CourtListener 10661090•People v. Perez CA2/8
Testo completo
Filed 8/26/25 P. v. Perez CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B336549
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA086169
v.
RAYMOND JOSE PEREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Debra Cole-Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, and Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
In July 2006, a jury convicted Raymond Perez of attempted
murder and shooting at an occupied vehicle. We affirmed Perez’s
convictions. (People v. Perez (Feb. 13, 2008, B196459) [nonpub.
opn.] (Perez I).)
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). Perez petitioned for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6. After an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court denied Perez’s petition.
Citing People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez)
and Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford),
Perez argues on appeal that the court considered inadmissible
gang expert testimony in finding he had the requisite mental
state to aid and abet an attempted murder.
We affirm. Statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
I
We sketch facts.
On November 3, 2004, Luis Zamora was driving home
along Maie Avenue near 83rd Street in the late afternoon. He
saw two young men on the sidewalk; one was wearing a hooded
sweatshirt, and the other was on a bicycle. He recognized one of
the men as Perez, whom he had seen around the neighborhood
before on at least two occasions. Perez and the other young man
moved in front of Zamora’s car and gestured with their hands.
Perez made gang signs at Zamora. Zamora believed this meant
they wanted to fight with him.
2
Zamora heard gunshots and felt pain. His next memory
was waking up at a rehabilitation center months later with
staples in his head.
J.A. was visiting family members living near Maie Avenue
and 83rd Street on the day of the shooting. J.A.’s family lived
next to Ricky Gonzalez, whom she believed to be a Florencia gang
member.
J.A. saw six or seven men hanging out by Gonzalez’s house
that day. The group migrated to the corner of 83rd and Maie.
Then, two or three men in the group separated from the group.
J.A. saw Zamora’s car drive by and heard three or four
gunshots. She turned toward the direction of the shots and saw
one of the men on a bicycle with his hands extended. She saw the
car moving towards 84th Street and heard a crash. Then she saw
the two men who had separated from the group rush back
towards Gonzalez’s house.
J.A. later identified Perez as one of the men who had
separated from the group. She knew him only as “Boxer.” She
had spoken to him a few times. He once asked her out. She did
not remember the “Boxer” nickname at first, but after a couple
days passed, she told Detective Frank Bravo.
Bravo, an experienced deputy sheriff, investigated the
shooting. One of the first people he interviewed was J.A. When
J.A. said “Boxer” had been at the shooting, Bravo used law
enforcement software to identify Perez, who was the only gang
member in that area using the name “Boxer.”
Bravo arrested Perez. He read Perez his Miranda rights
(Miranda v. Ariz. (1966) 384 U.S. 436), and Perez said he
understood those rights.
3
Perez told Bravo he was an active member of the Florencia
Little Rascals.
When Bravo asked, Perez confirmed he had heard about
Zamora’s shooting, but initially denied being present. Perez later
admitted he was present at the shooting, but denied being the
shooter. Perez said Carlos Nava, who joined him in confronting
Zamora, was the shooter.
Perez told Bravo that, when he saw Zamora, he believed
Zamora was a rival gang member who had flipped him off.
According to Perez, Nava then pulled a gun from his waistband
and fired shots at Zamora’s car. After Nava fired the shots, Perez
went back to Gonzalez’s house.
Detective Hector Velasquez encountered Perez on several
occasions before November 2004, and said they had “good
rapport.” When Velasquez heard that Bravo had arrested Perez,
Velasquez came to speak with Perez. Velasquez wanted to ask
Perez about the circumstances of Zamora’s shooting.
Velasquez read Perez his Miranda rights (Miranda, supra,
384 U.S. 436) and Perez told Velasquez that he wanted to talk
about the shooting. Velasquez recorded his conversation with
Perez.
During this conversation, Perez told Velasquez that on the
day of Zamora’s shooting, there was a “big group of guys” on Maie
Avenue that he was “kicking it” with. Velasquez asked Perez
whether it was normal for someone in the group to have a
weapon to defend themselves against a rival gang coming into the
neighborhood, and Perez responded: “possibly.”
When Zamora drove up, Perez believed Zamora “was just
acting too suspicious” and said of Zamora: “[l]ittle fuck dissing
me.” Perez responded by throwing a Florencia gang sign in
4
Zamora’s direction. According to Perez, Zamora then said: “fuck
you–all fools,” which Perez interpreted as meaning Zamora “was
just up to no good.”
Perez heard gunshots and biked away.
An August 2005 information charged Perez and Nava as
follows: in Count One, Nava and Perez unlawfully and with
malice aforethought attempted to murder Zamora, in violation of
section 664 and section 187, subsection (a); in Count Two, Nava
and Perez willfully, unlawfully, and maliciously shot a gun at an
occupied motor vehicle, in violation of section 246. The
information also included allegations for a gang enhancement
under section 186.22, subsection (b)(1)(A) and a gun
enhancement under section 12022.53, subsections (d) and (e)(1).
Perez and Nava were tried separately.
At Perez’s July 2006 trial, the prosecutor set forth two
theories of liability for Perez: either Perez knew about Nava’s
gun and intended to aid him in attempting to murder Zamora, or
Perez did not know about Nava’s gun, but intended to commit an
assault or breach of the peace by running up to Zamora, and
Nava shooting Zamora was a natural and probable consequence
of the target crime. The court instructed the jury on both
theories.
During the prosecutor’s case in chief, the jury heard
testimony from Zamora, J.A., Bravo, and other law enforcement
officers. The jury also heard the recorded conversation between
Perez and Velasquez, which Velasquez duly authenticated.
Next, the prosecutor called Velasquez as an expert witness
on the Florencia gang. Velasquez had been with the police
department for eighteen years and had investigated gang crimes
for over nine years by the time of the trial. He had interviewed
5
over 1,000 gang members, undergone several training sessions,
taught a class on gangs, and testified as a gang expert in court
over twenty times.
Velasquez first encountered the Florencia gang in 1990. He
had spoken to many Florencia gang members while on patrol and
was part of a task force that specifically dealt with Florencia
gang members and their rivals.
Velasquez testified that the Florencia gang is divided into
25 cliques. The Florencia clique that claims the area around
Maie Avenue is the Little Rascals.
While on patrol, Velasquez tried to figure out which gang
members were “putting in work.” Velasquez testified that
“putting in work” as a gang member meant showing one’s value
to the gang, and to do so, a member would “go out and commit
criminal acts that will benefit the gang.” These acts could
include graffiti, beating up a rival gang member, and shooting;
“whatever it takes to let them know you’re part of this gang.”
“Putting in work” would result in the gang member gaining
respect in the gang.
According to Velasquez, when a group of Florencia gang
members hangs out at a certain area, they are “claiming that
particular area as theirs. This is our turf.” Florencia gang
members would be wary of unknown cars entering their turf. If
this were to happen, one to three gang members would
“challenge” the person in the unknown car by throwing gang
signs, while the rest of the gang members would stay back and
watch. The gang members doing the “challenge” would arm
themselves before confronting strangers and were prepared to
inflict violence if they perceived the strangers as rivals.
Velasquez explained the gang members had “survival skills” to
6
defend themselves against rival gang members who would dare
invade their territory.
The prosecutor then described a hypothetical scenario: if
an unknown potential rival gang member drove by, and two or
three gang members ran up to the car, one of them throwing gang
signs, and the other shooting the driver, would the gang members
have done this to benefit the gang?
Velasquez responded: “Oh yes, definitely. Based on my
training and experience and the numerous investigations I’ve
conducted and interviews I’ve had with actual gang members, a
group separating itself from the main group is simply acting as
one.
“So that the group that stayed back can watch and say look
at [what] one, two, or three guys are doing.
“Those three guys are really crazy. Those three guys are
putting in the work for our neighborhood. They’re loyal to us.
“In return, the one, two, or three guys that actually
separated from the group to go conduct this act of violence, their
reputation, respect, would just grow by the number of individuals
in that group that’s watching.
“So do they benefit the three individuals committing the
act? The one throwing the hand signs, the one doing the
shooting, similarly the one standing there looking around making
sure no police come, making sure the witnesses, who’s looking so
they can contact them later, those three individuals within that
clique within that gang group — their status elevates.”
Velasquez testified the act of shooting a rival gang member
would benefit the gang. The neighborhood would hear about it,
which would bolster the gang’s reputation.
7
The jury found Perez guilty on both counts. It also found
true the allegations that Perez had committed the crimes for the
benefit of a criminal street gang under section 186.22, subsection
(b)(1)(A), and that a principal personally and intentionally
discharged a handgun causing great bodily harm to Zamora,
under section 12022.53, subsections (d) and (e)(1).
The trial court sentenced Perez on Count One to life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole, plus 25 years to life
for the gun enhancement. The terms were consecutive. The
court stayed Count Two under section 654.
Perez appealed the judgment, arguing the court committed
prejudicial error by instructing the jury on aiding and abetting an
attempted murder because there was insufficient evidence to
support either of the prosecutor’s theories of aiding and abetting.
(Perez I, supra.)
The appellate court rejected this argument and affirmed
because the evidence supported a reasonable inference that Perez
was liable as an aider and abettor “either because he knew about
Nava’s gun and intended that a shooting would occur, or because
he intended at least an assault or breach of the peace by stopping
Zamora’s car and challenging him to get out of the car and fight,
and the shooting was a natural and probable consequence of the
crime he intended.” (Perez I, supra.)
In January 2021, Perez filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1170.95 (now 1172.6).
Because the trial court had instructed the jury on the
natural and probable consequences theory of liability, the parties
stipulated that Perez had made a prima facie showing for relief
and asked the court to issue an order to show cause and set an
evidentiary hearing. The court obliged.
8
Neither party presented live testimony at the evidentiary
hearing; rather, both premised their arguments on the evidence
at Perez’s July 2006 trial. The main issue at the hearing was
what portions of Velasquez’s gang expert testimony were
admissible under Sanchez and Crawford.
At the hearing, the court largely overruled Perez’s
objections to Velasquez’s testimony. Relying on Velasquez’s
testimony, the court found Nava and Perez were “working
together as a team at that point,” with Perez as the “instigator of
that interaction.” The court noted that when Perez flashed the
gang signs to a perceived rival gang member, “it is reasonable to
believe, that, in fact, when they interacted with the individual in
the car, their intention was, in fact, to kill him.” Based on the
facts, the court found the prosecutor had proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Perez was guilty of attempted murder as a
direct aider and abettor to Nava and denied his petition.
II
We review a trial court’s findings at a section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence: “evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a
rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 298 [internal citation omitted].) In doing so, we accept the
trial court’s determinations on witness credibility and evidentiary
conflicts, along with any logical inferences it may have drawn
from the evidence. (People v. Didyavong (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
85, 97.) We will not reverse the trial court unless there is no
hypothesis upon which sufficient substantial evidence exists to
support its decision. (Ibid.)
9
After the passage of Senate Bill 1437 and Senate Bill No.
775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., effective January 1, 2022) (Senate Bill
775), resentencing relief became available to defendants with
attempted murder convictions who never had the intent to kill.
(See People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 456–457
(Rodriguez).) Senate Bill 1437 “eliminated natural and probable
consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and
abetting” and created a procedural mechanism—section 1172.6
(formerly 1170.95)—for defendants to seek retroactive relief.
(See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) Senate Bill 775
“expanded the class of defendants entitled to relief to those
convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (Rodriguez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p.
457.)
Nevertheless, a defendant who directly aids and abets an
attempted murder is not eligible for relief under section 1172.6.
(See People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 204.) This is
because “outside of the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, an aider and abettor’s mental state must be at least
that required of the direct perpetrator.” (People v. McCoy (2001)
25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118.) An aider and abettor’s guilt “would be
based on the combined actus reus of the participants, but also
solely on that person’s own mens rea.” (Id. at p. 1121.) For
attempted murder, the requisite mens rea is intent to kill.
(People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054.) The prosecutor
bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant remains guilty of attempted murder under California
law as amended by the changes from Senate Bill 1437 and Senate
Bill 775. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
10
On appeal, Perez challenges only the trial court’s finding
that there was substantial evidence of his intent to kill because,
in doing so, the trial court admitted inadmissible gang expert
testimony from Velasquez in violation of Sanchez. He argues:
“There is no evidence that [he] even knew Nava had a gun until
[Nava] pulled it and started shooting. Throwing a gang sign is
not the equivalent of nor does it indicate specific intent to kill
such as is required for attempted murder.”
This argument fails.
In Sanchez, our Supreme Court considered the degree to
which a defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause that the United States Supreme Court
articulated in Crawford “limits an expert witness from relating
case-specific hearsay content in explaining the basis for his
opinion.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 670.)
Detective David Stow, the prosecution’s gang expert in
Sanchez, testified generally about Delhi gang culture. (Sanchez,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 672.) When the prosecutor asked about
the defendant’s multiple contacts with the police, Stow gave the
details of each encounter. (Ibid.) Stow opined that the defendant
was a member of the Delhi gang based on records of the
defendant’s contacts with other police officers and police reports,
and that the defendant’s conduct (running into an apartment
where he had stored a loaded gun and drugs) benefited the Delhi
gang because he was willing to risk incarceration by possessing a
gun and narcotics on the gang’s turf. (Id. at p. 673.) However, on
cross-examination, Stow admitted he had never met the
defendant and his knowledge of the defendant’s police contacts
was from reading police reports. (Ibid.)
11
The Sanchez court found Stow’s case-specific testimony as
to the defendant’s police contacts of which he had no personal
knowledge but presented as true statements of fact to be
inadmissible hearsay. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 670.)
But it also clarified that its holding “does not affect the
traditional latitude granted to experts to describe background
information and knowledge in the areas of his expertise.” (Id. at
p. 685.) Sanchez further noted: “[g]ang experts, like all others,
can rely on background information accepted in their field of
expertise under the traditional latitude given by the Evidence
Code. They can rely on information within their personal
knowledge, and they can give an opinion based on a hypothetical
including case-specific facts that are properly proven.” (Ibid.)
Here, Velasquez did not rely on hearsay that Sanchez
forbids. Unlike Stow, he had spoken with Perez on several
occasions before asking him about Zamora’s shooting. He
testified generally about Florencia gang culture, and Perez never
challenged his qualifications to do so.
Velasquez did give an opinion based on a hypothetical
including case-specific facts about Zamora’s shooting, but those
case-specific facts were properly proven through the testimony of
Zamora and J.A.—percipient witnesses to the shooting—and the
authenticated recording of the interview between Perez and
Velasquez. Velasquez’s testimony was proper under Sanchez,
constituted substantial evidence, and the trial court did not err in
relying on it to find Perez had the intent to kill Zamora. (See
Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 685.) It was reasonable for the
court to infer Perez knew Nava had a gun, based on Velasquez’s
expert opinion that gang members armed themselves before
“challenging” potential rivals, and that Perez throwing gang
12
signs at Zamora and believing him to be a rival reflected the
intent to kill Zamora. (See People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th
600, 630 [a defendant’s “substantial participation” in the events
before a murder can support an inference that the defendant
knew of the plan to kill the victim, intended to facilitate the plan,
and aided in the plan].)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
13
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.