CourtListener 10653137•N.S. v. B.A. CA3
Testo completo
Filed 8/13/25 N.S. v. B.A. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Nevada)
----
N.S., C101604
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. FL0001696)
v.
B.A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
The family court issued a domestic violence restraining order against appellant
B.A. after two hearings on respondent N.S.’s request. B.A. appeals the restraining order,
contending the family court erred in: (1) allowing N.S. to testify at both hearings in
violation of B.A.’s statutory right to cross-examine; (2) refusing to review the transcript
of N.S.’s first testimony; (3) drawing an adverse inference from B.A.’s invocation of the
Fifth Amendment privilege by omitting evidence favorable to B.A. from its statement of
decision evidence.
1
We discern no violation of B.A.’s right to cross-examine and conclude any error in
the family court’s alleged refusal to review the transcript was harmless. We further find
B.A. forfeited his claims as to the deficiencies in the statement of decision. We affirm
the order.
Because N.S. did not file a respondent’s brief, we decide the appeal on the record,
the opening brief, and any oral argument by B.A. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
N.S. filed a verified request for domestic violence restraining order against B.A.
on December 7, 2023. The request was heard on December 27, 2023, with both parties
appearing in pro per (the first hearing). After N.S. testified, the family court asked B.A.
if he had any questions for N.S., and B.A. responded he had none. B.A. also claimed he
was unprepared for the hearing and requested a continuance. The family court continued
the hearing to January 10, 2024. After four more continuances, the request was heard on
May 8, 2024.
At the May 8, 2024 hearing (the second hearing), B.A. appeared with his counsel.
B.A.’s counsel informed the family court that N.S. had concluded her testimony at the
first hearing and offered a copy of the transcript. The family court allowed B.A.’s
counsel to use the transcript but stated it would ask N.S. to testify again because it had no
recollection of N.S.’s prior testimony. After N.S. finished her testimony, B.A.’s counsel
cross-examined N.S. When N.S. called B.A. as a witness, B.A. refused to testify,
invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The family court granted N.S.’s request and issued a one-year restraining order
against B.A. It also issued an oral statement of decision at the request of B.A.’s counsel,
explaining that it found B.A. committed an act of domestic violence against N.S. but
noted N.S. was not injured. B.A. made no objection to the statement of decision.
On May 24, 2024, B.A. filed a notice of intention to move for a new trial based
on: “1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the Court [citation]; 2. Irregularity in the
2
proceedings caused by defendant or defendant’s counsel [citation]; 3. Improper orders of
the Court [citation]; 4. Abuse of discretion by the Court [citation]; 5. Accident or
surprise, which ordinary prudence would not have guarded against [citation]; 6. The
judgment is contrary to law [citation]; 7. Error in law occurring at the trial and objected
to by the moving party [citation].” The memorandum of points and authorities and
declarations supporting the motion are not in the record. Before the family court set a
hearing date on the motion, B.A. filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Statutory Right to Cross-Examine
B.A. contends the delay between the two hearings was prejudicial because it
impaired the family court’s recollection of N.S.’s initial testimony. As a result, the
family court allowed N.S. to testify twice, violating B.A.’s right to cross-examine under
Evidence Code sections 773 and 776. We find no violation.
During the first hearing, the family court offered B.A. an opportunity to cross-
examine N.S., but B.A. elected not to exercise that right by stating he had no questions
for N.S. This was not a violation of B.A.’s right to cross-examine. (See San Diego
Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, 575.) At the second hearing, by
B.A.’s own account, his counsel “extensively examined [N.S.] as to her factual
contentions supporting her application for a [restraining order]” and “impeached [N.S.]
on a number of issues.” Because B.A. had an opportunity to cross-examine N.S. during
both hearings, we discern no violation of B.A.’s statutory right to cross-examine.
B. Family Court’s Alleged Refusal to Review the Transcript
B.A. contends the family court erred in refusing to review the transcript of N.S.’s
first testimony. According to B.A., without the transcript, the family court could not
evaluate whether N.S.’s second testimony was consistent with her first. We note the
record does not show the family court declined to review the transcript. But even
assuming it did decline to review it, any error was harmless.
3
“California Constitution, article VI, section 13, prohibits a reviewing court from
setting aside a judgment due to trial court error unless it finds the error prejudicial.”
(People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201; see Nevarez v. Tonna (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 774, 785 [applying the harmless error analysis in a domestic violence
restraining order review].) People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 and Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman) articulate two different tests for assessing
prejudice in a trial court’s error. We need not decide which standard applies here because
the family court’s alleged error was harmless even under the stricter standard in
Chapman.
Pursuant to Chapman, reversal is required unless we can conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the trial court’s error would not have affected the outcome.
(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 23-24.) Here, B.A.’s counsel had the transcript of
N.S.’s first testimony and the family court allowed him to use the transcript during the
second hearing. Thus, counsel could have pointed out any inconsistencies between the
testimonies to the family court. Indeed, B.A.’s opening brief states that his counsel “was
then given the first opportunity to cross-examine [N.S.] on May 8, 2024. Her testimony
varied significantly from the testimony she gave on December 27, 2023. She was
impeached[] and could not explain the variances in her testimony.” (Artal v. Allen (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [a reviewing court may treat statements of fact in a
party’s brief as admissions against that party].) We conclude any alleged error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. Statement of Decision
B.A. challenges the family court’s statement of decision in two ways. First, he
contends the statement of decision was deficient because it omitted evidence discrediting
N.S. and showing B.A. acted in self-defense. Second, he argues the omission was the
result of the family court improperly drawing an adverse inference from his invocation of
the Fifth Amendment privilege. He has forfeited both claims.
4
When a party fails to inform the trial court of omissions or ambiguities in the
statement of decision, he forfeits his right to claim on appeal that the statement was
deficient. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133-1134, citing Evid.
Code, § 634.) Here, B.A. made no objection after the family court announced its
statement of decision, forfeiting any claim as to the deficiencies therein. We reject
B.A.’s contention that his motion for a new trial preserved the claims. His notice of
intention to move for a new trial contained conclusory allegations of the family court’s
mistakes with no mention of the omission or adverse inference he now challenges on
appeal. And the declarations and memorandum of points and authorities supporting his
motion are not in the record.1 Thus, nothing in the record demonstrates B.A. raised
specific objections to the statement of decision below. He has forfeited his claims. (See
In re Marriage of Fossum (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 336, 346 [appellant forfeited his claim
that the statement of decision was deficient when he failed to raise specific objections
below].)
1 Counsel for B.A. claimed at oral argument that his declaration supporting the motion
for a new trial pointed out the specific evidence omitted by the family court. But for
purpose of appellate review, “if it is not in the record, it did not happen.” (Protect Our
Water v. County of Merced (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 362, 364.)
5
DISPOSITION
The restraining order is affirmed. Because N.S. did not appeal and nothing in the
record shows she has incurred any costs on appeal, no cost is awarded.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
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