CourtListener 10661770•People v. Winkle CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 8/27/25 P. v. Winkle CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085872
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF2102048)
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN WINKLE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
John M. Davis, Judge. Affirmed.
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Flavio Nominati, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Benjamin Franklin Winkle shot and killed a close friend and was
convicted by a jury of second degree murder and possession of a firearm by a
prohibited person. He was sentenced to 35 years to life in prison. During the
trial, his former girlfriend, E.M., who was with Winkle just before his arrest,
testified that Winkle threatened her and she feared for her life.
On appeal from the judgment of conviction, Winkle argues that the
trial court improperly admitted this testimony into evidence. Relatedly,
Winkle contends the District Attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct
by eliciting the testimony and asserting in his closing argument that Winkle
threatened to kill E.M. Winkle also asserts that by failing to adequately
object to E.M.’s testimony and the District Attorney’s closing argument, his
counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. As we
explain, we reject Winkle’s arguments and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Case
Winkle owned several properties in California, including a rural
property in Anza, which he used to farm marijuana. The victim, Michael
Mendoza, was Winkle’s long-time friend and helped him take care of the
Anza property. Mendoza regularly stayed at the property and Winkle came
down from his home in Northern California every month or two to visit. The
property was remote, but there were a few neighbors. R.H. lived down the
hill from Winkle’s property and had known Winkle for about 15 years. T.S.,
another neighbor, lived in a trailer near Winkle’s property and had known
Winkle and Mendoza for about five years.
Four years prior to the murder, Mendoza asked T.S. to look after a .45
caliber firearm that was given to him by Winkle. The gun was wrapped in a
plastic shopping bag and T.S. agreed to store the weapon in his trailer.
2
Winkle also owned a dog-breeding business with L.N., his ex-girlfriend
and the mother of his young child. Winkle and L.N. were together about 10
years and separated about a month before the murder. When they were
together they sold the dogs, Presa Canario and French Bulldog breeds, and
shared the profits. As a result of the separation, their relationship was
strained. At the time of murder, Winkle had some of the dogs in his
possession and L.N. was trying to get them back from him, including a
mother Presa Canario and her four puppies.
On the morning of October 6, 2021, Winkle and Mendoza arrived at the
Anza property after driving there from Northern California in Winkle’s
minivan. They planned to pick up a BMW that was kept on the property for
Mendoza to drive. Winkle also brought the four puppies with him and
intended to take the dogs to Los Angeles to have their ears clipped. After
they arrived at the Anza property, Winkle and Mendoza went to T.S.’s trailer
around 9:00 a.m. T.S. saw Winkle drinking beer and testified Winkle was
slurring his speech and appeared drunk. Winkle asked T.S. to return his gun
and T.S. gave the gun back to Winkle still in the plastic shopping bag.
Winkle also retrieved a truck from T.S.’s property that T.S. had borrowed.
Shortly after, T.S. walked over to Winkle’s property and saw Winkle
and Mendoza working on hitching a trailer to the truck. While helping
Winkle and Mendoza with the truck, T.S. received a call from a friend who
had run out of gas and needed help. T.S. left to help his friend. T.S. returned
in his own truck about an hour later and saw that Winkle’s truck was stuck
in the sand. Mendoza was on his hands and knees trying to get the truck out,
and Winkle was standing over Mendoza yelling, “You ran over my dog. You
killed my dog. You ran over my dog.” T.S. saw one of the puppies was badly
3
injured. Mendoza asked T.S. to go and get a high-lift jack to help free the
stuck truck.
T.S. walked away to look for the jack. As he did so, T.S. heard a loud
pop, which he assumed was Winkle shooting the injured puppy to end its
misery. After a 30-second pause, T.S. heard between six and nine more pops.
When T.S. returned to the truck, he saw Mendoza’s lifeless body and Winkle
standing over him with a gun in his hand. Winkle was waving the gun
frantically, and said, “you’re not going to tell anyone, are you?” T.S. thought
Winkle was going to kill him. Winkle asked T.S. to help him put Mendoza’s
body in the back of T.S.’s pickup truck to bury Mendoza in the desert. When
T.S. refused, Winkle began waving his gun again at T.S. and cursing.
T.S. then ran over to his truck to get away. Winkle followed and took
the keys out of T.S.’s ignition before T.S. could start the car. T.S. pulled out
his phone to call 911. Winkle tried to wrestle the phone from T.S., but T.S.
managed to hide it in his back pocket. Scared for his own life, T.S. offered to
drive Winkle to Rancho Cucamonga or San Diego. Before they left, Winkle
dragged Mendoza’s body to a nearby camper and covered it.
T.S. and Winkle then drove off the property in T.S.’s truck. In an effort
to get away from Winkle, T.S. abruptly drove onto R.H.’s property and into
his car port. As the truck pulled up, R.H. came outside from his house. T.S.
jumped out of the truck and frantically yelled, “Benny just shot Michael.” As
Winkle got out of the truck, the gun fell out of his belt buckle onto the
ground. T.S. yelled at R.H. to grab the gun. R.H. quickly picked it up and set
it near his house. R.H. told the men to leave.
T.S. then got back into his truck, drove away to where he could get cell
phone reception, and called 911. Meanwhile, Winkle asked R.H. for the keys
to R.H.’s car. When R.H. said no, Winkle fled on foot. Homicide detectives
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arrived and collected the gun from R.H.’s residence. The gun’s 13-round
magazine was empty. Seven shell cases were found at the scene of the
homicide and the parties stipulated that these casings were fired from the
gun R.H. recovered from Winkle. During Mendoza’s autopsy, law
enforcement also recovered a bullet from his body that was fired from the
same gun. In addition, Winkle’s and R.H.’s DNA was found on the firearm.
The coroner determined Mendoza’s cause of death was multiple
gunshot wounds. He was shot a total of four times. One gunshot entered
through his neck and hit his brainstem, which on its own, was fatal. Another
gunshot entered through Mendoza’s right armpit and exited through his left
armpit, piercing both lungs. The third punctured his thigh. The fourth
gunshot entered through the back of his right hand and exited his fingers—
indicating a sharp downward trajectory consistent with a person holding out
their hands to protect themselves.
After Winkle fled, the police began a manhunt. Aerial units searched
using night vision, but were unsuccessful. Later that evening, police tracked
Winkle’s cell phone to Escondido. Surveillance footage showed Winkle
emerge from the minivan he and Michael had driven to Anza in an In-N-Out
parking lot, but he escaped apprehension. Thereafter, detectives created a
wanted flyer for Winkle, which was disseminated through various media
outlets. The flier held back information related to the homicide so that
detectives could filter out false reports.
After the homicide, Winkle called L.N. and asked her to pick up the
dogs he had left at the Anza property. Winkle did not tell L.N. any specifics
about the homicide, but did tell her he did not want to make her “an
accessory” and asked her to go to Costa Rica with him. L.N. testified she
thought the conversation was strange.
5
Weeks later, around November 26, 2021, Winkle called E.M. E.M.
thought the phone call was out of the ordinary, although they had spoken
every year around the holidays since their breakup in 2011. Winkle asked
E.M. to pick him up in Auburn, California and she agreed. When E.M. first
joined Winkle, she thought he seemed paranoid. He asked her to drive him
around to various locations. She did not know why and remained in the car
at their stops. For several nights they stayed at different hotels in Northern
California, and each time E.M. booked the room in her name.
Over the few days she was with Winkle, E.M. became increasingly
suspicious. She did a Google search of his name on her phone and found an
article with Winkle’s picture stating he was wanted for murder. At one of the
hotels, E.M. asked Winkle about the article. Winkle first told E.M. a false
version of the events, which she did not believe. Winkle then told her that he
and his friend were changing a tire on a car when the jack fell, killing his
dog. Winkle referred to Mendoza by name and said he was upset by
Mendoza’s lack of remorse for killing the puppy. E.M. testified that Winkle
told her, “something along the lines of, ‘Don’t poke the bear,’ … don’t mess
with him.” Winkle then told E.M. he held up his gun, and said to her, “boom,
boom.”
After hearing this, E.M. became scared. She told the jury that she was
the most terrified she had ever been in her life and she thought she was going
to die. Although Winkle had taken her car keys, she was able to get them
back by telling Winkle she needed to go to the store for feminine products.
Once she had her keys, E.M. went to her car, drove somewhere safe, and
called the police. When she was interviewed by detectives, E.M. knew
information about Mendoza’s death that was not public, including Mendoza’s
identity, that a dog was killed, and that Mendoza had been shot in the chest.
6
Shortly after E.M. contacted police, Winkle was arrested at the motel
where they were staying.
B. Defense Case
Winkle took the stand in his own defense. He stated he did not intend
to kill his friend, he was very emotional over the death of the puppy and
Mendoza’s lack of sympathy for the dog, and he acted in the heat of passion.
Winkle also admitted drinking a case of mini-Coronas that morning. He
denied making any admissions to E.M. and said she misunderstood his
comment about poking the bear.
C. Charges, Conviction and Sentencing
After his arrest, the Riverside County District Attorney charged Winkle
with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 11), dissuading a witness,
T.S. (§ 136.1, subd. (a); count 2), and unlawful possession of a firearm by a
prohibited person (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3). As to count 1, the
information further alleged Winkle personally inflicted great bodily injury
upon Mendoza (§ 12022.7) and personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
At the conclusion of the seven day trial, the jury found Winkle guilty of
second-degree murder (count 1), not guilty of count 2, and guilty of count 3.
The jury also found true the enhancement allegations related to count 1. On
March 15, 2024, the court sentenced Winkle to a total term of 40 years to life
in prison. Winkle filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Winkle argues reversal is required because the jury was permitted to
hear E.M.’s testimony that Winkle threatened her. He contends the court
erred by admitting the evidence after it had ruled in limine that the
1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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testimony should be excluded as unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code
section 352, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting the
testimony and stating that Winkle threatened to kill E.M. in his closing
argument. Winkle also argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the evidence and its use by the prosecutor.
I
Additional Background
Winkle’s trial brief included a motion to exclude “evidence regarding
alleged domestic violence.” The motion stated Winkle was arrested after the
Placer County Sheriff responded to E.M.’s report that “Winkle had assaulted
her and threatened to kill her.” The resulting sheriff’s report also indicated
E.M. had injuries to her nose and chin, and that she told the sheriff’s
deputies Winkle had taken her keys and told her she could not leave. Winkle
sought to “prohibit the use of any evidence of assault, threats, or domestic
violence as not relevant to these proceedings” and as “impermissible Evidence
Code [section] 1101 character evidence.”
At the pretrial conference on the parties’ motions in limine, the
prosecutor stated he did not intend to ask the details of the domestic violence
that occurred before Winkle’s arrest, but Winkle’s demeanor at the time of his
confession to E.M. was relevant to her credibility. The prosecutor stated,
“while I don’t think I need to go down the rabbit hole that ‘You beat her up.
You did this. You did that,’ I think it is relevant to ask general questions in
regards to the demeanor of the defendant during the time that the
statements were revealed.” Winkle’s counsel responded that any type of
violence or threat that Winkle made to E.M. was not relevant and any
possible relevance was outweighed by its prejudicial effect under Evidence
Code section 352. The prosecutor then reiterated his position that the
8
circumstances of Winkle’s admissions to E.M., specifically his demeanor, were
relevant to assessing E.M.’s credibility.
After further argument, the court stated it was overruling the defense
motion and finding the threats made by Winkle at the time of his admissions
to her were relevant to the case. After this initial ruling, the parties
continued to argue about the relevance and potential prejudicial effect of the
evidence. The court then partially changed its decision, stating: “I would
allow the People to ask some questions about, you know, ‘Was he aggressive
with you? Was he, you know, angry? Menacing? Is that impacting on you
today?’ only if it appears to be relevant. In other words, if she says, ‘No, I’m
cool. Go ahead,’ boom, then I don’t think it would be relevant. But if she
says, ‘I’m really nervous and don’t want to be here,’ whatever she says like
that, then I’ll allow you to go, not all the way with it, but just use terms that
are not so graphic and don’t have so much to go towards our case. [¶] ... [¶]
And so it would be ‘At the time, was he angry? Was he upset? Was he
menacing?’ and that’s it. That’s all you need to do.”
The court then stated its decision was “a good middle ground” and that
it would not “let the People go all the way. I think it depends on how it all
goes with the questioning, and if anybody wants to go further because of the
way she’s acting or whatever, then we’ll stop and we’ll have a little 402 about
how much farther we can go.”
At the start of her direct examination, E.M. stated she did not want to
testify and was only doing so because she was subpoenaed. E.M. responded
to the prosecutor’s questions with one-word answers and stated she could not
recall various details about her time with Winkle before she escaped and
contacted police. She also stated she was unwilling to review the transcript
9
of her interview with investigators a few days after Winkle’s arrest because it
was too difficult.
When the prosecutor asked E.M. what Winkle told her about the
murder, she stated Winkle first told her a different story, that the shooting
was related to a gang fight, but that she did not believe him. E.M. testified
Winkle next told her that “he and his friend were changing a tire on
something, and that the jack fell and it killed the dog, and his friend,
Michael, said something, and [Winkle] didn’t like the reaction or what he
said. And then he said something along the lines of ‘poking the bear,’ and
then all he told me, he just held up his gun and said, ‘boom, boom.’ ” The
prosecutor asked E.M. what Winkle’s demeanor was at the time. She
responded he was angry and she “was terrified” because she “thought he was
going to kill [her], too.” The prosecutor then asked if Winkle threatened her,
and his counsel objected based on relevance. The court overruled the
objection and E.M. responded, “Yes.”
The prosecutor also asked E.M. if, after hearing Winkle tell her he
killed his friend, the hair on her back stood up. She answered, “Yes.” Then
the prosecutor asked her if this was “the most terrified [she] had been in [her]
life?” and if she thought she was “going to die.” E.M. responded yes to both
questions. E.M. also testified that she escaped and called the police,
“[b]ecause [she] was terrified for [her] life.”
During the prosecutor’s closing argument, he mentioned E.M. several
times and twice briefly referred to Winkle threatening her life. In laying out
the facts presented at trial, the prosecutor stated the killing was not done in
the heat of passion and that when Winkle was “finally caught after evading
police, day after day, week after week, seven weeks go by, he threatens to kill
[E.M.], and he reveals to you the exact reason why he killed Michael: You
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don’t poke the bear.” (Italics added.) Then, in discussing E.M.’s credibility,
the prosecutor emphasized that her testimony was not effectively impeached
by the defense. He stated: “Was she impeached about any single other
statement she made on the stand, of statements she made to law enforcement
on the day? No. She was scared to death. She was in that room when she
confronted him about it. He told a side story, and then told her the real
story, and he threatened to kill her. He had the keys. And so she pretended
like she wasn’t afraid and came up with a ruse to get out of that room. ‘Hey,
Ben, I need feminine products.’ Gone. Called police. And those statements,
consistent.” (Italics added.)
II
The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting E.M.’s Testimony
A
“No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.” (Evid. Code,
§ 350.) “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence … having any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” (Id., § 210.) Evidence Code section 1101 states:
“(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103, 1108, and
1109, evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character ... is
inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.
[¶] (b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a
person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove
some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake or accident ...) other than his or her disposition
to commit such an act. [¶] (c) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility
of evidence offered to support or attack the credibility of a witness.” (See
11
People v. Hendrix (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 216, 238 (Hendrix) [Evidence of
other crimes is admissible “when relevant for a noncharacter purpose”].)
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), makes evidence of a
person’s character, including evidence of the person’s conduct on specific
instances, inadmissible when offered to prove the person’s conduct on a
specific occasion. However, this provision does not preclude introduction of
evidence of a person’s prior bad acts for a different purpose, including “to
support or attack the credibility of a witness.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (c).)
Further, evidence that a witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation for
testifying is relevant to the credibility of that witness and is therefore
generally admissible. (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 429–430;
People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 302; see Evid. Code, § 780.) An
explanation of the basis for the witness’s fear is likewise relevant to his or
her credibility and is well within the discretion of the trial court to admit.
(People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 869 (Burgener).)
“Although a prior criminal act may be relevant for a noncharacter
purpose to prove some fact other than the defendant’s criminal disposition,
the probative value of that evidence may nevertheless be counterbalanced by
a section 352 concern. Evidence may be excluded under section 352 if its
probative value is ‘substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission [would] ... create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ ” (Hendrix, supra, 214
Cal.App.4th at p. 238.) Accordingly, “the admissibility of uncharged crimes
depends upon three factors: (1) the materiality of the facts sought to be
proved; (2) the tendency of the uncharged crimes to prove or disprove the
material fact (i.e., probative value); and (3) the existence of any rule or policy
12
requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence (i.e., prejudicial effect or other
§ 352 concern).” (Ibid.)
The admission of evidence under Evidence Code section 1101 is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. Memro (1995)
11 Cal.4th 786, 864.) Accordingly, on appeal, a trial court’s admission of such
evidence is reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.
(People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 202; Memro, at p. 864.) The trial
court’s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing that the
court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v.
Linkenauger (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1603, 1614.)
B
Winkle’s threat to E.M. was relevant to understand E.M.’s attitude
towards testifying and to explain the existence of a bias, interest, or other
motive for her desire not to testify. (Evid. Code, § 780, subds. (f) & (j).) E.M.
stated she did not want to testify against Winkle and would not have testified
but-for the subpoena. E.M. also stated she could not recall details of the
night she called police, refused to review her prior statement to police, and
testified it was difficult for her to be in the courtroom with Winkle watching
her. As the prosecutor anticipated before trial, E.M. feared testifying and
was reluctant to do so. Without specific prompting by the prosecutor during
her direct examination, she testified she feared for her life the night she
called police. The basis for E.M.’s fear was relevant to assess her credibility
on the stand. (See Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 869 [“Evidence that a
witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation for testifying is relevant to the
credibility of that witness and is therefore admissible.”]; and People v.
Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1086 [“evidence that a witness testifies
13
despite fear is important to fully evaluating his or her credibility”].) Indeed,
Winkle tacitly admits as much in his opening appellate brief, noting E.M.’s
state of mind “may be relevant to assessing her credibility as a witness.”
Winkle argues E.M.’s testimony that he threatened to kill her is
irrelevant to the ultimate issue of whether he made a “spur-of-the moment”
decision to kill Mendoza. We disagree. E.M. was a pivotal witness and
provided testimony that helped refute the defense theory that the killing was
done in the heat of passion. Winkle’s admission to E.M. tended to suggest the
shooting was calculated and intentional. Because E.M. was an important
witness for the prosecution’s theory of homicide, the trial court properly
admitted her testimony concerning the reason for her fear as relevant to
assessing her credibility.
Winkle asserts the prejudice created by E.M.’s testimony substantially
outweighed its probative value. Specifically, he argues that its relevance was
limited because there was no indication her testimony “was suspect.”
However, Winkle’s own testimony directly contradicted E.M.’s version of
events. Her credibility was, thus, directly drawn into question by Winkle
himself.
Winkle also argues the testimony was highly inflammatory and “would
necessarily have the devastating impact of proof of criminal propensity, a
propensity to contemplate murder.” A court must balance the evidence’s
relevance against the danger that its admission will “necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) “ ‘[A]ll
evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging to the
defendant’s case. The stronger the evidence, the more it is “prejudicial.”
[However, t]he “prejudice” referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to
14
evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the
defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues. In
applying section 352, “prejudicial” is not synonymous with “damaging.” ’ ”
(People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638, italics added.)
The evidence here was not as devastating as Winkle asserts on appeal.
It paled in comparison to the other evidence concerning the crimes with
which Winkle was charged. That evidence showed Winkle shot his unarmed
friend multiple times while he kneeled, defenseless, on the ground. After the
killing, Winkle turned to T.S. and insinuated he would harm T.S. if T.S.
called the police. Ultimately, Winkle was charged with threatening to kill
T.S. for reporting his crime.2 This charged conduct, and the evidence
submitted at trial about the crimes, was much more inflammatory than
Winkle’s verbal threat to E.M.
Further, the jury was never made aware that Winkle used physical
force against E.M. or that E.M. suffered injuries, and the prosecutor never
urged the jury to consider E.M.’s testimony as propensity evidence. Instead,
the prosecutor referred to Winkle’s threat against E.M. as a factor to consider
in evaluating E.M.’s credibility. In sum, the probative value of E.M.’s
testimony that Winkle threatened her was not substantially outweighed by
its prejudicial effect in light of the totality of the evidence presented to the
jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the challenged
testimony.
2 As the Attorney General points out, the jury’s verdict also suggests the
limited testimony by E.M. did not have the prejudicial effect Winkle now
assigns it on appeal. Of the charges, the crime most resembling the threat to
E.M. was the threat to T.S. If the jury used the testimony as propensity
evidence in the manner Winkle asserts, the more likely verdict for count two
would have been guilt. Instead, the jury found Winkle not guilty of this
crime, suggesting it did not draw inadmissible inferences from this evidence.
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III
There Was No Prosecutorial Misconduct
Winkle next argues the verdict must be reversed because the
prosecutor twice committed misconduct. He argues the prosecutor violated
his rights by eliciting the challenged testimony that Winkle threatened E.M.,
and by focusing the jury’s attention on this testimony in his closing
argument, adding that “the threat was to kill” E.M.
A
“ ‘ “A prosecutor’s conduct violates a defendant’s constitutional rights
when the behavior comprises a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects
‘ “the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] Even if the behavior does not reach that level of
egregiousness, it may still violate California law if it involves the ‘ “use of
‘deceptive or reprehensible methods’ when attempting to persuade either the
trial court or the jury, and it is reasonably probable that without such
misconduct, an outcome more favorable to the defendant would have
resulted.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “The focus of the inquiry is on the effect of the
prosecutor’s action on the defendant, not on the intent or bad faith of the
prosecutor.” ’ ” (People v. Sanchez (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528.)
“A claim of prosecutorial misconduct is ordinarily preserved for appeal
only if the defendant made ‘a timely and specific objection at trial’ and
requested an admonition. [Citations.] ‘ “The primary purpose of the
requirement that a defendant object at trial to argument constituting
prosecutorial misconduct is to give the trial court an opportunity, through
admonition of the jury, to correct any error and mitigate any prejudice.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] Consistent with that purpose, ‘[a] court will excuse a
defendant’s failure to object only if an objection would have been futile’
16
[citation], or if an admonition would not have mitigated the harm caused by
the misconduct [citations]. ‘ “[T]he absence of a request for a curative
admonition’ ” may likewise be excused if ‘ “ ‘the court immediately overrules
an objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct [and as a consequence] the
defendant has no opportunity to make such a request.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘A
defendant claiming that one of these exceptions applies must find support for
his or her claim in the record. [Citation.] The ritual incantation that an
exception applies is not enough.’ ” (People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4
Cal.5th 790, 853.)
B
With respect to the prosecutor’s comments during his closing statement
that Winkle threatened E.M.’s life, his trial counsel did not object to the
statements that he now claims constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Winkle
argues there was no forfeiture of the issue because such an objection would
have been futile and no corrective admonishment by the court could “unring
the bell.” However, he points to nothing in the record to support this
assertion. Had Winkle raised an objection, it would have allowed the court to
provide an admonishment to the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s alleged
misstatements before they began their deliberations. Accordingly, because
Winkle’s counsel did not object to the statements that he now asserts
constituted prosecutorial misconduct, the issue is forfeited.
C
Even if the issue had been preserved for our review, we would not
conclude the prosecutor’s comments during his closing argument were error.
17
Likewise, E.M,’s testimony that Winkle threatened her was not the result of
prosecutorial misconduct.3
“[I]t is misconduct for [a] prosecutor to state facts not in evidence or to
imply the existence of evidence known to the prosecutor but not to the jury.”
(People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 617.) A prosecutor may not
mischaracterize the evidence, refer to facts not in evidence, or even imply
facts not in evidence. (People v. Purvis (1963) 60 Cal.2d 323, 343.) In
determining whether a prosecutor’s allegedly improper remark constitutes
misconduct, the reviewing court must view the statement in the context of
the argument as a whole. (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 522.)
When a misconduct claim focuses on comments the prosecutor made before
the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury
construed or applied any of the comments in an objectionable fashion.
(People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841.)
Here, the prosecutor’s comments during his closing argument were
reasonable inferences based on the evidence presented. E.M. stated on
multiple occasions she was afraid of Winkle after he confessed the murder to
her. She described being the “most terrified” she had ever been in her life
and that she believed her life was in danger while she remained with Winkle.
During one exchange with the prosecutor, she stated that she thought Winkle
was going to “kill [her], too.” E.M. also testified Winkle threatened her.
During his closing argument, when summarizing the evidence, the prosecutor
stated twice that Winkle “threatened to kill her.” While E.M. never directly
testified to a specific threat, the prosecutor’s comments were a fair deduction
that could be drawn from E.M.’s testimony. E.M. testified that she believed
3 Because we conclude there was no prosecutorial misconduct, we need
not reach Winkle’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his
counsel’s failure to object at trial.
18
her life was in danger in Winkle’s presence, and it can be reasonably inferred
her fear was the result of Winkle’s threats.
With respect to Winkle’s assertion that the prosecutor’s questioning
violated the court’s in limine ruling, we also find no misconduct. During
direct examination, after E.M. testified she was terrified because she thought
Winkle was going to kill her too, the prosecutor asked E.M., “did he threaten
you,” defense counsel objected on the grounds of relevance, the court
overruled the objection, and E.M. answered “yes.” As discussed, before trial
commenced, the court made a ruling in limine on the defense motion
concerning the circumstances surrounding Winkle’s confession to E.M. The
issue was the subject of a lengthy debate between the court and the parties,
but the court’s ruling was not a model of clarity. At the end of the discussion,
the court ruled it would permit questions about Winkle’s demeanor at the
time he confessed to E.M., and told the prosecutor not to use graphic terms.
Winkle describes the court’s ruling as prohibiting the prosecutor from
asking E.M. if Winkle had threatened her unless the court first conducted an
additional hearing under Evidence Code section 402. The Attorney General
disagrees with this interpretation. He asserts the court’s ruling provided the
prosecutor with more latitude, and permitted questioning concerning why
E.M. was fearful, excluded graphic testimony concerning the domestic
violence that had occurred, and allowed the issue to be reassessed as the
testimony came in.
The Attorney General’s understanding of the ruling is accurate and the
prosecutor’s questioning was in line with that understanding. After E.M.
expressed hesitancy to testify, the court’s ruling permitted the prosecutor to
ask questions about her hesitancy in order to allow the jury to assess her
credibility. The prosecutor did not elicit any specific facts about the violence
19
that may have occurred at Winkle’s hands or any resulting injury, and he did
not explicitly ask whether Winkle threatened to “kill her.” The prosecutor
did not use “graphic” terms or elicit testimony of facts that were similar to
the charged violence. The prosecutor’s questioning, thus, did not run afoul of
the court’s ruling. Indeed, when the prosecutor asked E.M. what Winkle’s
demeanor was after he admitted killing Mendoza, she volunteered the fact
that she was terrified of him and thought Winkle was going to kill her too.
In sum, the prosecutor’s question did not constitute prosecutorial
misconduct and reversal on this basis is not warranted.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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