In re Dylan N. CA2/7

CourtListener 10652417Calctapp12 ago 2025

Testo completo

Filed 8/12/25 In re Dylan N. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re Dylan N., a Person Coming B340324, B344831
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County Super.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Ct. No. 20CCJP01036B)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Natalie Nardecchia, Judge. Affirmed.
Donna B. Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the County Counsel, Dawyn Harrison, County
Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid
Nakhjavani Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent, Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services.
___________________
In the first of her two appeals (B340324) involving her son
Dylan N. (born 2014), Amber H. (Mother) challenges the juvenile
court’s visitation order, arguing it gave Dylan improper veto
power over visits with her. She also contends the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) failed to comply with the inquiry and notice
requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq., and related state law. We affirm the visitation
order but agree there was ICWA error.
In her second appeal (B337307) Mother challenges the
summary denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code1 section
388 petition to reinstate reunification services. She also argues
the court erred in terminating her parental rights, contending the
beneficial parental relationship exception applies. The court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petition and
concluding termination of parental rights was appropriate
because no exception to adoption applies. However, we
conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights for
the juvenile court to conduct a proper ICWA inquiry.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Child Welfare History, the Referral, the Petition, and the
Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
In 2017, 2018, and 2019 the Department received referrals
concerning ongoing domestic violence between Mother and
Dylan’s father, Stephen N. (Father). In 2020 the juvenile court
sustained a petition alleging both parents had a history of

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise indicated.

2
substance abuse and domestic violence, and that Mother also
struggled with mental and emotional health issues. The court
removed Dylan from Mother’s custody, ordered family
reunification services including a full drug and alcohol program
with drug testing and AA meetings, and returned Dylan to her
care in May 2021 before terminating jurisdiction. Father died in
November 2020.
In February 2023 the Department filed a new petition
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), after Mother and then
eight-year-old Dylan were in a car accident. Dylan was in the
front seat without a seatbelt, and Mother had disabled the
passenger airbag. She rear-ended another car, and Dylan struck
his face on the dashboard, cutting his face and mouth and losing
several teeth. Dylan was hospitalized. At the time, Mother was
driving on a suspended license and, in violation of her probation
after being convicted of driving under the influence, without a
court-mandated ignition interlock device. The petition also
alleged ongoing substance abuse, including use of alcohol,
marijuana, methadone, Clonazepam, and Suboxone, which
rendered Mother unable to care for Dylan. Several days before
the crash, the Department had received another referral alleging
Mother was “under the influence of alcohol or an unknown
substance” while caring for Dylan. Mother had been renting a
room from a woman named Sandy Y. for about a year. Sandy
reported that Mother was not a good parent, Dylan appeared
malnourished, she had seen Mother smoke something out of foil,
and Mother told Sandy she was using fentanyl.
Two days after the accident, while Dylan was still
hospitalized, he had a virtual visit with Mother. During the call,
Dylan said to her, “Wake up, why are you falling asleep” and

3
asked her to stop being mean. When Mother brought up the
accident, Dylan began to cry and ended the call, saying he no
longer wanted to talk to her.
Dylan was detained from Mother and placed with a foster
family from his earlier case. His caregivers noted that
interactions with Mother appeared to “trigger” him. The
caregivers attempted to facilitate a visitation schedule with
Mother, but Dylan refused phone and in-person contact. In
March 2023, the Department arranged a visitation schedule, but
Mother said she preferred virtual visits because she was “getting
things settled” and moving because her roommate was a
“psychopath.” Dylan refused virtual visits scheduled for March 6,
7, 8, and 9.
At the April 2023 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the
court sustained the petition and removed Dylan from Mother’s
custody. The court ordered family reunification services for
Mother, including a full drug and alcohol program with testing, a
12-step program, parenting classes, conjoint counseling, and
individual therapy to address case issues. It ordered two-hour
monitored visits three times a week.

B. Six- and 12-Month Review Hearings
In April 2023 Dylan had a supervised virtual call with
Mother for his birthday, but he ended the call early after she
became emotional and repeatedly asked why he did not want to
see or talk to her. After that, Dylan refused further visits. Over
the next several months, the Department encouraged Dylan to
resume contact, offering short visits and video or phone calls, and
asking what Mother could do to see him again. Social workers
also forced Dylan to talk to Mother on the phone.

4
In June 2023 Dylan moved to the home of Bethany and
Robert A. after his previous caregivers had a family emergency.
That month, Dylan told his therapist he was afraid of Mother and
did not trust her, Mother had been mean to him, and he knew
when she was on drugs. In July, Bethany and Robert told the
Department they were trying to convince Dylan to visit Mother.
When the social worker advised Dylan’s therapist that Dylan was
refusing visits, the therapist responded that “bringing up
[M]other [during their sessions] at the moment was not
appropriate” because the therapist was trying to stabilize Dylan.
Dylan was having angry outbursts and saying he did not want to
live.
Dylan eventually agreed to an in-person visit in late July.
But as he got into the car, he began crying and shaking and
“screaming that he didn’t want to go, that he didn’t want to see
[M]other.” He eventually calmed down and had a positive visit
with Mother, but was ready to leave after one hour and afterward
told the social worker the visit took longer than he had wanted.
Over time, Dylan became more open to contact. Still, he
remained anxious during car rides and sometimes asked to turn
back. During visits Mother occasionally brought up
inappropriate topics, such as her boyfriend dying in a “tragic
accident” or Dylan’s aunt’s medical diagnosis. However, by
August, the Department reported visits were “very positive.”
Dylan and Mother played soccer, and Dylan appeared to enjoy
her attention, although he sometimes reacted negatively when
she raised sensitive topics. By October, Dylan said he wanted
more time with Mother, including unmonitored visits at her
home.

5
According to the October 2023 six-month review report,
Mother entered a detox program in May, then completed 90 days
in a residential treatment program. However, she had not yet
met the court-ordered minimum of six months in treatment.
Mother had unstable housing, frequently missed appointments,
and blamed the Department for Dylan’s removal. At the October
2023 review hearing, the court found Mother’s progress
unsubstantial and continued jurisdiction for six more months.
In December 2023, Mother tested positive for amphetamine
and methamphetamine. She denied drug use and claimed the
testing facility might have mixed up the samples. Between
September 2023 and March 2024, her tests were otherwise
negative, but she missed a test in January.
By April 2024, Mother and Dylan were having unmonitored
visits twice a week for four to five hours. The Department
reported that the visits were going well and recommended
further liberalization. Dylan expressed a desire to return to
Mother’s care. Mother had enrolled in psychiatric services and
was taking prescribed medication. She secured housing and
stable employment, completed an outpatient program in
February, reached the fourth step of her 12-step program, found
a sponsor, and continued individual therapy. She and Dylan
began conjoint counseling in January.
At the April 2024 12-month review hearing, the
Department recommended returning Dylan to Mother’s custody
with family maintenance services. Dylan’s counsel noted that
Dylan felt “a lot of nerves, excitement, [and] some mixed feelings”
about reunification—he was “50/50” on the recommendation.
After finding that Mother had made substantial progress, the
court returned Dylan to her custody.

6
C. Supplemental Petition and Removal
Mother tested positive for fentanyl the next month, and the
Department filed a section 387 petition. Mother denied using
fentanyl and told the Department she had taken a muscle relaxer
for a toothache that may have been laced with fentanyl, but her
roommate, Allison, had photographs of burned foil and reported
seeing Mother use fentanyl at least four times in recent weeks.
Allison stated she flushed the drugs down the toilet because
Mother left them on the counter where Dylan could have found
them. Allison also reported that Mother would stop using drugs
temporarily to pass a test, then start again.
Dylan was placed back with Bethany and Robert. On the
ride to their home, he cried and told the social worker, “I just
need time to process. I don’t understand. My mom lied to me.
She told me she was not using that stuff.” He briefly spoke to
Mother by phone, telling her, “You lied to me mom” and “This is
too much,” before hanging up. Dylan visited Mother at the end of
June but asked to end the visit shortly after it began. He then
refused to see Mother, despite the social worker trying to
convince Dylan otherwise.
At the June 2024 detention hearing, the court detained
Dylan and ordered monitored visits for Mother for three hours,
three times per week, despite the request of Dylan’s counsel that
visits be suspended.
In July Dylan’s therapist reported that Dylan felt deeply
hurt, was getting used to Mother’s behavior, “saw this coming,”
and no longer wanted to live with or visit Mother. The therapist
reported, “I’ve also spoken to my supervisor and the previous
therapist, and everyone agrees that conjoint therapy at this time

7
does not make sense. Dylan really does not want to have any
interaction with his mother and forcing the two of them into a
room together would be detrimental to his mental and emotional
well-being.” Dylan recalled seeing Mother put something in her
mouth and act suspicious in the past, saying there was a clear
difference between “when she’s normal and when she’s not.” He
also disclosed Mother hit him “[p]retty often actually,” including
on his head with a pan. Dylan said, “I don’t want to live with my
mom, and I don’t want to visit with her. I know that she’ll do
something like this again. I’ve given her three chances and she’s
lied to me. I’m kinda mad. I don’t want to interact with her. The
last time I saw her all she did was cry the whole time.” The
Department reported that all staff agreed it was inappropriate to
pressure Dylan to visit and that any recommendation for contact
should come from his therapist.
Mother tested positive for cocaine in July.
At the August 2024 hearing, the court sustained the section
387 petition and removed Dylan from Mother’s custody again,
with Dylan to remain placed with Bethany and Robert. The court
ordered Mother to complete a full drug and alcohol program with
testing, parenting classes, individual counseling, and conjoint
therapy if recommended by Dylan’s therapist. Dylan’s counsel
again requested removal and no visitation, citing the therapist’s
concerns. Over Dylan’s objection, the court ordered three-hour
monitored visits three times per week but stated, “Dylan can’t be
forced to go kicking and screaming to visits.” The court told
Mother, “I know you want to see him, but it sounds like he’s
really—his therapist submits that he’s not ready to do visits and
not do conjoint either.” It also stated, “I also don’t want to do
anything that would actually hurt your ability to repair with him

8
by forcing him to go. That is not, I think, best for him or your
relationship, so I’m going to keep the visits as in the case plan. I
am not going to make a detriment finding at this time, but I just
want it to be clear at this time that Dylan—his wishes really do
need to be taken into account, especially given the therapist’s
statements in the report.”
Mother timely appealed from the August 2024 jurisdiction
and disposition orders.

D. Eighteen-Month Review Hearing
As of the end of August 2024, Dylan had not visited Mother
in eight weeks, and his therapist was not recommending conjoint
therapy. Mother told the Department she planned to enter a
residential program. However, she refused to drug test when
asked, explaining she had taken Xanax over the weekend due to
nerves. She was “vague and dismissive” about the details.
In September Dylan told a social worker he did not want
any contact with Mother—not in person, by phone, or via
FaceTime—because he was upset with her and with being
removed again. He declined to read a letter Mother had written
him in July. When the social worker suggested Dylan meet with
Mother just to pick up a gift and a surprise, Dylan initially
agreed, but “after much thought, . . . said he believes the mother
is ‘bribing me to see her. She did this before. No, I don’t want to
see her. I don’t want the surprise or the gift. I don’t want to see
my mom.’ ” The social worker encouraged Dylan to reconsider
and let the social worker know if he changed his mind. Dylan
was happy in his placement with Bethany and Robert, who were
meeting his needs.

9
Later that month, approximately 44 days after the August
hearing on the section 387 petition, the court held an 18-month
review hearing under section 366.22. Mother’s counsel asked the
court to continue family reunification services. The Department
recommended the court terminate reunification services. Dylan’s
counsel agreed with the Department’s recommendation, noting
Dylan had lost trust in Mother, did not want to reunify, and was
“thriving” in his placement.
The court found further reunification efforts were not in
Dylan’s best interest, based on the therapist’s concerns, Dylan’s
own opposition to visitation and conjoint therapy, Mother’s
longstanding and unresolved substance abuse, and her lack of
substantial compliance with her case plan. The court noted “in
particular, the statements by the therapist and Dylan himself
regarding the harm and detriment to do conjoint, Dylan’s very
strong feelings of not visiting. And it’s not a veto by him, but it’s
just based on everything that’s happened, it’s subjected him to
emotional harm.” Accordingly, the court found a substantial risk
of detriment to Dylan if returned to Mother. The court
terminated reunification services and set a hearing under section
366.26.
In October 2024, Dylan told a social worker, “I want Robert
and Bethany to adopt me. I am happy here.” He did not want to
have any communication with Mother, stating, “ ‘please, I just
don’t want to. I gave my mom chances. I don’t want to do it
again.’ ” Bethany reported that Dylan had behavior problems at
school. Even so, Bethany and Robert remained committed to
adopting Dylan. Despite Dylan’s firm opposition to contact, the
social worker pledged to continue to ask Dylan about visitation

10
“as well as encourage [him] to communicate and visit with
[M]other.”
Dylan again refused contact with Mother in November,
December, and January. The social worker repeated that she
would continue encouraging Dylan to see Mother. By then,
Bethany and Robert reported that Dylan’s behaviors had
improved and he “want[ed] to do well.”

E. Mother’s Section 388 Petition, the Section 366.26 Hearing,
Termination of Jurisdiction, and the Final Visitation Order
In February 2025 Mother filed a section 388 petition
seeking custody or, alternatively, reinstatement of reunification
services with unmonitored and overnight visits. In her
supporting declaration, Mother described her changed
circumstances: she had attended AA meetings for over a year
and had a sponsor, completed a 60-day residential treatment
program in October 2024, and participated in outpatient
treatment with negative drug tests for six months. She also
attended weekly individual and group therapy, had taken
responsibility for her relapse, and completed her August 2024
case plan. Mother worked as a nanny and was studying to
become a drug counselor.
Mother argued that reunification was in Dylan’s best
interests because “Dylan and his mother are bonded, and he
knows his mother and for the majority of his life has been in his
mother’s custody. [Mother] can provide a[ ] safe and healthy
environment and she can support Dylan emotionally, medically.”
She also claimed reunification would allow Dylan to process their
relationship, which would be important for his long-term
emotional well-being. Her father submitted a declaration stating

11
he had previously doubted Mother’s sobriety but now believed she
was committed to recovery. Mother’s AA sponsor similarly
described Mother’s progress as “incredible” and her commitment
to sobriety as strong.
The court summarily denied the petition the same day,
finding Mother had not made a prima facie showing of changed
circumstances or that the proposed modification was in Dylan’s
best interest.
At the section 366.26 hearing the next day, the court
addressed Mother’s argument that it had improperly allowed
Dylan to veto visitation. Citing In re Julie M. (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 41 (Julie M.) and In re Brittany C. (2011)
191 Cal.App.4th 1343, the court explained it had “consistently
ordered” visitation, encouraged visitation during hearings, and
“asked that Dylan be encouraged” to attend, but also emphasized
“the court cannot, and social workers cannot, force children to go
kicking and screaming to visits.” The court referenced Dylan’s
therapist’s July 2024 report and found that the record contained
unrefuted evidence of detriment. It also noted that if Mother had
wanted different or more specific visitation orders, she had the
burden to request them.
Turning to the beneficial parental relationship exception to
adoption, the court concluded Mother had not shown Dylan would
suffer detriment by losing the parental relationship, observing
“[t]here must be some type of harm beyond the fact that visits
would cease” and there was no evidence that the reduced
visitation had negatively impacted Dylan. The court terminated
Mother’s parental rights and designated Bethany and Robert as
Dylan’s prospective adoptive parents.

12
Mother timely appealed both the summary denial of her
section 388 petition and the order terminating her parental
rights.

DISCUSSION

A. The Visitation Order Did Not Improperly Delegate Judicial
Authority
1. Applicable law and standard of review
Section 362.1, subdivision (a)(1)(A), provides: “In order to
maintain ties between the parent . . . and the child, and to
provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a
child to the custody of his or her parent . . . , any order placing a
child in foster care, and ordering reunification services, shall
provide . . . [¶] . . . for visitation between the parent or guardian
and the child. Visitation shall be as frequent as possible,
consistent with the well-being of the child.” (See In re Sofia M.
(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1044.) Section 362.1, subdivision
(a)(1)(B), states: “No visitation order shall jeopardize the safety
of the child.” A parent’s interest in visitation “cannot be
maintained at the expense of [a child’s] well-being,” and the court
must focus on the “ ‘possibility of adverse psychological
consequences of an unwanted visit between mother and child.’ ”
(Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 50; see In re Brittany C.,
supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357 [“a court has the power to
suspend visits when continuing them would be harmful to a
child’s emotional well-being”]; In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th
310, 317, fn. 9 (S.H.) [“The court may deny a parent visitation
only if visitation would be harmful to the child.”].)
“A juvenile dependency court has the power to issue ‘all
reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct,

13
maintenance, and support of [a dependent] child’ and to ‘direct
any reasonable orders to the parents or guardians of [that] child.’
[Citation.] ‘ “The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine
what would best serve and protect the child’s interests and to
fashion a dispositional order accordingly.” ’ ” (In re F.P. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 966, 975; see § 362, subds. (a), (d).) “The power to
regulate visits between dependent children and their parents
rests with the juvenile court and its visitation orders will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” (In re D.P.
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1070.)
2. The court’s order did not grant Dylan veto power over
visits
Mother contends that because the court stated “Dylan can’t
be forced to go kicking and screaming to visits” and “his wishes
really do need to be taken into account,” the court’s visitation
order improperly gave Dylan and his therapist “de facto veto
power” over his visitation with Mother. She relies on the well-
established principle that courts may not delegate absolute
discretion over visitation to children, or to their therapist or
social worker, because such delegations violate the separation of
powers doctrine. (See In re Korbin Z. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 511,
516 [“the juvenile court cannot delegate the decision whether
visitation will occur to any third party, including the child, the
social services agency, or the guardian”]; S.H., supra,
111 Cal.App.4th at p. 317 [“the power to decide whether any
visitation occurs belongs to the court alone”].)
However, a juvenile court may grant a social welfare
agency “limited discretion” to consider the children’s desires
regarding visits with a parent. (Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th
at p. 50.) “[A]lthough the child’s desires may be a dominant

14
factor,” “visitation may not be dictated solely by the child
involved.” (In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138;
accord, Julie M., at p. 51.)
This court’s decision in S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 310 is
instructive. In fashioning the visitation orders after the children
were removed from their mother, the juvenile court in S.H. “did
not specify either the frequency or the length of visitation.
Noting the children were fearful of their mother and that the
boys had refused visits with her during their detention, the
[juvenile] court added, ‘The social worker shall describe to the
children the safeguards in place for monitoring for both mother
and fathers, and if the children refuse a visit, then they shall not
be forced to have a visit.’ ” (Id. at p. 316.) We held that “by
failing to mandate any minimum number of monitored visits per
month or even to order that some visitation must occur each
month, the [juvenile] court’s abstract recognition of [the mother’s]
right to visitation is illusory, transforming the children’s ability
to refuse ‘a visit’ into the practical ability to forestall any visits at
all.” (Id. at p. 319.) “[W]hile the juvenile court may allow the
child to refuse to attend a particular visit, to prevent the child
from exercising a de facto veto power, there must be some
assurance that, should that occur, another visit will be scheduled
and actually take place. The simplest—but, by no means, the
only—way to accomplish this would be for the juvenile court to
order a minimum number of visits per month and to impose any
essential conditions (for example, whether the visits are to be
monitored or occur in a neutral setting), while allowing the
Department to organize other details of the visitation. In no
event, however, may the child’s wishes be the sole factor in
determining whether any visitation takes place, either as a

15
formal matter or, as occurred in the case now before us, by
effectively giving the children the power to veto all visits.” (Ibid.,
fn. omitted; accord, In re C.S. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 631, 640 [no
impermissible delegation of authority or “veto power” over
visitation where “juvenile court ordered visits were to occur and
prescribed how frequently and for how long” but gave the child’s
therapist discretion to decide when it was safe for visits to begin];
cf. Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 56 [visitation order was
improper delegation where it gave the children “the option to
consent to, or refuse, any future visits with their mother” and set
no minimum amount of visitation].)
Unlike in S.H., the juvenile court here set a minimum
number of visits—“three times a week three hours each in person
minimum.” Thus, the court did not condition visitation solely on
the consent of Dylan or his therapist. Rather, taking into account
Dylan’s past refusals to visit and his therapist’s concerns about
forcing Dylan to be with Mother, and noting the Department’s
request that the court find visits would be detrimental to Dylan
and terminate visitation, the court set a visitation schedule with
the reasonable caveat that “Dylan can’t be forced to go kicking
and screaming to visits.” The court further considered that it did
not “want to do anything that would actually hurt [Mother’s]
ability to repair with him by forcing him to go” because that
would not be “best for [Dylan] or [their relationship].” This was a
proper exercise of discretion, balancing the child’s needs with
Mother’s rights. (See Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 50-
51 [a child’s emotional readiness is proper factor for consideration
in administering visitation so long as it is not the “the sole
factor”].)

16
The court’s visitation order “must be viewed in the context
of the family dynamics in play” as well as the prior efforts of the
Department and the court to facilitate visitation. (In re Brittany
C., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1356-57 [affirming juvenile
court’s order that visits between children and mother take place
only in a therapeutic setting, when order followed months of
efforts to encourage visitation in a less-restrictive setting].) Here,
the Department and the court repeatedly attempted to encourage
and facilitate visits throughout the lengthy history of the case.
Dylan refused to visit with Mother from the outset, including
after the initial car accident. Over the course of several months,
social workers encouraged Dylan by offering shorter visits,
proposing virtual or phone calls, asking what Mother could
change to make visits possible, and even requiring him to speak
with her. After Dylan’s June 2024 removal, when he again
refused to see Mother, the social workers continued these
efforts—offering brief visits just to pick up a gift, encouraging
video or phone calls, and checking in about his willingness to
visit. These efforts continued throughout the approximately 44
days the challenged visitation order remained in effect before the
court terminated Mother’s parental rights. This case cannot
reasonably be compared to those in which the juvenile court gave
a child veto power over visits while never working to encourage
reconciliation.
Finally, even assuming the court delegated too much
discretion to Dylan regarding visits, Mother was not prejudiced,
because “on this record the juvenile court would have been within
its discretion if it simply denied [her] any visitation.” (In re
Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 214.) Here, Dylan’s therapist
had noted forcing Dylan to be together in a room with Mother

17
“would be detrimental to his mental and emotional well-being.”
The record, which was replete with examples of Dylan’s strong
adverse reactions to visits with Mother and mental health issues,
amply supported that opinion by the therapist and would have
supported an order suspending all visitation. “The fact that the
juvenile court rejected that course, and instead issued the
restrictive order challenged now, amounts to a windfall to
[Mother], not a violation of [her] rights.” (Ibid.)2

B. The Court Did Not Err in Summarily Denying Mother’s
Section 388 Petition
Mother asserts the court erred in denying, without a

2 Mother contends that after the September 2024 hearing at
which the court terminated Mother’s reunification services and
set the matter for a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing,
her attorney neglected to timely file a writ petition in this court
requesting this court strike the purportedly improper August
2024 visitation order. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.450(e)(4)(A) [after juvenile court sets a hearing under section
366.26, notice of intent to file writ petition must be filed within 7
days].) Mother then filed in this court a motion for relief from
default and a subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus
asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, both of which we
denied. Mother suffered no prejudice from not being permitted to
raise the visitation issue in a writ petition. She was able to raise
the issue in her appeal from the section 387 jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, and, as we have discussed, the visitation
order was proper.
We deny Mother’s request for judicial notice of her trial
counsel’s declaration in the habeas proceeding because it is not
relevant.

18
hearing, her February 2025 section 388 petition seeking custody
or, alternatively, reinstatement of reunification services with
unmonitored and overnight visits. The court did not abuse its
discretion.
1. Applicable law and standard of review
“Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile court
orders when the moving party presents new evidence or a change
of circumstance and demonstrates modification of the previous
order is in the child’s best interest. [Citations.] ‘ “The petitioner
has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence
(1) that there is new evidence or a change of circumstances and
(2) that the proposed modification would be in the best interests
of the child.” [Citation.] “[T]he change in circumstances must be
substantial.” ’ ” (In re Malick T. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109,
1122, fn. omitted; see In re Matthew M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
1186, 1194 (Matthew M.).) “After the termination of reunification
services, the parents’ interest in the care, custody and
companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at
this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for
permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is a
rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best
interests of the child.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295,
317; see In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 (Marilyn H.);
In re D.P. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1282, 1295; In re J.M. (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 833, 847.)
The parent “need only make a prima facie showing to
trigger the right to proceed by way of a full hearing.” (Marilyn
H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.) Section 388 “petitions are to be
liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider the
parent’s request.” (Id. at pp. 309-310; accord, In re R.A. (2021)

19
61 Cal.App.5th 826, 836 (R.A.); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.570(a) [“A petition for modification must be liberally construed
in favor of its sufficiency”].) “ ‘A “prima facie” showing refers to
those facts which will sustain a favorable decision if the evidence
submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is
credited.’ ” (In re B.C. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 129, 141.) “[I]f the
petition fails to make a prima facie showing (1) of a change of
circumstances or new evidence requiring a changed order, and
(2) the requested change would promote the best interests of the
child,” the juvenile court may summarily deny it without a
hearing. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188-189;
see R.A., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 836.) “To support a section
388 petition, the change in circumstances must be substantial.”
(In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223.)
We review the summary denial of a section 388 petition for
abuse of discretion. (R.A., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 837.) “We
do not . . . reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
that of the juvenile court.” (Matthew M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1195; see In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 104,
fn. 6.)
2. Mother did not show substantially changed
circumstances
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
determining Mother failed to make a prima facie showing of
substantially changed circumstances. Most of Mother’s evidence
focused on her achieving sobriety. But as the court recognized,
Mother had previously reached similar milestones, only to
relapse. For example, Mother completed a full drug and alcohol
program and participated in AA meetings in her 2020 case, but
had relapsed by the time this case began. In May 2023, Mother

20
entered a detox program and then transitioned to residential
treatment. Yet in December, while enrolled in outpatient care,
she tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. By
February 2024, she had completed her outpatient program,
progressed to the fourth step of her 12-step plan, found a sponsor,
and been in therapy. But just one month after regaining custody
of Dylan in April, Mother tested positive for fentanyl. Her
roommate reported that Mother had been using drugs regularly
in the weeks prior. Mother again tested positive for cocaine in
July and refused to test in August, stating she had taken Xanax,
which was not prescribed. Thus, Mother’s latest successful
attempt to gain sobriety, while laudable, does not amount to a
substantial change from the previous circumstances of the case.
(See In re Ernesto R., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 223 [“To
support a section 388 petition, the change in circumstances must
be substantial.”]; In re Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at
p. 189 [“In determining whether the petition makes the necessary
[prima facie] showing, the court may consider the entire factual
and procedural history of the case.”].)
3. Mother did not show that reunification was in Dylan’s
best interest
The juvenile court also did not abuse its discretion in
finding Mother did not establish a prima facie showing that
extending reunification services was in Dylan’s best interest. At
this stage of the case, the court’s primary focus was not on
Mother’s interest in custody but on Dylan’s need for permanence
and stability. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317; In
re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 [“[A]fter reunification
services have terminated, a parent’s petition for either an order
returning custody or reopening reunification efforts must

21
establish how such a change will advance the child’s need for
permanency and stability.”].)
Mother had already received 22 months of reunification
services. She failed to show how extending services further
would promote stability for Dylan. The evidence supported that
it would not. After Mother relapsed in June 2024, Dylan’s
therapist reported that he was deeply hurt and said “forcing the
two of them into a room together would be detrimental to his
mental and emotional well-being.” Dylan expressed a mature
and clear understanding of the situation, stating he had given
Mother multiple chances and no longer trusted her.
By contrast, in October 2024, Dylan told a social worker, “I
want Robert and Bethany to adopt me. I am happy here.” The
record supports that Dylan had found emotional security and
continuity in his placement. (See In re J.C., supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at p. 526 [child’s interest in permanency and
stability would be furthered by staying in a “loving and stable
placement”]; In re D.P., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1295 [juvenile
court properly focused on the “ ‘positive and secure attachments’ ”
between the child and her foster family].) Though Dylan had
initially shown behavioral problems, those behaviors improved
after several months of living with Bethany and Robert and not
visiting Mother. By December 2024 Bethany and Robert reported
Dylan’s behavior was much better and he “want[ed] to do well.”
Mother concedes that Dylan was “happy and comfortable in
his foster home,” but nonetheless argues reunification would
serve Dylan’s best interest because the two were bonded and she
had raised Dylan for most of his life. But the law requires more
than an existing parental relationship. (In re Jackson W. (2010)
184 Cal.App.4th 247, 260 [“ ‘[t]he presumption favoring natural

22
parents by itself does not satisfy the best interests prong of
section 388’ ”].) Mother offered no concrete evidence that
returning Dylan to her custody would benefit him. (See In re K.L.
(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62-63 [“court did not err in concluding
that . . . broad assertions did not constitute a prima facie showing
that the proposed placement changes would be in the best
interests of the children”].) While Mother claims reunification
would help Dylan “resolve” his feelings and avoid future regret
about cutting off his relationship with Mother, this theory was
speculative. There was no evidence Dylan was confused or
uncertain. On the contrary, he repeatedly expressed his feelings
with clarity and insight.
Finally, Mother argues the court’s summary denial of her
section 388 petition without a hearing violated her due process
rights under the state and federal constitutions. But because the
petition did not meet the prima facie standard, the court had no
obligation to hold an evidentiary hearing. We find no due process
violation. (See Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 306-310; In re
Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 460-461.)

C. The Court Did Not Err in Terminating Mother’s Parental
Rights
1. Applicable law and standard of review
“At the section 366.26 hearing, the focus shifts away from
family reunification and toward the selection and implementation
of a permanent plan for the child.” (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th
529, 532; accord, In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630
(Caden C.).) “ ‘Once the court determines the child is likely to be
adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to show that termination
of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of

23
the exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1).’ ” (In re
B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224-1225 (B.D.); accord, In re
Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“the court must order adoption
and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights,
unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling
reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child”].)
Under the beneficial parental relationship exception in
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), the parent may avoid
termination of parental rights if the parent establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence “that the parent has regularly
visited with the child, that the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship, and that terminating the
relationship would be detrimental to the child. [Citations.] The
language of this exception, along with its history and place in the
larger dependency scheme, show that the exception applies in
situations where a child cannot be in a parent’s custody but
where severing the child’s relationship with the parent, even
when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home,
would be harmful for the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 629-630; accord, B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225.)
A parent has regular visitation and contact when the
parent “ ‘visit[s] consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent
permitted by court orders.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632; accord, In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683, 691 (I.E.).)
Whether “ ‘the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship’ ” with his or her parent is shaped by factors “such as
‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the
parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction
between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ”

24
(Caden C., at p. 632; accord, In re Katherine J. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 303, 317 (Katherine J.).) When determining
whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child, courts consider “how the child would be affected by
losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like
for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s
life.” (Caden C., at p. 633; accord, In re D.P. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 153, 164.) “ ‘If severing the natural parent/child
relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive
emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the benefits of
a new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the
court should not terminate parental rights.” (Caden C., at p. 633;
accord, Katherine J., at p. 317.)
“While application of the beneficial parental relationship
exception rests on a variety of factual determinations properly
reviewed for substantial evidence, the ultimate decision that
termination would be harmful is subject to review for abuse of
discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 630; accord, I.E.,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 691.)
2. The court properly determined the beneficial parental
relationship exception did not apply
Mother argues that the court’s alleged denial of her
visitation rights “compromised Mother’s due process rights to
litigate and preserve her parental rights.” As discussed above,
we disagree with the premise that Mother was denied visitation;
thus, we also reject her due process challenge to the termination
of her parental rights.
Even setting aside the visitation prong of the Caden C.
analysis, Mother failed to carry her burden as to the two other
prongs: that Dylan would benefit from the continuing

25
relationship and that terminating the relationship would be
detrimental. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 629-630.)
As to the benefit of continuing the relationship, Mother points to
her historical bond with Dylan and their once “significant and
emotional relationship.” But even Mother acknowledges that
Dylan no longer viewed the relationship as positive. His trust
had eroded over time, and his desire to avoid contact with Mother
was consistent throughout much of the case. Dylan had been
removed from and returned to Mother multiple times starting at
age six, and by the time of the hearing, he had lived outside her
care for approximately 21 of the past 22 months. (Caden C., at
p. 632 [whether “ ‘the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship’ ” is shaped by factors like “ ‘the portion of the child’s
life spent in the parent’s custody [and] the “positive” or “negative”
effect of interaction between parent and child’ ”]; accord, In re
Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.)
Mother also failed to show terminating the relationship
would be detrimental to Dylan. Dylan and his therapist
consistently reported that contact with Mother caused him
emotional harm. The therapist specifically advised that forcing
Dylan to be in the same room with Mother would be detrimental
to his mental health. Mother’s assertion that Dylan would
eventually forgive her and their relationship could be repaired
through therapy is speculative. And there was no evidence that
Dylan suffered any harm from the lack of visits. (See I.E., supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 692 [evidence the child “experienced no
distress at the end of visits” supported the juvenile court’s finding
“the relationship was not so substantial that its severance would
be detrimental to the child”].) To the contrary, the record shows
Dylan was thriving in his placement with Bethany and Robert,

26
with whom he had lived for a total of 17 months as of the section
366.26 hearing.
Adoption remains the preferred permanent plan unless the
parent can show exceptional circumstances. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) On this record, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that the stability and
permanence Dylan had found with Bethany and Robert
outweighed any potential harm from severing his relationship
with Mother. (Id at p. 634; Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th
at p. 317.)

D. The ICWA Inquiry Was Inadequate
1. Facts relevant to ICWA
During the family’s prior dependency case in 2020, Mother
and Father both denied any Indian ancestry. During that case,
Father, who at the time was 60 years old, said he was born in
Connecticut, that his mother had been a nurse and his father a
police officer, and that he had an older sister with whom he was
not close.3
In February 2023 the Department asked Mother about
possible Indian ancestry, and she reported no reason to believe
Dylan was an Indian child. One week later, Mother submitted an
ICWA-020 form indicating no known Indian ancestry. At the
February detention hearing, the juvenile court confirmed with
Mother that neither she nor Dylan’s father had any Indian
heritage. Based on those representations, the court found it had
no reason to believe ICWA applied. In June 2024, Mother again

3 The record does not reveal whether the Department had
contact information for any of these family members during the
2020 dependency case.

27
denied Indian ancestry in an ICWA-010(A) form. The
Department asked additional individuals—including Dylan’s
maternal aunt, maternal grandmother, maternal grandfather,
and Mother’s then-roommate—about possible Indian heritage,
but all denied any ancestry.
2. ICWA and the duty of inquiry
Congress enacted ICWA to protect Indian children and “to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families”
by formalizing federal policy and standards regarding the
removal and placement of Indian children outside the family
home. (25 U.S.C. § 1902; see In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112,
1129 (Dezi C.).) “ICWA establishes minimum standards for state
courts to follow before removing Indian children from their
families and placing them in foster care or adoptive homes.”
(Dezi C., at p. 1129; see 25 U.S.C. §§ 1902, 1921.) ICWA applies
in proceedings to terminate parental rights. (See §§ 170,
subd. (c), 177, subd. (a), 180; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.480.)
“[W]hen ICWA applies, ‘the Indian child’s tribe shall have a
right to intervene at any point’ in a proceeding involving the
removal of an Indian child from their family.” (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1129; see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c); In re Isaiah W.
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8.) The court and any petitioner seeking
termination of parental rights have an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child who is subject to the
proceedings is, or may be, an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a);
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).) This duty to inquire “includes,
but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian,
Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or

28
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1)-(2).)
ICWA and related state law define “extended family member,” if
not separately defined by the law or custom of the tribe, as “a
person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian
child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-
law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see § 224.1, subd. (c)
[providing “extended family member” follows the definition stated
in ICWA].)
When an ICWA inquiry is inadequate, prejudice is
impossible to ascertain. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1136.)
Under these circumstances, remand is required along with
directions to the court and any other responsible party to fully
comply with the duty of inquiry—and, when necessary, ICWA’s
further notice requirements—and to document that compliance.
(Ibid.)
3. Remand for ICWA compliance is necessary
Mother contends the Department’s ICWA inquiry was
inadequate because the Department made no effort to identify or
contact any paternal relatives who might have information about
Indian ancestry. We agree.
Although Father denied Indian ancestry in 2020 before his
death, nothing in the record shows the Department asked
whether any of his relatives was alive or available for contact.
The Department responds that Mother provided no contact
information for paternal relatives. The Department is under no
obligation to contact family members if it is unable to do so. (See
In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082 [“[W]e cannot ask
the agency to intuit the names of unidentified family members or

29
to interview individuals for whom no contact information has
been provided.”].) But, at a minimum, the Department should
have asked Mother if such relatives exist and whether she has
their contact information, and if Mother provided contact
information, made reasonable efforts to contact them. (See
§§ 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2), 224.1, subd. (c), 224.2, subd. (b)(2); Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1)-(2)).) It cannot assume none is
available without any inquiry.
Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the order terminating
parental rights and remand for the Department to fulfill its
duties under ICWA and for the court to hold a hearing to
determine whether ICWA applies. (See Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1137.)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s August 2024 visitation order and its
order summarily denying Mother’s section 388 petition are
affirmed. The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is
conditionally reversed, and the juvenile court is directed to
ensure the Department complies fully with ICWA and related
California law. If, after reasonable inquiry, the court finds there
is no reason to believe Dylan is an Indian child, or if no tribe or
agency determines Dylan is an Indian child after notice has been
provided under ICWA, the judgment terminating parental rights
shall be reinstated. If, on the other hand, a tribe determines

30
Dylan is an Indian child and the trial court finds ICWA applies,
the court shall proceed in accordance with ICWA.

STONE, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

FEUER, J.

31

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.