Cox v. Gordon CA4/1

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Filed 8/8/25 Cox v. Gordon CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

TYSON COX, D083386

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
00019500-CU-JR-CTL)
STEVE GORDON, as Director of
Department of Motor Vehicles, etc.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Gregory Pollack, Judge. Affirmed.
A. P. Zmurkiewicz for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant Attorney
General, Jodi L. Cleesattle and Julianne Kelly Horner, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Defendant and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Tyson Cox was arrested for driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08
percent or more. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended his
right to drive pursuant to Vehicle Code1 section 13353.2. After an
administrative per se (APS) hearing, the DMV upheld the suspension. Cox
then petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate directing the DMV to
rescind the order suspending his driving privileges. Cox prevailed in the writ
proceedings, but the court declined to award him attorney fees.
Cox contends the trial court was required to award attorney fees
pursuant to Government Code section 800 because the DMV hearing officer
acted arbitrarily and capriciously when she refused to direct the San Diego
County Sheriff’s Department Regional Crime Laboratory (Sheriff’s
Department) to produce certain documents pursuant to a subpoena that had
been served by Cox before the APS hearing. We disagree. The Sheriff’s
Department objected to Cox’s request for the documents months before the
hearing. Cox nevertheless delayed seeking enforcement of the subpoena until
the day of the hearing after the proceedings were well underway. We
conclude the hearing officer acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously when
she declined to address Cox’s discovery issue in the middle of the defense
case. Consequently, he is not entitled to attorney fees and we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Arrest for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol
In August 2021, at about 20 minutes before midnight, Officer Tyler
Hubka saw a gray BMW traveling the wrong way down a one-way street in
Carlsbad. The road “was marked by a one-way sign on [its] south end” and
“several north-pointing arrows painted on the roadway.” In addition, “every
entrance” to the street “had appropriate no right turn signs, ‘Do Not

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.

2
Enter/Wrong Way’ signs, and ‘Left Turn Only’ signs posted to give drivers
notice of the one-way designation.” Cox, later identified as the driver of the
BMW, turned left onto Grand Avenue and continued to drive in the wrong
direction “on the left side of the upraised center median.” Hubka conducted a
traffic stop.
Cox told Officer Hubka he drank “three beers.” His speech was
“slurred.” His eyes were “red and watery.” When he stepped out of the car,
his walk was “staggered.” Hubka “smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage
coming from [Cox’s] exhaled breath,” and he conducted a “series of
standardized field sobriety tests.” Overall, Cox performed poorly.
During the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Cox could not smoothly
track Officer Hubka’s pen and his “balance was highly wobbly.” “[H]e swayed
around in circles during this test.” During the walk and turn test, when
instructed to stand still on the line with his heel touching his toe, “Cox was
not able to maintain his balance as instructed” and he “stepped off the line
four times.” During the rest of the test, his turns were “OK,” but he was
unable to walk in a straight line. He failed to walk heel-to-toe 11 times,
stepped off the line 15 times, did not count aloud as instructed, and also took
the wrong number of steps before turning around. Cox refused to perform the
one-leg stand test even though Hubka explained the refusal would be used
against him in court to show consciousness of guilt.
Officer Hubka arrested Cox for violations of driving under the influence
of alcohol and driving with a blood alcohol content (BAC) above 0.08 percent
in violation of sections 23152, subdivision (a), and 23152, subdivision (b). The
arrest took place at approximately one minute past midnight.
Following the arrest, Officer Hubka used an Intox EC/IR breath
machine (breathalyzer) to collect two breath samples from Cox. The first

3
sample, taken at 12:41 a.m., measured a BAC of 0.220 percent. The second
sample, taken three minutes later, measured a BAC of 0.231 percent. This is
more than three times the legal limit of 0.08 percent. (§ 23152, subd. (b).)
Officer Hubka completed a form statement recording the results. In it,
he certified under penalty of perjury that the “breath test sample results
were obtained in the regular course of [his] duties,” he was “qualified to
operate th[e] equipment,” and “the test was administered pursuant to the
requirements of Title 17 of the California Code of Regulations.” (Italics
omitted.)
Officer Hubka completed and gave Cox a DMV order that stated: “You
are hereby notified that your privilege to operate a motor vehicle will be
suspended or revoked effective 30 days from the issue date of this order.
[¶] . . . [¶] This action is taken under the authority of . . . [section] 13353.2
. . . because you were arrested . . . for driving under the influence of alcohol

and [¶] . . . [¶] [y]ou completed a breath test with 0.08% BAC or more.”2
II.
Subpoena to the Sheriff’s Department
Cox asserted his right to an APS hearing. (§§ 13558, subd. (a), 14100,
subd. (a).) The DMV set the hearing for December 13, 2021.
On December 3, 2021, Cox served a subpoena duces tecum on the
Sheriff’s Department. The subpoena directed the Sheriff’s Department to
produce its custodian of records to testify at the APS hearing on December
13, 2021. Relevant here, the subpoena also requested the production of all
records identifying the “reference sample” of “known alcohol concentration”

2 Cox had an Idaho driver’s license, not a California driver’s license. His
privilege to drive in California was therefore suspended, not his license.

4
that was attached to the breathalyzer used to test Cox’s breath on the night
of his arrest. It further requested the “certificate or certificates of analysis”
for the known alcohol concentration reference sample. Cox subpoenaed the
same documents from the Carlsbad Police Department.
On December 10, 2021, one business day before the scheduled hearing,
Cox appeared before a DMV hearing officer to review discovery received from
the Carlsbad Police Department. The discovery did not include documents
relating to the known alcohol concentration reference sample, because,
according to an affidavit by the custodian of records, the breathalyzer that
was used to test Cox was the property of the San Diego County Sheriff.
Because the Sheriff’s Department had not yet responded to Cox’s
subpoena, Cox asked for a continuance so he would have an opportunity to
review responsive documents before the hearing. The hearing officer granted
his request and rescheduled the APS hearing for March 18, 2022. In the
meantime, the officer stated she would forward to Cox any documents
received by the DMV from the Sheriff’s Department in response to the
subpoena.
On December 14, 2021, the Sheriff Department’s custodian of records
executed a declaration in response to Cox’s subpoena. The declaration stated
the Sheriff’s Department was producing the “calibration certificate” for the
breathalyzer, but it was objecting to the production of other documents. The
objection stated, “[t]he Sheriff’s Department believes that the remaining
records sought in the subpoena are not relevant to the matter before the
DMV. The Sheriff’s Department has provided the relevant material in this
case. The Sheriff’s Department does not believe that any additional
document production is warranted at this time. Please contact [the
department] if you have questions or would like to discuss the matter.”

5
According to its records, the DMV forwarded Cox the documents
produced by the Sheriff’s Department on December 22, 2021. The documents
did not include records identifying the reference sample of known alcohol
concentration that was attached to the breathalyzer or the certificate or
certificates of analysis for the known alcohol concentration reference sample.
III.
APS Hearing
On March 18, 2022, Cox appeared before the same DMV hearing officer
who had granted the continuance in December 2021. The purpose of the
hearing was to address three issues: (1) whether Officer Hubka had
reasonable cause to believe Cox was driving a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol; (2) whether Cox was lawfully arrested; and (3) whether
Cox was driving a vehicle while he had a BAC of more than 0.08 percent.
(Petricka v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1345
(Petricka).)
At the outset of the hearing, Cox informed the hearing officer he
received the documents and objection that had been produced by the Sheriff’s
Department and forwarded to him by the DMV. The hearing officer then
made a record of each of the specific documents the DMV had received from
the Carlsbad Police Department and the Sheriff’s Department. Cox stated he
intended to call the custodian of records from the Sheriff’s Department,
Richard Debevec, as a witness, but he raised no objection at this point in time
to the department’s response to his subpoena.
The hearing officer commenced the hearing. At the time of the
hearing, it was DMV practice for the hearing officer to both advocate on
behalf of the agency and act as a fact finder. (See California DUI Lawyers
Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 517, 523, 526

6
(DUI Lawyers).) On behalf of the DMV, the hearing officer accordingly
marked and identified five exhibits: (1) a sworn statement by Officer Hubka,
(2) the chemical breath test results from the two tests administered to Cox
showing BACs of 0.22 percent and 0.23 percent, (3) an arrest report prepared
by Hubka, (4) a DUI evaluation report prepared by Hubka, and (5) Cox’s
driving record. The hearing officer concluded the DMV’s case in chief by
saying, “Those are the exhibits on behalf of the [DMV].”
Cox commenced his defense with a direct examination of Debevec, who
appeared by videoconference. Debevec testified he was a “supervising
criminologist,” and was familiar with the laboratory records relating to the
forensic biology section of the Sheriff’s Department. He was generally
familiar with the breathalyzer used to test Cox’s breath, but he had “never
been trained on . . . the instrument, so technically [he could not] really talk
about the testing of the instrument or how it works.” He named three “fully

trained analysts” who were qualified to testify.3
Debevec testified the breathalyzer used to test Cox had “a small tank
that [was] attached to the[ ] machine.” The tank had a dry gas in it with a
known alcohol concentration, which was recorded on a “certificate of analysis”
that came with the tank. He confirmed the manufacturer provided the
certificate to the Sheriff’s Department in either paper or electronic format.
Cox asked Debevec whether the gas in the small tank is referred to by
the laboratory as “a standard,” and the hearing officer objected on

3 As noted, Cox’s subpoena directed the Sheriff’s Department to produce
its custodian of records to testify at the APS hearing. It did not request the
appearance of Officer Hubka, who administered the breathalyzer test to Cox,
or a person competent (or most knowledgeable) to testify about how the
breathalyzer worked.

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foundational grounds. She asserted Debevec had “indicated that he is not
trained on the device and cannot speak to the contents of the testing for that
device, so the [DMV’s] going to object.” Cox responded, “Well, so far, I believe
[the witness] indicated that he is sufficiently knowledgeable to answer these
questions. I assume that if the witness indicates he doesn’t have sufficient
knowledge to answer the question he’ll say so.” The hearing officer overruled
the objection (the one she had just herself lodged), and Debevec testified that
the Sheriff’s Department does refer to the gas in the tank as “a standard.”
Cox next asked whether sometimes the Sheriff’s Department referred
to the gas as a “reference standard.” The hearing officer objected, but this
time, after some argument with Cox, she prohibited further questions about
how the breathalyzer worked. She did so on the ground that Debevec had
testified he was only generally familiar with the breathalyzer and was not
qualified to testify about “the mechanics and the use and the workings of the
device.” She did not allow Cox to probe further about the extent of Debevec’s
knowledge about how the device functioned.
Cox turned next to questions about the Sheriff’s Department’s response
to his subpoena. Debevec confirmed he produced “a calibration certificate” for
the breathalyzer, but did not produce “records identifying the reference
sample of known alcohol concentration” that was attached to the breathalyzer
or “the certificates or certificate of analysis for those reference samples.” Cox
followed up by asking, “So, the subpoena directed you to produce those two
things and you didn’t produce either of those two things; is that right?”
Debevec responded, “Correct. I produced our standard discovery packet for a
breath instrument.” He explained, “That’s [our laboratory’s] standard, a
standard discovery packet that the lab provides.” He further admitted the
Sheriff’s Department had the requested records (or had access to them).

8
Based on Debevec’s admission, Cox asked the hearing officer to “direct
the witness to produce the records that were listed in the subpoena.” The
hearing officer declined and explained her reasoning: “[Mr. Devebec] testified
that the documents that were produced were based on the normal and
standard packet in response[ ] to the subpoena[ ] . . . . The [DMV] finds that
this information was provided to you in a timely manner, that if the
information that you requested for your subpoena was not received it was
incumbent upon you to do your due diligence to assert to the agency as to
why they are not responding to your subpoena. [¶] Being that you have not
done so[,] the [DMV] will not direct Mr. Debevec at this time to produce those
documents.”
Cox asserted the hearing officer was making an assumption that he did
not attempt to obtain the documents from the Sheriff’s Department. He
stated, “I believe the documentation is critical in terms of determining the
accuracy of the test result in this case.” He repeated his request for an order
directing production of the documents.
The hearing officer declined Cox’s request again: “This subpoena was
issued on December 3[ ] and the [DMV] in a timely manner forwarded this
information to you. If it was deficient, it was incumbent upon you to follow
up with the agency as to why or why not they are not compliant with your
subpoena. At the time of the hearing, it is not timely.”
Cox objected and asserted he had attempted to obtain similar
documents in other cases and the Sheriff’s Department “consistently” refused
to produce them. He asked the hearing officer to “certify the facts to the
[s]uperior [c]ourt” so the court could “issue an order to the [Sheriff’s
Department] to produce the subpoenaed records, not the records they chose to
produce, but the subpoenaed records.” He further asked for a continuance to

9
call one of the three witnesses that Debevec testified had trained to operate
the breathalyzer. The hearing officer declined both requests and took the
matter under submission.
IV.
DUI Lawyers Decision
Approximately one month after the hearing, on April 15, 2022, the
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Four, filed its opinion in DUI
Lawyers, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 517. The court held the DMV’s statewide
“hearing structure violate[d] the California and federal due process rights of
drivers by combining the advocacy and adjudicatory roles into a single DMV
employee.” (Id. at p. 530.) The court explained that, “[a]lthough procedural
fairness does not prohibit the combination of the advocacy and adjudicatory
functions within a single administrative agency, tasking the same individual
with both roles violates the minimum constitutional standards of due
process.” (Id. at p. 532.) The court accordingly found section 14112,
subdivision (b)—the statute that permits a DMV hearing officer to act as both
an advocate and adjudicator—to be unconstitutional. (DUI Lawyers, at
p. 533.)
V.
DMV Ruling and Petition for Review
Three days later, on April 18, 2022, the hearing officer issued a decision
upholding the suspension of Cox’s driving privilege. (§ 13559.) Relevant
here, the hearing officer found Debevec to be a credible witness, and she
noted “he provided the normal and standard information packet in response
to the received subpoena duces tecum from [Cox].”
Cox petitioned for review to the trial court. The petition sought a writ
of mandate directing the DMV to rescind the order suspending his driving

10
privileges. Section 13559, subdivision (a), authorizes the court to rescind an
order of suspension “[i]f the court finds that the department exceeded its
constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of the
law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination
which is not supported by the evidence in the record.”
Cox’s petition asserted two errors relevant here. First, relying on DUI
Lawyers, Cox claimed he was denied due process of law under the state and
federal constitutions because the hearing officer acted as both advocate and
adjudicator at his APS hearing. Second, he claimed the hearing officer erred
when she refused to enforce the request in his subpoena for documents
relating to the reference sample of known alcohol concentration attached to
the breathalyzer used to test Cox’s breath.
In support of his second argument, Cox explained the importance, in
his view, of the documents he sought in the subpoena. To begin, he
summarized a portion of Debevec’s testimony: “It is clear from the testimony
of Mr. Debevec that, at the time that Mr. Cox’s breath was being tested,
(1) there was a tank attached to the [breathalyzer], (2) the tank contained a
dry gas reference sample with a known alcohol concentration, (3) the
laboratory calls this reference sample a ‘standard’ . . . , and (4) the alcohol
concentration was known because the tank came with a certificate of analysis
that identified and certified the alcohol concentration of the gas in the tank.”
Next, he explained the breathalyzer purportedly tests the reference
sample twice when measuring the amount of alcohol in a person’s breath,
once before and once after the test, before converting the reading to BAC.
Using a highlighted image, he showed where the two reference sample tests
were documented on the “breath test strip” that recorded the results of Cox’s
breathalyzer test. Notably, although the breath test strip was entered into

11
evidence as part of an exhibit, there was no testimony at the APS hearing,
expert or otherwise, about how the breathalyzer uses the known reference
sample.
Finally, Cox explained the California Code of Regulations requires the
use of known alcohol reference samples to verify the accuracy of instruments
used for breath alcohol testing. In particular, California Code of Regulations,
title 17, section 1221.2, subdivision (a)(2), mandates that all instruments
used for breath alcohol “shall be checked for accuracy with reference samples
which are known water solutions or dry-gasses of alcohol.” The regulation
further provides, “Such determination of accuracy shall consist, at a
minimum, of periodic analysis of a reference sample of known alcohol
concentration within accuracy and precision limits of plus or minus 0.010
grams % of the true value; these limits shall be applied to alcohol water
concentrations and/or dry-gas reference samples of alcohol from 0.08 to 0.30
grams %. The reference sample shall be provided by a forensic alcohol
laboratory. [¶] . . . Such analysis shall be performed automatically on
applicable instruments, or manually by an operator . . . , and the results shall
be used by a forensic alcohol analyst to determine if the instrument continues
to meet the accuracy [requirements]. [¶] . . . For the purposes of such
determinations of accuracy, ‘periodic’ means either a period of time not
exceeding 10 days or following the testing of every 150 subjects, whichever
comes sooner.” (Id., § 1221.2, subd. (a)(2)(A)(i), (B).) In order to ensure the
accuracy of all instruments used for breath alcohol testing, law enforcement
is required to keep records showing compliance with these directives. (Id.,
§ 1221.2, subd. (a)(6).)
The Attorney General filed a return and memorandum of points and
authorities in opposition to Cox’s petition, and Cox filed a reply.

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VI.
Trial Court Decision
The trial court orally advised the parties of its tentative ruling. After
argument, it ruled in favor of Cox. In its written ruling, the court agreed, in
light of DUI Lawyers, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 517, that Cox’s state and federal
constitutional rights to due process were violated because the hearing officer
acted as both advocate and adjudicator at his APS hearing. The court ruled
this was structural error. The court ordered the DMV to “immediately
rescind and set aside its decision suspending [Cox’s] right to drive in the
State of California.” The court took no position as to whether the recission
“operated to preclude the DMV, on remand, from proceeding against [Cox]
with a constitutionally proper hearing that does not combine the advocacy
and adjudicatory roles in a single hearing officer.”
The trial court did not address Cox’s argument that the hearing officer
erred when she refused to direct the Sheriff’s Department to produce
documents relating to the reference sample of known alcohol concentration
attached to the breathalyzer used to test his breath. Cox did not seek a

statement of decision4 or otherwise press for a written ruling on this issue.
(See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 632, 657.)
VII.
Motion for Attorney Fees
This finally brings us to the proceedings and court order Cox has
appealed. Cox filed a motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant to
Government Code section 800. That code section requires an award of

4 “A hearing on a petition for writ of administrative mandamus is a trial
of a question of fact for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 632.”
(Giuffre v. Sparks (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1326, fn. 3.)

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attorney fees “computed at one hundred dollars ($100) per hour, but not to
exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500)” to the “complainant” in
a civil action to review a ruling in an administrative proceeding. (Gov. Code,
§ 800, subd. (a).) To be entitled to an award, the complainant must be the
prevailing party and must show “the award, finding, or other determination
of the proceeding was the result of arbitrary or capricious action or conduct
by a public entity or an officer thereof in his or her official capacity.” (Ibid.)
If the complainant makes the required showing, attorney’s fees must be
awarded; they are not optional. (Plumbing etc. Employers Council v. Quillin
(1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 215, 225.)
In his motion, Cox argued he was entitled to attorney fees, because the
hearing officer’s refusal to direct the Sheriff’s Department to produce the
additional records he had subpoenaed, coupled with the dual role she played
as both advocate and adjudicator, was arbitrary and capricious. The
Attorney General opposed the motion, asserting the hearing officer did not
unconstitutionally engage in advocacy while also acting as an adjudicator and
that she “simply collected and developed the evidence.” (Boldface omitted.)
He further asserted fees were inappropriate because there was a “ ‘bona fide
dispute’ ” at the time of the hearing as to whether the DMV’s practice was
permissible.
The trial court ruled Cox was not entitled to attorney fees. Explaining
its reasoning, the court first clarified that its ruling on Cox’s petition for
review had been based solely on the recent holding in DUI Lawyers. Based
on that decision, the court explained it had found the DMV’s practice of
“combining both the advocacy and adjudicatory roles in a single hearing
officer” to be unconstitutional, entitling Cox to recission and remand on that
basis alone. The court explained it “did not find that the actual decision by

14
the hearing officer was arbitrary and capricious, only that such decision had
been the product of a proceeding which did not pass constitutional muster
from a procedural due process standpoint.”
The trial court then addressed, for the first time, whether the hearing
officer’s “evidentiary rulings, factual findings, or ultimate decision” were
arbitrary or capricious. The court concluded they were not.
The trial court found “[t]he overwhelming evidence at the hearing
established that Cox’s blood alcohol level was 0.08% or more while driving a
motor vehicle.” It noted that “both the breathalyzer strip and the calibration
certificate were admitted into evidence, as was the arresting police officer’s
sworn statement. Cox had been observed driving the wrong way on a one-
way road [and] driving on the wrong side of a divided highway, [he] smelled
of alcohol, had slurred speech, a staggered walk, red-watery eyes, [and]
horizontal gaze nystagmus, [he] admitted to drinking alcohol, and [he] failed
a series of field sobriety tests.”
The trial court in addition found the DMV’s use of a single employee to
advocate and adjudicate on behalf of the agency was not arbitrary or
capricious. DUI Lawyers was not decided until a month after the hearing
was conducted. The court accordingly found there was a bona fide legal
dispute at the time of the hearing as to whether a single hearing officer could
advocate and adjudicate on behalf of the agency.
Finally, the trial court specifically ruled it did “not believe that the
hearing officer’s rulings regarding the certificate of analysis were arbitrary
and capricious.” The court observed there is a presumption pursuant to
Evidence Code section 664 that government agencies regularly perform their
official duties. And, the court noted, Cox’s attorney conceded at oral

15
argument “he had never seen the DMV produce a certificate of analysis,
though such is frequently requested.”
DISCUSSION
As the prevailing party in the trial court writ proceedings, Cox
contends he was entitled to attorney fees under Government Code section
800. We disagree. To be entitled to fees, Cox was required to show “the
award, finding or other determination” of the APS hearing was “the result of
arbitrary or capricious action or conduct” by the hearing officer. (Gov. Code,
§ 800, subd. (a).) He has not met this burden. Our review is for abuse of
discretion. (Doe v. Atkinson (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 667, 678.)
“Attorney’s fees may not be awarded under [Government Code section]
800 simply because the administrative entity or official’s action was
erroneous, even if it was clearly erroneous.” (Reis v. Biggs Unified School
Dist. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 809, 823 [cleaned up].) In this context, “the
phrase ‘arbitrary or capricious’ encompasses conduct not supported by a fair
or substantial reason, a stubborn insistence on following unauthorized
conduct, or a bad faith legal dispute.” (Halaco Engineering Co. v. South
Central Coast Regional Com. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 52, 79 [cleaned up].) Here, as
noted, the reason given by the hearing officer for declining to direct the
Sheriff’s Department to produce additional documents was she found Cox’s
request to be untimely. We see no caprice in this ruling.
The process for enforcing a subpoena in administrative proceedings has
the potential to be lengthy and cumbersome. The subpoenaed party may or
may not seek a protective order. (Gov. Code, § 11450.30, subd. (a).) If the
subpoenaed party fails to seek a protective order and still refuses to produce
documents, the driver may ask the DMV to issue a subpoena on his or her
behalf. (Delgado v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 572,

16
578.) And if the subpoenaed party still refuses to comply, the driver may ask
the DMV to certify the facts to superior court for contempt proceedings. (Gov.
Code, §§ 11455.10, 11455.20.) DMV hearing officers accordingly have
discretion and flexibility to grant hearing continuances to issue and enforce
subpoenas when the need arises. (Delgado, at p. 578.) Section 11524,
subdivision (a), of the Government Code accordingly provides that
administrative proceedings may be continued upon a showing of good cause.
Here, Cox subpoenaed the records from the Sheriff’s Department for
production to the DMV at the beginning of December 2021. Debevec, as
custodian of records, executed a declaration authenticating the Sheriff
Department’s response to Cox’s subpoena on December 14, 2021, and sent
them to the DMV. The DMV received the documents and, in compliance with
Government Code section 11507.6, forwarded them to Cox on December 22,
2021. Cox acknowledged he received the Sherriff Department’s objection and
that the documents produced did not contain the certificate of analysis of the
known reference sample or other related documents. Although the record
does not disclose the exact date Cox received the documents, the hearing
officer stated she forwarded them in a timely manner, Cox acknowledged he
received them before the March 18, 2022, hearing, and there is no evidence in
the record of substantial mail delay.
To the extent Cox disagreed with the Sherriff Department’s objection
and the department’s corresponding decision to not seek a protective order, it
was incumbent upon him to timely seek to enforce the subpoena and to do so
in time to seek a continuance of the hearing if needed. It is true that APS
hearings are conducted in a relatively informal manner. (See § 14112,
subd. (a); Petricka, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348.) And it is true DMV
hearing officers are empowered to issue subpoenas after a hearing has

17
commenced and to continue the proceedings pending compliance. (§ 14104.5,
subd. (a); see, e.g., Bussard v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 858, 862, 865 (Bussard).) But this does not mean there are no
deadlines, and no due diligence is required at all when seeking the
production of documents for use at an APS hearing. (Cf. Monaghan v.
Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1621, 1625–1626.)
Government Code section 11524, subdivision (b), includes a
requirement of reasonable diligence when a party seeks to continue an
administrative hearing. It provides: “When seeking a continuance, a party
shall apply for the continuance within 10 working days following the time the
party discovered or reasonably should have discovered the event or
occurrence which establishes the good cause for the continuance. A
continuance may be granted for good cause after the 10 working days have
lapsed if the party seeking the continuance is not responsible for and has
made a good faith effort to prevent the condition or event establishing the
good cause.” (Gov. Code, § 11524, subd. (b).)
This is not a case where the failure to respond to a subpoena first
manifested itself at the hearing. (Compare Bussard, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th
at p. 865 [finding good cause for a continuance when the need to subpoena a
witness was “an unexpected development” at the hearing].) The evidence
here is that Cox received the Sheriff Department’s objection at least two
months before the scheduled hearing date. The objection put him on notice
that he would likely need a continuance to enforce the subpoena. Despite
this advance notice, he waited until the day of the hearing, and waited until
after the DMV’s case in chief had concluded, to seek enforcement of the
document requests directed at the certificate of analysis of the known alcohol
sample. Such enforcement, if successful, would have required a continuance

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for the documents to be produced and then a second hearing on the merits. It
was not arbitrary or capricious of the hearing officer to conclude that counsel
had not acted diligently in failing to present the issue to the court until the
evidentiary portion of the hearing was complete.
We may have exercised our discretion differently than the hearing
officer did here, especially given the relatively informal nature of APS
hearings and what appears to be a sincere effort on the part of Cox’s attorney
to establish a right to verify the Sheriff Department’s compliance with
California Code of Regulations, title 17, section 1221.2, subdivision (a)(2).
But, given the due diligence provisions of Government Code section 11524,
subdivision (b), we cannot say it was arbitrary and capricious to find Cox’s
enforcement attempt untimely. We thus conclude the trial court did not

abuse its discretion when it ruled Cox was not entitled to attorney fees.5

5 Our ruling is without prejudice to Cox timely pursuing the production
of the certificate of analysis and related documents on remand if the DMV
chooses to conduct a new APS hearing. (See Knudsen v. Department of Motor
Vehicles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 186, 213.) We take no position on the merits
of his request.

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying attorney fees is affirmed. Costs on
appeal are awarded to the DMV. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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