CourtListener 10654820•Jones v. Brown CA1/1
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Filed 8/15/25 Jones v. Brown CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
LAVERNE NORMAN JONES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. A169426
GORDON D. BROWN,
(San Mateo County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Court No. 23-CIV-01355)
Plaintiff Laverne Norman Jones appeals from a judgment entered
against her due to her failure to file a timely amended complaint after the
trial court granted defendant Gordon Brown’s demurrer and gave Jones leave
to amend. Brown cross-appeals, contending the trial court should have
entered its judgment of dismissal with, instead of without, prejudice. We
affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the case against Brown, but we remand
for the court to enter the judgment with prejudice.
I.
BACKGROUND
Jones sued Brown and others for alleged wrongdoing in relation to a
trust and the disposition of a home, but the facts underlying the dispute are
immaterial to the issues in this appeal. Brown demurred to Jones’s
complaint, and in early September 2023 the trial court sustained the
demurrer on the basis of the statute of limitations. The court granted Jones
leave to file an amended complaint, giving her a deadline of September 20 by
which to do it. Jones did not file an amended complaint (although she claims
she emailed one to the court), and in early November the court issued an
order to show cause why her case against Brown should not be dismissed.
After holding a hearing, the court dismissed Jones’s claims against Brown,
and entered a judgment in his favor, but did so without prejudice.1
In its dismissal order, the trial court rejected Jones’s excuse that she
was unable to file the amended complaint before the deadline because she
was “bedridden” and “too sick to come to [the] Court to file her papers.” The
court found that the excuse fell flat because Jones reported she fell ill on
October 11, which was after the expiration of the court’s deadline. The court
also found that Jones “knows how to properly file documents” and that
Jones’s contentions were “belied by the fact[s] that [Jones] has successfully
electronically filed documents” and “attended a hearing in this action on
October 4, 2023.”
Jones filed a notice of appeal, purporting to appeal not only from the
judgment of dismissal but also from an order granting attorney fees. Brown,
however, was not awarded attorney fees in connection with the dismissal.2
1 “ ‘A dismissal “without prejudice” necessarily means without prejudice
to the filing of a new action on the same allegations, so long as it is done
within the period of the appropriate statute of limitations.’ ” (Cardiff
Equities, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1550.)
2 On appeal, Jones presents no arguments regarding attorney fees in
relation to the dismissal of her case against Brown. In her respondent’s brief
on the cross-appeal, she states the “orders granting attorney fees and other
fees should be set aside as soon as possible” (capitalization omitted), but she
appears to be complaining about fees that were awarded to Brown’s co-
defendants in connection with an anti-SLAPP proceeding. We deem any
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II.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Dismissing
Jones’s Claims Against Brown.
Under Code of Civil Procedure, section 581, subdivision (f)(2)
(section 581(f)(2)), a trial court may dismiss a complaint as to a defendant
when “after a demurrer to the complaint is sustained with leave to amend,
the plaintiff fails to amend it within the time allowed by the court and either
party moves for dismissal.” We review a trial court’s dismissal under this
rule for an abuse of discretion. (Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc.
(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 612.) The burden is on the plaintiff to establish
such an abuse. (Ibid.)
We begin by addressing the state of Jones’s appellate briefing. Jones’s
briefing is extensive, but it mainly advances arguments that do not pertain to
the validity of the trial court’s order dismissing her case against Brown. In
her 103-page opening brief, Jones complains about myriad perceived wrongs,
mostly in an unfocused and near-incomprehensible manner. She raises
issues about defendants who are not parties to this appeal, objects to orders
and proceedings unrelated to the dismissal order at issue,3 alleges
wrongdoing and bias on the part of the trial court, and belabors the
wrongdoing she claims defendants perpetrated on her. But she barely
discusses the actual issue in this appeal, which is the validity of the trial
arguments regarding attorney fees related to Brown’s dismissal to be
forfeited.
3 Many of her arguments appear to pertain to an anti-SLAPP order
entered in favor of Brown’s co-defendants. We previously dismissed a
separate appeal by Jones from that order. (Jones v. Norman (Apr. 15, 2025,
A168857) [nonpub. opn.].)
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court’s ruling dismissing her case on the basis that she failed to timely file an
amended complaint.
In her opening brief, she states in passing that she “e-filed her
amended complaint by the deadline BUT was unaware that it did not go
through” and did not know that emailing it to the trial court “was not
allowed.” She later repeats that she “served and filed her amended complaint
electronically BUT did not realize that her complaint did not go through.
Plus, she incorrectly filed her complaint electronically with the Court which
is not allowed.” Jones’s opening brief is also filled with general assertions—
such as the trial judge was biased or defendants’ “fraud on the court vitiates
all orders”—but they are conclusory and lack coherent analysis or
explanation as to how they relate to the validity of Brown’s dismissal order.
In her 38-page reply brief, she continues her protests but still fails to address
the dismissal order with any specificity, analysis, or legal citations. Finally,
in her 39-page respondent’s brief filed in connection with Brown’s cross-
appeal, Jones includes a heading stating the “dismissal with prejudice order
is not supported by the facts or evidence in this matter.” (Capitalization
omitted.) But no argument follows, and the issue is left completely
undeveloped.
In light of this briefing, we must conclude that Jones has forfeited her
challenge to the dismissal order and resulting judgment. The “cardinal rule
of appellate review” is that “a judgment or order of the trial court is
presumed correct and prejudicial error must be affirmatively shown.”
(Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.)
Jones’s arguments wholly fail to demonstrate any such error. (See
Fernandes v. Singh (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 932, 942–943 [“a brief must
contain ‘ “meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and
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citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error” ’ . . . or else we
will deem all points ‘to be forfeited as unsupported by “adequate factual or
legal analysis” ’ ”].)
Jones’s unrepresented status may explain the shortcomings of her
briefing, but it does not excuse them. (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267 [“ ‘ “the in propria persona litigant is held
to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney” ’ ”]; see Nwosu v.
Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.)
Even if we were to conclude that Jones preserved her challenge to the
dismissal order, we would reject it on its merits. A court’s discretion is
abused only when its ruling is “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of
Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.) Nothing in the record
suggests that the dismissal order comes even close to meeting this standard.
As we have said, section 581(f)(2) authorizes a court to dismiss a complaint
when “after a demurrer to the complaint is sustained with leave to amend,
the plaintiff fails to amend it within the time allowed by the court.” The trial
court here gave Jones until September 23 to file an amended complaint, but
she failed to file one. The court gave Jones the opportunity to show why her
case against Brown should not be dismissed, but it found Jones not credible
and found no compelling reason to excuse her from not complying with the
filing deadline. On the record before us, we perceive no abuse of discretion.
B. The Trial Court Should Have Dismissed the Action with
Prejudice.
Although the trial court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing
Jones’s case against Brown, it incorrectly entered the dismissal without
prejudice. California law is settled that when a plaintiff fails to timely file an
amended complaint after a demurrer is sustained with leave to amend, the
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defendant is entitled to a judgment of dismissal with prejudice. Thus, the
issue presented is a question of law, which we consider under a de novo
standard review, meaning we decide the legal issue without giving deference
to the trial court’s ruling. (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013)
55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191.)
The applicable rule was discussed in Cano v. Glover (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 326. Cano reiterated that “[s]ection 581[(f)(2)] ‘ . . . gives the
defendant the right to obtain a court order dismissing the action with
prejudice once the court sustains a demurrer with leave to amend and the
plaintiff has not amended within the time given.’ ” (Id. at p. 330.)
Dismissing a case without prejudice, when the defendant has the right to
have it dismissed with prejudice, leaves the defendant “in perpetual limbo”
and “the obvious consequence . . . would be to prolong, rather than to
terminate, litigation,” which would “not serve the orderly and timely
disposition of civil lawsuits.” (Ibid.) The rule was succinctly reiterated in
Haidet v. Del Mar Woods Homeowners Assn. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 530,
which stated that when a court exercises its discretion to dismiss a case for
failure to timely amend after a demurrer has been sustained, “it must do so
with prejudice.” (Id. at p. 536.) Jones presents no contrary authority. Brown
is entitled to have the dismissal against him entered with prejudice.
III.
DISPOSITION
The order dismissing Jones’s case against Brown is affirmed, but the
matter is remanded for the trial court to enter the judgment of dismissal with
prejudice. Brown is awarded his appellate costs.
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_________________________
Humes, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Banke, J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
Jones v. Brown A169426
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