CourtListener 10645600•People v. Chandra CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 7/31/25 P. v. Chandra CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085719
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. RIF2000290)
ANURAG CHANDRA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Valerie Navarro, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Visco & Selyem and Joshua Peter Visco, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson, and Junichi P. Semitsu, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
After deliberating for approximately two and one-half hours, a jury
convicted Anurag Chandra of three counts of murder in the first degree (Pen.
Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); counts 1, 2, and 3) and three counts of attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 4, 5, and 6). The court sentenced
Chandra to an aggregate term of 21 years to life in prison plus life without
the possibility of parole.
Chandra appeals, challenging a variety of prosecutorial conduct, the
efficacy of his counsel, evidentiary decisions, and the instructions received by
the jury. He further alleges that these purported errors, taken cumulatively,
denied him due process of law.
We conclude there was no error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The People’s Case-in-Chief
In January 2020, then 14-year-old J.I. gathered with five church
friends following Sunday services. The group included J.I.’s older brother,
Jacob, as well as Drake Ruiz, Daniel, J.H., and S.C. The boys planned a
sleepover in belated celebration of Jacob’s 18th birthday. They played games
and the group dared J.I. to either jump in the neighbor’s pool or “ding dong
ditch” and “moon” whoever answered the door. J.I. selecting the ding dong
dare, believing it to be the safer option.
To complete the dare, S.C. drove the boys in his Toyota Prius; J.I. sat in
the front seat. The four other boys sat in the back row. The group saw a
house that had LED lights visible from the street and assumed a teenager
lived there. J.I. believed it would be safer to select that house because a
teenager lived there; he was nervous about his task. With their selection
made, S.C. parked in front of the house and J.I. exited the car.
J.I. approached the house, knocked quietly on the door, rang the
doorbell, and lowered his pants to expose his buttocks. When J.I. heard
1 Further undesignated references are to the Penal Code.
2
someone begin opening the door, he ran back to the car. He identified
Chandra as the man who emerged from the residence and heard Chandra
following him. J.H. similarly identified Chandra as the man who left the
home. J.I. and J.H. explained that after the boys drove off, a white car, later
identified as Chandra’s Infinity, began following them. Similarly, S.C.
remembered a car making contact with the Prius at least twice, nudging the
Prius forward. J.I. described the car hitting the Prius “three or four” times.
At one point, the Infinity veered toward the Prius and S.C. pulled to
the side of the road and stopped briefly before reversing, turning around, and
driving away. After this encounter, S.C. described watching the car’s
headlights growing closer in his rear view mirror before he felt impact.
Security footage from nearby businesses revealed the Infinity closely
following the boys.
Following the Infinity making impact with it, the Prius hit a street
sign, telephone pole, and a large tree before coming to rest. Another driver
reported seeing a white car in the area with a “destroyed front” end, driving
without the headlights on and dragging its front bumper. After the driver
spotted the wrecked Prius, she stopped and directed her passenger to call for
emergency services. While they waited with the boys, she saw the white car
pass, slowing before it drove away.
Responding highway patrol officers Craig Mogi and Lucas Biczo found
the Prius pinned against a tree, with three of the boys, Jacob, Drake, and
Daniel, still inside in the back row of seats. The front passenger side of the
vehicle and the passenger side of the vehicle sustained “the bulk of the
damage.” One of the boys still in the car did not appear to be breathing and
was unresponsive; the other two were breathing but were similarly
unresponsive. Officers Mogi and Biczo were not able to extract the boys from
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the car and had to wait for fire department personnel to cut the roof of the
vehicle open to remove them. One of the boys was pronounced dead at the
scene and two were taken to the hospital, where they succumbed to their
injuries.
The three other boys, J.I., S.C., and J.H., were able to extricate
themselves from the crash and officers observed they bore injuries and were
disheveled, panicked, confused, and disoriented. J.I. testified he saw the
Infinity drive slowly past the crash site before driving away. J.H. testified to
hearing Drake choking on his blood before he crawled over the center console
and out the door J.I. opened. S.C. exited the vehicle from the driver’s door
and sat against the tree. One of the boys explained to Officer Mogi that the
Prius was hit by a vehicle that left the scene.
California Highway Patrol dispatched Officer Guillermo Martinez and
his partner to Chandra’s home shortly after the accident. They observed a
damaged white Infinity parked along the street in front of the residence,
partially obscured by trash cans. The officers received no reply after
knocking on Chandra’s door multiple times and established a perimeter.
Approximately three hours later, Chandra dialed 911, emerged from the
home, and was ultimately arrested. During an interview with police,
Chandra stated he drank a beer with his dinner.
An accident reconstruction expert, working for the California Highway
Patrol, located a partial license plate frame, temporary paper license plate,
and “Infinity” emblem near the Prius. The remainder of the license plate
frame was embedded in Chandra’s front bumper. The expert also identified
an impression on the Prius back bumper as made by that license plate frame.
When questioned on the matter, the expert testified that the evidence
did not indicate any pre-impact braking by the Prius. He also testified that
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the data from the Infinity revealed that five seconds before the crash, the car
traveled at 99 miles per hour. Two seconds before impact, the Infinity was
traveling 94 miles per hour, at which point the driver began to softly depress
the brake pedal. The expert opined that this was “not avoidance braking” or
“even slowing” for traffic braking. The data revealed that the Infinity veered
toward the right and then the left in the final second preceding impact. At
the moment of impact, the Infinity traveled at 88 miles per hour, faster than
the Prius, which traveled approximately 63 miles per hour.
B. Chandra’s Defense
Chandra elected to take the stand as the sole defense witness. On the
stand, he described drinking 12 beers on the night of the incident, a
departure from his statement to police that he had consumed “a beer.” He
testified that he heard “pounding” on his front door, asserting it made him
“alarmed” and “really, really[ ] afraid.” He said the family was not expecting
anyone that night, let alone a “man” in a hoodie with his pants pulled low,
“doing some hand signals to someone” in a car in front of the house. When
J.I. rang the doorbell, Chandra got “agitated” and concluded he was “probably
someone . . . targeting [his] family.” Chandra admitted J.I. was facing away
from the home when he opened the door and asserted J.I. ran back to the car
with his pants still down.
However, Chandra testified that his reaction to the prank was not just
fear. He admitted to becoming “extremely, extremely mad,” “like [his] blood
was boiling.” He described the ding dong ditch as “more of a pre-planned
assault on a family to really sexually harass someone by dropping their
pants.” He believed the prank was “simply unacceptable,” but did not dial
911. He described “a moral and legal and religious duty to stand up for [his]
family and for [his] daughters.”
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Chandra admitted to getting into his car and following the boys. He
stated that if he caught up to the car he “wanted to really express [his] anger”
and tell them to never come back. He felt compelled to hold the prankster
“accountable.” Consistent with that testimony, he agreed that he felt
“intense anger and rage” the entire time he was driving.
Despite his admitted rage, Chandra testified that he did not
intentionally make contact with the Prius. He reported the Prius sideswiping
his Infiniti before he got ahead of it and attempted to get it to stop. He
attributed his ability to get in front of the Prius to his “more powerful” car.
During cross-examination, he contradicted his earlier testimony and stated
he moved in front of the Prius so he could pull over to “assess” after the
supposed sideswiping. When his attempt to pull over or stop the Prius was
unsuccessful, he began to “basically follow” the Prius so he could “get their
license plate number.” During his testimony, he described being too
“enraged” to remember his cell phone when he left the house, but stated that
he would have borrowed a stranger’s cell phone to report the purported
assault and the license plate number.
While he admitted to “driving fast,” he described the Prius as “driving
very, very fast” and asserted the Prius was swerving. He testified that the
Prius suddenly “applied the brakes—[a] few seconds before the collision”
while he followed behind it, and that the braking was to “throw [him] off the
road.” Chandra stated that, in response to the supposed “brake check,” he
“immediately tried to swerve in order to avoid the contact,” but instead “had
an unfortunate collision.”
He saw the Prius against the tree in his rearview mirror, turned his car
around to get a better look, and left. He explained that he did not stop at the
scene because he “felt scared” and “didn’t want to be blamed.” He
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nevertheless drove past the collision again before driving home. When he
returned home, he testified that he parked the Infiniti on the street, behind
the trash bins he asserts his wife put out for collection during his absence,
went straight to his bedroom, calmed himself down, and “passed out.” He did
not call 911 at any point to report either the doorbell prank or the collision.
When he heard “loud banging” on his door at approximately 2:00 a.m.,
Chandra dialed 911, asserting he believed someone was there to hurt him.
Dispatch informed him there were police officers outside his door, who
ultimately arrested him.
Chandra continued to deny that he caused the collision that killed
Jacob, Daniel, and Drake, instead blaming S.C., the driver of the Prius.
C. The People’s Rebuttal
In rebuttal to Chandra’s version of events, the People called
Rodney Guetti and recalled two investigators. Guetti observed the wreck and
attempted to offer assistance to the boys. When Guetti concluded he could
not help extricate the boys from the car, he focused instead on finding the
vehicle others described as being involved. He followed a trail of debris and
fluid back to Chandra’s house, where he observed Chandra emerge from the
Infiniti. He inquired whether Chandra knew what he had just done, to which
Chandra provided a mumbled response. After watching a woman put trash
bins in front of the Infiniti and taking photographs, Guetti returned to the
scene of the crash.
DISCUSSION
A. Prosecutorial Conduct
Chandra alleges a variety of prosecutorial actions amounted to
reversible error. We disagree with his characterizations.
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1. Doyle2 Violation
Chandra alleges the prosecutor committed a Doyle violation.
Specifically, he details three incidents he believes impermissibly referenced
Chandra’s postarrest silence: (1) inquiring whether an audio recording
contained “the entirety of . . . the pertinent facts” from his interview with
police, (2) inquiring whether he told investigators about the doorbell prank,
and (3) impeaching Chandra’s testimony that he consumed 12 beers on the
night of the incident. The People argue any such error was forfeited and,
further, that there was no Doyle error because the prosecutor only asked
about Chandra’s pre-Miranda invocation silence. The People have the better
argument.
On the record before us, we conclude Chandra forfeited any alleged
Doyle violation by failing to object below. However, because Chandra also
challenges the efficacy of counsel around the failure to object, we consider the
merits of his argument and conclude no Doyle violation occurred.
a. Additional Factual Background
During the People’s cross-examination of Chandra, they introduced a
13-minute recording of his initial interview. At the start of that interview,
investigators read Chandra his Miranda3 rights and he acknowledged that
he understood each of the rights included in the advisement. Chandra then
continued answering questions from the police.
The exhibit ended before Chandra invoked his right to silence and the
parties stipulated to its use.
2 Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610 (Doyle).
3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
8
During his direct examination, Chandra testified that he consumed 12
beers on the night of the incident. This contradicted a statement he made to
police about having just one beer that night, memorialized in the originally
omitted portion of the interview. The court allowed the People to introduce a
very limited section of the interview for impeachment purposes―the
statement that he consumed one beer.
b. Analysis
“In Doyle, the United States Supreme Court held that it was a violation
of due process and fundamental fairness to use a defendant’s postarrest
silence following Miranda warnings to impeach the defendant’s trial
testimony.” (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 203.) When a defendant
is given a Miranda warning, he is informed that his silence, or refusal to
answer questions posed by law enforcement, will not be used against him.
(People v. Lewis (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 246, 256.) Given that representation,
a prosecutor that later comments on the defendant’s silence―or failure to
answer questions or disclose exculpatory facts or evidence―after the
defendant has been arrested and read a Miranda warning may violate the
defendant’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doyle,
supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 619–620.) Such errors are commonly referred to as
Doyle errors, and a prosecutor can commit a prejudicial Doyle error by asking
a single question that improperly refers to the defendant’s silence. (Lewis,
supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 256.)
However, if the defendant waives his Miranda rights and voluntarily
speaks to law enforcement, the defendant has not chosen to remain silent.
(Evid. Code, §§ 769, 770, 780, subd. (h), 1235; Anderson v. Charles (1980)
447 U.S. 404, 408.) In such cases, anything the defendant does say, including
any statements that are inconsistent with the defendant’s testimony later at
9
trial, may be used to impeach the defendant’s credibility. (Anderson, at
p. 408; People v. Hurd (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1093–1094; United States
v. Hale (1975) 422 U.S. 171, 176.)
Here, Chandra voluntarily continued speaking with police after they
read him his Miranda rights―he did not initially elect to remain silent.
Subsequently, Chandra testified at trial and the People impeached his
credibility by pointing out that he did not tell the police of the doorbell prank
during his voluntary statement, and by highlighting the inconsistent
statements regarding how much alcohol he consumed. It is clear the purpose
of the allegedly improper questions was not to imply that Chandra’s
invocation and eventual silence indicated his guilt, but rather to impeach his
credibility by pointing out gaps and differences between his postarrest
statement, offered immediately after the event, and his testimony at trial
years later. (See People v. Champion (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1448,
1450–1451; People v. Cartwright (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 402, 415 [“A
defendant testifying on his own behalf at a criminal trial exposes himself to
cross-examination and to explanation concerning his credibility and the
reliability of his testimony.”].)
Chandra’s other challenge, to the question of whether the excerpt was
“the entirety . . . of the pertinent facts that came out during [his] interview,”
similarly fails. Chandra affirmed the excerpt to be all the pertinent facts
and, on his own accord, offered to the jury that “there were more
conversations” and “more questions asked.” However, neither the question
nor the unresponsive answer Chandra offered informed the jury that
Chandra exercised his right to remain silent; he effectively stated that there
were additional questions and conversations that were not pertinent. The
prosecutor confirmed those details on the record, asking, “Yes or no. Is the
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entirety of the pertinent questions and answers regarding the incident on
January 19, 2020, has that been presented to the jury in your interview?”
Chandra replied that it was.
On this record, it is clear that the People did not impermissibly
highlight Chandra’s invocation or impeach him with his protected silence.
2. Other Conduct
Chandra also describes what he perceives to be prosecutorial
misconduct, specifically asserting the People reduced their burden of proof,
improperly stated the law regarding inconsistent statements, and
impermissibly highlighted the fact that Chandra’s family did not testify for
his defense These, he asserts, rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct
and merit reversal. Chandra uses the term “misconduct” which “ ‘is
somewhat of a misnomer to the extent that it suggests a prosecutor must act
with a culpable state of mind.’ ” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659,
666–667 (Centeno).)
To preserve a claim of prosecutorial error for appeal, “ ‘a criminal
defendant must make a timely and specific objection and ask the trial court
to admonish the jury to disregard the impropriety.’ ” (People v. Clark (2011)
52 Cal.4th 856, 960.) “The failure to timely object and request an admonition
will be excused if doing either would have been futile, or if an admonition
would not have cured the harm.” (Ibid.) However, “[a] prosecutor’s
misstatements of law are generally curable by an admonition from the court.”
(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 674.)
Although Chandra raises these issues now, he concedes he made no
objections below. Nothing in the record indicates an objection or request for
an admonition would have been futile. Chandra’s claims of prosecutorial
11
error were therefore forfeited. Even assuming he preserved the issues for
appeal, the challenged statements do not constitute prosecutorial error.
First, Chandra alleges the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof.
He argues that when the prosecutor described the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, he “undoubtedly misstated and lessened the prosecution’s burden
of proof.” In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “Many of
you―probably all of you have some questions still because this is a human
endeavor. This is a real thing that really happened that we’re looking for
justice for. This is not CSI. There is always going to be questions in any
human endeavor. Questions don’t mean it’s not proven to you. ¶ ‘Beyond a
reasonable doubt’ very simply means you have an abiding conviction. That
just means when you ask yourself in your heart, What do I think happened?
In your heart, you feel he’s guilty and that feeling sticks with you. It’s an
abiding conviction. It’s not, What happened? Well, I think he’s guilty.
Maybe not. That wouldn’t be fair. But beyond a reasonable doubt simply
means that your confirmation, your belief abides with you. It is a sustained
belief. That’s what it means.”
“[I]t is improper for the prosecutor to misstate the law generally
[citation], and particularly to attempt to absolve the prosecution from its
prima facie obligation to overcome reasonable doubt on all elements.” (People
v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 831.) Although a showing of bad faith by
the prosecutor is not required (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 822),
Chandra “must show that, ‘[i]n the context of the whole argument and the
instructions’ [citation], there was ‘a reasonable likelihood the jury understood
or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.
[Citations.] In conducting this inquiry, we “do not lightly infer” that the jury
drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the
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prosecutor’s statements.’ ” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.) If, when
viewed in context, the prosecutor’s challenged comments “ ‘would have been
taken by a juror to state or imply nothing harmful, [then] they obviously
cannot be deemed objectionable.’ ” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101,
130.) Applying these principles, we do not find the prosecutor’s statements
regarding proof beyond a reasonable doubt to be error.
Prior to closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury and
specifically advised: “You must follow the law as I explain it to you . . . . If
you believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law conflict with my
instructions, you must follow my instructions.” The trial court also
explained: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an
abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate
all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt.” They were also twice instructed that, “Nothing that the
attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements and closing
arguments, the attorneys discuss the case, but their remarks are not
evidence.”
Contrary to Chandra’s arguments on appeal, the prosecutor did not
improperly attempt to diminish the People’s burden of proof. Considering the
statement and the instructions that jury received, there is no reasonable
likelihood the jury would have understood the prosecutor’s remarks to reduce
the burden of proof or to contradict the unchallenged instruction they
received. (See Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.)
Second, Chandra alleges that the prosecutor misstated the law
regarding inconsistent statements. He specifically challenges the
prosecutor’s statement: “Not one witness in this case told you that they
picked a house based on whether or not there was a pickup truck. You heard
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about it a lot, but not one witness ever said that. Investigator Cuevas said
that he believed [S.C.] said that, but then he reviewed [S.C.]’s transcript, and
[S.C.] didn’t say that. So I want to emphasize this. The evidence comes from
what the witnesses say.” He argues now that “[i]t was for the jury to
determine whether to accept Officer Cuevas’s testimony on this point about
what he was told,” citing to Evidence Code section 1235 and CALCRIM
No. 318.
The jury received CALCRIM No. 318, advising them: “You have heard
evidence of statements that a witness made before the trial. If you decide
that the witness made those statements, you may use those statements” in
listed, permissible ways. Again, Chandra concedes his counsel did not object
to the prosecutor’s statement or request any curative instruction. The
prosecutor’s argument did not misstate the law; instead, the prosecutor
clarified what constitutes evidence and summarized what Officer Cuevas’s
testimony consisted of. Further, the prosecutor’s summary did not contradict
the instruction the jury received on that point from the court.
Finally, Chandra alleges the prosecutor misled the jury when he
questioned why Chandra did not call logical witnesses, asserting the People
told the jury they were barred from calling his spouse or children. We note
that he does not quarrel with the People’s right to comment on his failure to
call logical witnesses, but rather with the prosecutor’s explanation for why
the People did not call his family themselves. During his closing argument,
the prosecutor stated: “Look. It’s our burden to prove this case, every
element of it, and we embrace that burden. But both sides get to call
witnesses. You can ask yourself which witnesses were called and which ones
weren’t? That’s a logical question. If Mr. Chandra was in his house drinking
all day or all night, it would be logical to expect [his wife or children] to
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testify.” Later, he returned to the topic, asking: “Where is [his wife]; right?
Where is she? I don’t know. I don’t know. You should all be asking yourself
that question.” After questioning why Chandra did not call those logical
witnesses, he explained why the People did not: “There are rules of evidence,
like marital privilege, spousal privilege, spousal communications. And not to
mention that [his wife] has a Fifth Amendment right as well, just like
Mr. Chandra. Because if she did anything to obstruct justice in this case, or
to be an accessory after the fact, like moving that trash bin, or who knows
what else, she would have a Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify.”
Chandra complains that the privileges his wife held were not
impediments to the People calling his family to testify and that the
prosecutor failed to make that clear. Specifically, he argues that because he
and his wife were legally separated, they were neither spouses nor married
people as contemplated by the law. He alleges that his wife could have
testified to his actions or to communications made within earshot of their
children that could not be confidential. Finally, he asserts the People could
have resolved the issue of his wife’s Fifth Amendment rights by offering her
immunity. Taken together, he argues the prosecutor inaccurately
represented that he had no means by which to secure her testimony. He also
highlights that his children were not shielded by the same privileges enjoyed
by his wife.
“California recognizes two marital privileges. First a spouse may
refuse to testify against the other spouse (spousal testimony privilege.)
(Evid. Code, § 970.) Second, a spouse may refuse to disclose or may prevent
the other spouse from disclosing confidential communications between them
during their marriage (marital communications privilege). (Evid. Code,
§ 980.)” (People v. Sinohui (2002) 28 Cal.4th 205, 208.)
15
It is an inescapable fact that Chandra and his wife were legally
married at the time of trial. The marital privilege codified in Evidence Code
section 970 survives “until the marriage is dissolved by a final judgment of
dissolution even though the marriage became nonviable years before.
([Citation].) The privilege is not available after the marital relationship is
terminated by divorce.” (People v. Barefield (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 890, 901,
italics added.) We must conclude, therefore, that Chandra’s wife still enjoyed
spousal testimony privilege at the time of trial.
Similarly, there is nothing on the record before us to suggest that
section 980 of the Evidence Code, regarding the marital communications
privilege, would not apply. Section 980 of the Evidence Code states: “Subject
to Section 912 and except as otherwise provided in this article, a spouse . . . ,
whether or not a party, has a privilege during the marital or domestic
partnership relationship and afterwards to refuse to disclose, and to prevent
another from disclosing, a communication if he or she claims the privilege
and the communication was made in confidence between him or her and the
other spouse while they were spouses.” (Italics added.) It is clear, then, that
the prosecutor did not err by observing that Chandra’s wife held privilege
that could prevent her from testifying against him.
We turn to the matter of the Fifth Amendment. Chandra asserts that
the People could have offered Chandra’s wife immunity in order to compel her
testimony over any claims of privilege. He relies on this possibility to argue
that the People misstated the facts and misrepresented whether they had
any means by which to secure his wife’s testimony. The prosecutor did not
state that he had no means by which to secure her testimony. Instead, he
observed “she has a Fifth Amendment right as well, just like Mr. Chandra.”
Chandra advances no law or facts that suggests his wife did not have a Fifth
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Amendment right against self-incrimination at the time of trial, or that
otherwise undermine the veracity of the prosecutor’s statement.
Chandra briefly argues that he “was not married to his daughters” at
the time of trial, so it was error for the prosecutor to “conflate [his] wife and
her issues with the question of [his] daughters.” The jury received
instruction on using the ordinary meanings of words. No reasonable juror
would extrapolate that the “marital privilege, spousal privilege, [and] spousal
communications” referred to Chandra’s daughters. The People’s argument
was narrow―calling into question why Chandra did not call his wife to testify
and delving into specific concerns around her Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. Regarding Chandra’s children, the prosecutor reminded
the jury only that they “[we]re uncooperative” and “wouldn’t talk to law
enforcement.”
In total, we conclude the prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial error
by highlighting the logical witnesses that Chandra could have called, or by
truthfully explaining the privileges some of them may have held and why the
People did not call them to testify.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
“ ‘ “A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the assistance of
counsel by both the state and federal Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 6th
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) ‘Construed in lights of its purpose, the
right entitles the defendant not to some bare assistances but rather to
effective assistance.’ ([Citation], italics in original.) In order to demonstrate
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show counsel’s
performance was ‘deficient’ because his ‘representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms.’ ” ’ ” (In
re Richardson (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 647, 657.)
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“ ‘We presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised
reasonable professional judgment in making significant trial decisions.’ ”
(People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 261.) “A claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel based on a trial attorney’s failure to make a motion or
objection must demonstrate not only the absence of a tactical reason for the
omission [citation], but also that the motion or objection would have been
meritorious if the defendant is to bear his burden of demonstrating that it is
reasonably probable that absent the omission a determination more favorable
to defendant would have resulted.” (People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826,
876, italics added.)
We note that “ ‘deciding whether to object is inherently tactical, and the
failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance.’ ” (People v.
Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 985.) Counsel may, in the exercise of their
professional judgment, determine that an objection would not result in a
more favorable determination for their client. (Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 690; accord, People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081,
1105.)
The People did not commit a Doyle violation by impermissibly
impeaching Chandra with his post-Miranda silence. Similarly, the
prosecutors did not commit error meriting challenge. We therefore conclude
Chandra has not met his burden of showing ineffective assistance of counsel.
His counsel could have reasonably determined, under established laws, that
objections at the time of trial would be unmeritorious.
C. Evidentiary Decisions
1. Chandra’s Statement
Chandra challenges the admission of his statements to investigators,
discussed briefly above with respect to Doyle errors. He asserts he was
18
deceived and participated in the interview against his will because the officer
asked biographical questions before transitioning to inquiring about the
incident. Chandra’s argument regarding deception is structured exclusively
around the officer building rapport with him. He argues that because the
statements were obtained through deception, they were obtained in violation
of Miranda.
a. Additional Factual Background
At the start of his interview, Officer Cuevas first asked for Chandra’s
name and birthdate. After getting those details, Officer Cuevas explained:
“[CUEVAS]: So I’m, uh, I’m—I’m investigating a traffic collision
that happened today. Okay? I talked to a lot of different
witnesses. Um, I got a pretty big picture[ ] of what happened.
Um, there is—There’s two sides to every story. Uh, I am looking
to find out exactly what happened. Um, you’re a big piece to the
puzzle. Your information is important to this investigation and
what you have to offer. Um, other people have been willing to
help us out by telling us what they know and we got witnesses.
Uh, we got the people that were driving another vehicle. Um, but
I want you to help out as well.
“[CHANDRA]: Yes, Sir.
“[CUEVAS]: Okay? Um, before we start, I wanna read you
something. Uh, okay so you know as you are in handcuffs and
you are here at my station, I have to read you your Miranda
Rights. Uh, you have the right to remain silent. Do you
understand that?
“[CHANDRA]: Yes, Sir.
“[CUEVAS]: Anything you say may be used against you in court.
Do you understand that? Is that a yes?
“[CHANDRA]: Yes, Sir.
“[CUEVAS]: You have the right to the presence of an attorney
before and during any questioning. Do you understand?
19
“[CHANDRA]: Uh, yes, Sir.
“[CUEVAS:] If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed free of charge before any questions if you want. Do you
understand?
“[CHANDRA]: Yes.”
Officer Cuevas then asked for Chandra’s address and additional
background information before discussing the night of the incident. The
admitted portion of the interview were the first 13 minutes.
b. Analysis
A defendant’s statements to police during a custodial interrogation are
inadmissible to establish his guilt unless the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived the right to remain silent and to the presence and
assistance of counsel. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475.) An interrogation
must end if the suspect indicates the desire to remain silent or to consult an
attorney, and any statements contained thereafter may not be admitted
against the accused during trial. (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707,
709.) “[A] suspect who desires to waive his Miranda rights and submit to
interrogation by law enforcement need not do so with any particular words or
phrases. A valid waiver need not be of predetermined form, but instead must
reflect that the suspect in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights
delineated in the Miranda decision.” (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636,
667 (Cruz).) “A suspect’s expressed willingness to answer questions after
acknowledging an understanding of his or her Miranda rights has itself been
held sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of such rights.” (Ibid.) “ ‘In
general, if a custodial suspect, having heard and understood a full
explanation of his or her Miranda rights, then makes an uncompelled and
uncoerced decision to talk, he or she has thereby knowingly, voluntarily, and
20
intelligently waived them.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1184, 1216 (Parker).)
After Chandra was properly admonished of his Miranda rights, he
elected to continue speaking with police. He did not indicate a desire to
remain silent or speak with an attorney. Although his waiver was not of
some “predetermined form,” it was nevertheless a waiver. (Cruz, supra,
44 Cal.4th at p. 667.) That is, he expressed a “willingness to answer
questions after acknowledging an understanding of his . . . Miranda rights.”
(Ibid.) He heard a full recitation of his rights, acknowledged understanding
them and made an “ ‘uncompelled and uncoerced decision to talk.’ ” (Parker,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1216.) We must therefore conclude he “ ‘knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waived’ ” his Miranda rights. (Ibid.)
We are unpersuaded by Chandra’s claim that Officer Cuevas used
“psychological ploys . . . so coercive that the[y] tend[ed] to produce a
statement that is involuntary.” He contends that Officer Cuevas used
“deception . . . through the implied benefit of faster processing, access to
consular officials in [India], and, if needed, medical treatment.” Further, he
attacks questions Officer Cuevas asked about Chandra’s children, alleging
they were coercive because Chandra “would have an interest in answering
[questions] to ensure that they were looked after if he were to remain in
custody.” However, he cites no authority to support his contention that
transitioning from biographical questions to questions about a fatal car crash
constitutes deception. We nevertheless evaluate whether Chandra’s implied
waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary.
“The test for the voluntariness of a custodial statement is whether the
statement is ‘ “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice” ’
or whether the defendant’s ‘ “will has been overborne and his capacity for
21
self-determination critically impaired” ’ by coercion.” (People v. Cunningham
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 642.) “Relevant considerations include ‘ “the crucial
element of police coercion [citation]; the length of the interrogation [citation];
its location [citation]; its continuity” as well as “the defendant’s maturity
[citation]; education [citation]; physical condition [citation]; and mental
health.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 642–643.)
The record here establishes that Chandra’s will was not overborne and
his statements were not coerced. It is undoubtedly true that Officer Cuevas
sought to establish a rapport with Chandra, asking background questions
before transitioning into inquiries regarding the incident. However, building
rapport is not impermissible. (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063,
1081, 1086–1087; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 447.) In
contradiction to Chandra’s argument on appeal, Officer Cuevas never
discussed faster processing or consular officials during the 13-minute
interview. Indeed, he clarifies: “I’m not going to badger you. I’m not gonna
mistreat you, okay?” During the short interview, Officer Cuevas established
that Chandra earned his master’s degree at a university in England,
inferring he was comfortable proceeding in English. He inquired into
whether Chandra was physically well or on any substances. In short, Officer
Cuevas addressed the considerations relevant to whether Chandra’s Miranda
waiver was voluntary before turning to the topic of the crash.
Because Chandra impliedly waived his Miranda rights and did so
freely, we conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the statements
Chandra made to police.
2. Excluded Evidence
Chandra challenges the court’s refusal to admit evidence that the boys
were contributorily negligent. He focuses his argument on the court’s
22
decision to prohibit him from soliciting additional testimony regarding
seatbelt usage and the maximum weight capacity of the Prius. The court
prevented defense counsel from exploring the details of a theory of
contributory negligence. He contends that trial court’s constraints denied
him the ability to cross-examine the People’s witnesses and, thus, denied him
his right to due process.
Only relevant evidence―evidence “having any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action” (Evid. Code, § 210)―is admissible at trial. (Id.,
§ 250.) Even if relevant, the court has discretion to “exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.” (Id., § 352.) We review Evidence Code section 352
decisions for abuse of discretion. (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 643.)
“As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence”―including
Evidence Code section 352―“do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s
right to present a defense.” (People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834.)
“Although completely excluding evidence of an accused’s defense theoretically
could rise to this level, excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary
point does not impair an accused’s due process right to present a defense.”
(People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1103.)
As relevant here, contributory actions do not absolve a defendant of
responsibility for murder. (See People v. Caldwell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, 219–
221.) A defendant “cannot obtain exoneration by claiming the victim should
have reacted differently or more prudently.” (People v. Armitage (1987)
194 Cal.App.3d 405, 421.) In People v. Marlin (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 559,
23
570, a defendant, who collided with another car while driving under the
influence of alcohol, was criminally liable for the victim’s injuries despite the
potential that she might have been drinking as well. Indeed, our colleagues
in the Third District explicitly rejected the defendant’s premise “that he was
not guilty of a crime because [his victim] might have avoided the accident.”
(Id. at p. 569.) Such contributory negligence relieves an accused of liability
only when it was the “sole or superseding” cause of death. (People v. Autry
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 360.) Chandra does not contend that either the
lack of seatbelts for every occupant or the total weight of the Prius was the
sole and superseding cause of death.
Here, we see no abuse of discretion or constitutional violation. The fact
that the Prius had only five seatbelts while it carried six occupants was
already before the jury. Similarly, the jury heard that the “gross vehicle
weight rating” for the Prius was 3,615 pounds and the total estimated weight
on the night of the fatal crash was 3,612 pounds. Testimony beyond those
facts, elicited on cross examination to develop the theory of contributory
negligence, would serve only to confuse the issues or mislead the jury. Such
testimony could serve only to imply to the jury that being unrestrained in the
vehicle, or being at or exceeding the total gross vehicle weight rating,
somehow superseded Chandra ramming the car as the cause of death for
three boys.
The seatbelt and weight issues are severable from Chandra’s
contentions regarding causation. Chandra maintained that S.C.’s driving
caused the fatal collision. However, neither unrestrained passengers nor
total weight go to the issue of whether brake checking caused the accident.
We therefore conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
additional evidence about the use of seatbelts and weight of the Prius.
24
D. Jury Instructions
Chandra also alleges the jury was improperly instructed and, as a
result of these supposed errors, his right to due process was abridged.
On review, we determine independently whether substantial evidence
supported a requested jury instruction. (People v. Shelmire (2005)
130 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1055.)
1. Kill Zone
The prosecution requested the jury receive the “kill zone” instruction,4
which Chandra contended and now maintains was not required on the facts
of this case. He argues that the instruction was inappropriate because he did
not know how many people were in the Prius and therefore could not
maintain a specific intent to kill them.
An instruction on the kill zone theory is warranted “if there was
substantial evidence in the record that, if believed by the jury, would support
a reasonable inference that defendants intended to kill everyone within the
‘kill zone.’ ” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 609–610 (Canizales).)
As applied here, there must be: (1) evidence regarding the circumstances of
Chandra’s (attack) on J.I. “that would support a reasonable inference” that he
intentionally created a zone of fatal harm around J.I., and (2) evidence that
4 The relevant portion of the instruction read: “A person may intend to
kill a primary target and also secondary targets within a zone of fatal harm
or ‘kill zone.’ A ‘kill zone’ is an area in which the defendant used lethal force
that was designed and intended to kill everyone in the area around the
primary target. In order to convict the defendant of the attempted murder of
[S.C.] and [J.H.], the People must prove that the defendant not only intended
to kill [J.I.], but also either intended to kill [S.C.] and [J.H.], or intended to
kill everyone within the kill zone. ¶ In determining whether the defendant
intended to kill [S.C.] and [J.H.], the People must prove that (1) the only
reasonable conclusion from the defendant’s use of reasonable force, is that the
defendant intended to create a kill zone; and (2) [S.C.] and [J.H.] were located
within the kill zone.”
25
the other boys were “located within that zone of fatal harm.” (Id. at p. 610.)
Such evidence, taken together, would permit a finding that Chandra
harbored the requisite intent to kill the five other boys “because [they were]
within the zone of fatal harm.” (Ibid.)
We are unpersuaded by Chandra’s argument that the instruction was
inappropriate because he did not know how many people were in the Prius; it
is not necessary that Chandra knew the precise number of people in the kill
zone. (See e.g., People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 140 [a person placing a
bomb on an airplane with the intent to kill any passengers would be guilty of
the kill zone attempted murder of everyone on that plane, notwithstanding
the person’s ignorance of who was on the manifest or how many individuals
would board that plane].) The fact that Chandra did not or could not see all
of his victims “did not somehow negate [his] express malice or intent to kill as
to those victims who were present and in harm’s way, but fortuitously were
not killed.” (People v. Vang (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554, 564.) The focus
remains, instead, on Chandra’s intent to create a zone of fatal harm around
J.I.
Chandra described his anger toward J.I. and his desire to follow him
and hold him “accountable” for the prank. He watched J.I. make hand
motions at someone in the car before J.I. returned to the passenger side of the
Prius. He also repeatedly described trying to find and stop “them” and
determine where “they” had gone, even though he identified the doorbell
ringer as a single male. Chandra also described angrily following the Prius,
the power superiority his car held over the Prius, and connecting with the
back of the Prius while he was driving more than double the posted speed
limit. He admitted that the Prius subsequently left the roadway and collided
with a tree. That testimony supports an inference that Chandra targeted J.I.
26
and that Chandra knew there was at least one other occupant of the vehicle
beyond his target. Therefore, substantial evidence supports giving a kill zone
instruction because the evidence would permit a finding that Chandra
intended to create a zone of fatal harm around J.I. as the primary target in
retaliation for what he described as preplanned assault—mooning him. (See
Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 610.)
2. CALCRIM No. 371
Chandra next quarrels with the court’s decision to instruct the jury
regarding consciousness of guilt using CALCRIM No. 371.5 He contends the
instruction was erroneously given because the People did not separately
present evidence that Chandra prevented anyone from testifying against
him. At trial, he objected only because “it requires a showing that [Chandra]
suppressed or fabricated evidence.” Now, his argument focuses exclusively on
the portion of the instruction regarding discouraging a witness from
testifying, specifically his wife and daughters.
We conclude the instruction was appropriate because sufficient
evidence supported it. “A trial court properly gives consciousness of guilt
instructions where there is some evidence in the record that, if believed by
the jury, would sufficiently support the inference suggested in the
instructions.” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 921.) The facts
5 CALCRIM No. 371, as given, reads: “If the defendant tried to hide
evidence or discourage someone from testifying against him, that conduct
may show that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant
made such an attempt, it is up to you to decide its meaning and importance.
However, evidence of such an attempt cannot prove guilt by itself. ¶ If the
defendant tried to create false evidence or obtain false testimony, that
conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the
defendant made such an attempt, it is up to you to decide its meaning and
importance. However, evidence of such an attempt cannot prove guilt by
itself.”
27
giving rise to an inference of consciousness of guilt need not be conclusively
established before the instruction may be given; there need only be some
evidence in the record that would sufficiently support the suggested
inference. (Ibid.)
Chandra placed his wife in the critical moments of the night at issue.
He testified that there were loud repeated bangs on their door that scared
her. He implied she could confirm that he drank a case of beers prior to the
ding dong ditch. Chandra testified that his wife put the trash bins out as
part of the usual waste collection schedule and that he parked his damaged
car behind them. A rebuttal witness described a woman pulling the trash
cans in front of Chandra’s mangled car in the minutes after the accident―not
that he pulled up behind them as he implied. While Chandra was in custody,
he called his wife to explain what they reportedly witnessed together―to
confirm with her what they experienced and what he told police.
Together, this evidence supported the instruction given, even as to
discouraging witnesses from testifying. That is, a reasonable juror could
infer that Chandra provided a version of the night’s events that he wished his
wife to go along with―requiring she perjure herself―or, in the alternative,
that he was instructing her to not testify and contradict him. Accordingly, we
conclude the court did not err by instructing the jury using CALCRIM
No. 371. (People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1236.)
28
3. Pinpoint Instruction
The final error Chandra alleges regarding jury instruction involves the
court’s decision to deny the pinpoint instruction he requested.6 The proposed
instruction incorrectly stated that if the jury did not believe Chandra
intentionally hit the Prius, they must acquit him of all charges.
When a pinpoint instruction incorrectly states the law, denying the
instruction is not error. (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 53.)
Chandra was charged with three counts of first degree murder and
three counts of attempted murder. Second degree murder is a lesser included
offense of first degree murder. (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 827.)
Consistent with theories of second degree murder, the jury received
instruction on express malice and implied malice murder. As the People
argue in their briefs, even if Chandra’s contentions about sideswiping and
brake checking were true and he did not intend to strike the Prius, he could
still be convicted under an implied malice theory of second degree murder.
That is, a reasonable fact finder could determine he intentionally and
deliberately drove more than 90 miles per hour in a 40-mile per hour zone,
chased down a car he concedes was much less powerful and followed closely
6 The proposed pinpoint instruction read: “The People allege that the
defendant intentionally―and by that I mean on purpose―struck the Toyota
Prius with his car. ¶ To find the defendant guilty of any of the crimes he is
charged with, or any lesser included offenses he is charged with, you must
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant struck the Toyota Prius
with his car intentionally, that is, on purpose. ¶ If you believe that the
defendant struck the Toyota Prius by accident, or by mistake, or by ordinary
negligence of carelessness, or if you have any reasonable doubt as to whether
the defendant struck the Toyota Prius with his car intentionally, that is on
purpose, the defendant is not guilty of all of the crimes he is charged with,
including all lesser offenses, and, accordingly, you must find the defendant
not guilty.”
29
behind it due to his reported rage. A reasonable jury could further conclude
he knew the natural and probable consequences of that act were dangerous to
human life. It follows that because Chandra could still be convicted on a
theory of implied malice second degree murder, the pinpoint instruction he
offered was an incorrect statement of the law and the trial court properly
denied it.
E. Cumulative Error
Finally, having found no error, we do not consider Chandra’s claims of
cumulative error. (See People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 704.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
KELETY, J.
30
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