CourtListener 10656866•Techna Land Co. v. 2733 SFLA CA2/4
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Filed 8/19/25 Techna Land Co. v. 2733 SFLA CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
TECHNA LAND CO., INC. et al., B343099
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCP01370)
v.
2733 SFLA, LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christopher K. Lui, Judge. Affirmed.
Shapero & Shapero and Steven J. Shapero, for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
Stoner Carlson and Richard A. McDonald, for Defendant
and Respondent.
Appellants Techna Land Co., Inc. and Hayk Martirosian
(collectively, Techna) appeal from the denial of their request for
attorney fees and costs incurred in arbitration, which Techna
made in connection with a petition to confirm an arbitration
award. The trial court determined it did not have authority to
award Techna the fees and costs it failed to request during the
arbitration proceedings. We agree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2020, respondent 2733 SFLA, LLC (SFLA) retained
Techna to provide civil engineering services for residential real
property. The written agreement between the parties contained
an arbitration clause, which stated: “Any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this agreement, or any breach thereof,
shall be settled or resolved by arbitration administrated by the
American Arbitration Association. Such arbitration is to be
conducted under the rules of Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Any judgment
upon the award granted by the arbitrator may be entered in any
court having jurisdiction thereof.” Additionally, the agreement
contained a provision providing for Techna to recover its attorney
fees and costs in the event it was required to institute an action
under the contract.
In October 2022, SFLA filed a demand for arbitration with
the American Arbitration Association (AAA), alleging that
Techna breached the contract and committed professional
negligence. Techna filed its answering statement about two
weeks later. According to SFLA, the AAA form Techna used to
answer the demand for arbitration contained a box that was to be
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checked when a party seeks attorney fees, but Techna did not
check the box.
In April 2024, the arbitrator issued a final award, finding
in favor of Techna on all claims and ordering SFLA to pay Techna
$13,725.75. The award further stated: “[Techna is] the
Prevailing Part[y]. However, [Techna] make[s] no claim for
attorney fees in its/his Answering Statement, Answer, or Closing
Argument. As such, no attorney fees are awarded to [Techna].
The right of the prevailing part[y] to seek attorney fees and
expenses in this arbitration, according to the terms of the
agreement, shall not preclude the submission of an original or
subsequent application for attorney fees, if any, to any Court of
competent jurisdiction.” The award concluded: “This Award is in
full settlement of all claims submitted to this Arbitration. All
claims not expressly granted are hereby denied.”
Techna filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award
and requested an award of $65,868.20 for attorney fees and costs
incurred in the arbitration. Techna asserted it prevailed in the
arbitration, and the arbitrator determined it should apply to the
trial court for fees and costs. Techna argued the arbitrator “was
well within her authority to award to [Techna] the ability to
request attorneys fees, as prevailing party, from th[e] court.” In
opposition, SFLA argued, among other things, that the arbitrator
decided not to award Techna any attorney fees because it failed
to request them during arbitration. SFLA further asserted
Techna was precluded from seeking attorney fees from the trial
court because Techna agreed to arbitrate all claims and
controversies relating to the contract.
The trial court granted Techna’s petition “as to the [a]ward
of $13,725.75 only.” The court entered judgment on the award
3
and noted SFLA had fully satisfied the judgment. However, the
court denied the petition as to the request for attorney fees. It
found that Techna “waived the right to recover attorney’s fees
incurred in arbitration by failing to seek such attorney’s fees
before the arbitrator, and the arbitrator made a decision [on] the
merits that because [Techna] did not request such attorney’s fees,
they would not be awarded.” The court reasoned: “The fact that
the arbitrator indicated that [Techna] may seek attorney’s fees by
applying to the court is of no effect. The question of the
entitlement to and amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded in
arbitration was for the arbitrator, not this [c]ourt, to decide.”
Techna timely appealed.1
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“The California Arbitration Act (CAA; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1280 et seq.)[2] ‘represents a comprehensive statutory scheme
regulating private arbitration in this state.’” (Cooper v. Lavely &
Singer Professional Corp. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 (Cooper).)
“‘The statutes set forth procedures for the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate (. . . §§ 1281.2–1281.95), establish rules
for the conduct of arbitration proceedings except as the parties
otherwise agree (. . . §§ 1282–1284.2), describe the circumstances
in which arbitrators’ awards may be judicially vacated, corrected,
1 We grant Techna’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the
AAA construction industry arbitration rules in effect in May 2020
when the parties entered into their agreement. (Boghos v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London (2005) 36 Cal.4th 495, 505, fn. 6.)
2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
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confirmed, and enforced (. . . §§ 1285–1288.8), and specify where,
when, and how court proceedings relating to arbitration matters
shall occur (. . . §§ 1290–1294.2).’” (Cooper, at pp. 10–11.)
“[I]t is the general rule that parties to a private arbitration
impliedly agree that the arbitrator’s decision will be both binding
and final.” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9, fn.
omitted (Moncharsh).) To enforce arbitral finality, the CAA
minimizes judicial intervention. (Id. at pp. 10–11; Cooper, supra,
230 Cal.App.4th at p. 11.) “Once a petition to confirm an award
is filed, the superior court has only four courses of conduct: to
confirm the award, to correct and confirm it, to vacate it, or to
dismiss the petition.” (Cooper, at p. 11.) It may not otherwise
interfere with the award. (Ibid.)
“‘On appeal from an order confirming an arbitration award,
we review the trial court’s order (not the arbitration award)
under a de novo standard.’” (Toal v. Tardif (2009) 178
Cal.App.4th 1208, 1217; Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel
Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 376, fn. 9 [court of appeal reviews
award deferentially but reviews order confirming award de
novo].)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Have Authority to Award
Attorney Fees and Costs Incurred in Arbitration
Techna asserts that, although the arbitrator declined to
award it attorney fees and costs incurred in arbitration, the
arbitrator expressly granted Techna the ability to request such
from the trial court. Techna argues the court erred by not
enforcing the award in accordance with its terms. SFLA
contends the arbitrator had “exclusive jurisdiction” over the
question of whether either party was entitled to fees and costs,
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and the arbitrator decided not to award fees to Techna because it
failed to request them in arbitration. We conclude the court
correctly determined Techna was precluded from recovering fees
and costs incurred in arbitration from the court.
The parties agree that the arbitrator had jurisdiction over
the issue of entitlement to attorney fees and costs. Indeed, the
arbitration agreement broadly stated: “Any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this agreement, or any breach thereof,
shall be settled or resolved by arbitration administrated by
[AAA].” The agreement included a provision entitling Techna to
its attorney fees and costs in an action under the contract. Under
the agreed upon AAA rules of arbitration, the arbitrator was
empowered to include “an award of attorneys’ fees if all parties
have requested such an award or it is authorized by law or their
arbitration agreement.” (AAA, Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules (2015) rule R-48(d), p. 33.) Accordingly, the parties’
agreement placed the decision to award fees and costs solely
within the arbitrator’s authority. (DiMarco v. Chaney (1995) 31
Cal.App.4th 1809, 1816 (DiMarco) [“An award of attorney fees for
the arbitration itself is within the arbitrator’s purview”]; see
Maaso v. Signer (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 362, 377–378 (Maaso)
[plaintiff not entitled to award of costs from trial court because he
never requested such from arbitrators].)
When the parties agree that the arbitrator is to decide
whether to award attorney fees and costs, the parties must
request fees and costs from the arbitrator. (Corona v. Amherst
Partners (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 701, 706 (Corona).) In Corona,
the plaintiff prevailed in arbitration and sought attorney fees and
costs incurred both in arbitration and in court to confirm the
award. (Corona, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 704.) On appeal
6
from the trial court’s ruling denying the application for fees and
costs, the court concluded the plaintiff could not recover fees and
costs incurred in arbitration because he did not present the claim
to the arbitrator. (Id. at pp. 706–707.) The Corona court held:
“[W]here parties have agreed their dispute will be resolved by
binding arbitration, judicial intervention is limited to reviewing
the award to see if statutory grounds for vacating or correcting
the award exist. [Citations.] Under the statutory scheme, a
party’s failure to request the arbitrator to determine a particular
issue within the scope of the arbitration is not a basis for
vacating or correcting an award.” (Id. at p. 706.) “Such an
interpretation of the applicable statutes promotes the
Legislature’s determination that there is a ‘“strong public policy
in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive
means of dispute resolution.”’” (Ibid.)
Similarly, in Maaso, the plaintiff filed a petition to confirm
an arbitration award in his favor and also sought to recover costs
incurred in the arbitration under section 998 and prejudgment
interest under Civil Code section 3291.3 (Maaso, supra, 203
Cal.App.4th at p. 369.) The plaintiff “did not request that the
arbitrators rule on the issue of section 998 costs or seek to
present evidence on the issue” during the arbitration. (Ibid.) The
trial court granted the petition to confirm the arbitration award
but denied the plaintiff’s claim for costs and prejudgment
interest. (Ibid.) The Maaso court affirmed, concluding “that [the
plaintiff] was not entitled to these costs and interest because he
3 The Maaso court noted that “[a]lthough [the plaintiff] styled his
petition as one to ‘confirm’ the award, he essentially sought ‘correction’
of the award by asking the court to add costs and interest not awarded
by the [arbitrators].” (Maaso, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 378.)
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never requested these enhancements from the arbitrators.” (Id.
at p. 377.) Because the issues submitted to arbitration were not
limited, they “included the issue of costs and interest and, where
available, attorney fees.” (Ibid.) Thus, the plaintiff could not
recover such costs and interest on a petition to confirm the
arbitration award. (Ibid.)
Here, the arbitrator considered the issue of attorney fees
but decided not to award Techna any fees or costs because
Techna did not request them in arbitration. While the
arbitrator’s award also indicated that the prevailing parties could
submit “an original or subsequent application for attorney fees, if
any, to any Court of competent jurisdiction,” the trial court did
not have authority to award Techna fees and costs incurred solely
in the arbitration proceedings. (Corona, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th
at p. 706; Maaso, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 377; see
Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 31 [“[f]ailure to raise the claim
before the arbitrator . . . waives the claim for any future judicial
review”].) “‘[N]ot only is the determination as to the amount [of
attorney fees and costs] properly within the purview of the
arbitrator, but we observe it is the arbitrator, not the trial court,
which is best situated to determine the amount of reasonable
attorney fees and costs to be awarded for the conduct of the
arbitration proceeding.’” (Maaso, at p. 379.)
Techna’s reliance on Caro v. Smith (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th
725, in arguing the arbitrator could leave the amount of fees and
costs incurred in arbitration to be determined by the trial court is
misplaced. The costs at issue in Caro were statutory costs
related to the proceedings in the trial court. (Id. at p. 736.) “Caro
[did] not seek to recover costs she incurred in arbitration.” (Id. at
p. 738, fn. 7.) Caro therefore did not provide the trial court with
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“an independent basis for a cost award to a prevailing party
where those costs were not part of the arbitration award.”
(Maaso, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 380.) Techna does not
otherwise cite any authority permitting the court to award
attorney fees and costs incurred in arbitration where the issue
was within the scope of the arbitration and the arbitrator
declined to award such fees.
In the alternative, Techna argues the trial court should
have remanded the matter for the arbitrator to determine the
appropriate amount of attorney fees and costs, citing DiMarco,
supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 1809. In DiMarco, the defendant prevailed
against the plaintiffs in arbitration. Although the arbitration
agreement provided that the award of attorney fees and costs to
the prevailing party was mandatory, the arbitrator denied the
defendant’s request for them. (Id. at pp. 1811–1812 & fn. 1.) The
defendant filed a motion to correct the arbitration award to
reflect her entitlement to fees and costs, which the trial court
granted. (Id. at pp. 1812–1813.) On appeal, the DiMarco court
agreed the arbitrator exceeded his powers by not awarding
attorney fees as required by the subject agreement. (Id. at
p. 1815) However, it held the trial court erred by determining
the amount of attorney fees to be included in the corrected award.
(Id. at pp. 1816, 1818.) The trial court was directed to remand
the matter to the arbitrator for a determination of the
appropriate amount of fees to award, as the issue of attorney fees
for the arbitration proceeding was within the “arbitrator’s
purview.” (Ibid.)
As Techna acknowledges, cases have declined to follow
DiMarco’s holding that an arbitration award is subject to
correction where the award contradicts the parties’ agreement.
9
(See, e.g., Safari Associates v. Superior Court (2014) 231
Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412.) Nevertheless, its reasoning about the
award of fees being within the arbitrator’s purview is consistent
with our conclusion that it was not for the trial court to decide
the issue of entitlement to fees and costs in this case. Further,
the facts of DiMarco are distinguishable. Unlike Techna, the
defendant in DiMarco presented her claim for attorney fees and
costs to the arbitrator and showed the arbitrator lacked
discretion to deny such a request. (DiMarco, supra, 31
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1815–1817.) Techna does not demonstrate a
similar reason to remand this matter to the arbitrator.
In short, the parties agreed the issue of attorney fees and
costs incurred in arbitration was to be arbitrated. The court was
without authority to award Techna the requested fees and costs
in the post-arbitration judicial proceedings.4
4 Given our conclusion, we need not and do not reach the parties’
remaining contentions.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. SFLA is awarded costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
COLLINS, Acting P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
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