CourtListener 10657450•Schmid v. ThompsonGas CA1/4
Testo completo
Filed 8/20/25 Schmid v. ThompsonGas CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
FREAR STEPHEN SCHMID et al., A170526
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. (Sonoma County
THOMPSONGAS, LLC. Super. Ct. No. SCV270322)
Defendant and Respondent.
Frear Stephen Schmid and Astrid Schmid (collectively the Schmids)
challenge the trial court’s entry of judgment in ThompsonGas, LLC’s
(ThompsonGas) favor after the court sustained a demurrer to two causes of
action in the Schmids’ second amended complaint (SAC) but overruled the
demurrer as to others. We dismiss the appeal on the basis it is taken from a
nonappealable order.
I. BACKGROUND
The Schmids, the owners of a 61-acre property located in Sonoma
County, sued ThompsonGas for installing and connecting a propane tank in
violation of a preliminary injunction order that had been issued in a separate
lawsuit between the Schmids and the Two Rock Volunteer Fire Department.1
1 In that lawsuit, Schmid v. Two Rock Volunteer Fire Department et al.
(Super. Ct. Sonoma County, 2020, No. SCV266225), the Schmids alleged the
1
The Schmids also sued the fire department, the fire department’s insurance
carrier, and the County of Sonoma (County) for purportedly breaching a
settlement agreement that had been reached in the other lawsuit.
As relevant here, the SAC claimed defendants violated local code
provisions, breached a contract, and engaged in public and private nuisance,
among others. ThompsonGas demurred to each of the causes of action
alleged against it. The trial court overruled ThompsonGas’ demurrer as to
five claims and sustained with leave to amend the demurrer to the
seventeenth and eighteenth causes of action for public and private nuisance.
The Schmids did not amend their two nuisance claims. ThompsonGas
subsequently filed an answer to the surviving causes of action.
ThompsonGas also submitted a proposed “Dismissal and Judgment in Favor
of Defendants as to Causes of Action 17 and 18” (Dismissal Judgment), which
the trial court signed and filed three days after ThompsonGas filed its answer
to the remaining claims. ThompsonGas filed a notice of entry of judgment or
order relative to the Dismissal Judgment, and then proceeded to file a
memorandum of costs.
This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
The Schmids argue on appeal that the Dismissal Judgment is not a
final judgment or an appealable order, “th[eir] appeal requires dismissal,”
and they should be awarded costs on appeal because “the activities of
Thompson[Gas] forced [them] to pursue the appeal to establish the judgment
is not an appealable judgment.” Alternatively, the Schmids contend that if
the Dismissal Judgment is an appealable order, the trial court erred in
fire department’s newly constructed storage garage, which abutted the
Schmids’ property, violated local code provisions, zoning ordinances and the
use permit for that facility.
2
sustaining ThompsonGas’ demurrers to the seventeenth and eighteenth
causes of action for public and private nuisance. In response, ThompsonGas
contends the Dismissal Judgment should be affirmed. We need not reach the
substance of the Dismissal Judgment because the judgment is not an
appealable order.2
Under the “one final judgment rule,” an appeal may only be taken from
the final judgment in an entire action. (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51
Cal.4th 751, 756.) “A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the
parties in an action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 577.) Thus, when a
judgment “fails to complete the disposition of all the causes of action between
the parties,” an appeal cannot be taken. (Morehart v. County of Santa
Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 743 (Morehart).) The purpose of this rule is to
2 We also deny ThompsonGas’ “Application to Attach Additional Pages
of Attachments to Respondent’s Brief.” This application was brought
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(d), which allows a party to
seek authorization when it wishes to attach more than 10 pages of exhibits,
materials in the appellate record, or copies of citable but not readily
accessible materials to its brief. ThompsonGas seeks to attach 17 pages of
exhibits to its brief, which consist of: (1) the Schmids’ notice of appeal from
the December 16, 2024, judgment of dismissal the trial court entered in favor
of the County; and (2) a November 22, 2024, ruling in another Sonoma
County Superior Court matter wherein the trial court found Frear Stephen
Schmid to be a vexatious litigant.
It is unnecessary to consider the aforementioned exhibits because we do
not reach the merits of ThompsonGas’ arguments. Additionally,
ThompsonGas’ application appears to be an improper attempt to augment the
record. Though styled as an application to attach additional pages of exhibits
to its brief, ThompsonGas’ request actually seeks to supplement the record
with matters that occurred after this appeal was filed on May 16, 2024. This
is impermissible. (See In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450, 455–456
[appellate court will normally only consider matters that were part of the
record at the time judgment was entered and not matters occurring during
the pendency of the appeal].)
3
prevent “piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action” which
can be “oppressive and costly.” (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 688, 697.)
Here, despite being labeled a “Dismissal and Judgment,” the Dismissal
Judgment was not, in fact, a final judgment in favor of ThompsonGas because
it did not dispose of all claims between the Schmids and ThompsonGas.3
Rather, after the trial court ruled on the pleading challenges, five claims
remained against ThompsonGas and ThompsonGas had filed an answer
relative to these claims. As such, the Dismissal Judgment did not constitute
an appealable final determination of rights between the Schmids and
ThompsonGas. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 577; Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th at
p. 743.)
The Schmids acknowledge this fact and apparently seek to use this
appeal as a vehicle to “establish” the nonappealability of the Dismissal
Judgment. But they cite no authority for the proposition that an appeal may
be employed for this purpose. (See Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v.
Casasola (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 189, 212 [treating as forfeited arguments
that are not supported by legal authority].) Further, to the extent the
Schmids are seeking some type of affirmative relief, we are unable to provide
any because, in the absence of an appealable judgment, we lack jurisdiction
over this appeal. (See Brown v. Upside Gading, LP (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
3 In this regard, we note it was improvident for the trial court to enter
the Dismissal Judgment as it constituted a judgment as to only a subset of
the Schmids’ causes of action against ThompsonGas. (See Contreras-
Velazquez v. Family Health Centers of San Diego, Inc. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
88, 102 [entering one judgment as to subset of plaintiff’s causes of action and
a later second judgment as to the remaining claims would violate the one
final judgment rule].)
4
140, 144 [existence of appealable judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
an appeal].)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. We express no opinion on the merits of the trial
court’s order sustaining the demurrer to the nuisance claims. In the interests of
justice, no costs are awarded.4 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
_________________________
Clay, J.*
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Brown, P. J.
_________________________
Goldman, J.
Schmid v. ThompsonGas/A170526
4 The Schmids request that they be awarded costs on appeal because
ThompsonGas’ pursuit of costs based on the Dismissal Judgment “forced”
them to file the present appeal to establish the Dismissal Judgment was not
appealable. We deny this request. We see no need for the Schmids to have
pursued an appeal at this juncture. If the trial court awarded ThompsonGas
costs based on the Dismissal Judgment, the Schmids could have appealed
that order and raised their challenges to the Dismissal Judgment at that
time. (See Gassner v. Stasa (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 346, 354 [costs order is an
appealable judgment as it is a final determination of the parties’ rights].)
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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