CourtListener 10645596•People v. Knowles CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 7/31/25 P. v. Knowles CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B336296
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA154553)
v.
JOSEPH MEKHI KNOWLES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Affirmed.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Joseph Knowles of first degree murder and
found that he personally used a gun. At his trial, the prosecution
introduced gang evidence, even though Knowles was not charged
with a gang allegation. On appeal, Knowles contends there is
insufficient evidence he shot and killed the victim and
premeditated. He further contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting gang evidence, erred in denying a
mistrial motion, and erred in failing to instruct the jury on
voluntary manslaughter and on the provocation that reduces a
first degree murder to second degree murder. We reject all of
Knowles’s contentions and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. Evidence at trial
Knowles was charged with the murder of Edward Jenkins.
The prosecutor’s theory of the case was Knowles shot and killed
the victim during a gang confrontation. However, the People did
not allege a gang enhancement against Knowles.
A. The shooting at the strip mall
On June 9, 2020, at around 9:30 p.m., the victim Edward
Jenkins was with his sibling Deshun Jenkins,1 Raquel Keaton,
and Sandra Garcia2 outside of Imperial Liquor Land, which was
in a strip mall at South Vermont Avenue and Imperial Highway.
Vincent Jones, the store’s security guard, was also there that
night.
1
We refer to the Jenkins siblings by their first names to
avoid confusion.
2
Garcia and Edward have a child together.
2
Deshun abused drugs and was living in a tent nearby.
Edward had come to see Deshun that night. According to
Deshun, they associated with Pimptown, which Deshun said was
not a gang but was about “the ladies” and doing “licks and shit
like that.”
Edward and the others were hanging out in the strip mall’s
parking lot when a group of people crossed Vermont. Keaton
estimated there were 10 to 15 people in the group. In a
statement to police given soon after the incident, Deshun said
that the group yelled, “Denver Lanes.” But at trial, Deshun said
the group was “gangbangin’ on cars” and yelling “ ‘Blood’ ” and
“ ‘Bounty Hunters.’ ” Deshun explained that the people could
have been from Denver Lane but were yelling the name of a
different gang, Bounty Hunters. Garcia heard someone from a
car yell back, “ ‘Oh, fuck you, Blood. On Denver Lane, get your
ass beat.’ ”
Members of the group went into the liquor store. When
they came out, they asked everyone where they were from. Some
of the group approached Deshun and Edward. The group accused
Deshun and Edward of gangbanging, being from Pimptown, and
being the “ ‘Crip niggas we lookin’ for.’ ” Edward responded,
“ ‘Yeah, y’all know what it is. Y’all know who I am’ ” and that he
was Pimptown. Deshun assumed that Edward had a prior beef
with the group because they seemed to target Edward.
Two men came from the strip mall parking lot area about a
minute after the main group and joined that main group in
confronting Edward. Jones testified that one of the men who
came from the parking lot area wore a black hoodie and had a
gun. Keaton said that these two men asked her where she was
from.
3
A fight quickly broke out. Keaton and Deshun said that
they and their friends did not throw the first punch. Instead,
Deshun told detectives that the man who threw the first punch
wore a grayish-black sweatshirt with no hood, was over six feet
tall, and had short dreads. Deshun also testified that a man
wearing a black hoodie and dark blue or black pants tried to pull
out something chrome-colored that could have been a gun, but
somebody stopped him or he changed his mind. Edward ran
between parked cars, near a walkway fronting the stores in the
strip mall.
Deshun heard multiple gunshots and a second gun being
fired. Deshun could tell it was a different gun because it was
“shooting faster” and “more heavy artillery.”
Garcia was with Edward. She told the shooter, who wore a
black hoodie, to stop because “ ‘He’s handicapped.’ ”3 But the
shooter said, “ ‘I don’t give a fuck.’ ”
Edward died from a gunshot wound to the head. He also
had a graze wound on his calf.
B. Identifications
The security guard, Jones, told police after the shooting
that the shooter wore a black hoodie, but Jones could not identify
the shooter. Keaton also did not see Edward get shot or the
shooter.
On June 12, 2020, which was several days after the
shooting, Deshun and Garcia separately identified Knowles from
photographic six-packs. Deshun identified Knowles as the man
with a gun; however, Deshun did not see the actual shooting and
3
Edward could not see out of one eye.
4
therefore could not say Knowles was the shooter. Garcia agreed
that the shooter wore a hoodie. She identified Knowles as the
shooter from a photographic six-pack, but she was only 50
percent certain of her identification. At trial, Garcia identified
Knowles as the shooter.
C. Ballistics and cellphone evidence
Law enforcement recovered fired bullets and 15 cartridge
cases from the crime scene. All of the cartridge cases were fired
from the same gun. Thus, this ballistics evidence suggested that
only one gun was used during the events.
On the night Edward was killed, Knowles’s cellphone was
in Los Angeles before the shooting, and at 9:45 p.m., the
cellphone used a cell tower near Vermont where the shooting
occurred. After the shooting, the cellphone travelled to San
Diego.
D. Video surveillance
The trial court admitted video surveillance from three
locations: the liquor store, the donut store in the same strip mall,
and the gas station across the street from the strip mall. The
videos were in color, had no sound, and were played for the jury
while the investigating officer, Detective Scott Lawler, narrated.
The entire incident, from when the main group crossed Vermont
and arrived at the strip mall to when they fled the strip mall,
occurred in about 3 minutes. Based on the detective’s review of
the videos, he believed that a man in red shoes was the shooter.
First, the liquor store video showed a group of people
crossing Vermont at about 9:40 p.m. Some of them approached
Edward. Two men then immediately approached Edward from
behind. One man wore a gray hooded sweatshirt. The second
5
man wore red shoes, a black hooded sweatshirt, and dark pants
with a red stripe down them. A physical fight quickly ensued
between the Jenkins siblings and the others, including the two
men who had approached Edward from behind. Edward ran
away to between two parked cars. The man in a black hooded
sweatshirt and red shoes ran with an outstretched arm, and
multiple muzzle flashes could be seen as he ran.
The donut shop surveillance showed Edward between two
cars and bullet impacts creating sparks. Detective Lawler did
not see Edward’s group do anything aggressive toward the other
group.
Finally, the gas station surveillance showed the group
walking across Vermont, as cars stopped for them. The detective
said that the person he believed was the shooter was not with
that initial group. Instead, the individual in a black sweatshirt,
red shoes, and red-striped, camouflage pants, whom the detective
believed to be the shooter, and the individual in a gray sweatshirt
appeared a bit later “from the right-hand side.”
E. Social media evidence
The day after the shooting, Detective Lawler shared the
video or video stills from the surveillance footage with Sergeant
Carlos Gonzalez, an expert on gangs in the area where the
murder occurred. Using that information, Sergeant Gonzalez
searched social media and found a photograph of individuals in
an alley who were wearing the same clothing as members of the
group that crossed Vermont the night Edward was killed.
Knowles was one of the group, and in the photograph he wore
red-striped, green camouflage pants and red shoes.
6
In another photograph found on social media, Knowles is
wearing the same red-striped, green camouflage pants, and he is
with a man wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt.
On the afternoon of June 10, 2020 (the day after the
shooting), Sergeant Gonzalez found a group photo on social media
that had been posted as part of a story on Instagram on June 10,
2020. An Instagram story disappears 24 hours after it is posted.
In the photo, Knowles is with people the sergeant knew to be
Denver Lane gang members based on the sergeant’s prior
contacts with them. The photo was taken at Gil’s Liquor, which
is a Denver Lane hangout.
Detective Lawler met with Detective Alex Torres in April
2021 because Detective Torres had personal contact with
Knowles and was familiar with him through social media.
Detective Torres subpoenaed records from Knowles’s social media
account. In one photograph posted on social media of Knowles he
is wearing red shoes. In another photograph, Knowles is with
Pasadena Denver Lane gang members. Detective Torres
recognized Knowles in the video surveillance as the person
wearing a black hooded sweatshirt, camouflage pants with a red
vertical stripe down the leg, and red shoes. He also recognized
five other individuals.
A criminalist, Luza Luna, also searched Knowles’s social
media accounts and found a photograph posted on June 6, 2020
(three days before the shooting) in which Knowles is wearing red
shoes.
F. Gang expert testimony
Sergeant Gonzalez testified for the People as a gang expert.
He was assigned to the Denver Lane Bloods gang, whose territory
is the 105 Freeway to the north, Imperial Highway to the south,
7
the 110 Freeway to the east, and Vermont to the west. Vermont
is a “threshold location” in which the Denver Lane gang claims
the eastbound curb but not the westbound curb. Denver Lane
also has a subset in Pasadena, so its slogan is “ ‘Two Cities, one
Lane. The Denver Lane Bloods.’ ”
Blood gangs often drop letters from the alphabet that are
associated with rivals; for example, Bloods will say “bity” instead
of city, because Crips starts with the letter “c.”
Photographs of Knowles at Denver Lane gang strongholds
were introduced. One photograph was taken at Gil’s Liquor at
109th and Figueroa, where Denver Lane gang members hang out.
They also hang out at a nearby motel on Figueroa, near the 110
Freeway. In the photographs, individuals are making hand signs
associated with Denver Lane. In photographs, Knowles is
wearing red shoes, which appear to be red, low-top Nike Air
Force 1.
Sergeant Gonzalez had no prior contacts with Knowles but
believed he was a Pasadena Denver Lane gang member based on
Knowles’s tattoos, his presence at gang strongholds, and his
association with other Denver Lane gang members. Knowles has
“D” and “L” tattooed on his right forearm and “Denvaju3k” with
the “k” crossed out on his face. Denvaju3k refers to Denver Lane.
Denva is short for Denver Lanes, and 3k is a derogatory term for
Crip killer.
The Bounty Hunters is a large Watts gang, and it is a
completely separate gang from Denver Lane Bloods.
When given a hypothetical in which a group of Denver
Lane gang members cross a street into rival territory, Sergeant
Gonzalez opined that they would do so to promote criminal
8
misconduct, cause havoc, and commit violence on rivals.
Committing violence elevates a member’s status.
Sergeant Gonzalez also explained that “gangbanging”
refers to active members who are trying to promote their gang
and themselves through violence or selling drugs. “ ‘Where are
you from’ ” is “one of the most violent things you can hear in the
city of Los Angeles,” because it’s asking what gang you are from.
Also, “snitching” is breaking the code of silence that gang
members and community members are expected to uphold.
Snitching can result in acts of violence, including getting shot or
killed. So it is possible for a witness to identify one gang as the
perpetrator of a crime but then later testify that it was different
gang to avoid being known as a snitch.
II. Information, verdict, and sentence
A jury convicted Knowles of first degree murder (Pen.
Code,4 § 187, subd. (a)), found true an allegation that he
committed the murder willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation (§ 189, subd. (a)), and found true a personal gun
use allegation (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
At the December 18, 2023 sentencing hearing, the trial
court, at a bench trial, found that Knowles had a prior conviction
within the meaning of the Three Strikes law and sentenced him
to 25 years to life, doubled to 50 years to life, plus four years
under section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
4
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
9
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the evidence
Knowles contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support, first, the jury’s premeditation finding, and second, that
he was the actual killer. After setting forth the standard of
review, we address, and reject, each contention.
A. Sufficiency of the evidence standard of review
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.] We presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from
the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify
the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not
warranted simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] A
reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a
witness’s credibility.’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th
838, 890; Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318–319.) Our
“task is not to resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts,
nor is it to inquire whether the evidence might ‘ “ ‘be reasonably
reconciled with the defendant’s innocence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Gomez
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 278; accord, People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20
Cal.4th 1, 12 [reversing court of appeal that reweighed
evidence].)
10
The same standard of review applies to cases where the
prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People
v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 820; accord, People v. Brooks
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57 [substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from
it].) “ ‘An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the
[finder of fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial
evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Before the judgment of the trial court can
be set aside for the insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly
appear that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support the verdict of the [finder of
fact].’ ” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.)
B. Sufficient evidence supports the premeditation finding
The jury found that Knowles committed premeditated
murder. As we now explain, Knowles’s argument that the
evidence was insufficient to support that finding is based on an
improper reweighing of the evidence.
Murder is of the first degree when it is willful, deliberate,
and premeditated. (§ 189, subd. (a).) A killing is premeditated
and deliberate if it is considered beforehand and occurred as the
result of preexisting thought and reflection, rather than as the
product of an unconsidered or rash impulse. (People v. Pearson
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 443.) “Deliberation” refers to careful
weighing of considerations in forming a course of action;
“premeditation” means thought over in advance. (Ibid.)
However, it is unnecessary to prove the defendant maturely and
meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of his act. (§ 189,
subd. (d).) Premeditation and deliberation do not require any
extended period of time. (People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214,
245.) The issue is not so much the duration of time as it is the
11
extent of reflection, because thoughts may follow each other with
great rapidity, and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at
quickly. (People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1027.)
Three categories of evidence are especially probative to
establish premeditation and deliberation: (1) planning activity,
i.e., what was the defendant doing before committing the crime,
(2) motive, i.e., facts about the relationship between the victim
and the defendant, and (3) the manner of killing. (People v.
Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27.) These Anderson factors
are not all required, are not exclusive, and need not be accorded
any particular weight; instead, they are a framework to guide
appellate review. (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 89.)
Substantial evidence of premeditation will typically be found
where there is evidence of all three Anderson factors or extremely
strong evidence of planning, or of motive in conjunction with
planning and manner of killing. (People v. Williams (2018)
23 Cal.App.5th 396, 409.)
Here, there was evidence of all three Anderson factors.
First, there was evidence that the group planned to engage in a
gang confrontation. A photograph was taken of Knowles with
other Denver Lane gang members at Gil’s Liquor, a known gang
hangout. Sergeant Gonzalez came across that photograph on
June 10, 2020 in an Instagram story, which is available for 24
hours after it is posted. Inferentially, the group gathered at Gil’s
Liquor before walking to Liquor Land. As they did so, they loudly
and disruptively crossed Vermont while yelling gang-related
names.
At the strip mall, the group then asked Edward and his
friends where they were from, which, as the gang expert testified,
is a dangerous and provocative question. (See, e.g., People v.
12
Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 210 [expert gang testimony
admissible to explain “defendant’s motivation for entering rival
gang territory and his likely reaction to language or actions he
perceived as gang challenges”].) There was also evidence that
Knowles was armed with a gun, which evidenced preparing and
planning for a violent confrontation. (See, e.g., People v.
Cardenas (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 102, 122 & cases cited therein.)
Therefore, that about 10 individuals travelled as a group into
rival gang territory while loudly issuing gang challenges to
passing cars and, ultimately, to Edward and his friends, and that
Knowles was armed shows that Knowles planned a violent
confrontation.
Second, this same evidence shows that there was a gang-
related motive for the murder. The Denver Lane group crossed
Vermont, which is a “threshold location,” with Denver Lane
claiming the eastbound but not westbound curb. Therefore, the
Denver Lane group crossed into rival territory. Moreover, the
group accused Edward of being from Pimptown and of being the
“ ‘Crip niggas we lookin’ for.’ ” (Italics added.) That the group
seemed to know Edward was from Pimptown and said they were
“lookin’ for” them supported Deshun’s supposition that they were
seeking and targeting Edward. The gang expert also gave this
gang confrontation additional context, explaining that gangs
engage in violence against rivals to elevate their status. (See,
e.g., People v. Huynh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 969, 980–981
[common gang motives include criminal activity against rival or
suspected rival; a battle over gang territory; intimidation
preceded by gang signs and identification; or bolstering one’s
reputation within gang].)
13
Finally, the manner of killing supports the premeditation
finding. Knowles and a second man approached Edward from
behind, while their associates were confronting Edward. Edward
was therefore surrounded by his aggressors. Deshun saw
Knowles begin to pull a gun from his pants but put it back.
Although Knowles did not use the gun at that moment, that he
reached for it nonetheless speaks strongly to premeditation
because it shows his willingness to use the gun, as the evidence
shows he did very shortly thereafter. Keaton said Edward
backed up with his palms out, showing he was unarmed.
However, Edward was shot in the head, which is a type of
shooting that suggests premeditation. (See, e.g., People v.
Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 271 [close range
shooting without provocation supports premeditation finding];
see People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 348 [shooting victim in
head “execution-style” at point-blank range without evidence of
struggle supported first degree murder conviction].)
In response, Knowles makes much of evidence that he was
not with the first group of people who crossed Vermont and asked
everyone where they were from. Instead, he and his companion
in the gray sweatshirt arrived at the strip mall a minute later,
when the main group was already confronting Edward. Knowles
therefore argues that he was not really involved in the gang
challenges, implying he just happened upon the fight and
believed that his friends, not Edward, were in danger. However,
the evidence we cited above supports a different interpretation:
Knowles went to the strip mall looking for rival gang members,
intending to commit violence. We may not reweigh the evidence.
(People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 890.) Moreover, the
evidence strongly supported the inference that Knowles was part
14
of the Denver Lane group, even if he got to the strip mall a
minute after the main group did. As soon as Knowles arrived at
the strip mall, he asked Keaton where she was from and joined
his fellow gang members in surrounding and confronting Edward
and Deshun.
Knowles also suggests that this shooting was unplanned,
and the shooter merely fired “wildly” in the parking lot.
However, the evidence we summarized above supports the
finding that Knowles intentionally shot Edward. That the
shooting took place very quickly after Knowles arrived at the
strip mall does not negate premeditation. Rather, premeditation
can occur quickly. (People v. Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1027.)
Moreover, Deshun saw Knowles start to take out a gun before
putting it back, which shows Knowles’s intent to use the gun.
And that Knowles continued shooting as he ran away does not
undermine the premeditated nature of the murder, as Knowles
argues, but supports it. Wildly firing his gun after shooting
Edward in the head shows an intent to continue harming anyone
in the vicinity.
Finally, in his reply brief, Knowles argues that gang
evidence could be considered on issues of motive and
identification but not to show he premeditated. That is,
CALCRIM No. 1403 instructed the jury it could consider gang
evidence for the limited purposes of whether Knowles had a
motive for the charged crime, to evaluate the credibility of a
witness, and when it considered “the facts and information relied
on by an expert witness in reaching” an opinion. Knowles thus
suggests that CALCRIM No. 1403 prohibited the jury from
considering gang evidence to prove premeditation.
15
However, Knowles did not expressly raise this issue in his
opening brief, and therefore it is forfeited. (See generally United
Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th
142, 158 [“ ‘Fairness militates against allowing an appellant to
raise an issue for the first time in a reply brief because
consideration of the issue deprives the respondent of the
opportunity to counter the appellant by raising opposing
arguments about the new issue.’ ”].)
In any event, motive is often probative of intent to kill.
(People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741.) Here, Knowles’s
intent was in many ways inextricably linked to his motive, and
therefore it was proper for the jury to consider the gang evidence
as relevant to his intent and whether he premeditated. Although
CALCRIM No. 1403 did not expressly state the jury could
consider the gang evidence to determine whether Knowles
premeditated, that was a proper purpose of the gang evidence.
We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence supports the
premeditation finding.
C. Sufficient evidence supports the murder conviction
The prosecutor’s theory of the case was that Knowles was
Edward’s actual killer, so the jury was not instructed on any
aiding and abetting theory of murder liability. Knowles,
however, contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that
he shot and killed Edward. We disagree.
Witnesses consistently testified that the person who shot
Edward wore a black hoodie. Jones told the police that the
shooter wore a black hoodie. Garcia testified that the shooter
wore a black hoodie, and she identified Knowles as the shooter
twice, once from a photographic six-pack soon after the murder
and a second time at trial. The only person Deshun saw with a
16
gun wore a black hoodie, although Deshun did not see the actual
shooting. Forensic evidence suggested that there was only one
shooter: 15 cartridge cases were found at the crime scene, all of
those cartridge cases were fired from the same gun, and casings
were found in locations consistent with where the muzzle flashes
were seen on the video surveillance.
That video surveillance shows a person in a black hooded
sweatshirt and red shoes with his arm outstretched and muzzle
flashes. This is the only person in the video who appears to shoot
a gun. Detective Torres recognized Knowles in the video
surveillance as the person wearing a black hooded sweatshirt,
camouflage pants with a red vertical stripe down the leg, and red
shoes.
Knowles does not discuss this evidence supporting the
conviction and instead cites Deshun’s testimony that there were
two shooters because Deshun heard two guns. But, as we have
said, other eyewitness testimony, video surveillance, and
ballistics evidence showed that there was only one shooter,
Knowles. We may not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Rather,
there being more than sufficient evidence that Knowles shot and
killed Edward, Knowles’s argument amounts to nothing more
than an improper request that we reweigh evidence, reevaluate a
witness’s credibility, and resolve credibility issues or evidentiary
conflicts. (See generally People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th
at p. 890; People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 278.)
II. Admission of evidence regarding gang culture and
snitching
Knowles contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence about gang
17
culture and snitching in the absence of a gang allegation. We
disagree.
A. Additional background
At the preliminary hearing, Deshun testified about the
events at the Liquor Land strip mall. When asked if there was a
reason Deshun did not want to testify, Deshun answered it was
“a safety reason,” and Deshun had “been hearing people still
looking around [ ] looking for us and things like that.” Deshun
clarified that people from that night were looking for witnesses to
the crime, and Deshun did not want to get caught in any
“crossfire because of what happened.” Deshun had heard of the
term, “snitch,” and understood that identifying someone could
result in being killed.
Then, before trial, defense counsel objected on relevance
grounds to any testimony that a witness was afraid. The trial
court responded that if it became apparent a witness was
recanting or not making an identification, it could be relevant, so
if the issue arose during trial, counsel should approach the bench.
During Deshun’s trial testimony about identification, the
prosecutor asked at sidebar if he could inquire whether Deshun
had any concerns about gangs that might affect Deshun’s
testimony. The trial court noted the defense’s objection. Back
before the jury, the prosecutor asked Deshun about growing up in
an area with gangs and whether Deshun knew what it meant to
be a snitch in the context of gang culture. Deshun denied having
anything to snitch about.
Back at sidebar, defense counsel objected to any further
questions about snitching because Deshun forcefully denied being
fearful. The prosecutor responded that the questions were
relevant, especially since Deshun’s trial and preliminary hearing
18
testimony were inconsistent. The trial court then observed that
Deshun was at times evasive, nonresponsive, defensive, and had
accused detectives of lying. Some of Deshun’s answers were, as
the trial court described, “bizarre” and could be caused by being
under the influence of a substance or be an attempt not to snitch.
Therefore, the trial court said it would allow the prosecution to
pursue the line of questioning and to impeach Deshun with
Deshun’s preliminary hearing testimony. In determining how far
the prosecutor could go, the trial court said it would be guided by
Evidence Code section 352.
Back before the jury, the prosecutor asked if Deshun had
any safety concerns about testifying. Deshun answered,
“Always.” Something “possibly” could happen to Deshun, like
“get caught up somewhere,” or maybe the people still have a
“beef” and would want to “finish the job of killing me too.”
However, Deshun was not afraid to identify anyone. When asked
what could happen to snitches, Deshun answered there were “a
lot of possibilities.”
The prosecutor then went through Deshun’s preliminary
hearing testimony, and Deshun agreed with that prior testimony
about having safety concerns, not wanting to be caught in
crossfire, that it was bad to identify someone, that a snitch was
someone who identified the perpetrator of a crime, and that
someone might have to handle the “situation” by shooting or
“kill[ing] us.”
The prosecution filed a supplemental motion under
Evidence Code section 402. Citing Deshun’s testimony, the
prosecution asked to introduce evidence about “the concept of
being a snitch within the gang culture.” The defense objected
that the evidence was cumulative. The trial court found, given
19
Deshun’s “perplexing answers” and that he identified the group
as Bounty Hunters rather than Denver Lane, that the evidence
was relevant and not more prejudicial than probative. The trial
court said the prosecutor could elicit testimony about how gangs
view snitching but could not go into specific examples of
witnesses who have been murdered.
The People’s gang expert Sergeant Gonzalez then testified
that “snitching” is breaking the code of silence that gang
members and community members are expected to uphold,
snitching can result in acts of violence, and it was possible for a
witness to change his testimony to avoid being labeled a snitch.
B. Expert testimony about snitching was admissible
Knowles’s argument on appeal appears to be that Sergeant
Gonzalez’s testimony about snitching in the gang context should
have been excluded as cumulative of Deshun’s testimony. As we
now explain, we disagree.
Except “as otherwise provided by statute, only relevant
evidence is admissible.” (Evid. Code, § 351.) Relevant evidence is
that having any tendency in reason to prove any disputed fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid.
Code, § 210; People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1010.) A court
has discretion to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the probability its admission will
necessitate undue consumption of time or create a substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Given the discretionary
nature of this process, our review of a ruling under Evidence
Code section 352 is “highly deferential.” (People v. Parker (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1, 39.) We will not disturb a ruling under that section
unless the trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or
20
patently absurd manner that resulted in a clear miscarriage of
justice. (Ibid.)
Generally, gang evidence can be highly inflammatory.
(People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1167.)
Nonetheless, it may be admissible where it is relevant to the
underlying charges. (Ibid.; People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1,
31; People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049
(Hernandez).) Thus, “[e]vidence of the defendant’s gang
affiliation—including evidence of the gang’s territory,
membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal
enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove identity,
motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force
or fear, or other issues pertinent to the guilt of the charged
crime.” (Hernandez, at p. 1049.)
The testimony of a gang expert may be admissible to
establish gang culture. (People v. Hill (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th
1104, 1120; see generally Evid. Code, § 801 [expert may render
opinion on subject “sufficiently beyond common experience” to
assist trier of fact].) For an “expert’s opinion to be admissible, the
subject matter need not be completely unfamiliar to the jury.”
(People v. Sotelo-Urena (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 732, 753.) “Whether
members of a street gang would intimidate persons who testify
against a member of that or a rival gang is sufficiently beyond
common experience that a court could reasonably believe expert
opinion would assist the jury. ‘It is difficult to imagine a clearer
need for expert explication than that presented by a subculture in
which this type of mindless retaliation promotes “respect.” ’ ”
(People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 945.) Thus, evidence
explaining why a witness might be afraid to testify in a gang case
is admissible in the trial court’s discretion. (People v. Tran (2022)
21
13 Cal.5th 1169, 1209 [trial court is entitled to admit evidence
demonstrating fear of testifying]; People v. Nguyen (2015) 61
Cal.4th 1015, 1035 [expert may testify “that witnesses to a gang-
related crime are usually reluctant to testify because of fear of
retaliation”]; see generally People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th
686, 724.)
Sergeant Gonzalez’s expert testimony about snitching was
highly relevant. As the trial court said, Deshun’s testimony
about which gang the shooter and his companions were from was
unclear. At trial, Deshun suggested that perpetrators were
Denver Lane gang members, but they tried to “fake everyone out”
by yelling a different gang’s name, Bounty Hunters. It would not
have been readily apparent to the trier of fact why Deshun might
be so equivocal about identifying the gang. The expert clarified
that a witness might feel pressure to misidentify a gang to avoid
being labelled a snitch. This fear of retribution thus explained a
reason for Deshun’s testimony, which could be interpreted as a
reluctance to clearly link the shooter with a specific gang.
Knowles, however, argues that Sergeant Gonzalez’s expert
testimony added “nothing to the jury’s understanding of the
factual matters before it, including Deshun’s credibility,” as
Deshun had already acknowledged having concerns about
retribution for testifying against gang members. To support this
argument, Knowles attacks the trial court’s justifications for
exercising its discretion to admit the evidence.
He thus first asserts that the trial court erred in finding
the evidence relevant to explain why Deshun said the group
yelled “Bounty Hunters” rather than Denver Lane, which is the
gang Knowles associated with. Rather, Knowles argues that
Deshun expressly said the perpetrators were from the Denver
22
Lane gang. The record, however, is not as clear as Knowles
makes it out to be. Deshun gave a statement to the police that
the group was yelling about the Bloods and Denver Lane. Then,
at the preliminary hearing, Deshun testified, “I heard a few
people say some of them could have been from Denver Lane[ ],
but I was only hearing Blood this and Blood that,” and Deshun
was “not sure” someone yelled, “ ‘Denver Lane[ ].’ ” At trial,
Deshun testified to only hearing the group say, “ ‘Bounty’ ” and
“ ‘Bloods.’ ” Although Deshun said that Denver Lane and Athens
Park were the only Blood gangs in that area, Deshun did not hear
them say “ ‘Denver Lane[ ].’ ” However, Deshun also said that
the group might have been from Denver Lane trying to “fake
people out,” so “possibly” they were from Denver Lane.
Thus, as we have said, the expert’s testimony was relevant
to explain that Denver Lane might want to “fake people out” by
yelling the name of another gang, Bounty Hunters, to gain easier
entry into rival gang territory. Further, it explained why Deshun
might be reluctant to clearly identify the perpetrators as Denver
Lane gang members. This was not a tangential issue, as the
identity of Edward’s attackers and killer were main issues at
trial, as was Deshun’s credibility and the killer’s intent.
Second, Knowles argues that Deshun did not accuse
detectives of lying during the identification process, and therefore
the trial court incorrectly relied on this to justify admitting the
evidence. But this was not a basis for the trial court’s ruling
admitting gang evidence. It was merely an observation that
Deshun’s testimony was erratic. In any event, this was a fair
characterization of what Deshun was suggesting. Deshun
testified that Detective Lawler had Deshun focus on one
photograph, and Deshun felt pressured to pick somebody, even if
23
nobody fit the shooter’s description. When asked by the
prosecutor on redirect examination if Deshun was saying that the
detective suggested picking someone, Deshun said that was “how
it sounded to me.” The prosecutor then elicited that the detective
admonished Deshun that the photographs may not contain the
perpetrator, and there was no obligation to make an
identification. In context, the trial court correctly found that
Deshun intimated that the detective improperly pressured
Deshun to identify Knowles. Deshun might not have technically
said the detective lied, but Deshun nonetheless suggested that
the detective behaved inappropriately and fraudulently.
Therefore, the record supports the trial court’s finding that
Deshun’s testimony about the circumstances surrounding the
identification procedure supported admitting the evidence.
We therefore conclude that the evidence was relevant and
admissible, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting it.
For the same reasons, admitting the gang evidence did not
render Knowles’s trial fundamentally unfair or otherwise violate
his due process rights. Rather, the admission of evidence, even if
erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only
if it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. (People v. Partida
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.) Sergeant Gonzalez’s testimony about
snitching in the context of gang culture, was relevant, admissible,
and relatively brief, comprising just over two pages of transcript.
And it clarified and gave greater context to Deshun’s own
testimony about snitching.
III. Admissibility of gang evidence
In addition to his contention that the trial court improperly
admitted the expert’s specific testimony about snitching, Knowles
24
contends that gang evidence generally was inadmissible. Again,
we disagree.
A. Additional background
Before trial, the prosecution moved to admit gang evidence
to establish motive, intent, and identification. The trial court
found that photographs were admissible to establish the shooter’s
identity, that Detective Torres could testify he was familiar with
Knowles and recognized him, and the prosecution could introduce
evidence to explain why a group of people were crossing Vermont,
yelling gang names, and asking the victim where he was from.
When the trial court asked defense counsel for a response,
counsel did not address the ruling and instead asked the trial
court to exclude any field identifications or stops involving
Knowles, evidence about gang tattoos, past crimes committed by
the Denver Lane gang, and “speculative or unparticularized
general statements” about how gang activity negatively impacts
community members. The trial court precluded the prosecution
from raising these issues.
Later, during trial, the prosecution represented it could not
establish Knowles’s gang membership based on self-admissions to
law enforcement but could do so through social media
photographs and videos and his tattoos. Over defense counsel’s
objection, the trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible.
Then, in a supplemental motion under Evidence Code
section 402, the prosecution sought to introduce a photograph
taken at Gil’s Liquor, which was just northeast of where Edward
was killed. Also, the prosecution wanted to introduce evidence
about Denver Lane’s territory and Knowles’s tattoos. Over
defense counsel’s objection, the trial court found the evidence
relevant and more probative than prejudicial.
25
B. The gang evidence was admissible
Knowles contends that gang evidence was inadmissible,
focusing on evidence of his facial tattoo, photographs of him with
other gang members at gang hangouts, and the gang
hypothetical. All of this evidence was highly relevant to motive,
intent and identity, more probative than prejudicial, and, as
such, admissible.
As we have said, the prosecution is “generally entitled to
introduce evidence of a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if
it is relevant to the charged offense.” (People v. Chhoun, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 31; Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1049.)
“Gang evidence is relevant and admissible when the very reason
for the underlying crime, that is the motive, is gang related.”
(People v. Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1167.)
However, relevant evidence of a defendant’s gang membership
should be excluded if it creates a risk the jury will convict the
defendant based on an improper inference the defendant has a
criminal disposition. (People v. Melendez (2016) 2 Cal.5th 1, 28–
29.)
As we understand it, Knowles’s first argument is that gang
evidence was inadmissible because he was not part of the group
that crossed Vermont shouting gang names, and there was no
evidence he engaged in any gang conduct. To the extent this is
Knowles’s argument, it is inaccurate. As we have said, there was
evidence Knowles was associated with the group, he had been
with them at a known gang hangout just before the shooting, and
he arrived at the strip mall a minute after the group. By
immediately approaching Edward when Knowles arrived at the
strip mall, Knowles joined and supported the others. Further,
Keaton testified that Knowles issued a gang challenge to her,
26
asking where she was from. Therefore, the gang evidence was
relevant to show Knowles was a gang member and had a gang-
related motive for targeting Edward, who was in rival territory
and was a Pimptown member. (See, e.g., People v. Flores (2020)
9 Cal.5th 371, 398 [expert testimony about gang-related motives
for murder admissible]; Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1049
[evidence of gang affiliation and activity are relevant to motive or
intent].)
Knowles also argues that the trial court improperly found
that the prosecution had to prove he was a gang member as an
element of murder. That is not correct. Rather, in the context of
ruling on the admissibility of Knowles’s tattoos and other gang
evidence, the trial court said the prosecution had to prove
Knowles was a member of Denver Lane insofar as his
membership was relevant to prove identity, motive, and intent.
The trial court never said that gang membership is an element of
murder.
Second, Knowles argues that Sergeant Gonzalez’s
testimony that the “3k” in Knowles’s “Denvaju3k” tattoo referred
to “crip killer” was unduly prejudicial, cumulative, and of
tangential relevance. But the shooter’s identity was the main
issue at trial. Knowles’s tattoo tended to establish he was a
Denver Lane gang member, while other evidence tended to
establish that the group who attacked Edward were also
members of that gang. Thus, the tattoo tended to establish he
was at the strip mall that night. Knowles appears to argue that
the tattoo was only tangentially relevant because other evidence
showed that he was involved with “others claiming Bloods and
Denver Lane[ ].” However, Knowles, both below and on appeal,
attempted to distance himself from the “others,” arguing that he
27
was not with them or part of that group. Accordingly, his tattoo
was directly relevant to establish that he was a Denver Lane
gang member, at the strip mall that night, and at the strip mall
for a nefarious purpose and not by happenstance. Moreover,
Knowles does not argue that the expert’s explanation that the
“Denva” portion of the tattoo referred to Denver Lane was
inadmissible. Had the expert not then explained what the rest of
the tattoo (“3k”) might refer to, this omission could have stood out
to the jurors and left them speculating what it might mean.
Third, Knowles argues that photographs of him with other
individuals making gang signs with their hands at Denver Lane
gang hangouts (Gil’s Liquor and a motel) were unfairly
prejudicial, cumulative, and of only tangential probative value.
However, that Knowles hung out with Denver Lane gang
members at known gang hangouts tended to show that he was a
member of that gang and that he was a gang member who might
commit violent acts to support the gang. Also, the photograph of
Knowles with other individuals at Gil’s Liquor, which was posted
in an Instagram story on July 10, 2020, raised the inference that
the photograph was taken just before the shooting, as Knowles
and others in the photograph wore clothing matching the group
that went to the Liquor Land strip mall that night. Moreover,
Knowles wore clothing in the photograph matching the shooter’s
clothing. Similarly, in the photograph of Knowles at the other
Denver Lane hangout, a motel, he wears clothes matching the
shooter’s clothes, and is with a man wearing a gray hooded
sweatshirt, which is what the second man who was with the
shooter wore. Thus, the photographs directly went to identity.
Lastly, Knowles asserts that the hypothetical posed to
Sergeant Gonzalez was evidence of his bad character and
28
therefore inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 352 and
1101, subdivision (a), the latter of which prohibits evidence of a
person’s character to prove conduct on a specified occasion.
However, hypotheticals rooted in the facts of the case are
permissible. (People v. Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 398; People
v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1045.) “While a gang expert is
prohibited from opining on a defendant’s specific intent when
committing a crime, the prosecution can ask hypothetical
questions based on the evidence presented to the jury whether
the alleged crime was committed to benefit a gang and whether
the hypothetical perpetrator harbored the requisite specific
intent.” (People v. Perez (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 598, 607.) The
hypothetical posed to Sergeant Gonzalez tracked the facts of this
case. Therefore, the evidence was admissible.
Because the gang evidence was relevant to motive, identity,
and intent, we reject Knowles’s final argument that its admission
was fundamentally unfair. (See generally People v. Partida,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439.) The trial court here meticulously
considered the gang evidence, limited the prosecution’s evidence,
and granted a defense motion to exclude some gang evidence.
Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 1403, which informed the jury it could consider the gang
evidence for the limited purposes of whether Knowles had a
motive for the charged crime, to evaluate the credibility of a
witness, and when it considered “the facts and information relied
on by an expert witness in reaching” an opinion. The instruction
further admonished the jury not “[to] consider this evidence for
any other purpose. You may not conclude from this evidence that
the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a
disposition to commit crime.” (CALCRIM No. 1403.) We
29
presume the jury followed that instruction. (People v. Chhoun,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 30.)
IV. Mistrial motion
Knowles next contends that the trial court violated his due
process rights by refusing to declare a mistrial after a law
enforcement witness used a prohibited phrase suggesting that
Knowles had a prior criminal background. The issue arose
during the testimony of a criminalist, Luna, who explained how
she created photographic six-packs. She testified that she
created the photographic six-packs by finding people with similar
characteristics to the suspect. She then identified one
photograph of Knowles as a “booking photo.” When asked where
the other six-pack photographs came from, Luna said she found
them by looking through “the Los Angeles County booking
photos. So people that have previously been arrested.” These
references to booking photos and prior arrests, however, violated
a trial court order excluding evidence of prior arrests or
investigations involving Knowles and the court’s instruction to
the prosecutor to admonish his witnesses not to use words like
bookings, arrests, and previous investigations and to instead use
a neutral phrase like government or department resources.
The defense moved for a mistrial. The trial court found
that Luna did not intentionally use the prohibited phrase and,
having scrutinized jurors for any reaction to them and finding
none, the trial court denied the motion.
“ ‘ “ ‘A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of
prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction.
[Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial
is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested
with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.
30
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] A motion for a mistrial should be granted
when ‘ “ ‘a [defendant’s] chances of receiving a fair trial have been
irreparably damaged.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th
166, 240.)
A witness’s volunteered statement may be the basis for a
mistrial motion. (People v. Harris (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1575,
1581.) In one case, for example, a witness blurted out that the
defendant “ ‘got the word out,’ ” implying that the witness was
beaten because the witness had testified against the defendant at
the preliminary hearing. (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d
522, 565.) The trial court denied the defendant’s mistrial motion.
The appellate court affirmed, finding no incurable prejudice
because the statement did not “directly implicate” the defendant,
the trial court gave a curative admonishment, and other
testimony dispelled any lingering doubt about the defendant’s
participation in the beating. (Id. at p. 566.)
In this case, Luna’s inadvertent references to booking
photos and prior arrests were much less inflammatory than the
Wharton witness’s statement implying that the defendant had
committed violence against the witness for snitching. Luna’s
statements were brief, and, as the trial court carefully noted, had
no visible impact on jurors who, the trial court said, looked bored
and had no visible reaction. (See, e.g., People v. Perez (2018) 4
Cal.5th 421, 459–460 [brief statement about defendant’s past
criminality in recorded interview played for jury did not warrant
mistrial where admonition given].)
The trial court did not give a curative admonition expressly
directed at Luna’s statements. However, CALCRIM No. 220 on
reasonable doubt did instruct the jury not to be “biased against
the defendant just because he has been arrested, charged with a
31
crime, or brought to trial.” Although directed at Knowles’s arrest
for this crime, CALCRIM No. 220 is nonetheless not so limited.
Given this instruction, the brevity of Luna’s statements, the
jury’s lack of reaction to them, and that the statements did not
clearly connect Knowles to a “history of criminality” as he asserts
on appeal, we cannot find that the statements irreparably
damaged Knowles’s chance of receiving a fair trial. We therefore
reject Knowles’s argument that Luna’s testimony, when coupled
with other properly admitted evidence that he was a gang
member with a Crip killer tattoo, was so prejudicial that a
mistrial was warranted.
V. Instructional error
Knowles contends that the trial court erred by refusing to
instruct the jury on, first, voluntary manslaughter, heat of
passion and imperfect self-defense and, second, on provocation
that reduces a first degree murder to second degree murder.
A. Additional background
The defense asked the trial court to instruct the jury on
voluntary manslaughter, heat of passion and imperfect self-
defense. Defense counsel argued that the victims provoked the
confrontation, citing evidence that Deshun knocked down five or
six people and that when Edward was asked where he was from,
Edward responded, “ ‘Y’all know what it is, y’all know what I
am.’ ” The prosecutor responded that there was no evidence
Edward did anything to provoke either the group that crossed
Vermont or the two people who came up from behind Edward. As
to imperfect self-defense, there was no evidence about Knowles’s
state of mind.
32
After receiving further written briefing, the trial court
disagreed that there was sufficient evidence Edward provoked
the attack. Rather, Edward and Deshun were surrounded and
outnumbered and there was “an absolute lack of evidence” that
Knowles acted rashly or under the influence of intense emotion.
The trial court therefore denied the request to instruct the jury
on voluntary manslaughter, heat of passion.
Next, as to voluntary manslaughter, imperfect self-defense,
the defense argued that Knowles, who was 20 years old during
the events, had minimal life experience, so “it would be
reasonable for him to feel in danger and in need to defend
himself” and his friends. The trial court found that there was no
evidence Knowles actually believed he needed to defend himself
or others and denied the request to instruct on voluntary
manslaughter, imperfect-self-defense.
B. General principles
A trial court must instruct on all general principles of law
relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, including lesser
included offenses, even in the absence of a request. (People v.
Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 239.) Instruction on a lesser
included offense is required when there is substantial evidence
the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but not the greater, offense.
(People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 98 (Landry).) This duty is
not satisfied by instructing on only one theory if other theories
are supported by the evidence. (People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th
47, 61.) Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable jury
could find persuasive. (People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th
1244, 1263.) The existence of any evidence, no matter how weak,
will not justify an instruction (ibid.), but the testimony of a single
33
witness, including the defendant, may suffice (People v. Wyatt
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 698).
We independently review whether the trial court erred by
failing to instruct on a lesser included offense. (People v. Nelson
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 538.) In making this determination, we do
not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. (People v. Wyatt,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 698.) We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the defendant. (People v. Millbrook (2014) 222
Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.)
Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional but
nonmalicious killing of a human being, and is a lesser included
offense of murder. (§ 192, subd. (a); People v. Nelson, supra, 1
Cal.5th at p. 538; People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549.) A
killing may be reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter if
it occurs upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion on
sufficient provocation, or if the defendant kills in the
unreasonable but actual, good faith belief that deadly force is
necessary in self-defense. (Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 97;
Moye, at p. 549.)
“The heat of passion sufficient to reduce murder to
manslaughter ‘exists only where “the killer’s reason was actually
obscured as the result of a strong passion aroused by a
‘provocation’ sufficient to cause an ‘ “ordinary [person] of average
disposition ... to act rashly or without due deliberation and
reflection, and from this passion rather than from
judgment.” ’ ” ’ ” (Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 97.) Thus, heat
of passion manslaughter has objective and subjective
components. (People v. Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 549; People
v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 759.) The “provocation which
incites the defendant to homicidal conduct in the heat of passion
34
must be caused by the victim [citation], or be conduct reasonably
believed by the defendant to have been engaged in by the victim”
(People v. Lee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 59), and must have been
sufficiently provocative to cause an ordinary person of average
disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and
reflection, i.e., “ ‘from this passion rather than from judgment’ ”
(People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 939). To satisfy the
subjective component, the defendant must have killed while
under the actual influence of such a strong passion induced by
legally adequate provocation. (Moye, at p. 550; People v.
Millbrook, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139.) The passion
aroused may be any violent, intense, high-wrought or
enthusiastic emotion other than revenge. (Millbrook, at p. 1139.)
As to imperfect self-defense, the defendant must
unreasonably but in good faith believe he was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily injury. (Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at p. 97.) The doctrine is narrow and applies only where the
defendant actually believes in the need for self defense and fears
immediate harm that must be instantly dealt with. (Ibid.)
Failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter amounts to constitutional error and is
thus subject to review under Chapman v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 18, which asks whether the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 243.)
C. Failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, heat of
passion
There was insufficient evidence to warrant instructing the
jury on voluntary manslaughter under a heat of passion theory.
We first reject that these events resulted from a sudden
quarrel started by Edward’s conduct. Rather, the evidence is
35
that Knowles and his associates initiated the encounter, not
Edward. (See, e.g., People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306
[victim must engage in provocative conduct].) The group that
crossed Vermont were Denver Lane gang members and were
already engaging in hostile, provocative behavior, yelling gang-
related things like “Bloods” at passing cars. Then, at the strip
mall, they deliberately approached Edward and his companions
and asked where they were from. Although Knowles tries to
distance himself from this behavior, Knowles was first seen not
long after the Vermont group arrived, he too asked Keaton where
she was from, he joined the others in surrounding Edward, and
his companion in the gray sweatshirt threw the first punch.
Therefore, while Knowles tries to paint a picture of a sudden,
chaotic melee that he happened upon, that is not what the
evidence shows.
Knowles also tries to paint Edward’s statement that he was
from Pimptown and that they knew who he was as sufficient to
provoke an ordinary, reasonable person. However, Edward was
responding to a gang challenge; Edward did not initiate the gang
challenge. “A defendant may not provoke a fight, become the
aggressor, and, without first seeking to withdraw from the
conflict, kill an adversary and expect to reduce the crime to
manslaughter by merely asserting that it was accomplished upon
a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. The claim of
provocation cannot be based on events for which the defendant is
culpably responsible.” (People v. Oropeza (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
73, 83.)
In any event, Edward’s statements about being from
Pimptown were legally insufficient to provoke an ordinary person
of average disposition to shoot him. Gang-related challenges and
36
insults are legally insufficient to provoke an ordinary person.
(People v. Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 759; People v. Gutierrez
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826 [voluntary manslaughter instruction
unwarranted where allegedly provocative act was just taunting
words, a technical battery, or slight touching]; People v.
Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 586 (Manriquez) [victim calling
defendant “ ‘mother fucker’ ” and repeated taunting of defendant
insufficient to provoke reasonable person to bludgeon victim to
death]; People v. Lucas (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 721, 739–740
[laughing, smirking, and name-calling insufficient to provoke
reasonable person to shoot].) Reasonable people do not become
homicidally enraged on hearing a gang reference or challenge.
(People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 706.)
Otherwise, there was no evidence Edward engaged in
provocative behavior. His companions testified that Edward was
unarmed, no weapon was found at the crime scene, and when he
was confronted, Edward put his palms up, inferentially to show
that he was unarmed. Indeed, Garcia told Knowles that Edward
was handicapped, but Knowles said he did not give “a fuck.” This
statement shows that Knowles knew Edward was not a threat.
As to the subjective component of voluntary manslaughter,
there was no evidence Knowles was actually influenced by an
intense emotion caused by any provocation rather than from
judgment. (See, e.g., Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 586.)
Knowles did not testify at trial, and there was otherwise no
evidence to show he exhibited anger, fury, or other intense
emotion before shooting Edward. (Compare id. at p. 585 [no
testimony victim’s insults enraged defendant], with People v.
Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163, 180 [defendants’
testimony they felt “ ‘super panicked’ ” and “ ‘super scared’ ” after
37
victim issued a gang challenge and lunged at them constituted
sufficient evidence of subjective provocation].)
The evidence is to the contrary, that Knowles acted
thoughtfully and deliberately and was not overcome by any
sudden and intense emotion. Knowles and his companion, the
man in the gray sweatshirt, approached Edward from behind
while other Denver Lane gang members were already confronting
Edward. Deshun saw Knowles begin to take out what looked like
a gun and then put it back, showing Knowles was in full
command of his actions. And Knowles ignored Garcia’s plea not
to shoot Edward, stating he did not give a “fuck.”
We therefore conclude that there was insufficient evidence
to support instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter.
Having so concluded, we need not decide whether any error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, we note that
error in failing to instruct on a lesser included offense is harmless
when the jury necessarily decides the factual questions posed by
the omitted instructions adversely to the defendant under other,
properly given instructions. (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at
p. 582.) Knowles’s jury found that the murder was premeditated,
willful, and deliberate. “By finding defendant was guilty of first
degree murder, the jury necessarily found defendant
premeditated and deliberated the killing. This state of mind,
involving planning and deliberate action, is manifestly
inconsistent with having acted under the heat of passion—even if
that state of mind was achieved after a considerable period of
provocatory conduct—and clearly demonstrates that defendant
was not prejudiced by the failure to give his requested
instruction.” (People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 572;
accord, People v. Wang (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1071–1072
38
[premeditation finding is “manifestly inconsistent” with acting
under heat of passion]; People v. Franklin (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th
881, 894 [“jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation is
‘manifestly inconsistent with having acted under the heat of
passion’ and nullifies any potential for prejudice”].)
Knowles, however, argues that we cannot rely on the
premeditation finding to support a harmless error finding. He
cites People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509. In that case, the
Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by refusing to
instruct on voluntary manslaughter based on sudden quarrel or
heat of passion and reversed a first degree murder conviction.
(Id. at p. 518.) In finding the error prejudicial, the court noted
that the instructions made only casual and passing “reference to
heat of passion and provocation for the purpose of distinguishing
between murder of the first and second degrees.” (Ibid.) There
was no clear instruction to the jury to consider whether the
victim’s conduct provoked the defendant, as an ordinary person of
average disposition, into committing the homicide under a heat of
passion. (Ibid.) The court therefore concluded that the
defendant’s conviction of first degree murder under the
instructions given did not establish that the factual question
posed by the omitted instruction—that the defendant did not kill
the victim under a heat of passion—was necessarily resolved
adversely to the defendant under other, properly given
instructions. (Ibid.)
Berry is distinguishable. The court there only considered
“whether the error was harmless because the jury received some
instruction on the concepts of heat of passion and provocation,
not whether the error was harmless because the jury found the
murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated and such a
39
finding was inconsistent with a finding that the defendant acted
in a heat of passion.” (People v. Peau (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 823,
831–832.) Stated otherwise, it is not clear that Berry considered
the effect of a premeditation finding in its harmless error
analysis. In contrast, Knowles’s jury was instructed on
premeditation with CALCRIM No. 521 and found true a
premeditation allegation. Where, as here, a jury has expressly
found that the murder was premeditated, willful, and deliberate,
any error in failing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter is
harmless. The jury necessarily found that Knowles did not kill
Edward in the heat of passion.
Further, Knowles contends that the trial court’s failure to
instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, heat of passion
violated his constitutional right to present a defense. (See
generally California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 485
[“criminal defendants must be afforded meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense”]; People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th
703, 736 [“Defendants have a constitutional right to have the jury
determine every material issue presented by the evidence, and a
trial court’s failure to instruct on lesser included offenses denies
them that right.”].) Given our conclusion that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant giving the voluntary
manslaughter, heat of passion instruction, this contention fails.
40
D. Failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter,
imperfect self-defense
For the same reasons we have found that the trial court did
not err by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter under a heat of passion theory, it did not err by
refusing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter under an
imperfect self-defense theory. Rather, that theory also requires
the defendant to have unreasonably but actually and in good
faith believed he had to act in self-defense or defense of another.
(Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 97.)
There was insufficient evidence Knowles had any such
belief. As we have said, the evidence was that Knowles arrived
with a man in a grey sweatshirt at the strip mall just after the
main group arrived. The main group had shouted gang names,
they were Denver Lane gang members, Knowles was a Denver
Lane gang member, and the main group and Knowles issued
gang challenges to Edward and others. As the gang expert
testified, asking someone where they are from is a “violent”
question. Therefore, Knowles and his companions provoked and
anticipated a physical confrontation. That Knowles had a gun
further buttressed the inference that he anticipated violence
would occur. A defendant cannot set up and provoke a violent
confrontation and claim self-defense when the expected occurs.
Further, there is no evidence that Knowles actually
believed he had to defend himself or others from Edward.
Rather, Knowles and his 10 or so companions outnumbered
Edward and his friends. When Garcia asked Knowles to leave
the handicapped Edward alone, Knowles said he did not give a
“fuck,” which tends to show Knowles was not overcome by some
intense fear or emotion. (See, e.g., People v. Oropeza, supra, 151
41
Cal.App.4th at pp. 78–82 [only substantial evidence of
defendant’s state of mind came from testimony about his
aggressive and provocative behavior].) Edward was unarmed,
put his palms up, and ran away. Thus, Knowles had no reason to
fear Edward.
E. Failure to instruct on provocation
Knowles next contends the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury on the provocation that reduces first degree
murder to second degree murder, although he did not request
that instruction, CALCRIM No. 522, at trial. He thus asserts the
trial court had a sua sponte duty to give the instruction, and
further that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to ask
for it. We disagree.
“ ‘First degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice
aforethought, premeditation, and deliberation’; ‘[s]econd degree
murder is an unlawful killing with malice, but without ...
premeditation and deliberation.’ ” (People v. Nunez (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 362, 368.) “Provocation may preclude a defendant
from subjectively premeditating and deliberating and, as a result,
may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree.” (Ibid.)
The test is a subjective one, asking whether the defendant acted
because the defendant was provoked.
Provocation instructions are pinpoint instructions, and the
trial court has no sua sponte duty to give the instruction absent a
request. (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 384.) Knowles
did not request the instruction and has therefore forfeited the
argument.
Nonetheless, because Knowles alternatively contends that
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to ask
for the instruction, we address the issue on the merits. A claim of
42
ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and prejudice from the error. (Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 687–688; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641,
745–746.)
For the same reasons the evidence was insufficient to
support a voluntary manslaughter instruction, the evidence was
also insufficient to warrant giving CALCRIM No. 522 on
subjective provocation. There was no evidence Edward or any of
his companions provoked Knowles, or that Knowles acted because
he was provoked. Thus, Knowles’s trial counsel did not engage in
ineffective assistance by failing to ask the trial court to instruct
on CALCRIM No. 522, and Knowles suffered no prejudice from
its omission.
VI. Cumulative error
Knowles contends he is entitled to reversal because of
cumulative error. “A series of trial errors, though independently
harmless, may in some circumstances rise by accretion to the
level of reversible and prejudicial error.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17
Cal.4th 800, 844.) However, defendants are entitled to fair trials,
not perfect ones. (Ibid.) Here, we have found no errors, harmless
or otherwise. Therefore, there are no trial errors to cumulate.
43
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
ADAMS, J.
KLATCHKO, J.*
* Judge of the Riverside County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
44
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