CourtListener 10655903•Heiser v. Pakula CA2/6
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Filed 8/18/25 Heiser v. Pakula CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
SHARON HEISER, 2d Crim. No.B341308
(Super. Ct. No. 56-2022-
Plaintiff and Appellant, 00564219-CU-PO-VTA)
(Ventura County)
v.
ANDREA PAKULA,
Defendant and Respondent.
Sharon Heiser appeals a judgment entered following
Andrea Pakula’s successful motion for summary judgment. We
conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment
regarding Heiser’s action for medical battery and affirm.
This appeal concerns Heiser’s complaint alleging that
Doctor Pakula committed medical battery by using Dermabond to
bandage Heiser’s surgical incisions without her express consent.
Heiser experienced pain and inflammation in the days following
surgery and returned to the hospital for treatment. She later
brought this lawsuit against Pakula. Heiser alleged a cause of
action sounding in battery, but not medical negligence or lack of
informed consent.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 6, 2022, Heiser brought this action arising from
complications she experienced following her surgery. Heiser
alleged that on July 2, 2021, Pakula applied Dermabond or
another adhesive to close Heiser’s surgical wounds without her
consent. As a result, Heiser suffered pain and inflammation at
the site of the incisions.
On June 6, 2024, Pakula filed a motion for summary
judgment. Pakula asserted that Heiser consented to the surgery
and did not report an allergy to Dermabond. In support of her
motion, Pakula included a separate statement of undisputed
material facts, evidentiary declarations, and deposition excerpts.
Heiser responded with a separate statement of undisputed
material facts and evidentiary objections. Heiser contended that
it was a battery to dress her incisions with Dermabond because it
is a type of adhesive and she has allergies to tape, latex, and
other adhesives. The undisputed material facts and evidence
established this:
On July 1, 2021, Heiser presented to the Adventist Health
Simi Valley Hospital emergency room with severe abdominal
pain that required urgent surgical intervention. Pakula was the
on-call surgeon who visited Heiser in the hospital. As part of her
admission to the hospital, Heiser reported allergies to multiple
antibiotics, medicines, foods, and materials, including latex and
clear/paper tapes and adhesives. These were noted on her
medical records. She did not report an allergy or a problem with
Dermabond.
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On July 2, 2021, Pakula performed a robotic-assisted
laparoscopic cholecystectomy on Heiser to treat a diagnosis of
gallstone pancreatitis. It is undisputed that Heiser consented to
the surgery and there was no discussion of Dermabond
beforehand. Pakula applied Dermabond instead of plastic or tape
to close Heiser’s incisions.
The surgery was successful and Heiser was discharged
from Adventist Health Simi Valley Hospital in stable condition.
Her incisions were clean and without evidence of rash, reaction,
or drainage. Twelve days later, Heiser returned to the
emergency room with complaints of significant pain and
inflammation surrounding the surgical incisions. Pakula then
removed residual Dermabond that covered the incisions and
treated the skin inflammation with topical steroid medication.
To support her motion, Pakula submitted the declaration of
James R. Macho, a board certified surgeon with additional
training in critical care medicine. Macho described Dermabond
as a liquid skin adhesive that is a standard for closing incisions.
Allergic reactions to Dermabond are relatively rare and in many
cases may be contact dermatitis rather than an allergic reaction.
He opined: “There is no correlation or cross-sensitivity between
the latex and tape allergies listed in Ms. Heiser’s hospital records
and the Dermabond. . . . [¶] . . . Dermabond was a safe choice
because its chemical makeup is not related to the traditional
adhesives used in medical applications.”
After hearing from the parties, the trial court granted
summary judgment, finding that Pakula did not commit battery
by application of Dermabond to close Heiser’s incisions. The
court concluded that Heiser did not expressly advise Pakula of an
allergy or reaction to Dermabond. The court also pointed out that
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Pakula’s expert declared that the chemical makeup of
Dermabond is not related to the traditional adhesives used in
medical applications. Moreover, Macho’s unchallenged opinion
was that Dermabond has a relatively low rate of allergic
reactivity.
Heiser appeals and contends that there are disputed
material facts regarding her cause of action for battery.
DISCUSSION
Heiser asserts that Pakula improperly applied Dermabond,
an adhesive, to her surgical incisions after she expressly warned
her that she was allergic to adhesives and asked Pakula not to
use them. Heiser points out that battery is “an offensive and
intentional touching without the victim’s consent.” (Kaplan v.
Mamelak (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.)
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence
shows that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A triable issue of material
fact exists if the evidence and inferences therefrom would allow a
reasonable juror to find the underlying fact in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, 856.)
A party moving for summary judgment must show “that
one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be
established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the
losing party, liberally construing his evidentiary submission
while strictly construing the defendant’s showing. (McCurry v.
Singh (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1170, 1175.) The court also
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resolves any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor.
(Ibid.)
We review a trial court’s order granting summary judgment
de novo. (Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16
Cal.5th 611, 620; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25
Cal.4th 826, 860.) We consider all the evidence set forth in the
moving and opposition papers except that to which objections
have been raised and sustained. (McCurry v. Singh, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th 1170, 1175.) Within this framework, we review the
court’s ruling concerning evidentiary objections for an abuse of
discretion. (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 830, 852.)
In medical malpractice actions, a physician’s alleged failure
to obtain a patient’s informed consent to treatment usually
sounds in negligence rather than battery. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972)
8 Cal.3d 229, 239-241; id. at p. 240 [“The battery theory should be
reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an
operation to which the patient has not consented”].) Issues
regarding disclosure and adequacy of consent to use medication
or particular treatment should be addressed in a negligence
action. (Daum v. SpineCare Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 52
Cal.App.4th 1285, 1313.) “[T]here is no physician’s duty to
discuss the relatively minor risks inherent in common
procedures, when it is common knowledge that such risks
inherent in the procedure are of very low incidence.” (Cobbs, at p.
244.)
Here Pakula’s expert witness opined that Dermabond has
no cross reactivity to clear or plastic tapes or adhesives and it is a
safe option to use in those patients with plastic tape and adhesive
allergies. Heiser did not refute this expert opinion and it is
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undisputed. A surgeon must close an incision in some manner.
(So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669 [“consent to surgery
necessarily encompasses consent to postoperative care”].) It is
also undisputed that Heiser did not advise Pakula of a possible
Dermabond allergy. There is no triable issue of fact requiring a
factfinder to resolve regarding Heiser’s consent.
Moreover, Heiser’s claim is a more appropriate one of
alleged medical negligence. A medical battery occurs where a
doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of
treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different
treatment for which consent was not obtained. (So v. Shin,
supra, 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669.) In contrast, when the patient
consents to certain treatment and the doctor performs that
treatment but an undisclosed inherent complication with a low
probability occurs, no intentional deviation from the consent
given appears. (Ibid.) Instead, the doctor in obtaining consent
may have failed to meet his duty of due care to disclose pertinent
information. (Ibid.) This claim should be pleaded in negligence
not battery. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Pakula shall recover costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J. CODY, J.
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Matthew P. Guasco, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Law Offices of Malcolm R. Tator and Malcom Tator for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hall Hieatt Connely & Bowen and Mark B. Connely for
Defendant and Respondent.
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