People v. Gonzalez CA4/3

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Filed 8/21/25 P. v. Gonzalez CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062473

v. (Super. Ct. No. 19HF0174)

EDUARDO GODOY GONZALEZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Terri K. Flynn-Peister, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant
Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Caelle McKaveney, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Eduardo Gonzalez appeals from a judgment finding him guilty of,
inter alia, aggravated kidnapping with intent to commit rape. He contends
the judgment should be reversed for three reasons: (1) there was no
substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the movement of the
victim satisfied the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping under
Penal Code section 2091; (2) section 209 is unconstitutionally vague; and (3)
the trial court erred in admitting certain prior-acts evidence under Evidence
Code section 1101, subdivision (b).
We reject each contention. First, the evidence showed defendant
moved the victim to a more secluded location, away from possible escape or
detection, to facilitate a sexual assault. That satisfied the asportation
element. Second, the court in People v. Ledesma (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 830
(Ledesma) already rejected the void-for-vagueness argument Gonzalez raises
here, and we find the Ledesma analysis persuasive. Finally, even assuming
some prior-acts evidence should have been excluded, any error was harmless
in light of defendant’s admissions and the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.
THE ATTEMPTED RAPE
In the early morning hours of February 6, 2019, Jane Doe was
working at her overnight job as a cleaning person in an office building in
Irvine. Doe was vacuuming a room near the entrance, which had a
transparent glass wall, when she was saw Gonzalez come into the building.
Gonzalez checked to see if the victim was alone and briefly looked around the

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless stated

otherwise.

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office space. He returned to the front room where Doe was working and asked
if she wanted to have sex with him. He told Doe he had condoms and asked
her to remove her clothes. Doe responded that he was crazy and to leave
before getting out her phone to call the police. Gonzalez pulled out what
appeared to be a handgun and threatened to kill her if she called anyone or if
she did not take off her clothes. He also had a knife clipped to his waistband.
Fearful, Doe pleaded with Gonzalez not to harm her as she had three young
children. Gonzalez stated he did not care.
Gonzalez pulled Doe down the hallway into another room, which
did not have a transparent wall, and where they were no longer visible from
the hallway. He “just wanted to have sex with her” and intended to do so
regardless of her consent.
Doe attempted to defend herself from the attack while being
dragged down the hall. Once Gonzalez and Doe had entered into the second,
side room, he started to pull his pants down and attempted to pull Doe’s
pants down as well.
Doe was eventually able to remove the vacuum strapped to her
back and grab the gun from Gonzalez. Doe, now in possession of the gun,
threatened to kill Gonzalez, but he laughed and informed her the gun was
fake. She then ran from the room to which Gonzalez had dragged her, back
towards the front room, and to her coworker in an adjacent building for help.
Upon hearing Doe’s screams for help, appellant fled the scene in attempts to
avoid arrest.
Police later recovered and identified that “gun” as a replica of a
Glock semi-automatic firearm. As a result of Gonzalez’s attack, Doe sustained
a torn shoulder muscle in addition to various scratches, bruises, and soreness
on her face, elbows, and breasts.

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Irvine Police located Gonzalez at a grocery store the next day.
Gonzalez initially denied his involvement in the crime and only admitted he
sexually assaulted Doe after being shown the incriminating surveillance
video. Gonzalez admitted to detectives that after the victim denied his sexual
advances, “[He] got aggressive, and [he] started pushing her against the wall,
and [he] took her to another room.” When asked by detectives why he had
dragged Doe into that side room, Gonzalez answered because there were beds
in that room and he wanted to rape her there.
II.
THE CHARGES AND THE TRIAL
By way of amended information, Gonzalez was charged with
kidnapping to commit a sex offense (count 1, § 209, subd. (b)(1)); assault with
the intent to commit a sexual offense (count 2, § 220, subd. (a)(1)); criminal
threats (count 3, § 422, subd. (a)); burglary in the second degree (count 4, §§
459-460, subd. (b)); and brandishing an imitation firearm, a misdemeanor,
(count 5, § 417.4.) The information alleged three aggravating factors as to
counts 2 through 4: (1) That the offense involved great violence, great bodily
harm or threat of great bodily harm (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421 (a)(1));
(2) That the defendant was armed with and used a weapon, including fake
firearm and or a pocket knife (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421 (a)(2)); and (3)
That the victim was particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421
(a)(3)).
At trial, the People put on evidence of two prior incidents
pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).
The first incident occurred on January 13, 2019, a few weeks
before Gonzalez attempted to rape Doe. Shortly before 7:00 p.m., Maria G.
left the gym where she had been working out and was walking through a

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Carl’s Jr. parking lot when she was approached by Gonzalez. He spoke to her
in English and the only word she understood was “money.” She told him she
did not speak English, did not have any money, and started walking away.
Gonzalez said he spoke Spanish and he was not asking for money, but said he
had some money and asked if she would have sex with him if he gave her
money. Maria said, “No, no, thank you,” and continued walking. The man
kept walking with her and asked why not, and she said he was crazy and that
if he did not go away, she would call the police.
He went back to the Carl’s Jr. but then came back to Maria again
on a skateboard. She turned and walked toward him, telling him she had
already called the police and he responded, “So what? What [are] the
police . . . going to do to me?” Maria was afraid because they were in an
isolated area, so she engaged him in conversation, and asked him why he was
doing this when he was so handsome and should not have to pay for sex, and
invited him to walk with her. He walked with her toward Edinger Avenue,
and he invited Maria to dinner and asked for her phone number. Maria gave
him her phone number, and had him call the number so she had his number.
He told her his name was Eduardo and that he was a member of the same
gym. They walked together to a more well-lit area, and she told him goodbye,
and he stopped following her. After she got home she received a text from
him.
Maria told her boyfriend about the incident, and he used the
phone number to confirm the man was actually a member at their gym.
Maria identified a photo on the gym’s computer as being the same person. A
few weeks later, Maria contacted the police after seeing a news story about
the incident in Irvine, and she recognized a photo of Gonzalez shown on the
news.

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In the second incident, Ms. Avalos testified that she was working
a graveyard shift at a Santa Ana medical clinic on February 5-6, 2019, the
night of the attempted rape of Doe. Early in the morning on the 6th (prior to
the attempted rape of Doe), Avalos noticed someone walking around the
building and looking in the windows. She believed it was a male, and she saw
him walk around and look in several windows before approaching the front
door of the clinic. He pulled on the main door, but it was locked. He buzzed
the intercom and asked if he could come in and use the restroom. Avalos told
him over the intercom that the clinic was closed, and after pulling on the door
one more time, she saw the man walk away. Gonzalez admitted it was him at
the office building.
At trial, Gonzalez testified and admitted essentially everything
Doe had testified to. During closing argument, Gonzalez’s counsel made no
argument as to counts 2 through 5 and instead focused entirely on the
aggravated kidnapping charge (§ 209). His counsel argued that the
asportation element of that crime had not been proven.
The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. Gonzalez
waived his right to a jury on the aggravating factors, and in a bench trial on
March 24, 2023, the court found each of the allegations to be true. The court
then imposed a term of life with parole for count 1 and ordered the upper
terms for counts 2 through 4 imposed and stayed pursuant to section 654.
Sentence on count 5 was set at 30 days and deemed time served. Appellant’s
total term of imprisonment was life with the possibility of parole. Defendant
appealed.

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DISCUSSION
I.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE ASPORTATION FINDING
Gonzalez first contends there was insufficient evidence to support
the asportation element of the kidnapping charge. We review that contention
for substantial evidence. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 577.)
Section 209, subdivision (b)(1), punishes kidnapping to commit
robbery, rape, or other enumerated sex offenses. Subdivision (b)(2) provides:
“This subdivision shall only apply if the movement of the victim is beyond
that merely incidental to the commission of, and increases the risk of harm to
the victim over and above that necessarily present in, the intended
underlying offense.” “These two aspects are not mutually exclusive, but
interrelated.” (People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 12 (Rayford).)
The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 1203, which
required proof of: (1) intent to commit rape; (2) taking or detaining another
by force or fear; (3) moving the person a substantial distance by force or fear;
(4) movement beyond that merely incidental to rape; (5) intent to commit
rape prior to the movement; and (6) lack of consent. It defined “substantial
distance” as “more than a slight or trivial distance” that “must have
increased the risk of harm to the person beyond that necessarily present in
the rape,” and it directed the jury to consider “all the circumstances” in
deciding if the movement was substantial.
The California Supreme Court in Rayford explained that in
determining whether the movement is merely incidental to the commission of
the underlying crime, the jury considers the “ ‘scope and nature’ of the
movement,” as well as the “context of the environment in which the
movement occurred.” “This includes the actual distance a victim is moved.

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However, . . . there is no minimum number of feet a [victim] must [be]
move[d] in order to satisfy” the asportation requirement. (Rayford, supra, 9
Cal.4th at p. 12.)
On the increased risk of harm, People v. Dominguez (2006) 39
Cal.4th 1141, 1152, instructed: “The essence of aggravated kidnapping is the
increase in the risk of harm to the victim caused by the forced movement.
[Citation.] We have articulated various circumstances the jury should
consider, such as whether the movement decreases the likelihood of
detection, increases the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to
escape, or enhances the attacker’s opportunity to commit additional crimes.”
And importantly: “The fact that these dangers do not in fact materialize does
not, of course, mean that the risk of harm was not increased.” (Rayford,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 14.)
People v. Shadden (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 164 upheld the
asportation element of kidnapping to commit rape where a defendant moved
the victim only nine feet into a back room. The defendant argued the
movement was insubstantial. “But ‘a rape . . . does not necessarily require
movement to complete the crime.’ [Citation.] Where a defendant drags a
victim to another place, and then attempts a rape, the jury may reasonably
infer that the movement was neither part of nor necessary to the rape.” In
such cases, “[t]he critical factor” is whether the defendant “secluded or
confined the victim,” thereby “decreas[ing] the odds of detection.” (Id. at pp.
169-170.)
Gonzalez argues that: The distance was minimal; the movement
occurred during the sexual assault and was inseparable from it; and Doe was
never moved far enough from potential help to increase her risk. In arguing
these factors require reversal, Gonzalez draws heavily from cases involving

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robberies where movement of the victims within the confines of a building
was deemed incidental to the crime. (See People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d
1119 (movement within a residence); People v. Washington (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 290 (movement from a teller area to a bank vault); People v.
Hoard (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599 (movement from the front of a jewelry
store to the back office while the robbers ransacked the front)).
We disagree with Gonzalez and find the robbery cases
distinguishable. Unlike the robbery cases, where the movement within the
confines of a building was necessary to reach the property to be stolen and
did not significantly increase the risk of harm to the victims, it was not
necessary to move Doe in order to commit rape. As the Shadden court noted,
rape is an assault on the person and thus no movement is necessary. As such,
it was not incidental to the crime to drag her into another room. Indeed,
Gonzalez testified that there were couches in the room where he initially
confronted Doe and that he could have raped her there. Moreover, there was
substantial evidence that the room where Gonzalez dragged Doe was more
secluded in that it did not have a glass wall like the front entry where
Gonzalez first confronted Doe. It was also farther from Doe’s means of escape.
Because the movement reduced the likelihood of detection, made escape more
difficult, and thereby increased the opportunity for further assault, the
movement was substantial.
II.
SECTION 209 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
Next, Gonzalez contends section 209 is unconstitutionally vague.
His argument principally relies on linking the analysis under section 209
with the sort of analysis the United States Supreme Court found to be
unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States (2015) 576 U.S. 591

9
(Johnson). However, this exact argument was rejected in Ledesma, supra, 14
Cal.App.5th 830, which we find convincing. Below, we begin by explaining
the void-for-vagueness doctrine, then discuss Johnson, and conclude by
explaining why we find Ledesma persuasive.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is rooted in due process. It
requires penal statutes to give “ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it
punishes” and prohibits statutes that are “so standardless that it invites
arbitrary enforcement.” (Johnson, supra, 576 U.S. 591at p. 595) A statute is
not unconstitutionally vague simply because it requires interpretation;
“[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical
certainty from our language.” (Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S.
104, 110.) Rather, a statute fails for vagueness only if it is so indeterminate
that it both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement
by judges. (Johnson, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 595.)
Only a reasonable degree of certainty is required, and there is a
strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes. (Tobe v. City
of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1107.) “[L]egislative enactments ‘must be
upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably
appears.’” (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 143.)
In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court considered the
federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandated enhanced
sentences for offenders with three prior convictions for a “violent felony.” The
statute defined “violent felony” to include certain enumerated offenses or any
offense that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another.” (18 U.S.C. § 924, subd. (e)(2)(B)(ii).) That last
portion — the “residual clause” — was at issue. The residual clause required
courts to: (1) identify the abstract “ordinary case” of a crime, not the facts of

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the defendant’s actual offense; (2) then, assess whether that ordinary case
“abstraction presents a serious potential risk of physical injury” comparable
to the enumerated crimes (i.e. burglary, arson, extortion, or use of
explosives). (Johnson, supra, 576 U.S. at pp. 594, 596.)
The Court concluded this framework was impermissibly vague for
two independent reasons. (Johnson, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 597.) First, there
was no reliable way to choose between competing accounts of what the
ordinary case looks like in the abstract, making the inquiry inherently
speculative. (Ibid.) Second, the clause offered no yardstick for how much risk
qualified as “serious potential risk,” creating “uncertainty about how much
risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony . . . .” (Id. at p. 598.) The
combination of an abstract, hypothetical offense and an imprecise risk
standard rendered the residual clause too unpredictable and arbitrary to
satisfy due process. (Ibid.) Importantly, the problem in Johnson was not
simply that a court had to think hypothetically; it was that the hypothetical
was divorced from any real-world facts and thus left the analysis unmoored
from objective criteria. “As a general matter, we do not doubt the
constitutionality of laws that call for the application of a qualitative standard
such as ‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct . . . .” (Id. at pp. 603-604.)
In Ledesma, the Court of Appeal considered — and rejected —
the same void-for-vagueness challenge Gonzalez raises here. The defendant
argued that the asportation element in section 209, subdivision (b)(2), was
just as indeterminate as ACCA’s residual clause because it required the trier
of fact to decide whether the movement was “merely incidental” and whether
it “increased the risk of harm,” both of which he characterized as vague and
standardless. (Ledesma, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 835.)

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Ledesma disagreed, emphasizing that the asportation
requirement of section 209, subdivision (b)(2), does not require courts to
imagine an abstract ordinary case divorced from real-world facts. Rather, the
statute directs the trier of fact to assess actual conduct — the movement of
the actual victim in the actual case — and to determine whether that
movement went beyond what was necessary to commit the intended crime
and increased the risk of harm. (Id. at p. 839-840.) This “appl[ication] of a
legal standard to real-world facts,” the court concluded, is not constitutionally
problematic, and any variability in results simply reflects the statute’s fact-
specific application. (Id. at pp. 838-40.) As the Ledesma court astutely
observed, “In contrast [to the federal cases applying the ACCA], California
cases on the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping . . . show broad
agreement on both the nature of the inquiry required and the relevant factors
to evaluate when deciding whether the facts in a case are sufficient to satisfy
the asportation element of the aggravated kidnapping statute . . . .” (Id. at p.
839.)
We agree with Ledesma’s analysis. The analysis called for under
section 209 is clear on its face and does not suffer the flaws that the Supreme
Court condemned in Johnson. If there has been difficulty applying the
kidnapping statute over the years, it is not because the statute itself is vague,
but rather because Courts of Appeal routinely deal with edge cases that
require difficult judgment calls. That is the inevitable byproduct of any law
trying to capture the complexity of real life in a verbal formulation. That does
not, however, render the statute itself unconstitutionally vague.

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III.
ANY ERROR IN ADMITTING PRIOR-ACTS EVIDENCE WAS HARMLESS
Gonzalez contends the evidence of Gonzalez’s encounters with
two women prior to the attempted rape invited the jury to draw an
impermissible inference of criminal propensity in violation of Evidence Code
section 1101, subdivision (a), and that the limiting instruction was
insufficient to dispel this prejudice. He cites cases cautioning against the
“inflammatory” nature of sexual-misconduct evidence, particularly when the
prior conduct is similar to the charged offense.
Assuming, without deciding, that the court committed error in
admitting the evidence, we conclude the error was harmless. The principal
harm Evidence Code section 1101 seeks to prevent is an inference of guilt
based solely on a defendant’s character or disposition. Here, Gonzalez
admitted to nearly all of the conduct underlying the charged offenses, and the
defense’s case contested only whether the movement satisfied the asportation
element of aggravated kidnapping. The prior-acts evidence did not bear on
that discrete issue in a way that could have affected the verdict.
Moreover, the jury was instructed under CALCRIM No. 375 that
it could not consider the evidence for propensity, but only for the limited
purposes identified. We presume jurors follow such instructions. (People v.
Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 821.) Given Doe’s testimony, the
corroborating physical evidence, Gonzalez’s admissions, and the video
surveillance, there is no reasonable probability of a more favorable verdict
had the prior-acts evidence been excluded. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836.) Even under the more stringent Chapman standard urged by
Gonzalez, any assumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

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