CourtListener 10655901•In re D.H. CA3
Testo completo
Filed 8/18/25 In re D.H. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered
published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----
In re D.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile C102928
Court Law.
SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY (Super. Ct. No. STK-JD-DP-
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, 2023-0000483)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
D.H. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appellants S.R. (mother) and D.H. III (father) (collectively, parents) appeal1 from
the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and freeing D.H. IV (minor) for
adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code,2 §§ 366.26, 395.) Parents contend: (1) the juvenile court
1 Parents filed separate notices of appeal and briefs but join in each other’s
arguments. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).) Further undesignated rule references
are to the California Rules of Court.
2 Further undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
1
erred in denying the petition of his paternal great-great-aunt, Betty C.,3 for placement
(§§ 361.3, 388); and (2) this court should conditionally reverse the orders for failure to
comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1902 et seq.).
We conclude that parents lack standing to appeal the juvenile court’s decision not
to place the minor with Betty C. We conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s
dispositional orders and finding that ICWA does not apply and will remand to the juvenile
court for the limited purpose of further compliance with the inquiry and notice
requirements of ICWA and related law.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 21, 2023, the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (the
Agency or Agency) filed a section 300 petition, alleging the minor, born in December
2023, came within section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The petition alleged mother had a
history of substance abuse and had tested positive for amphetamines at prenatal
appointments and reported using methamphetamine throughout her pregnancy. Mother
had seven prior cases involving four half-siblings of the minor in which she failed to
reunify, and parents had an open case in Nevada for minor’s sibling, Da. H., who was
placed with a paternal great-great-aunt in Nevada. Father also had a history of substance
abuse and had failed or refused to rehabilitate. Additionally, the parents lacked a safe,
stable residence.
As recounted in the petition, a social worker interviewed the minor’s parents in the
hospital. Mother reported no Native American ancestry, but father reported his
grandmother was a registered member of an unknown tribe in Oklahoma. Both mother
3 To protect their privacy, we refer to the witnesses by their first name and last
initial or initials. (Rule 8.90(b)(10) & (11).) Betty C., is referred to in the record
numerous times as father’s “great-aunt.” In her testimony at the child placement hearing
in November 2024, Betty C. clarified that she is father’s great-great-aunt. We will refer
to father’s relative as Betty C. or his great-great-aunt.
2
and father completed Parent Notification of Indian Status forms ICWA-020. Mother
checked a box disclaiming any Indian tribe connection, but father checked the box that
the minor is or may be a member of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized
Indian tribe. On the line for the name of the tribe, father wrote: “Unknown in Oklahoma
father’s grandmother.” The Agency concluded there was a claim of Native American
heritage, but not sufficient information for “ ‘reason to know’ ” the minor is ICWA
eligible. The Agency stated that notice would be provided to all federally recognized
Indian tribes and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).
In the interview, the parents stated that the minor’s sibling, Da. H., was two years
old as of December 21, 2023, and lived with a parental great-great-aunt in Las Vegas,
Nevada. Mother initially claimed she lived at a residence in Stockton but later admitted
she was homeless. Father denied he was homeless, but the social worker was unable to
verify father’s claim that he lived with his adult daughter, Tiffany L. The social worker
met with the minor’s assigned nurse at the hospital, who reported speaking by telephone
with Betty C. According to Betty C., the parents were homeless and lived in a tent along
the railroad tracks in Stockton. Parents asked for Tiffany L. to be assessed for emergency
relative placement, and, if the minor could not be placed with Tiffany L., they requested
an Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC) assessment for Betty C. in Las
Vegas, Nevada.4 An assessment of Tiffany L. determined that she had a disqualifying
criminal history.
4 The ICPC (Fam. Code, § 7900 et seq.) governs conditions for out-of-state
placement of dependent children. (In re Z.K. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 51, 66.) “Among
other things, the ICPC provides that a dependent child subject to the compact’s provisions
‘shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought into the receiving state until
the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in
writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the
interests of the child.’ (Fam. Code, § 7901, art. 3, subd. (d).)” (Id. at p. 58, fn. 4.)
3
The next day, the social worker spoke with Betty C. Betty C. reported she had
five other children in her home in addition to Da. H. She received support from her
husband, Ralph C., an attorney from Stockton, in caring for the minor children in her
home.
On December 29, 2023, Betty C. and Ralph C. requested placement of the minor
with them. They stated they had placement of the minor’s sibling, Da. H., and would like
to keep the children together.
On January 4, 2024, the juvenile court authorized the Agency to start the ICPC
process but stated that the minor should not yet be moved. At the hearing, the juvenile
court also questioned both mother and father regarding possible Native American
heritage. Mother stated she had no Native American heritage, and father said, “I don’t
know.”
On January 12, 2024, the Agency filed a jurisdictional and disposition report
recommending bypass of reunification services for mother and father under sections
361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (11), and (12). The report repeated father’s claim that his
grandmother was a registered member of an unknown tribe in Oklahoma. Father was
interviewed regarding his family background. He stated his father died 15 to 20 years
ago, and he had not talked to his mother in approximately nine years. Father had four
living siblings, twins S.H. and Sa. H. in Oakland, California, and M. H. and A. R. The
Agency sent placement letters to a number of mother’s potential family members, as well
as Sa. H., father’s half-sibling Dal. H., and father’s current wife V. H. The Agency noted
Betty C. and Ralph C.’s request for placement of the minor but observed that the minor’s
relationship with Da. H. was “nonexistent” as she was in foster care in another state and
had never met him. The Agency acknowledged it was appropriate to develop and
maintain the sibling relationship, but the ICPC process needed to be completed.
On January 30, 2024, the minor was made a dependent child of the juvenile court.
The court authorized the Agency to make an appropriate placement of the minor.
4
On February 1, 2024, the Agency served a Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for
Indian Child (ICWA-030) on the BIA. No tribe was specified. The notice provided the
names and location information for mother’s and father’s parents, grandparents, and
great-grandparents, including the current city of residence (Phoenix, Arizona) for father’s
living grandmother.
On March 12, 2024, a transmittal memo from the Agency ICPC to Nevada ICPC
noted that Betty C. and Ralph C. had changed their licensing foster agency to Apple
Grove Family Services in Las Vegas, Nevada, and were in the process of becoming
licensed. On March 20, 2024, Nevada ICPC provided the Agency ICPC with a
preliminary report stating that Betty C. and Ralph C.’s background checks were
incomplete, and licensing was pending with Apple Grove, estimating a completion time
of six to eight weeks for the ICPC process. Nevada ICPC stated: “This is NOT approval
to place.”
On March 26, 2024, the juvenile court found both father and mother bypassed for
reunification services, sustained the petition, made the minor a dependent of the juvenile
court, and awarded custody to the Agency for placement.
On April 2, 2024, the Agency filed a declaration regarding its efforts to identify
the minor’s Native American affiliation. The Agency stated that notices setting forth the
parents’ family information were sent to the BIA. The BIA responded that no tribe had
been identified, and insufficient information was provided to determine tribal affiliation.
The Agency stated that, based on this response, the BIA determined the minor was not an
Indian child under ICWA.
On June 24, 2024, Anne Z. filed a request to be appointed de facto parent of the
minor. Anne Z. stated that she had been responsible for the minor’s day-to-day care since
December 20, 2023.
On July 9, 2024, the Agency filed a status review report and case plan update
recommending that parental rights of mother and father be terminated and the minor
5
freed for adoption. The Agency noted father’s claim of Native American heritage but
concluded there was insufficient information to conclude there was “ ‘reason to know’ ”
the child was ICWA eligible. The Agency requested a finding that ICWA does not apply.
Regarding placement, the Agency reported Betty C. advised that she was working with
Apple Grove. Betty C. stated she has six beds and room for the minor and his sibling at
her home, as five foster youth were leaving to return to their parents in the next two
months.
On July 17, 2024, the Agency filed a section 366.26 report recommending a 90-
day continuance to evaluate placement of the minor with Betty C. and Ralph C. The
Agency noted the minor appeared to have adjusted well in the care of his current
caregiver. The minor was a happy and healthy six-month-old boy who was developing
age appropriately and thriving. The minor was placed in a stable and loving home and
appeared attached and bonded with his caregiver. The Agency nonetheless planned to
place the minor with Betty C. and Ralph C. in Las Vegas, Nevada, after the hearing and
requested the juvenile court to order placement with them. An Agency social worker
reported speaking to Betty C. and Ralph C. on July 15, 2024, regarding ICWA. Betty C.
stated that there were no family members who had ICWA heritage.
On August 15, 2024, a Nevada ICPC social services specialist reported that an
amendment was needed to the license of Betty C.’s home because there was currently
only one adult in the home with six children, and the minor would bring the total number
of children to seven placed in the home. Betty C. stated that the other children in her
home would be reunited with their parents at the end of August 2024. Betty C., however,
was not approved for placement of the minor over her capacity limit. Should she be
approved for placement, the Agency would also need to approve a placement contract.
On August 20, 2024, Nevada ICPC informed the Agency that the minor was
approved for placement with Betty C. and Ralph C. Nevada ICPC attached an amended
license for Betty C. to operate a specialized foster home with Apple Grove as the foster
6
agency. The amended license increased the number of beds allowed from six to seven,
the age preference from 2 to 14 years to 0 to 14 years, and licensed relative placements
for the minor, Da. H., and four half-siblings.
On the same day, the Agency filed an amended section 366.26 report changing its
placement recommendation to recommend that the minor be placed with his current
caregiver. On September 19, 2024, the Agency notified Betty C. that her home had been
assessed and approved as a potential placement for the minor, but after further assessment
of the home and the minor’s needs, he would not be placed in her home. The Agency
explained that the minor had been in the care of the current caregiver for eight months,
receiving stability, security, and safety for his well-being. The Agency concluded there
was no need to move the minor, as his needs were being met by the current caregiver.
On September 23, 2024, the juvenile court (1) granted the de facto parent request
and (2) found that the Agency made substantial and reasonable efforts to determine the
minor’s Native American affiliation and ICWA did not apply. At the request of counsel
for parents, the juvenile court set a hearing on placement for November 5, 2024.
On October 14, 2024, Betty C. filed a petition under section 388 to change the
juvenile court’s order placing the minor with his current caregiver and order placement in
Betty C.’s home.
On November 5, 2024, the juvenile court conducted a combined section 366.26
and placement hearing at which Betty C., Ralph C., and an Agency social worker,
Jennifer Cruz, testified.
Betty C. testified that, after mother called to tell her of the minor’s birth, Betty C.
spoke to a social worker at the hospital who asked if she was interested in taking the
minor, and she said, yes. When asked if she was able to care for the minor, Betty C. said
she had been caring for the minor’s sibling, Da. H., since she was a month old. Betty C.
was approved to have seven children in her home, and now only had Da. H. and a 15-
year-old grandson. Betty C. believed it was in the minor’s best interest to be placed with
7
her in Nevada because he is a blood relative and should be raised with his sister. Betty C.
testified that she was aware the minor has special needs, but all the children she cared for
had special needs.5
Ralph C. testified that he had one case set for trial in January in Stockton but
otherwise was retired. This case would require Ralph C. to come to Stockton for trial for
two or three days before returning to Las Vegas. Ralph C. believed it was vitally
important for a child’s well-being to be raised with his biological family and his sister.
Betty C. and Ralph C. had legal guardianship of the minor’s sister and intended to adopt
her and the minor.
Jennifer Cruz testified she was assigned to the case in April 2024. The previous
social worker explained that after the ICPC process had been started, Betty C. changed
from the county foster agency to Apple Grove, causing a delay. Cruz contacted Apple
Grove, which explained there was one space for the minor. Cruz was waiting on a home
study and to determine who was going to be the support for Betty C. Apple Grove sent
Cruz a December 2023 home study by a Nevada county foster agency describing the
home of Betty C. and Ralph C. in favorable terms, and listing the children residing in the
home, including Da. H. In July 2024, Cruz wrote a section 366.26 report recommending
placement with Betty C., stating that the Nevada county foster agency approved the
placement on December 28, 2023. Cruz sent the December 2023 home study to counsel
for the parties in July or August 2024 and relied on it in recommending in her July 2024
report that the minor be moved to Las Vegas.
In August 2024, a Nevada county foster agency sent an email stating there was no
room for another child, and Jennifer Cruz wrote a new report recommending that the
5 A sonogram in the hospital revealed the minor was missing one kidney and would
need to see a specialist. In her de facto parent motion, Anne Z. reported that the minor
has fluid around the brain, which required trips to the emergency room and follow-ups
with specialists.
8
minor remain with the current caregiver. Betty C. had seven children placed in her home,
three with special needs, though she was only approved for five children. Later in August
2024, the Agency was informed that the ICPC had been approved, and there was room at
Betty C.’s home for the minor.
Jennifer Cruz testified that the minor was placed with the current caregiver at birth
and had been with this caregiver ever since. The current caregiver met the minor’s needs
by taking him to all his medical appointments. The minor was thriving in her care and
bonded with her. The Agency had no concerns with the care the minor was receiving,
and there was no reason to change the placement. Betty C.’s contact with the minor over
his life span had been minimal, and she had no relationship with the minor.
On January 14, 2025, the juvenile court denied Betty C.’s request to change the
placement order, finding the proposed change did not promote the best interests of the
child. The court terminated the parental rights of mother and father and freed the minor
for adoption.
Mother and father filed separate appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
Relative Placement
Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it found that the
relative placement preference under section 361.3 did not apply and denied Betty C.’s
motion to change the placement order under section 388. Father joins in this contention.
The Agency argues parents lack standing to raise a section 361.3 claim on appeal. The
Agency alternatively argues that under sections 361.3 or 388, the juvenile court’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence. We agree that parents lack standing.
We begin with section 361.3. This statute “ ‘gives “preferential consideration” to
a relative’s request for placement, which means “that the relative seeking placement shall
be the first placement to be considered and investigated.” (§ 361.3 subd. (c)(1).)’
9
[Citation.] ‘When considering whether to place the child with a relative, the juvenile
court must apply the [section 361.3] placement factors, and any other relevant factors,
and exercise its independent judgment concerning the relative’s request for placement.’ ”
(In re A.K. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492, 498 (A.K.).)
“Whether a person has standing to raise a particular issue on appeal depends upon
whether the person’s rights were injuriously affected by the judgment or order appealed
from. [Citation.] A person does not have standing to urge errors on appeal that affect
only the interests of others. [Citation.] Accordingly, a parent is precluded from raising
issues on appeal which do not affect his or her own rights.” (A.K., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th
at p. 499.)
Section 361.3 “protects a relative’s ‘separate interest’ in a relationship with the
child. [Citation.] In contrast, a parent’s interest in a dependency proceeding is in
reunifying with the child.” (A.K., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 499.) Thus, “a parent does
not have standing to raise relative placement issues on appeal, where the parent’s
reunification services have been terminated. [Citation.] This is because decisions
concerning placement of the child do not affect the parent’s interest in reunification,
where the parent is no longer able to reunify with the child.” (Ibid.; In re Jayden (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1460 [“Once a parent’s reunification services have been
terminated, the parent has no standing to appeal relative placement preference issues”].)
Here, parents cannot establish that their rights and interests in reunification were
injuriously affected by failure to place the minor with Betty C. and Ralph C. (A.K.,
supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 499.) The juvenile court terminated the parents’ reunification
services months before it considered whether to grant Betty C.’s petition to change the
order placing the minor with his current caregiver, Anne Z. Accordingly, parents lack
standing to assert error under section 361.3.
Turning to section 388, in In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231 (K.C.), the California
Supreme Court held that a father lacks standing to appeal the juvenile court’s denial of
10
grandparents’ motion under section 388 to modify a minor’s existing placement by
placing them in their home. (K.C. at pp. 234-235.) The high court observed that,
although parents have an interest in their children’s companionship, care, custody, and
management, after reunification services are terminated or bypassed, the parent’s interest
in the care, custody and companionship of the child is no longer paramount and the focus
shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability. (Id. at p. 236.) For this
reason, “[a] parent’s appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights confers standing
to appeal an order concerning the dependent child’s placement only if the placement
order’s reversal advances the parent’s argument against terminating parental rights.” (Id.
at p. 238.)
Here, mother and father do not argue that reversing the juvenile court’s order will
bolster their case against the termination of their parental rights. They do not argue, for
example, that they would have retained their parental rights if the minor were placed with
relatives, notwithstanding the denial of reunification. (See K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at
pp. 236-237 [“the decision to terminate or bypass reunification services ordinarily
constitutes a sufficient basis for terminating parental rights”].) As in K.C., the only
persons with standing to appeal the juvenile court’s denial of the section 388 petition are
Betty C. and Ralph C., who have not filed an appeal. (K.C., at p. 239.)
In her reply brief, mother attempts to distinguish K.C. by arguing that in that case
the father did not contest termination of parental rights, thus relinquishing the interest in
the child that could render him aggrieved by the juvenile court’s declining to place the
child with the grandparents. (K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 238.) Here, mother did contest
termination. Mother points out that the court in K.C. stated the placement of a child with
relatives can, under certain circumstances, make the termination of parental rights
unnecessary. (Id. at p. 237; see also In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 10; In re
Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1053-1054.) However, in In re Isaiah
(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, the court found such circumstances did not exist where the
11
relatives were seeking to adopt the child. (Id.at p. 436.) In this instance, Betty C. stated
in the petition and Ralph C. testified at the hearing that the couple were seeking to adopt
the minor. Moreover, mother had already failed to reunify with four other half-siblings of
the minor, and Betty C. and Ralph C. had legal guardianship of Da. H., the minor’s sister,
whom they also intended to adopt. Thus, the record does not support any contention that
placement of the minor with Betty C. and Ralph C. would have made termination of
parental rights unnecessary. (Ibid.)
Even if the parents had standing, their contentions of trial court error fail. The
juvenile court conducted a full hearing on Betty C.’s petition in November 2024. At the
time of the hearing, the minor was almost 11 months old and had lived his entire life with
the caregiver, Anne Z. (In re Lauren R. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 841, 855 [“The passage
of time is a significant factor in a child’s life; the longer a successful placement
continues, the more important the child’s need for continuity and stability becomes in the
evaluation of her [or his] best interests”].) As social worker Jennifer Cruz testified, the
minor was bonded to the caregiver and was thriving in her care. Conversely, Betty C.’s
contact with the minor was minimal, and she had no relationship with him. Moving the
minor would have been disruptive and not in his best interest. There was no abuse of
discretion. (See Alicia B. v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th
856, 863 [we review a juvenile court’s custody placement order for abuse of discretion].)
II
ICWA Compliance
Father contends that a conditional reversal is required because the juvenile court’s
finding that ICWA did not apply was due to inadequate inquiries of the extended family
and the Oklahoma tribes, and is therefore not based on substantial evidence. Mother
joins in the father’s argument. (Rule 8.200(a)(5).) We agree that the Agency’s inquiry
was inadequate and conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s ICWA findings.
Congress enacted ICWA to protect Indian children and “to promote the stability
12
and security of Indian tribes and families” by formalizing federal policy and standards
regarding the removal and placement of Indian children outside the family home.
(25 U.S.C. § 1902; see In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1128-1129 (Dezi C.).) The
juvenile court and the social services agency have an affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire whether a child who is subject to the proceedings is, or may be, an Indian child.
(Rule 5.481(a); § 224.2, subd. (a).) “Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the
child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who
have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the
child is, or may be, an Indian child . . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) An “ ‘extended family
member’ ” includes “a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian
child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece
or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see § 224.1,
subd. (c) [adopting ICWA definition of “ ‘[e]xtended family member’ ”].)
“This ‘duty to inquire begins with the initial contact, including, but not limited to,
asking the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information
that the child may be an Indian child.’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132.) “When
the agency has ‘reason to believe’ that an Indian child is involved, further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child is required. (§ 224.2, subd. (e); see also
rule 5.481(a)(4).” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) “If the inquiry establishes a reason to know an
Indian child is involved, notice must be provided to the pertinent tribes. (§ 224.3, subds.
(a), (b); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).)” (Id. at p. 1133.)
“We review claims of inadequate inquiry into a child’s Native American ancestry
for substantial evidence.” (H.A. v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 956, 961.) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an
inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’
[citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
“ ‘On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion to determine
13
whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts
of the case. However, the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion
necessarily becomes.’ ” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101-1102.)
The Agency’s inquiry here was manifestly inadequate. After father stated his
grandmother was a registered member of an unidentified Oklahoma tribe, the Agency
essentially limited its inquiry to one-time conversations with father and Betty C. The
Agency sent placement letters to father’s sister Sa. H., wife V. H., and half-sibling Dal.
H., informing them of a relative in the foster care system, but the letters are not in the
record, and there is no indication that the Agency inquired about Native American
affiliation.6 The Agency’s conversation on July 15, 2024, in which Betty C. stated no
family member had Native American affiliation, appears to have been an afterthought. In
April 2024, the Agency filed a declaration that the BIA had indicated from the
information in the ICWA-030 notice that the minor was not an Indian child under ICWA.
In a report filed on July 9, 2024, the Agency requested that the juvenile court find, based
on the declaration, that ICWA did not apply. Thus, the Agency deemed its ICWA inquiry
adequate before speaking with Betty C.
The ICWA-030 notice the Agency served on the BIA included information that
6 The Agency sent similar letters to a number of mother’s relatives, which were
equally inadequate to satisfy its duty of inquiry under ICWA, notwithstanding mother’s
denial of Indian heritage. (H.A. v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at p. 960 [agreeing with petitioner’s contention that “although both parents
completed ICWA-020 forms denying knowledge of any Native American ancestry,
inquiry of relatives and family members about the minors’ potential Indian heritage is
necessary to meet the requirements of the ICWA”]; In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542,
556 [a parent “does not need to assert he or she has Indian ancestry to show a child
protective agency’s failure to make an appropriate inquiry under ICWA and related law is
prejudicial. . . . It is unreasonable to require a parent to make an affirmative
representation of Indian ancestry where the Department’s failure to conduct an adequate
inquiry deprived the parent of the very knowledge needed to make such a claim”]; In re
Rylei (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 309, 321-322.)
14
Phoenix, Arizona, was the city of residence for a possibly living paternal grandmother.
Yet the record does not indicate the Agency attempted to locate or interview her. (In re
Michael V. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 225, 235 [inadequate inquiry where “[t]he Department
made no effort to locate the children’s maternal grandmother to interview her even
though it was she who reportedly had the direct link to a tribe” and mother said
grandmother “might be living in San Diego, thus giving the Department at least a starting
place for its inquiry”]; see also In re M.E. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 73, 82.) Similarly,
father identified four siblings that the Agency also did not contact to inquire about Native
American affiliation. (In re Michael V., at p. 235 [inquiry also inadequate because the
county department failed to contact mother’s siblings].)
The Agency’s failure to inquire of father’s sister, A. R., about possible Indian
ancestry is inexplicable given the opportunities it had to do so. Betty C. stated in her
section 388 petition that A. R. accompanied her to court hearings in this case and visits
with the minor. A. R. was potentially an important source of information, since she
actually lived in Oklahoma, suggesting a family connection to the state and the Indian
tribes located there.
Father’s inability to identify a tribe did not relieve the Agency of its affirmative
obligation to attempt to contact and interview extended family members. (In re Elizabeth
M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 786 [“the use of a tribal name that does not correspond to
that of a federally recognized tribe—or saying ‘Indian’ but providing no tribal name at
all—does not, without more, relieve the child protective agency of its affirmative
obligation to interview family members”]; In re Michael V., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 235-236 [social worker’s reported statement that mother’s mother was a “full-blooded
Indian” required the department to contact relatives to inquire about possible Indian
ancestry].)
Section 224.2, subdivision (b), places the duty of inquiry, including that of
extended family members, on the Agency, but section 224.2, subdivision (a), of the
15
statute provides that both the Agency and the juvenile court have an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian child. The juvenile
court’s inquiry into the minor’s Native American affiliation in this instance consisted of a
single colloquy with mother and father where she said, “No,” and he responded, “I don’t
know” to the court’s question whether they had Native American heritage. The juvenile
court never asked the Agency what efforts it made to contact father’s extended family
members. The juvenile court should have ensured that the Agency had made an adequate
inquiry under ICWA and California law before finding that ICWA did not apply.
(§ 224.2, subd. (a); H.A. v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 965-966.)
16
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights are conditionally reversed, and the matter is
remanded for the limited purpose of complying with the inquiry and notice provisions of
ICWA, as well as the requirements of sections 224.2 and 224.3 and the documentation
provisions of rule 5.481(a)(5). If the juvenile court thereafter determines that a further
inquiry was proper and adequate, due diligence was conducted, and ICWA does not
apply, the orders shall be reinstated. However, if the juvenile court determines that ICWA
applies, the juvenile court is ordered to conduct a new section 366.26 hearing and
proceed in accordance with ICWA and the California implementing provisions.
\s\ ,
Krause, J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Hull, Acting P.J.
\s\ ,
Wiseman, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
17
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