CourtListener 10654039•People v. Apoyan CA2/8
Testo completo
Filed 8/14/25 P. v. Apoyan CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B339697
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA077165-01)
v.
ARMEN APOYAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph A. Brandolino, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Ashwini Mate, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo), we review an order denying Armen Apoyan’s motion
for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.1, subdivision
(a)(1). Because we find the order is not appealable, we dismiss
the appeal.
BACKGROUND
A jury convicted appellant Armen Apoyan of willful,
deliberate and premeditated murder in violation of section 187,
subdivision (a). The jury also found true several firearm
enhancements pursuant to subdivisions (b) through (d) of section
12022.53. On November 8, 2018, the trial court sentenced
Apoyan to 50 years to life in prison, consisting of 25 years to life
for the murder and a consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The trial
court declined to strike the firearm enhancement, finding it was
not in the interest of justice to do so. The remaining
enhancements were not imposed or were stricken.
On June 5, 2024, Apoyan filed a petition for recall and
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1). He
asked the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike the 25-
year-to-life firearm enhancement pursuant to Senate Bill
No. 620. On June 21, 2024, the trial court found that because
Apoyan’s sentencing took place after the effective date of Senate
Bill No. 620, there was no change in the law warranting recall
and resentencing under section 1172.1. The court denied
Apoyan’s request for resentencing. The trial court’s order stated:
“The Court has received and reviewed defendant Armen Apoyan’s
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Petition for Resentencing filed June 5, 2024. Defendant seeks
resentencing pursuant to SB 620, effective January 1, 2018.
Defendant’s sentencing occurred subsequent to the effective date
of SB 620. The Court exercised its discretion and imposed the
firearm enhancement at the time of his sentencing. The
imposition of that enhancement was upheld on appeal in 2020,
when Defendant’s case became final. For these reasons,
Defendant is not eligible for relief and the Petition for
Resentencing is denied.” Apoyan timely appealed.
We appointed counsel to represent Apoyan on appeal. On
July 7, 2025, counsel filed a no issue brief pursuant to People v.
Delgadillo. Counsel advised us they told Apoyan he could file his
own supplemental brief within 30 days and sent him transcripts
of the record on appeal as well as a copy of the brief.
On July 7, 2025, this court sent Apoyan notice that a brief
raising no issues had been filed on his behalf. We advised him he
had 30 days within which to submit a supplemental brief or letter
stating any issues he believes we should consider. We also
advised him that if he did not file a supplemental brief, the
appeal may be dismissed as abandoned.
On July 17, 2025, Apoyan filed a supplemental brief. He
contends: 1) circumstances have changed since he was convicted
because the only witness for the prosecution has now sworn in an
affidavit that she lied at trial for promised amenities like free
housing and money; 2) he never would have been convicted
without the perjured testimony of this witness; 3) the trial court
abused its discretion in denying him an opportunity to present
information about the perjured witness testimony; 4) the
courtroom was “corrupt” because it lost the archived transcripts
of the original court reporter who is no longer employed with the
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court; 5) the loss of his court transcripts is a violation of due
process; 6) the court of appeal should review the facts of the trial,
particularly the perjured witness testimony, to carry out the
purpose of section 1385 which is to fight corruption and promote
due process; 7) no firearm was recovered to validate the firearm
enhancement, which confirms the corruption of court processes.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.1, the Recall and Resentencing Statute
Section 1172.1 endows a trial court with authority to recall
the sentences of incarcerated defendants and resentence them
under certain circumstances. Like its predecessor provisions,
section 1172.1 is a statutory exception to the general rule that
“ ‘once a judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has
begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or
modify the sentence.’ ” (People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629,
637–638.)
Under section 1172.1, a trial court may recall and
resentence “at any time” upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
the Board of Parole Hearings, the district attorney of the county
in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney General if
the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) Until recently, the statute also provided
that a trial court may recall and resentence “on its own motion”
within 120 days of the date of commitment. Effective January 1,
2024, the 120-day provision was expanded. Now a trial court
may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant on its own
motion “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time
of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
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authority or case law.” (Ibid.; Assem. Bill No. 600 (2023–2024
Reg. Sess.).) Once a trial court decides to recall and resentence, it
may either reduce the sentence by modification or vacate the
conviction and impose judgment on “any necessarily included
lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that
offense was charged in the original pleadings.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(3).)
Notably, section 1172.1, by its terms, denies a defendant
the right to petition the court for recall and resentencing.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (c) [“[a] defendant is not entitled to file a petition
seeking relief from the court under this section,” and “[i]f a
defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the
court is not required to respond.”].) As to a right to appeal, the
statute provides: “After ruling on a referral authorized by this
section, the court shall advise the defendant of their right to
appeal.” (Id., subd. (d).)
II. The Right to Appeal Generally
The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not
appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is
expressly made appealable by statute. (Teal v. Superior Court
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 598.) Criminal defendants are entitled to
appeal from “any order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.” (§ 1237, subd. (b).)
III. The Definition of “Substantial Rights”
Our Supreme Court has not provided “a comprehensive
interpretation of the term ‘substantial rights’ as used in section
1237, subdivision (b).” (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155,
1161, fn. 3 (Loper).) But Loper did discuss how to approach
formulating a definition. There, the court addressed the question
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whether a defendant has the right to appeal a trial court’s denial
of a request for compassionate release properly made by the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
under section 1170, former subdivision (e). That statute is
similar to section 1172.1 in that both statutes do not give
defendants the right to make a request for relief themselves. For
relief under section 1170, only the Secretary of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation or the Board of Parole Hearings
may make such a request. (§ 1170, former subd. (e).)
In deciding that the denial of a request for compassionate
release affects substantial rights, our Supreme Court in Loper
noted: “Although the defendant has no independent right to
initiate compassionate release proceedings in the trial court, the
Secretary [of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation]
evaluated defendant’s medical condition and made a
recommendation for compassionate release on his behalf. By
providing a mechanism for releasing eligible prisoners from
custody, section 1170[, former subdivision] (e) implicates a
prisoner’s substantial interest in personal liberty. Moreover,
although section 1170[, former subdivision] (e) authorizes the
trial court to exercise discretion whether to release a prisoner for
compassionate reasons, the statute also establishes clear
eligibility criteria (§ 1170[, former subd.] (e)(2)), suggesting that
discretion is not unfettered when evidence is presented satisfying
the statutory criteria. These factors lead us to conclude the trial
court’s ruling clearly affected defendant’s substantial rights for
purposes of section 1237, subdivision (b).” (Loper, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 1161, fn. 3.)
We glean from this footnote that the combination of three
factors dictates whether a defendant’s substantial rights in
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personal liberty are implicated: 1) the Legislature sets up a
mechanism for releasing eligible prisoners from custody; 2) that
mechanism is used to get the issue of release from custody before
the trial court; and 3) that mechanism includes a list of eligibility
statutory criteria that must then be followed by the trial court in
making its ruling, suggesting that the trial court’s discretion is
not unfettered. We also glean from the extended discussion in
Loper on standing that whether or not the defendant has the
express right to initiate the request for sentencing relief is
immaterial to determining whether substantial rights are
affected. (See Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 1161–1165
[defendant may appeal an adverse decision on a postjudgment
motion or petition if it affects substantial rights, even if someone
else brought the original motion].) Indeed, we find that it is use
of the mechanism set up by the Legislature, coupled with
legislatively mandated factors to consider, that are determinative
of whether substantial rights are affected by the statute.
Keeping these three factors in mind, we hold that section
1172.1 does not implicate a defendant’s substantial rights where,
as here, a defendant has personally filed a petition not authorized
by statute. It is true that the Legislature created a mechanism
for release, satisfying the first of the three criteria set out above.
However, that mechanism, authorized for use by only designated
entities or persons, was not followed in this case. Section 1172.1,
subdivision (c) expressly provides: “A defendant is not entitled to
file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If
a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section,
the court is not required to respond.” The statute also expressly
provides that where an authorized request for relief is denied, a
defendant must be advised of their appellate rights, inferring a
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right to appeal a properly authorized request. (§ 1172.1,
subd. (d).
Here, Apoyan filed an unauthorized request for relief to
which the trial court was not obligated to respond. Thus, the
second criterion—that the authorized mechanism be used to
obtain the requested relief – has not been satisfied. This
analysis, we emphasize, is apart from a standing analysis per se.
Neither has the third factor been met. We see nothing in
section 1172.1 which describes the factors a trial court must
consider in deciding whether to recall a sentence. The only
factors set out are those that will support extending the time
within which the trial court may recall and impose sentence. We
conclude that section 1172.1, as created by the Legislature, does
not implicate the substantial rights of defendants. Therefore,
orders denying requests for relief that do not properly invoke the
mechanisms set out by the statute are not appealable.
We also adopt the analysis of our colleagues in Division 2
who concluded that orders denying requests for relief from
defendants personally, as opposed to those from authorized third
parties, are not appealable. (People v. Hodge (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 985.) As Presiding Justice Lui wrote, “[T]he
second sentence of section 1172.1, subdivision (c) does undermine
any claim that defendants have a substantial right at stake when
they file an unauthorized request for resentencing. That
sentence excuses the trial court from any responsibility to rule on
such a request, or even to respond. It follows that a defendant
who chooses to file an unauthorized request for resentencing has
no right to a ruling. The defendant may have a liberty interest at
stake in any decision as to whether they should remain
incarcerated. But a defendant has no right to demand that the
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trial court actually make such a decision. If the defendant has no
right to a decision, the trial court’s choice not to make one does
not deprive the defendant any right, much less a substantial
one.” (Id. at p. 996.) Under Hodge, where a statute expressly
relieves the court of any obligation to adjudicate a request for
relief filed by defendants personally, it follows that defendants do
not have a substantial right in this particular pathway toward
resentencing. (Ibid; see also People v. Faustinos (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 687, 697 [order declining to act on defendant’s
unauthorized section 1172.1 petition not an appealable order];
People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1047 [same].)
We add that our analysis does not change where, as here,
the trial court issued an order explaining why it was declining to
act on the request (instead of ignoring the request, as it was
authorized to do). It is the Legislature’s mechanism and the use
of that mechanism that is paramount in deciding whether
substantial rights are affected, not the format of the trial court’s
order.
Because we find that the order declining to take any action
on the section 1172.1 petition is not an appealable order, we do
not address the merits of Apoyan’s petition.
We also decline Apoyan’s request that we conduct an
independent review of the record. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 232.)
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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