
his nephews and of injuring a spouse. The court thus turned to
the insanity phase of the trial, where the defense relied entirely
on Dr. Romanoff’s testimony.
Dr. Romanoff provided his opinion based on the same
materials he reviewed for the guilt phase, augmented by
additional mental health evaluations and records from the state
prison hospital. He stressed his reliance on 195 hours of personal
interviews with defendant over the past two years. Dr. Romanoff
psychiatric issues, never appeared to be suffering from delusions
or hallucinations, never attempted suicide, and did not have
extreme mood swings. Torres testified that in all his years living
with his father, he had never seen him suffering from
hallucinations or delusions.
13
testified that defendant was capable of knowing or understanding
the nature and quality of his acts. Therefore, solely at issue was
whether defendant could not distinguish between right and
wrong for the purposes of an insanity finding.
However, Dr. Romanoff testified that he was not able to
form “a definitive conclusion in [his] own mind” as to whether
defendant was legally insane at the time of the murders. The
primary reason for his ambivalence was that defendant professed
an “absence of memory for the events from before the offense
committed against his wife, through the entire period of the
sequence of events that occurred with . . . the murders of his
nephews, and then continuing on through the period of time until
he got to Hong Kong.” Defendant had told Dr. Romanoff nothing
about what he was thinking at the relevant times.
Although the expert could not reach an opinion on
defendant’s sanity when he committed the crimes, he noted that
defendant’s 1986 hospital records from China reported “command
auditory hallucinations,” in which defendant said he heard voices
over a six-month period telling him, “ ‘you’re useless, go to hell.’ ”
Also, while at Patton State Hospital after his arrest, he was
diagnosed with “posttraumatic stress disorder and a psychotic
disorder of some sort.”
Dr. Romanoff believed defendant’s behaviors in the weeks
and days leading up to the crimes showed that defendant was in
an “increasingly paranoid and delusional state, an increasingly
psychotic state” that was exacerbated by his posttraumatic stress
disorder, which further militated against his “abilities to regulate
himself.” Crediting Pan’s guilt-phase testimony, it appeared that
defendant suffered from delusions, heard voices, and acted in an
irrational, self-destructive manner (such as choosing to return to
14
China where he had been tortured) indicative of “disordered
thinking.”
On cross-examination, Dr. Romanoff agreed that
defendant’s prior diagnoses or self-reported instances of psychotic
breaks alone did not support a determination that he was
psychotic at the relevant time for establishing legal insanity
when he committed the crimes.
He testified: “I see evidence that supports the finding, and
I see evidence that is insufficient to support the finding or that
raises questions about the finding. And in that state, I can’t
objectively find, I can’t arrive at a conclusion to my satisfaction
that supports insanity.” On re-direct examination, Dr. Romanoff
explained that the legal standard for offering an opinion as to
insanity is whether there is a “reasonable medical certainty” for
the determination. Applying that standard, he could not opine on
whether defendant was insane when he committed the
underlying crimes.
V. Directed Sanity Verdict
At the conclusion of the defense case, the People moved for
a directed verdict of sanity, arguing that defendant failed to
present evidence he was insane at the time he committed the
crimes. The defense responded that circumstantial evidence
showed defendant did not know right from wrong when he
committed the murders.
The trial court granted the motion, stating that it was
viewing the defense evidence in the light most favorable to
defendant and drawing all reasonable inferences in defendant’s
favor. The court concluded that at most, the defense expert
“testified [that] in the days or hours before the attack, his level of
psychosis could lead somebody to not know[] the difference
15
between right and wrong.” However, there was no evidence
supporting that this was the case when the crimes were
committed. The court explained that defense expert Dr.
Romanoff “conceded that defendant understood the nature and
quality of his acts, but he did not give any opinion as to whether
. . . defendant could distinguish between right and wrong.”
Dr. Romanoff was unable to form an opinion on the critical part
of California’s sanity test—whether defendant “deemed his
conduct was morally right.”
The court subsequently sentenced defendant to two
consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole for the
murders, along with an additional eight-year term for the spousal
injury. Defendant appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court’s directed verdict on his
insanity defense violated his right to a jury trial under the Sixth
Amendment and Due Process Clause. He also contends that he
presented sufficient evidence in support of his not guilty by
reason of insanity pleas to submit the issue to the jury. As we
explain below, the directed verdict did not violate defendant’s
constitutional rights, nor did the court err in removing the issue
of defendant’s sanity from the jury.
I. The Trial Court May Direct a Sanity Verdict Without
Violating the Sixth Amendment or Due Process
Defendant contends his constitutional right to a jury trial
under the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause
precluded the trial court from granting a directed verdict of
sanity. “We review the legal question of whether defendant’s
16
constitutional rights were violated de novo.” (People v. Palmer
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 268, 280.)
a. Insanity Affirmative Defense
“Insanity is a plea raising an affirmative defense to a
criminal charge, although one that does not negative an element
of the offense. The plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is one
of the six kinds of pleas to an indictment or information. (Pen.
Code, § 1016.)” (People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 512, 522
(Hernandez).) “A plea of not guilty by reason of insanity ‘is a
statutory defense that does not implicate guilt or innocence but,
instead, determines “whether the accused shall be punished for
the guilt which has already been established.” [Citations.]’
([Hernandez, supra,] 22 Cal.4th 512, 528 [conc. opn. of Brown,
J.].)” (People v. Blakely (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 771, 775
(Blakely).) There is a two-prong test for insanity. The defendant
must show “that, based on a mental disease or defect, he was
incapable of: (1) knowing or understanding the nature and
quality of his acts; or (2) distinguishing right from wrong when”
he committed the crimes. (People v. Severance (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 305, 322 (Severance); Blakely, at p. 780 [“ ‘If [a]
mental illness is manifested in delusions which render the
individual incapable either of knowing the nature and character
of his act, or of understanding that it is wrong, he [or she] is
legally insane’ ” under California law.].)
“California as a matter of procedure has provided that the
issue of guilt and sanity shall be tried separately. (Pen. Code,
§ 1026.) The . . . second facet of defendant’s . . . trial differs from
the first procedurally in that the issue is confined to sanity and
the burden is upon the defendant to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense.”
17
(People v. Flores (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 118, 121.) Like the guilt
phase, “the question whether the defendant was sane or insane at
the time the offense was committed [is] tried, either before the
same jury or before a new jury in the discretion of the court.”
(§ 1026, subd. (a).)
The Courts of Appeal have held in multiple instances that,
“[b]ecause a plea of insanity is an affirmative defense in which
the defendant has the burden of proof, the court may, through the
grant of a directed verdict, ‘remove the issue of sanity from the
jury when the defendant has failed to present evidence sufficient
to support the special plea.’ (People v. Ceja (2003) 106
Cal.App.4th 1071, 1089 [(Ceja)]; see Severance, supra, 138
Cal.App.4th at p. 324 [noting the court properly directed a verdict
of sanity because even if credited and viewed in the light most
favorable to the defendant, he failed to proffer sufficient evidence
of legal insanity, including evidence providing a substantial basis
for the jury to find that when he committed the crimes he
believed his actions were morally acceptable].)” (Blakely, supra,
230 Cal.App.4th at p. 775.)
b. Defendant’s Right to Trial by Jury for His
Insanity Plea
Defendant contends that by directing a verdict on the issue
of insanity, the trial court violated his right to trial by jury.
“The Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the states in
this context by the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal
Constitution, confers upon a defendant in a criminal prosecution
the right to a trial by jury. [Citations.] The right to a trial by
jury is recognized to be a ‘fundamental constitutional right.’
[Citations.] Similarly, article I, section 16, of the California
Constitution confers upon a defendant in a criminal prosecution
18
the right to a trial by jury.” (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th
297, 304.) In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 494
(Apprendi), the United States Supreme Court held that any fact
that “expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that
authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict” is an “element” that must
be submitted to a jury.
In Ceja, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at page 1079, the
defendant contended “[b]ased on the United States Constitution,
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment, and the California
Constitution, article I, section 16, . . . it is error in a criminal
action for a trial court to direct a [sanity] verdict in favor of the
prosecution.” In rejecting the defendant’s argument, Division
Four of this District held that trial courts have the inherent
power to direct a verdict on an insanity defense when there is no
evidence to support insanity and that “there is no constitutional
infirmity, either under the California Constitution or the United
States Constitution, for a judge to remove the issue of sanity from
the jury.” (Id. at p. 1089.)
The Ceja court, relying in part on Justice Brown’s
concurrence in Hernandez, observed that “ ‘[u]nder the United
States and California Constitutions, a criminal defendant has the
right to a jury determination of all elements of the charged
offenses. [Citations.] Because a finding of insanity under
California law “is dispositive only on the question of whether the
accused is to be held criminally responsible for committing the
charged offense[,] it is not determinative of whether the elements
of the offense, and thus the criminal conduct itself, have been
established.” [Citations.] Thus, taking the issue of insanity away
from the jury does not violate the United States or California
Constitution. [Citations.]’ (People v. Hernandez, supra, 22
19
Cal.4th at pp. 528–529, fn. omitted.)” (Ceja, supra, 106
Cal.App.4th at p. 1084.) The Ceja court concluded: “there is no
constitutional infirmity, either under the California Constitution
or the United States Constitution, for a judge to remove the issue
of sanity from the jury when the defendant has failed to present
evidence sufficient to support the special plea. As recognized by
Justice Brown in Hernandez, and the prior cases involving double
jeopardy, courts retain an inherent power to remove an
affirmative defense from the jury where there is no evidence to
support it.” (Id. at p. 1089.)
In Severance, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at page 315, the
Third District Court of Appeal addressed a defendant’s
contention that “ ‘Ceja is wrong because dismissal of a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity offends constitutional principles of
due process and the right to present [an] affirmative defense to a
jury, and also because the Legislature has, by statute, created the
right to a jury trial on a plea of not guilty b[y] reason of insanity
without giving the trial court any statutory authority to take the
issue from the jury.’ ” The Severance court disagreed: “ ‘Where
“the evidence is uncontradicted or leads to a single conclusion a
question of law is presented” [citation], and “the trial court is not
required to submit the question to the jury for a finding upon
that plea” [citation]. Instead, the court may strike the plea
[citation], or direct a verdict in favor of the prosecution or the
defendant.’ (See, e.g., People v. Bechtel (1953) 41 Cal.2d 441, 445;
People v. Wilson (1924) 193 Cal. 512, 514–515; People v. Newell
[(1923) 192 Cal. 659,] 668.) There is no logical reason these same
principles should not apply to a plea of insanity. Just as a
criminal defendant may be ‘precluded from presenting to a jury
defense such as unconsciousness [citation], diminished capacity
20
[citation], [or] entrapment [citation], where there is insufficient
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the
particular facts underlying the instruction requested exist’
(People v. Mapp (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 346, 350), so a criminal
defendant may be precluded, through the grant of a directed
verdict, from presenting an insanity defense where the evidence
is insufficient for a reasonable jury to find the defendant was
insane at the time of his crimes.” (Id. at pp. 316–317.)
c. We Agree with Ceja and Severance
Defendant urges us to disregard Ceja and Severance
because they adopt analysis from Justice Brown’s concurring
opinion in Hernandez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at page 528, which
likened the affirmative defense of insanity to the affirmative
defense of double jeopardy when concluding the trial court could
direct a verdict on sanity without violating the defendant’s right
to trial by jury. (See Ceja, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1083–
1085, citing Hernandez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 528–529 (conc.
opn. of Brown, J.).) Defendant argues “[u]nlike a plea of once in
jeopardy, a defendant’s plea that he committed the offense while
insane does go to his culpability,” and thus insanity should be
treated differently. Defendant argues that Severance tracked
Ceja’s reasoning.
We are unpersuaded by defendant’s argument. As
Severance points out in responding to a similar argument, both
insanity and double jeopardy defenses present issues of fact
which the jury alone possesses the power to pass on. (Severance,
supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 316.) “Like any issue that is usually
treated as one of fact, the issue of a defendant’s sanity can
become one of law in the proper circumstances. ‘An issue of fact
is one where the evidence introduced will support a decision on
21
either side, that is to say, reasonable minds could fairly differ as
to the answer to the question posed. [Citations.] An issue of fact
can become an issue of law when reasonable minds can draw only
one conclusion from the evidence. [Citations.] An issue of fact
cannot be taken from a jury by the trial court and treated as an
issue of law unless only one conclusion is legally deducible and
any other conclusion cannot command the support of substantial
evidence that will survive appellate review.” (Ibid.) Defendant
does not make a compelling argument why a defendant, who fails
to present evidence of insanity, nonetheless has a right to have a
jury decide this factual issue.
We agree with the analysis set forth in Ceja and Severance.
Furthermore, their analysis is consistent with Apprendi, supra,
530 U.S. at page 494, which held that any fact that “expose[s] the
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the
jury’s guilty verdict” is an “element” that must be submitted to a
jury. As the affirmative defense of insanity is not an element the
prosecution must prove, we see no error under Apprendi either.
We thus conclude that where a defendant fails to present
evidence to support his insanity defense, the trial court may
direct a verdict on sanity without violating the defendant’s
constitutional rights.
II. Defendant Failed to Present Substantial Evidence of
Insanity
We next turn to whether the trial court erred in this
instance by directing a verdict on insanity based on the evidence
before it.
a. Applicable Law
A trial court may direct a verdict on sanity “ ‘ “only when,
disregarding conflicting evidence and giving to [the opposing
22
party]’s evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled,
herein indulging in every legitimate inference which may be
drawn from that evidence, the result is a determination that
there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff if such a verdict were given.”
[Citations.] Unless it can be said as a matter of law, that, when
so considered, no other reasonable conclusion is legally deducible
from the evidence, and that any other holding would be so lacking
in evidentiary support that a reviewing court would be impelled
to reverse it upon appeal, or the trial court to set it aside as a
matter of law, the trial court is not justified in taking the case
from the jury. [Citation.] A motion for a directed verdict “is in
the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, and is governed by
practically the same rules, and concedes as true the evidence on
behalf of the adverse party, with all fair and reasonable
inferences to be deduced therefrom. . . . The power of a court in
passing upon such motions is strictly limited. It has no power to
weigh the evidence, but is bound to view it in the most favorable
light in support of the verdict. . . .” [Citation.] In other words,
the function of the trial court on a motion for a directed verdict is
analogous to and practically the same as that of a reviewing court
in determining, on appeal, whether there is evidence in the
record of sufficient substance to support a verdict. Although the
trial court may weigh the evidence and judge . . . the credibility of
the witnesses on a motion for a new trial, it may not do so on a
motion for a directed verdict.’ ” (Blakely, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 775–776.)
Although we apply the substantial evidence standard of
review, in doing so “ ‘we do not look for substantial evidence in
support of the trial court’s ruling that defendant was sane;
23
rather, we look for substantial evidence from which the jury
reasonably could have found defendant was not sane. If we find
such evidence, then a directed verdict of sanity was improper.’
(Severance, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 320.)” (Blakely, supra,
230 Cal.App.4th at p. 776.) Specifically, we are looking for
substantial evidence that due to a mental disease or defect,
defendant “was incapable of (1) knowing or understanding the
nature and quality of his acts or (2) distinguishing right from
wrong when he [committed the murder]. (See Severance, supra,
138 Cal.App.4th at p. 322.)” (Ibid.)
In Severance, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th 305, at pages 309 and
318, the Court of Appeal upheld a directed verdict of sanity,
finding no substantial evidence that the defendant was legally
insane when he committed a series of robberies. During the
sanity phase, the defendant testified that he committed the
robberies because “when he is hit on the head he becomes
paranoid and schizophrenic, Satan takes control of his mind and
body, and he does things he does not normally do.” (Id. at p. 322.)
The defendant also stated that he took psychotropic medications
prescribed for people who hear voices. (Ibid.) The defendant
contended this testimony supported a finding of insanity, arguing
the jury could have found he suffered from a delusion that his
conduct was morally justified. (Id. at p. 323.) The appellate
court disagreed, holding the evidence was insufficient because
“there was no evidence about what [the] defendant believed or
did not believe” concerning the moral rightness or wrongness of
his actions at the time of the offenses. (Id. at p. 324.)
Similarly, in Blakely, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pages 773
and 779, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s decision to
remove the issue of Blakely’s sanity from the jury in his trial for
24
assault with a deadly weapon and robbery. At the sanity phase,
a psychologist who had examined Blakely testified that he
“suffered from ‘paranoid schizophrenia or schizoaffective
disorder, paranoid type,’ but was unable to form an opinion about
Blakely’s sanity in April 2010 when he committed the crimes.”
(Id. at p. 776.) Blakely had told the psychologist that he heard
voices telling him to hurt people and that he had visual
hallucinations. (Ibid.) “Blakely had a difficult time recalling
events during the interview. [The psychologist] testified that
memory loss could be a symptom of a person who is actively
hallucinating. [The psychologist] also considered the possibility
that Blakely’s sporadic memory could have been caused by an
injury he suffered from a bullet wound to the frontal area of his
forehead.” (Id. at p. 777.) When counsel indicated Blakey had
been rocking back and forth after attacking the victim, the
psychologist opined the rocking was common behavior for a
schizophrenic episode. (Ibid.) However, when the psychologist
asked Blakely about the assault and robbery, Blakely responded
that he did not remember. (Ibid.) With inadequate information
about Blakely’s state of mind, the psychologist could not render
an opinion about whether he was insane when he committed the
crimes. (Ibid.)
In addition, “Blakely testified that he suffered from
schizophrenia most of his life and was taking psychotropic
medications at the time of the crimes. He claimed that when he
stepped outside the supermarket he heard voices say, ‘[t]here he
is right there,’ referring to [the victim]. Blakely believed the
voices meant [the victim] was ‘the demon.’ Based on this
evidence, Blakely contends ‘the jurors could have found that
because of his delusional state, [he] had a moral imperative to rid
25
the world of [the victim], who was the devil.’ Thus, Blakely’s
claim is that he suffered an insane delusion which rendered him
incapable of distinguishing right from wrong.” (Blakely, supra,
230 Cal.App.4th at p. 780.)
The Court of Appeal disagreed, stating: “there is no
evidence in the record before us from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that Blakely believed his crimes were
morally justified. Although Blakely testified he suffered from a
delusion that [the victim] was a demon, at no point during his
testimony did Blakely state that he believed it was morally
acceptable to attack [the victim] and take his money. Without
such evidence, Blakely cannot establish by the preponderance of
the evidence the defense of insanity.” (Blakely, supra, 230
Cal.App.4th at p. 781.) Likening the case to Severance, the
Blakely court concluded: “While we acknowledge Blakely
presented evidence that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia,
he did not present sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably
conclude he was incapable of distinguishing the moral rightness
or wrongness of his actions when he attacked and robbed [the
victim].” (Id. at p. 779.)
b. No Evidence Defendant Was Unable to
Distinguish Moral Right from Wrong at the
Time of the Offenses
Here, the defense expert eliminated the first prong of the
sanity test when he testified that defendant understood the
nature and quality of his acts. Thus, the court was tasked with
determining whether there was substantial evidence presented
that defendant could not distinguish right from wrong when he
committed the crimes due to a mental disease or defect. We
conclude the court did not err in finding that defendant failed to
26
meet this burden. Like in Blakely, the expert here could not
opine about defendant’s sanity at the time the crimes were
committed and no other circumstantial evidence provided
substantial evidence of insanity.
Although defendant presented evidence that he had
schizoaffective disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder, he did
not present any evidence that he could not understand right from
wrong when he bludgeoned Amy and murdered his nephews.
Defense expert Dr. Romanoff testified that he was unable to
“arrive at a definite conclusion” as to whether defendant was
legally insane at the time of the murders. This was largely
because defendant told him he could not remember “the events
from before the offense committed against his wife, through the
entire period of the sequence of events that occurred with . . . the
murders of his nephews, and then continuing on through the
period of time until he got to Hong Kong.”
Dr. Romanoff testified that in 1986, when defendant was a
teenager, defendant had an episode of losing control and had
experienced episodes of losing control in the two months leading
up to the murders, with the “extent of the out-of-control-ness”
seeming to increase. Drawing on testimony from Pan and Jane,
as well as his own interviews with defendant and defendant’s
sister, Dr. Romanoff concluded that defendant was experiencing
active psychosis triggered by his schizoaffective disorder and
PTSD in that two-month period. The expert stated this
deterioration in mental state was illustrated by defendant’s out-
of-control behavior, including incidents of domestic violence such
as hitting and assaulting Amy. Dr. Romanoff credited testimony
describing symptoms such as auditory hallucinations, paranoid
delusions about David monitoring him with “strange equipment,”
27
uncontrollable crying, and angry outbursts. He characterized
defendant’s behavior as self-destructive and testified: “So it’s
becoming increasingly irrational from my perspective as time is
unfolding. And he’s losing the ability to control himself. He can’t
get no insight [sic] into this at this point. He’s not understanding
that this is happening.”
However, during cross-examination, Dr. Romanoff admitted
that just because defendant had hallucinations or delusions at
earlier points in time does not mean that at the time of the
crimes, defendant was insane. Dr. Romanoff acknowledged that
having “some kind of statement or piece of evidence right at the
time of a murder that would indicate [that] the person was either
experiencing auditory hallucinations or delusion[s] or something
that . . . indicated they didn’t know right from wrong” would
make the task of evaluating defendant’s sanity much easier.
Because defendant offered no such evidence and made no
statements about his mindset during the crimes, Dr. Romanoff
could not assess whether defendant understood his actions were
wrong.
Defendant argues that although Dr. Romanoff testified that
he could not opine on defendant’s insanity to a “ ‘reasonable
medical certainty,’ ” the jury could nonetheless find that
defendant was insane by “a preponderance of the evidence—the
applicable legal, as opposed to medical, standard.” Yet, the
evidence failed to establish insanity by any standard. As
mentioned, Dr. Romanoff provided no opinion as to defendant’s
mental state during the relevant time period. Testimony from
Pan and Jane did not address defendant’s mental state,
statements, or behavior during the pertinent time frame—
immediately before or during the crimes.
28
The only evidence of defendant’s mindset with regard to his
criminal conduct showed planning and awareness of what he was
doing. A week before the murders, he searched the Internet for
information about committing a crime in the United States and
fleeing to China to avoid punishment, including whether a
Chinese citizen could escape liability for killing a local citizen
abroad. Hours before assaulting Amy, he withdrew $392,000
from their joint account and transferred funds to a Chinese bank.
A bank employee who interacted with him for over an hour
observed no signs of delusions or hallucinations. Defendant also
removed license plates from his car and, after bludgeoning Amy,
told his son, Torres, that he needed to flee because the police
were coming. Both Torres and Amy testified that defendant did
not appear to be experiencing delusions or hallucinations when
he attacked Amy or at any time in the past.
After murdering his nephews, defendant drove to LAX,
bought a one-way ticket to China, and behaved normally with
airline staff. LAX security footage similarly showed no signs of
active psychosis. Thus, the only circumstantial evidence of
defendant’s mindset during the relevant timeframe showed that
defendant planned the crimes and anticipated the need to escape,
indicating that defendant understood his actions were wrong.
The record contains no evidence to the contrary.
Defendant argues that his memory loss and “harebrained”
escape plan indicate mental illness and insanity. Defendant
contends that this irrational behavior, combined with his mental
deterioration and increasingly psychotic state in the period of
time leading up to the crimes could support a finding of legal
insanity under California law.
29
We disagree. First, there was no testimony whatsoever
that defendant’s lack of memory evidenced his mental illness and
insanity. Defendant offers no citation to the record to support
this claim or identifies any witness who so testified. Even if his
escape plan was “harebrained,” it does not show defendant lacked
moral understanding—it merely suggests desperation or self-
destruction. Assuming defendant was psychotic, psychosis alone
does not establish legal insanity. As Dr. Romanoff explained, a
person’s ability to distinguish the hallucination or fantasy from
reality “varies infinitely from person to person and for each
individual over time.” A person with hallucinations or delusions
may still understand right from wrong depending on how the
condition affects their cognition.
Here, no expert testified and no circumstantial evidence at
the relevant time showed that defendant’s psychosis rendered
him incapable of distinguishing right from wrong when
committing the crimes. The only relevant evidence of his mental
state showed “intentional” and “goal-directed” conduct, as
described by Dr. Romanoff. Like in Blakely and Severance,
defendant failed to present substantial evidence that he was
legally insane at the time of the murders.
30
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
EGERTON, J.
ADAMS, J.
31
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