CourtListener 10648179•People v. Rivera CA1/2
Testo completo
Filed 8/5/25 P. v. Rivera CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171301, A171328
v.
SEVION MICHAEL RIVERA, (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. Nos. CR2202614,
Defendant and Appellant.
CR2400480)
A jury convicted defendant Sevion Michael Rivera of one count of first
degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459),1 two counts of being a felon in possession
of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of being a felon in
possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). He was sentenced to two
years in state prison for the burglary, and concurrent 16-month terms for the
remaining counts. On appeal from that judgment,2 defendant seeks reversal
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 That appeal is case no. A171328 (superior court case no. CR2400480).
Defendant also filed a notice of appeal (no. A171301) from a sentence imposed
in superior court case no. CR2202614 following the revocation of his
probation based on his convictions in case no. CR2400480. At defendant’s
request, we consolidated the appeals. Defendant filed identical briefs in both
appeals. However, as the Attorney General notes, defendant’s briefs do not
raise any claims of error regarding the probation revocation and sentence
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of only his burglary conviction, arguing: (1) the trial court incorrectly
instructed the jury on the elements of burglary, and (2) he received
inadequate notice of the prosecution’s intention to rely on felony vandalism
as a predicate offense of the burglary charge, thereby violating his
constitutional rights. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Facts
The victim in this case, Quincy Hayden, was defendant’s friend, had
known him for about 10 years as of the time of trial, and thought of him “like
[her] brother.” In December 2023, she lived in a two-story duplex apartment
in Eureka. Her roommate was her friend, Aiyana Risling. At that time,
Risling was romantically involved with defendant, whom she had met years
earlier through Hayden. Hayden and Risling had separate bedrooms.
Defendant spent a lot of time at the apartment and slept over.
At some point, Risling communicated to Hayden her belief that
defendant was being “unfaithful” to her, and Hayden agreed with Risling.
On the morning of December 18, 2023, Hayden woke up to hearing
defendant and Risling arguing. Hayden went to check on Risling, knocked on
her bedroom door, and opened it. Hayden and defendant then got into an
appealed from in appeal no. A171301. We therefore deem appeal no.
A171301 abandoned and order it dismissed. (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59
Cal.App.4th 289, 293, fn. 3 [where two appeals—one from true findings and a
wardship adjudication and the other from an order continuing wardship—
were consolidated, but the appellant’s briefs did not claim any errors
concerning the latter appeal, the appellate court deemed that appeal to be
abandoned and ordered it dismissed]; People v. Hayes (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th
175, 178, fn. 2 [“At appellant’s request, we consolidated the appeals. In his
brief, appellant does not claim any error concerning the probation revocation
appeals. We therefore deem those appeals to have been abandoned and order
that they be dismissed.”].)
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argument and “snapped at each other.” Defendant, frustrated with Hayden,
told her “it was [her] fault [he and Risling] were arguing and that [Hayden
was] telling her lies” about him being unfaithful to Risling. The altercation,
though brief, was “intense.”
Several days later, on Friday, December 22, Hayden left town for the
weekend. Before leaving, she locked her bedroom door.
The next morning, on December 23, Risling woke up with defendant
next to her still asleep. When Risling got up to go to the bathroom, she saw
Hayden’s bedroom door open and “[s]ome things thrown around in her
bedroom.” Risling was concerned, so she woke up defendant and Facetimed
Hayden. Risling told Hayden that someone had broken into their apartment
and destroyed Hayden’s room. Hayden “panicked” and left right away to go
back to her apartment. Hayden’s father and brother went separately to
Hayden’s apartment to meet her there.
After that call, Risling and defendant started getting ready to leave the
apartment. According to Risling, she was planning to drop defendant off at a
friend’s house in Arcata, and then go to Redding to spend the holiday with
her family. Defendant packed items into bags and loaded them into Risling’s
car before they drove off. When they reached Arcata, they called Hayden to
“check[ ] in where she was at.” Hayden asked Risling and defendant to “wait
around until she got to town.” Risling and defendant headed back to the
apartment, with defendant driving Risling’s car.
After Hayden, her father, and brother arrived at the apartment, they
reported the incident to law enforcement. Deputy Hal Egset and Deputy
Frank Rojas of the county sheriff’s department arrived, and they all then
went upstairs to Hayden’s bedroom. Items were strewn about on her
bedroom floor. There was damage to her bedroom: the doorjamb was cracked
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open; there was a hole in the door, a hole in the wall, and another hole in the
closet door; eyelash adhesive glue was “squirted all over the walls”; and
“[t]here was stuff spilled on the carpet and on the walls.” Hayden’s TV had
been knocked off an entertainment center to the ground, and was facing
downward. Also, her mattress had been flipped over, and her laptop was
shattered and looked like it had been stomped on.
Hayden informed Deputy Egset that numerous items of hers were
missing, including her green Xbox console that had a gold Michael Jordan
sticker on it, Xbox controllers, a silver money clip, and several other items.
Risling and defendant arrived at the apartment to find Hayden, her
brother, her father, and the deputies there. Deputy Egset testified he
interviewed Risling, who told him that around 4:00 that morning she and
defendant “heard some noise downstairs” and that defendant had told her
“there was a screen that was off of one of the lower story windows.”
Risling, however, testified she did not hear any noises and did not wake
up during the night. She and defendant left the apartment around 9:30 p.m.
to go to a friend’s place where they drank, and returned to the apartment
around 12:30 a.m. Risling testified she was “drunk” and that she and
defendant went to sleep when they returned to the apartment.
Meanwhile, Deputy Rojas searched Risling’s vehicle. He found
Hayden’s Xbox with the gold Michael Jordan sticker, the silver money clip,
and other items Hayden identified as taken from her room.
Deputy Rojas also found a black Nike bag on the rear passenger
floorboard in Risling’s car. Inside the bag was an unregistered Sig Sauer
loaded firearm and additional live rounds of ammunition for a 40-caliber
firearm and a shotgun. Risling said the bag belonged to defendant. A loaded
black Mossberg 500 shotgun and backpack with a firearm holster were also
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found in the trunk.
The Proceedings Below
On May 3, 2024, following a preliminary hearing, the district attorney
filed in case no. CR2400480 an information charging defendant with first
degree residential burglary (§ 459; count 1); being a felon in possession of a
firearm (a handgun) (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2); being a felon in
possession of a firearm (a shotgun) (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3); and being
a felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 4).
On July 12, the jury found defendant guilty of all counts charged.
On August 8, the trial court sentenced defendant to the low term of two
years for the burglary and concurrent 16-month terms for each of the
remaining three counts.
Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction.
DISCUSSION
Burglary Instructions
Defendant’s first argument is that the trial court incorrectly instructed
the jury on the specific intent of burglary, in violation of his rights under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. We conclude
that the parties’ closing arguments resolved the instructions’ ambiguity such
that it is not reasonably likely the jury misunderstood the relevant legal
principles.
Additional Background
Burglary is committed when a person enters a dwelling, or a room
within a dwelling, with the intent to commit a theft or any felony. (§ 459;
People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1041 & fn. 8.)
In this case, the People sought to prove that defendant committed a
burglary by entering into the victim’s bedroom with the intent to commit: (1)
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a theft (§ 484); or (2) felony vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)). To that end,
the People requested that the court instruct the jury using their modified
versions of the pattern instructions on burglary (CALCRIM No. 1700), theft
(CALCRIM No. 1800), and felony vandalism (CALCRIM No. 2900).
The People’s proposed instruction on burglary stated:
“The defendant is charged in Count One with a violation of Penal Code
Section 459.
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must
prove that:
“1. The defendant entered a room within a building; [¶] AND [¶]
“2. When the defendant entered a room within a building, he
intended to commit theft or felony vandalism.
“To decide whether the defendant intended to commit theft or felony
vandalism, please refer to the separate instructions that I will give you on
those crimes.
“A burglary was committed if the defendant entered with the intent to
commit theft or felony vandalism. The defendant does not need to have
actually committed theft or felony vandalism as long as he entered with the
intent to do so.
“The People allege that the defendant intended to commit theft or
felony vandalism. You may not find the defendant guilty of burglary unless
you agree that he intended to commit one of those crimes at the time of entry.
You do not all have to agree on which one of those crimes he intended.”
The People’s proposed instruction on theft stated in pertinent part:
“The defendant is charged in Count One with burglary. In order to find
defendant guilt [sic] of burglary, the People must prove that the defendant
entered Ms. Hayden’s room with the intent to commit theft or felony
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vandalism.
“To prove that the defendant entered Ms. Hayden’s room with the intent
to commit theft, the People must prove that:
“1. The defendant took possession of property owned by someone else;
“2. The defendant took the property without the owner’s consent;
“3. When the defendant took the property, he intended to deprive Ms.
Hayden of it permanently; [¶] AND
“4. The defendant moved the property, even a small distance, and
kept it for any period of time, however brief.” (Italics added.)
Similarly, the People’s proposed instruction on felony vandalism stated
in relevant part:
“The defendant is charged in Count One with burglary. In order to find
the defendant guilty of burglary, the People must prove that the defendant
entered Ms. Hayden’s room with the intent to commit theft or felony
vandalism.
“To prove that the defendant entered Ms. Hayden’s room with the intent
to commit felony vandalism, the People must prove that:
“1. The defendant maliciously damaged or destroyed real or personal
property;
“2. The defendant did not own the property; [¶] AND [¶]
“3. The amount of damage caused by the vandalism was $400 or
more.
“Someone acts maliciously when he or she intentionally does a wrongful
act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure
someone else.” (Original italics omitted, italics added.)
During a conference on jury instructions at trial, defense counsel
objected to the italicized language in the instruction on theft. Counsel
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argued: “in the second paragraph . . . it should read something to the effect of
to prove the defendant entered Ms. Hayden’s room with the intent to commit
theft. The People must prove the defendant intended to, and then the bullet
points. Because the People have to show the intent going into the room, not
just that he did the acts that he’s accused of.” Counsel continued, “[T]he jury
instruction as written is saying in order to prove the intent, you just have to
show that he did it. When, in fact, the jury instruction should be he entered
with the intent, that at the time of entering, he intended to take possession of
the property owned by somebody else, took property without the owner’s
consent and intended to deprive the owner permanently. But that was the
intent when he entered the room.”
Defense counsel made the same objections to the People’s proposed
instruction on felony vandalism to the extent it contained similar language.
The court invited defense counsel to submit his version of the
instructions and stated it would choose between his and the prosecution’s.
The record does not show that the defense submitted such instructions.
Ultimately, the court gave the People’s versions of the instructions on
burglary, theft, and felony vandalism as recited above.
Applicable Law
“A court is required to instruct the jury on the points of law applicable
to the case, and no particular form is required as long as the instructions are
complete and correctly state the law.” (People v. Andrade (2000) 85
Cal.App.4th 579, 585.) Where, as here, “ ‘a defendant is charged with
burglary, the trial court, on its own initiative, must give instructions to the
jury identifying and defining the target offense(s) that the defendant
allegedly intended to commit upon entry into the building [or dwelling].’ ”
(People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 349, original italics omitted.)
8
“A jury misinstruction that relieves the prosecution of its burden to
prove an element of the crime—by either misdescribing the element or
omitting it entirely—violates [the federal Constitution].” (People v. Hendrix
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 942, citing United States v. Gaudin (1995) 515 U.S.
506, 509–510 [the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury “require criminal
convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of
every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable
doubt”], fn. omitted.)
“In considering a claim of instructional error we must first ascertain
what the relevant law provides, and then determine what meaning the
instruction given conveys.” (People v. Andrade, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p.
585.) We review the wording of jury instructions de novo. (People v. Posey
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)
“ ‘A defendant challenging an instruction as being subject to erroneous
interpretation by the jury must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the
jury understood the instruction in the way asserted by the defendant.’ ”
(People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 822; see People v. Smithey (1999)
20 Cal.4th 936, 963 [“If a jury instruction is ambiguous, we inquire whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied
the instruction”].) “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined
from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an
instruction or from a particular instruction.’ ” (People v. Carrington (2009) 47
Cal.4th 145, 192.) “ ‘Instructions should be interpreted . . . to support the
judgment rather than defeat it if they are reasonably susceptible to such
interpretation.’ ” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.) We
presume jurors are intelligent and capable of understanding and applying the
9
instructions they are given. (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 390.) We
“also must consider the arguments of counsel in assessing the probable
impact of the instruction.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202
(Young).)
Analysis
As he did below, defendant challenges the portions of the instructions
given to the jury defining theft and felony vandalism, the target offenses of
the burglary charge in this case. The assertedly problematic language, as
noted above, was the following: “To prove that the defendant entered Ms.
Hayden’s room with the intent to commit [theft or felony vandalism], the
People must prove that[,]” followed by a list of the elements of theft or felony
vandalism. Defendant argues that these instructions improperly “suggest[ed]
the requisite intent at the time of entry could be proved by the commission of
the intended crime[s],” without necessarily finding that he had the intent to
commit those crimes at the time he entered Hayden’s bedroom. These
instructions, defendant argues, had the effect of lightening the prosecution’s
burden of proof with respect to the mens rea required for burglary, in
violation of his constitutional rights to have a jury make a finding on the
elements of the charged offense.
As a preliminary matter, although defendant objected to the
prosecution’s proposed instructions above, the record does not show that he
submitted his own version of the instructions as requested by the trial court.
Assuming defendant preserved his instructional error claim despite not
submitting his version of the instructions, we would reject the claim on the
merits.
Viewed in isolation, one could construe the above quoted language in
the theft and vandalism instructions as defendant does—that is, as telling
10
the jury it could find defendant had the specific intent to commit burglary if
he intended to commit the target offenses, without necessarily having to find
that he had the intent to commit the target offenses at the time of entry.
Interpreted in this manner, these instructions conflict with the other, correct
instructions, which stated (five separate times) that in order to convict
defendant of burglary, the People had to prove both that (1) defendant
entered the victim’s bedroom and (2) at the time of entry, he intended to
commit theft or felony vandalism.
To the extent the instructions on theft and vandalism created some
ambiguity on the requisite intent for burglary, defendant must demonstrate
“whether it is reasonably likely the jury misunderstood and misapplied the
instruction.” (People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 963; see People v.
Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 822.) Based on the record as a whole—and
counsel’s arguments in particular—we conclude that defendant’s
interpretation is not reasonably likely. (See People v. Carrington, supra, 47
Cal.4th at p. 192 [alleged ambiguity in instructions must be viewed in light of
the instructions as a whole and the entire record]; Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th
at p. 1202 [“The reviewing court also must consider the arguments of counsel
in assessing the probable impact of the instruction on the jury.”].)
Any possibility of confusion about the requisite intent for burglary was
diminished by the parties’ closing arguments. The prosecutor began her
argument by stating, “The evidence that has been presented has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant broke his way into Ms.
Hayden’s locked bedroom with the intent to not only destroy her room but
also with the intent to steal.” The prosecutor argued that defendant “had a
score to settle” due to his belief that Hayden was interfering with his
relationship with Risling. Then, addressing the burglary instructions
11
specifically, the prosecutor stated: “So for you to find the defendant guilty of
burglary, I have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt three main things: One,
that the defendant entered; two, Ms. Hayden’s locked bedroom; and three,
with the intent to steal or commit felony vandalism.” As to vandalism, the
prosecutor argued, “The People just need to prove that the defendant entered
that bedroom with the intent to commit damage—$400 worth of damage.” As
to theft, the prosecutor argued that defendant “entered that bedroom with
the intent to steal . . . .”
Similarly, in his closing statement, defense counsel argued, “To get to
first-degree burglary, the People have to show beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant entered the room. . . . [The] People have to show beyond a
reasonable doubt when defendant entered the room, defendant intended to
commit theft or a felony vandalism, one of those things.”
Taken as a whole, the arguments of both counsel cleared up the
ambiguity in the instructions regarding the requisite intent of burglary, as
they repeated to the jury that in order to convict defendant of guilty, it had to
find he entered the victim’s bedroom with the intent to commit theft or felony
vandalism.
Moreover, we note that the “record contains no inquiries from the jury
regarding the application of these instructions.” (Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
p. 1203.) Indeed, there is no indication the jury struggled with its verdict at
all—the record indicates that the jury deliberated and reached its verdict in
the same afternoon.
In sum, we conclude it is not reasonably likely the jury misunderstood
the requisite intent of burglary and, as such, the court did not commit
instructional error.
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Notice of the Prosecution’s Reliance on Felony Vandalism as a
Predicate Offense for Burglary
Defendant’s second argument is that he was denied his constitutional
rights to a fair trial and due process because he was not given notice of the
prosecution’s intention to rely on felony vandalism as a predicate for the
burglary charge. We disagree.
Additional Background
On July 11, 2024, the day after Hayden, Risling, and Deputy Egset
testified at trial for the prosecution, and the day before closing argument, the
parties had a conference on jury instructions. They discussed the People’s
request for an instruction advising the jury that burglary could be based on
entry with intent to commit theft or felony vandalism. Defense counsel
“object[ed] to the felony vandalism part of [the instruction],” stating, “We’ve
had no indication of the value of the damage done, and I have gotten no
discovery whatsoever concerning that.” Counsel argued, “I think that at this
stage of the game, going over jury instructions, the People presenting that as
a theory of the case it wasn’t [sic] even in the prelim.”
The prosecutor noted that defense counsel was “the one who presented
photographs first of the damage done to the bedroom.” The prosecutor then
argued, “we have that the door was busted. We have that the frame of the
door was cracked. We have that there was writing on the wall. We have two
holes in the wall. We have a stomped-on computer. We have a TV that was
turned on its face. . . . If the value is what we are discussing, I think that a
jury can reasonably conclude that the value of the destruction done in that
bedroom was very great, more than $400.” The prosecutor added that the
People intended to call Deputy Rojas as the next witness and question him on
the approximate amount of damages.
The court noted that the evidence “as far as [it has] been able to discern
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right now” is that the damages to the victim’s bedroom “are going to be
substantial amounts” and “over $400 for the door frame and the holes in the
wall alone.” The court stated, “[the prosecution] came in with photographs
showing significant—and I’ll use the word, vandalism—to that room. And so
if they have a witness who paid money and who is under oath and says this is
how much the damage was, then it’s either over four or under four. And
you’ll have an opportunity to cross-examine that. So that’s where we’ll leave
it.”
Over defense counsel’s objection, the court gave the jury the burglary
instructions that included felony vandalism as a target offense.
Applicable Law
“Both the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution and the due
process guarantees of the state and federal Constitutions require that a
criminal defendant receive notice of the charges adequate to give a
meaningful opportunity to defend against them.” (People v. Seaton (2001) 26
Cal.4th 598, 640.) “Under modern pleading procedures, notice of the
particular circumstances of an alleged crime is provided . . . not by a factually
detailed information.” (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 358.)
Rather, notice is adequate if the factual basis of the theory was presented at
the preliminary hearing. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1024;
People v. Quiroz (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 65, 70 (Quiroz).) Notice is also
satisfied “by the People’s express mention of that theory before or during trial
sufficiently in advance of closing argument.” (Quiroz, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 70–71, citing People v. Crawford (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1, 8–9 [initial,
pretrial instructional conference], People v. Lucas (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 721,
738 [same], and Stephens v. Borg (9th Cir. 1995) 59 F.3d 932, 936 [five days
prior to closing argument]; see also People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557,
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630 [“assuming defendant first learned of the lying-in-wait theory when the
parties were discussing appropriate instructions, it was not at that time too
late to move to reopen the proceedings to allow the defense to produce
evidence addressing the theory. [Citation.] Defendant, then, had sufficient
time to confront the facts that allegedly supported the theory, eliminating the
possibility that any lack of notice was fatally unconstitutional.”].) “What due
process will not tolerate is the People affirmatively misleading or ambushing
the defense with its theory.” (Quiroz, at p. 71.)
“Whether defendant received constitutionally adequate notice that the
prosecution was relying on a particular theory of guilt entails a resolution of
a mixed question of law and fact that we believe is predominantly legal. As
such, we undertake an independent review.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1158, 1205.)
Analysis
Defendant contends he received inadequate notice of the prosecution’s
intent to rely on felony vandalism as a predicate offense of burglary. He
claims that he “did not discover this new theory . . . until after the testimony
of both the victim and her roommate, well into the trial, during the
discussion of the jury instructions.” Accordingly, he claims he was denied his
rights to a fair trial and due process under the federal and state
Constitutions. We are unpersuaded.
Felony vandalism is committed if: (1) the defendant defaces with
graffiti, damages, or destroys real or personal property; (2) the defendant
does not own the property; and (3) the amount of damages is $400 or more.
(§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1); CALCRIM No. 2900.)3
3 Damage of less than $400 is punishable solely as a misdemeanor.
(§ 594, subd. (b)(2).)
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As we understand it, the crux of defendant’s objection below and his
claim on appeal is that he had no notice the prosecution might rely on felony
vandalism as a predicate for burglary, because there was no evidence from
the preliminary hearing regarding the third element—that the damages done
to Hayden’s bedroom and property met the felony vandalism threshold of
$400. As he puts it in his reply brief, not all the elements of felony vandalism
could be “gleaned from the preliminary hearing testimony.”
Initially, we note that in asserting the lack of evidence as to the
amount of damages, defendant does not appear to dispute there was evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing as to the other elements of felony
vandalism. Nor could he reasonably do so. The testimony, which included
that of Deputy Egset’s, put defendant on notice that the prosecution intended
to show that defendant entered Hayden’s locked bedroom with the intent to
damage or destroy her bedroom and personal property. Deputy Egset
testified he was told by Hayden that days before the incident, defendant
became upset with her, and the two got into argument when defendant
accused her of interfering with his and Risling’s relationship. On the
morning after the incident, Hayden told Deputy Egset that her bedroom had
been broken into and “ransacked” and that several of her possessions were
missing. Deputy Egset then testified as to the damages he observed: “[t]he
doorjamb was cracked from forced entry. The lock mechanism was kind of
bent and, also, I believe that one of the hinges were almost off one side of the
door. As we entered, there was items strewn about, there was a hole in the
wall, her TV was thrown down on the ground and there was some type of
writing on the wall that was illegible.” In addition, Hayden’s laptop was
damaged. Upon investigation, the deputies found Hayden’s missing items in
defendant’s backpack.
16
It is true, as defendant asserts, there was no testimony at the
preliminary hearing that specified the amount of damages to Hayden’s
bedroom and possessions caused by the vandalism. Assuming arguendo for
that reason defendant could not determine from the preliminary hearing
transcript by itself that the People might rely on felony vandalism as a
predicate offense, we agree with the Attorney General that the requisite
notice was provided by other sources.
One of those sources is, as the Attorney General notes, and defendant
does not refute in his reply brief, the People’s trial memorandum filed at the
start of trial. The memorandum was accompanied by a list of the People’s
requested “CALCRIM instructions,” two of those of which addressed felony
vandalism. (CALCRIM Nos. 2900, 2901.) The memorandum also included
the People’s statement of the case: “On or about December 23, 2023,
Defendant broke the door to his girlfriend’s roommate’s locked bedroom, and
stole the victims [sic] green X-box while trashing her room, including writing
on the wall, punching a hole in the drywall, breaking the door frame, and
punching a hole through the door.” Additionally, as the Attorney General
asserts, the evidence presented at trial, which included photographs of the
damages to Hayden’s bedroom and personal property, was consistent with
that theory.
Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that he was “unfairly
surpris[ed]” by the People’s intention to rely on felony vandalism as a target
offense of the burglary charge. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the record
demonstrates he received constitutionally adequate notice of that theory.
But even if we were persuaded defendant received late notice of that
theory, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “[I]n cases
where a new theory is introduced late in the game for reasons other than
17
prosecutorial gamesmanship, courts have employed a harmless error test.
That test looks to whether the late notice ‘unfairly prevented [defense
counsel] from arguing his or her defense to the jury or . . . substantially
misled [counsel] in formulating and presenting arguments.’ ” (Quiroz, supra,
215 Cal.App.4th at p. 71.) In Quiroz, the appellate court held that any late
notice the defendant received of the People’s aiding and abetting theory was
harmless because the defendant “had ample time to call witnesses and tailor
his closing argument after the People reaffirmed their request for an aiding
and abetting instruction. Indeed, [he] capitalized on the People’s midtrial
shift in emphasis during closing argument.” (Ibid.)
Here, the record does not reflect any intent by the People to ambush or
mislead the defendant, and so, we look to whether the asserted error was
harmless. Even accepting defendant’s assertion he had no notice of the felony
vandalism theory until the jury instruction conference, he nonetheless had
ample time to confront the facts in support of that theory and to formulate
and present arguments in response to that theory.
The conference on jury instructions took place after Hayden, Risling, or
Deputy Egset had testified, but while the People were still presenting their
case at trial. During that conference, the prosecutor informed the court and
the defense that the People’s next witness (Deputy Rojas) would testify on the
approximate amount of damages caused by the vandalism. Thus, as the
court noted, defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine that witness on
that issue. Further, if defendant needed Hayden, Risling, or Deputy Egset to
answer more questions about the damages, the defense could have requested
to have any such witnesses testify further. Additionally, if the defense
needed additional time, such as for the purpose of producing evidence
addressing the issue, it could have also requested a short continuance. (See
18
People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 751, fn. 11 [where defendant failed
to request a continuance to prepare a defense against a theory he arguably
learned late at trial, the People’s “failure to give defendant earlier notice of
this theory did not impair the presentation of defendant’s defense”], overruled
on another ground in People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772–773.)
Moreover, even after the close of evidence, defendant “could have moved to
reopen the taking of evidence so as to present a defense against [the theory].”
(See People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 869, overruled on another
ground in People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 181, fn. 2.) However,
instead of doing any of these things, the defense proceeded to closing
arguments, which, we note, included arguments that the People failed to
prove that defendant had entered Hayden’s bedroom with the intent to
commit felony vandalism.
Given these circumstances, we conclude any late notice of the
prosecution’s theory of burglary predicated on felony vandalism did not
“ ‘unfairly prevent[ ] [defense counsel] from arguing his . . . defense to the
jury or . . . substantially misle[a]d [counsel] in formulating and presenting
arguments.’ ” (Quiroz, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 71.) In sum, any late
notice was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
In appeal case no. A171328, the judgment is affirmed. The appeal in
case no. A171301 is dismissed.
19
RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.
We concur.
MILLER, J.
DESAUTELS, J.
(A171301N, A171328N)
20
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