In re N.O. CA2/4

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Testo completo

Filed 8/4/25 In re N.O. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re N.O. a Person Coming B340207
Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
23CCJP02780,
23CCJP02780A )
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and
Respondent.
v.
L.O.,

Defendant and
Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Philip L. Soto, Judge. Affirmed.
Lori N. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Courtney Fisher, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Father L.O. asserts that the juvenile court had insufficient
evidence to assert jurisdiction over his then-one-year-old
daughter, N., under sections 300, subdivision (b) and 342. He
further contends the court erred in ordering N. removed from his
care pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c). We find no error
and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Eight months into the family’s open dependency case
related to domestic violence, the court returned one-year-old N. to
father’s physical custody at the recommendation of the Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS). Six weeks later, father and N. were involved in a single-
car collision with the center divider on the 10 freeway. First
responders arrived on the scene at 1:30 a.m. and found father in
the driver’s seat, unconscious and smelling of alcohol. The car
was damaged, and the airbags were deployed. N. was securely
strapped into her car seat and was uninjured. Father was

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the full factual and
procedural background because our opinion is unpublished and
the parties are familiar with the facts of the case and its
procedural history. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847,
851 [unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial
court’s decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal
statement”].) Undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

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transported to the hospital, where he regained consciousness.
Police performed a blood draw and arrested father for driving
under the influence and child endangerment; he was later
charged with these offenses in a misdemeanor complaint.
When father spoke to DCFS the day after the incident, he
denied drinking any alcohol. He stated that he and N. had been
at a family gathering for Memorial Day, and someone gave him a
soda in which he did not taste any alcohol. At the time of the
collision, he was driving home; he denied doing so recklessly, as a
bystander had reported. He did not remember what happened
but said he was “tired from having such a long day and believes
he might have fallen asleep.”
DCFS subsequently filed the section 342 petition at issue,
which alleged a single count under section 300, subdivision (b)(1):
“On 05/28/2024, . . . father . . . placed the child in a detrimental
and endangering situation in that the father drove a vehicle, with
the child as a passenger, recklessly on a freeway, including
father’s vehicle striking a center divider and coming to a
complete stop on the freeway. The father was found unconscious
and smelled of alcohol. Such a detrimental and endangering
situation established by the father endangers the child’s physical
health and safety and places the child at risk of serious physical
harm, damage and danger.”
In an ensuing jurisdiction/disposition report and last-
minute information, DCFS reported a second interview with
father, approximately one month after the collision. At that time,
father stated that he had consumed “like three” servings of punch
at the Memorial Day party and “did not know if someone spiked
the punch.” He “felt tired only,” otherwise “fine,” and no one at
the party told him he looked impaired or should not drive.

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Father reported that he had enrolled in services including an
outpatient substance use disorder program, a 12-step program,
counseling, and toxicology testing; since the incident, he had
three negative test results and two missed tests.
Paternal grandmother told DCFS there had been no alcohol
at the party unless someone sneaked it in, father did not appear
to be under the influence that day, and father “seemed fine” but
“may have been tired” when he left the party. Paternal
grandmother denied speaking to mother about the party or
having a conflict with father. However, mother reported that
paternal grandmother called mother on the night of the party
and said she “got into it” with father when he refused to leave N.
overnight because he had been drinking. Mother also reported
that father “does not drink much, but when he drinks, he drinks
too much, he cannot control it,” and is “very destructive when he
gets frustrated.” Paternal grandmother, mother, N.’s foster
caregiver, and father’s family preservation services provider all
reported that father had been overwhelmed recently. N.’s
caregiver also reported that N. was “different,” more “quiet” and
“clingy,” when she returned to the caregiver’s care after the
incident.
The juvenile court sustained the petition, citing the
“objective signs of being under the influence” and father’s
inability to “control the car appropriately” while transporting N.
The court stated that father “should not have been drinking” any
beverages he knew contained alcohol, “considering he was going
to be driving the child.” The court found that although father
was “on the road to recovery,” and would likely “think twice at
least before he goes to a party and starts drinking anything that
he’s not aware of what’s in it,” “under the circumstances, to keep

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the child safe,” it was necessary to sustain the petition. At
disposition, the court removed N. from father and returned her to
mother. It found that father “still poses a significant substantial
risk to the child” and was not “in a position” to transport N. to the
daycare and therapy programs she was attending to address her
“challenges managing her emotions.”
We grant DCFS’s unopposed request and take judicial
notice that the case was subsequently transferred to San
Bernardino County over father’s objection. (Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
DISCUSSION
Jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A) is
appropriate when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of . . . [t]he failure or inability of the child’s
parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.” (See also
§ 342, subd. (b) [“Unless otherwise provided by law, all
procedures and hearings required for an original petition are
applicable to a subsequent petition filed under this section.”].)
Similarly, removal under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) is
appropriate when a court finds, by clear and convincing evidence,
“[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of
the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no
reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be
protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent’s
. . . physical custody.”
We review a juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional
orders for substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766,
773; see also In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154 [“A

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juvenile court’s removal order at a disposition hearing will be
affirmed on appeal if it is supported by substantial
evidence.”].) We view the record in the light most favorable to
the court’s determinations and draw all reasonable inferences
from the evidence to support the findings and orders. (In re I.J.,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) Because issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court, we do not reweigh
the evidence or exercise independent judgment; instead, we
determine if a reasonable trier of fact could find that the order is
appropriate. (Ibid.) With respect to the removal finding, which
must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, we consider
whether the “record as a whole contains substantial evidence
from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 996.) “The appellant has the burden of showing
there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support
the findings or orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195,
206.)
Father has not met that burden as to either the
jurisdictional finding or the disposition order. With respect to the
jurisdictional finding, father first maintains that he “did not
knowingly consume alcohol” and discounts mother’s statements
about his drinking. We do not reweigh the trial court’s credibility
determinations to the contrary. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p.
773.) Moreover, father’s ongoing refusal or inability to recognize
his poor judgment in transporting N. while intoxicated or, as he
alternatively suggested, so drowsy he fell asleep while driving,
poses a risk of harm to N. “One cannot correct a problem one
fails to acknowledge.” (In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
188, 197.) Father points out that “[n]o one told Father he looked

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unwell to drive,” but it is father’s responsibility as N.’s caregiver
to assess his own fitness to transport or care for N., and to make
necessary arrangements if he is unable to do so. To the extent
others did assess his ability to care for N., they unanimously
reported that father was “overwhelmed” and “crying out for help.”
The juvenile court was not required to “wait until a child is
seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps
necessary to protect the child.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 591, 602.)
Father also points to his enrollment and re-enrollment in
services, and his development of a safety plan. However, father’s
prompt participation in services, while commendable, was
nascent, and he remained in denial about the objective signs of
intoxication observed during the incident. (See In re A.F. (2016)
3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“‘[D]enial is a factor often relevant to
determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior
in the future without court supervision.”].) Additionally, the
court was permitted to treat father’s missed toxicology tests as
positive ones (see L.C. v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th
1021, 1036), and the safety plan does not address alcohol,
substances, or the transport of N. The juvenile court reasonably
could infer from this record that father’s sobriety remained
fragile, particularly given the numerous reports that he was
overwhelmed, and that jurisdiction over N. was necessary.
Father’s final argument relating to jurisdiction is that the
incident was an isolated one, akin to those in In re J.N. (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 1010 (J.N.) and In re Gilberto G. (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 52 (Gilberto G.), that did not create or demonstrate a
future risk of harm to N. We disagree. Unlike either of those
cases, which both involved single incidents of intoxicated parents

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transporting children—J.N. in a minivan, Gilberto G. on a public
bus—N. was the subject of an open dependency case when this
incident occurred. As DCFS argues, the crash “was yet another
example of father exercising incredibly poor judgment and
putting his child at substantial risk of suffering serious physical
harm.” Moreover, father “continued to minimize the seriousness
of the incident during the dependency proceedings” (In re M.R.
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 101, 107), notwithstanding his enrollment
in services prior to the jurisdictional hearing. There was also
evidence that N. had regressed while in his care. These facts set
the case apart from J.N., where “there was no evidence, and
there were no factual allegations, that either parent’s parenting
skills, general judgment, or understanding of the risks of
inappropriate alcohol use is so materially deficient that the
parent is unable ‘to adequately supervise or protect’ the
children.” (J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1026.) Father’s
circumstances also set them apart from Gilberto G., in which the
mother did not drive the children, there was minimal evidence
relating to a prior sustained petition from several years earlier,
and mother had six months of sobriety and cooperation between
the filing of the petition and the hearing. (See Gilberto G., supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 65.)
“In evaluating risk based upon a single episode of
endangering conduct, a juvenile court should consider the nature
of the conduct and all surrounding circumstances.” (J.N., supra,
181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1026.) “The nature and circumstances of a
single incident of harmful or potentially harmful conduct may be
sufficient, in a particular case, to establish current risk
depending on present circumstances.” (Ibid.) Here, the record
reflects that the juvenile court engaged in this careful

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consideration. Substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional
order.
Father also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the removal of N. at disposition. He contends there
was no evidence that N. would be at substantial risk of harm if
returned to him, or that there were no reasonable means to
protect N. without removal. Father largely makes the same
arguments he made with respect to jurisdiction: the collision was
an isolated incident; N. was not harmed in the collision; father
took responsibility for the incident, enrolled in services, and
prepared a safety plan; father agreed not to drive N. and had
transportation and childcare lined up for her; and his
unmonitored family time with N. after the incident was positive.
“In determining whether a child may be safely maintained
in the parent’s physical custody, the juvenile court may consider
the parent’s past conduct and current circumstances, and the
parent’s response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court
intervention.” (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332.)
Jurisdictional findings are prima facie evidence that a child
cannot remain safely in the home. (Ibid.; § 361, subd. (c)(1).) “A
removal order is proper if it is based on proof of (1) parental
inability to provide proper care for the minor and (2) potential
detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent.
[Citation.] The parent need not be dangerous, and the minor
need not have been harmed before removal is appropriate. The
focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re T.W.
(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163.)
Here, the substantial evidence supporting jurisdiction also
supports the order removing N. from father’s custody. The court
reasonably could find that N. remained at risk because father did

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not accept responsibility for the incident. The evidence also
supports the court’s conclusion that father was unable to reliably
transport N. to her current daycare and therapy programs, and
that she was likely to face detriment if her attendance at those
programs was interrupted. Based on these facts and the others
described above, we conclude the court's finding of substantial
danger to the child if left in father’s custody is supported by
substantial evidence, and we accordingly affirm the removal
order.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional finding and dispositional order are
affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, ACTING P. J.

We concur:

MORI, J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

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