In re A.M. CA2/4

CourtListener 10661037Calctapp26 ago 2025

Testo completo

Filed 8/26/25 In re A.M. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re A.M. a Person Coming B338724
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
21CCJP04268,
21CCJP04268F)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and
Respondent.
v.

E.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Philip L. Soto, Judge. Dismissed.
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for
Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County
Counsel, Sally Son, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Father E.R. appeals from the juvenile court’s order exercising
jurisdiction over his daughter, A., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j).1 He argues that the court lacked
jurisdiction because he complied with the court’s orders regarding mental
health treatment for 15-year-old A. and there was no evidence he would pose
a continued risk of harm to the child. Respondent Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) contends the appeal is
moot, as the juvenile court subsequently terminated jurisdiction with a
custody order to father. We agree that the appeal is moot. We therefore
dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
I. Petition
Father and mother, V.M., have one child together, A., born in 2008.
Mother has several other children with other partners.2 According to father,
A. had been living with him since she was one and a half years old.
In October 2023, DCFS received a report that A. was at a psychiatric
treatment facility on an involuntary hold. The reporting party stated that A.
was having suicidal ideations and that father was not supportive of A.’s
mental health treatment. The case manager at the treatment center stated
that father claimed A. was just “acting out.” A DCFS children’s social worker
(CSW) made multiple attempts to contact father between October and early
December, 2023, including sending letters and emails, leaving voicemails,
and making visits to father’s home, all without response.
A CSW met with A. at her high school on October 20, 2023. A. reported
that she had been hospitalized because she threatened to kill herself at

1
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2
A. is the only child at issue in this dependency proceeding. Mother is
not a party to this appeal.
2
school. She had been struggling with depression for the past four years. She
also cut herself on the wrist with a razor two to three months earlier; she did
not tell anyone about it at the time and denied other self-harm since then. A.
reported that she had attended only two therapy sessions. She stated that
she would like to try psychotropic medication, but she could not convince
father to allow it. She admitted to generally feeling overwhelmed and said
she wanted help. A. wished father “knew more about mental health.”
A.’s school psychologist told DCFS that A. had been placed on a
psychiatric hold after she reported thoughts of dying and killing herself, and
stated that father made her feel that she would be better off dead. The
psychologist reported that A. had come into the office very upset. A. was
running late for school and had been texting with father. She became
overwhelmed with the conversation and told father she was thinking about
running into the street. Father replied by text that if she did, it would be less
of a burden for him. A. told the counselor that she had difficulty coping with
the situation and had strong urges to hurt herself. The psychologist told
DCFS that she had not spoken with father, despite the school’s attempts to
reach out. The school could not reach father when A. was hospitalized and he
did not communicate about a safety plan upon A.’s return to school.
A.’s school counselor told DCFS that her biggest concern was that A.
needed to be assessed for an Individualized Education Plan (IEP). The school
had tried multiple times to get father involved in the process, including
asking him to attend meetings and sign paperwork, but he had not done so.
A. originally qualified for an IEP three years ago in middle school, but father
had never accepted the proposed services.
On November 16 and November 29, 2023, A. told the CSW that father
had not yet enrolled her in therapy or returned the signed IEP paperwork. A.
admitted feeling angry and sad. She said she last cut her wrist with a razor
about a month ago. When she would cut herself in sixth grade, father would
take her phone away, blaming the phone for her behavior. A. also admitted
to trying to hang herself with a skirt in the closet in sixth or seventh grade.

3
She reported being stressed about school and her grades and said that father
talked to her every day about her grades and needing to do better.
At the end of November, DCFS tried to reach father through paternal
grandmother. Paternal grandmother stated that father told her A. was
seeing a therapist, that he was taking care of A.’s needs and there was no
need for further follow-up, so father would not be calling the CSW. DCFS
confirmed that father applied for support from an adolescent mental health
center on December 4, 2023.
DCFS finally met with father in an unannounced visit to his home on
December 8, 2023. Father stated he had been busy with work, that he had
signed the IEP paperwork and A. was in therapy. Father cut the meeting
short, stating he had to leave for work. A few days later, the CSW met with
father again. He stated that his medical insurance had changed on November
30, which delayed enrolling A. in therapy. Father said that A. seemed “okay”
and happy. Regarding A.’s hospitalization, father stated that A. was in
distress because her grades were slipping. He also felt she was distracted by
a relationship. He did not believe A. was depressed. Father was unhappy
about DCFS’s attempts to contact him, stating he was being harassed. He
rejected DCFS’s suggestion to consider a voluntary family maintenance plan.
DCFS filed a dependency petition in December 2023 on behalf of A.
under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (c), and (j). In count b-1, the petition
alleged that A. suffered from “mental and emotional problems, including
depression, self-injurious behaviors, suicidal ideation, and a suicide attempt,”
and that A. had been involuntarily hospitalized on two occasions for
treatment of her psychiatric condition. The petition further alleged that
father failed to obtain necessary mental health treatment for A., including
medication, failed to consent to an IEP assessment at school, and “repeatedly
failed to make himself available to school staff to address the child’s mental
health, which also negatively impacted the child’s educational needs.” Count
c-1 contained the same allegations, and further alleged that father
emotionally abused A. by suggesting that she was a burden in response to her
threat to run into traffic.
4
The petition alleged in counts b-2 and j-1 that mother had a history of
substance abuse, resulting in dependency proceedings involving A.’s half-
siblings. The petition further alleged that mother’s alcohol abuse endangered
A. The court ordered A. to remain living with father.
At the January 2024 detention hearing, the court found father was A.’s
presumed father. The court found a prima facie case for jurisdiction over A.
under section 300. The court ordered A. released to father, with monitored
visitation for mother.
II. Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
In its February 2024 jurisdiction/disposition report, DCFS stated that
A. reported her situation had improved because she was getting mental
health treatment. She stated she did not feel she had been neglected by
father, and they were now in family therapy together. Although previously
father did not know how to communicate with A. and thought A. was
pretending to have mental health problems, which was upsetting to A., now
A. stated she was talking more to father and expressing herself. A. could not
recall the last time she had contact with mother.
A. began treatment in a mental health program at the end of December
2023, including meeting with a psychologist. The school psychologist
reported that father had attended an IEP team meeting in early February
2024. She also stated that father did not appear to be minimizing A.’s mental
health issues during the meeting but seemed focused on A.’s needs. A.’s
grade point average for fall 2023 was 2.05, with multiple failing grades.
DCFS opined in the report that although father had “recently shown an
effort to follow through with services” for A.’s mental health needs, he “lacks
insight into the child’s needs and will benefit from psychosocial education.”
DCFS did not believe a voluntary family plan would be appropriate given A.’s
needs and father’s lack of compliance during most of the investigative period.
DCFS recommended allowing A. to remain living with father but continuing
court oversight to ensure that A. and father participated in services.
After multiple attempts by DCFS to reach father, he agreed to a
meeting on February 10, 2024. Father expressed frustration with the time
5
required to participate in an open dependency case. He reported that A. was
currently taking prescribed medication for her mental health and was
responding well. He denied that A. was offered an IEP in middle school and
denied the allegations of mental abuse. He stated that he was not aware of
A.’s suicidal feelings and that A. seemed fine and did not appear depressed.
He denied telling A. she could not have mental health services and stated he
could not participate in most of the IEP meetings because of his work
schedule.
DCFS confirmed that A. participated in mental health services briefly
during the summer of 2021, but the agency closed the case after it could not
get in touch with father and the family failed to attend several appointments.
A. was re-enrolled in October 2023, following her hospitalization, but those
services were terminated a few months later after A. stated she did not want
to miss school for sessions and the family stated it would look for other
services outside of school.
III. Adjudication and disposition
The adjudication hearing, initially set for February 22, 2024, was
continued to May 2024. In a March last-minute information, DCFS reported
that it had learned from A.’s mental health services program that A. was no
longer there. Father told DCFS that A. was “doing okay” and was in a
residential treatment program at her request. He denied that A. had
experienced any recent trauma or self-harm, she “only wanted more services,”
so she was transferred to the facility on March 16, 2024. When asked why he
had not informed DCFS, father stated that he was busy with A.’s care and
the CSWs were “the last people he wanted to speak to.” Father became
agitated, claimed that DCFS did not help and was a “money grab,” and
blamed DCFS and the court for increasing A.’s anxiety.
The CSW learned that A. had been hospitalized on February 27, 2024,
after she disclosed suicidal thoughts and a plan to her therapist. Father took
A. to residential treatment after she was discharged from the hospital. The
CSW noted that she spoke to father on March 7 about a visit and father
stated only that they were going to be out of town that week. The CSW
6
visited A. at the treatment center on March 23, 2024. A. did not want to
discuss her hospitalization and became angry, stating she wanted the
dependency case to close and if it did not, she would kill herself. DCFS
expressed continued concern about A.’s mental health, father’s lack of
honesty with DCFS, and father’s minimization of A.’s mental health needs.
In a May 2024 last-minute information, DCFS provided an assessment
from the residential treatment program, including statements by father that
he was aware of A.’s mental health and school challenges as early as middle
school, including self-harming. These statements indicated father’s
knowledge of A.’s issues much earlier than he had indicated to DCFS, but
father failed to enroll A. in services until DCFS’s involvement in late 2023.
A. also disclosed substance use since age 12 and six previous suicide
attempts. The treatment program assessed A. as “high risk.”
As of May 2024, A. had returned to her prior outpatient mental health
treatment program. She was receiving group and individual therapy, plus
weekly family therapy. Father had not made himself available to speak to or
meet with DCFS.
In a last-minute information on May 30, DCFS reported that A.
planned to re-enroll at her prior high school for the next school year. The
school stated that the family was a “no show” for a scheduled meeting the
week before.
The court held the adjudication hearing on May 30, 2024. A.’s counsel
asked the court to sustain count b-1, citing A.’s long history of untreated
mental health issues, father’s failure to obtain services or medication until
very recently, and his continued minimization of the issues by failing to be
forthcoming with DCFS. Father’s counsel asked the court to dismiss the
entire petition. She argued that father’s difficulty communicating with the
school was due to his work schedule and that the record did not support the
allegations that father minimized A.’s issues and failed to seek help. She
acknowledged that father “has not been communicating with” DCFS but
argued that he “has prioritized action over talking” and had taken all the
necessary steps for A.’s care and there was no ongoing risk of harm to A.
7
The court sustained the allegations regarding father’s conduct and A.’s
mental health problems (count b-1) and mother’s abuse of alcohol and
endangerment of A.’s half-siblings (count j-1). The court struck the
remaining counts b-2 (mother’s substance abuse) and c-1 (father’s emotional
abuse). The court found jurisdiction over A. under section 300, subdivisions
(b) and (j).
The court removed A. from mother and ordered her to remain in
father’s care, with monitored visitation with mother and monthly sibling
visits. The court’s case plan included counseling for father, psychosocial
education, and an order to follow all mental health recommendations for A.
The court rejected father’s request to close the case, noting that it was “a very
serious case, and obviously this child is very disturbed. I’m not just going to
let this case go away. . . . We need to make sure this child gets all the
services that are available.”
Father timely appealed from the court’s May 30, 2024 orders.
IV. Subsequent Proceedings
DCFS filed an unopposed request for judicial notice of the juvenile
court documents reflecting relevant developments in the case while this
appeal was pending. We grant that request.
In March 2025, the juvenile court granted father sole legal and physical
custody of A. The court then terminated jurisdiction over the matter.

DISCUSSION
Father argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction findings, because there was no substantial risk of harm to
A. at the time of adjudication. DCFS contends the appeal is moot because the
juvenile court subsequently terminated jurisdiction and awarded full custody
to father. We agree that the appeal is moot and decline to exercise our
discretion to reach the merits.
Under the doctrine of justiciability, “[a] court is tasked with the duty
‘“to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect
and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions or to

8
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in
the case before it.”’” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) A case
becomes moot when a court cannot render effective relief. “[R]elief is effective
when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal
status.’” (Id. at p. 277.) “A reviewing court must “‘decide on a case-by-case
basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a
case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in a
subsequent proceeding.’” (Id. at p. 276, quoting In re Anna S. (2010) 180
Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498.)
In the dependency context, an appeal is not moot where the “juvenile
court’s finding forms the basis for an order that continues to impact a
parent’s rights—for instance, by restricting visitation or custody.” (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276, citing In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th
1544, 1548 [reviewing challenge to jurisdictional finding because finding was
the basis of order restricting visitation and custody rights].) Where “reversal
of the jurisdictional finding calls into question the validity of orders based on
the finding, review of the jurisdictional finding can grant the parent effective
relief,” even after the juvenile court has terminated its jurisdiction. (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277.) Conversely, where the juvenile court terminates
jurisdiction without issuing any order that continues to impact the appealing
parent, that parent must show some harm beyond a general complaint of
“stigma” to avoid mootness. (Ibid.) “Although a jurisdictional finding that a
parent engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally stigmatizing,
complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to sustain an appeal. The stigma
must be paired with some effect on the plaintiff's legal status that is capable
of being redressed by a favorable court decision.” (Ibid.) “[S]peculative
future harm” is not sufficient. (Id. at p. 278.)
We agree with DCFS that this appeal is moot. The jurisdictional
finding that father failed to adequately address A.’s mental health needs did
not result in any disposition orders adverse to father. He retained physical
custody of A. at all times and ultimately received full legal and physical
custody when the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction in 2025. In addition,
9
father’s briefing identifies no ongoing “tangible legal or practical
consequence” resulting from the juvenile court’s orders. (D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 278.) As such, there is no effective relief this court could grant
by reversing the challenged jurisdiction finding.
However, even where a case is moot, we have “inherent discretion” to
reach the merits of an appeal. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) As our
Supreme Court explained, in deciding whether to exercise discretionary
review, “courts may consider whether the challenged jurisdictional finding
‘could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current
or future dependency proceedings,’ or ‘“could have other consequences for [the
appellant], beyond jurisdiction.”’” (Id. at p. 285.) Courts may also evaluate
factors such as whether the allegations against the parent are particularly
egregious and whether “[p]rinciples of fairness” favor discretionary review.
(Id. at pp. 284-286.) “Ultimately, in deciding whether to exercise its
discretion, a court should be guided by the overarching goals of the
dependency system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection for children’
with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as well as the safety,
protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the child.’” (Id. at p.
286.)
Father urges us to exercise our discretion to reach his argument
regarding the insufficiency of the evidence supporting count b-1, citing the
potential implications between being found an “‘offending’ parent versus a
‘non-offending’ parent.” (See In re Andrew S. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 536, 542,
fn. 2.) Other than noting this distinction, father gives no further explanation
why the findings under count b-1 could impact possible future dependency or
family law proceedings involving A., particularly given that father remains
the custodial parent. Father’s vague assertions here are insufficient to
demonstrate that discretionary review is warranted. (See In re Destiny D.
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 209 [The status of a parent as “‘offending’” or
“‘nonoffending’” is not “outcome determinative” and “does not categorically
disqualify [a parent] from custody or otherwise limit the court’s ability to
issue orders necessary to further [the child’s] best interest.”]; In re I.A. (2011)
10
201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1495 [dismissing appeal and finding “no threatened
prejudice” to father despite his argument that the jurisdiction finding might
have some consequence in a future proceeding].) Moreover, the juvenile
court’s findings that father failed to take seriously A.’s mental health needs
do not suggest the sort of “particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct”
that warrants discretionary review of a moot challenge to a jurisdiction
finding. ( See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286 [“The more egregious the
findings against the parent, the greater the parent’s interest in challenging
such findings.”].)
Under these circumstances, we decline to exercise our discretion to
address the substance of father’s challenge to the court’s jurisdiction findings.
We therefore dismiss father’s appeal as moot.
DISPOSITION
Father’s appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

11

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.