People v. Ward CA2/5

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Filed 7/31/25 P. v. Ward CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B336224

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA502954)

DOMINIC WARD,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Craig E. Veals, Judge. Affirmed.
Jonathan Soglin and Maria Leftwich, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found defendant and appellant Dominic Ward
(defendant) guilty of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon.
We are asked to decide claims of evidentiary error and asserted
ineffective assistance of counsel: whether the trial court erred in
allowing witnesses to testify the assault victim appeared to be
dying and recited a message to tell his mother, and whether
defendant’s trial attorney should have requested the court give
certain instructions on eyewitness identification testimony.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense Conduct, as Established by the Evidence
at Trial
On October 30, 2021, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Juan
Garcia-Quintero (Garcia-Quintero), Sulaymaan Muhammad
(Muhammad), and Jason Cohetero (Cohetero) arrived outside the
Spring Tower Lofts in Los Angeles following a night out
celebrating Halloween. When they arrived, they saw several
fights occurring in the vicinity, but they did not know any of the
people fighting—one of whom was defendant. They entered the
Spring Tower Lofts to attend an “after party.”
Garcia-Quintero, Muhammad, and Cohetero took the
elevator to the floor of the after party, but the fire alarm went off,
forcing them to return to the lobby and exit the building. While
waiting, Garcia-Quintero, Muhammad, and Cohetero saw
defendant standing roughly five or ten feet away and yelling “Six
Street Crip” and “I’m a Crip” toward them. The three men were
confused and concerned as they were not involved in any gangs,
and they subsequently reentered the lobby. Defendant followed
them in, and video surveillance footage shows him holding a
reflective object behind his back.

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Garcia-Quintero, Muhammad, and Cohetero were standing
near the elevators when Garcia-Quintero and Cohetero saw
defendant charge toward them with a knife. Defendant stabbed
Muhammad in the neck, and Garcia-Quintero attempted to
defend himself and his friends by pushing defendant away and
trying to disarm him—when doing so, defendant slashed Garcia-
Quintero’s arm. Cohetero then grabbed defendant’s arm, but
defendant was much stronger and used the knife to scrape
Cohetero’s collarbone, cutting his shirt in the process. The
elevator doors then opened and a group of people pushed
defendant away from Cohetero and beat him (defendant).
Los Angeles Police Department Officer Vanessa Reyes
arrived in the area of the lofts in response to a call about an
assault with a deadly weapon at approximately 2:30 a.m. Officer
Reyes noticed defendant (who appeared to be unconscious) lying
on the floor of the lobby and she gave first aid to Garcia-Quintero
and Muhammad while waiting for an ambulance to arrive. While
Officer Reyes was applying pressure to Muhammad’s neck, she at
one point thought he “passed away in [her] arms.” Around that
same time, Garcia-Quintero also heard Muhammad say, “Bro, tell
my mom I’m good. Love you. This might be the last day.”1
Garcia-Quintero and Muhammad were later transported to
the hospital, and Muhammad survived. Defendant was taken
into custody.

1
We detail post how these statements were made during the
examination of Garcia-Quintero and Officer Reyes at trial, and
the defense objections on Evidence Code section 352 (section 352)
grounds.

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B. Instructions, Verdict, and Sentencing
After the presentation of evidence at trial, the court gave
the jury a number of instructions concerning evaluating witness
testimony including CALJIC No. 2.20, Believability of Witnesses;
CALJIC No. 2.21.1, Discrepancies in Testimony; CALJIC No.
2.21.2, Witness Willfully False; CALJIC No. 2.22, Weighing
Conflicting Testimony; and CALJIC No. 2.27, Sufficiency of
Testimony of One Witness. The jury was also instructed on
reasonable doubt generally (with CALJIC No. 2.90). The defense
did not request or object to the absence of CALJIC Nos. 2.91
(Burden of Proving Identity Based Solely on Eyewitnesses) and
2.92 (Eyewitness Identification) in the charge to the jury.2

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CALJIC No. 2.91 provides: “The burden is on the People to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person
who committed the crime with which [he] [she] is charged. [¶] If,
after considering the circumstances of the identification [and any
other evidence in this case], you have a reasonable doubt whether
defendant was the person who committed the crime, you must
give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and find [him] [her]
not guilty.”
In pertinent part, CALJIC No. 2.92 provides: “Eyewitness
testimony has been received in this trial for the purpose of
identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime[s]
charged. In determining the weight to be given eyewitness
identification testimony, you should consider the believability of
the eyewitness as well as other factors which bear upon the
accuracy of the witness’ identification of the defendant.” The
instruction goes on to enumerate more than 10 factors including
“[t]he opportunity of the witness to observe the alleged criminal
act and the perpetrator of the act”; [t]he stress, if any, to which
the witness was subjected at the time of the observation”; “[t]he
witness’ ability, following the observation, to provide a
description of the perpetrator of the act”; “[w]hether the witness

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After receiving these instructions, the jury convicted
defendant on two counts of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen.
Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) The jury also found true multiple
alleged aggravating circumstances, including allegations that the
assaults involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of
great bodily harm, and other acts disclosing a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, and callousness. The trial court sentenced
defendant to four years in state prison: the middle term of three
years on one of the assault counts and a consecutive one-year
term (one-third the middle term) for the other count.

II. DISCUSSION
Both of the arguments defendant makes for reversal of the
judgment against him are unavailing.
Defendant’s evidentiary error contention, that the trial
court should have excluded testimony from Officer Reyes and
Garcia-Quintero that could provoke an emotional response from
the jurors, is partially forfeited and otherwise meritless. The
argument is forfeited as to Garcia-Quintero’s testimony about
Muhammad’s message for his mother in case he died because
defendant never moved to strike that testimony. The argument
lacks merit as to Officer Reyes’s testimony that Muhammad
appeared to be dying because aspects of that testimony were
relevant and not unduly prejudicial and the remainder of the
testimony was harmless.
Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel contention,
which is predicated on the decision not to request eyewitness

was able to identify the alleged perpetrator in a photographic or
physical lineup”; and [w]hether the witness had prior contacts
with the alleged perpetrator.”

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testimony instructions, fails under the test for resolving such
contentions on direct appeal, which is “difficult” for a defendant
to satisfy. (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198 [“a
reviewing court will reverse a conviction based on ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if there is affirmative
evidence that counsel had ‘no rational tactical purpose’ for an
action or omission”].) Defendant does not satisfy the test here
because we can easily hypothesize reasons why his trial attorney
would have rationally decided to forgo requesting the
instructions: his attorney may have believed the other
instructions the court gave were sufficient and his attorney may
have concluded aspects of the missing instructions would not
have been helpful to defendant’s case.

A. There Was No Evidentiary Error Justifying Reversal
1. Additional background
During Garcia-Quintero’s testimony about the aftermath of
defendant’s stabbing in the lobby, the prosecutor asked, “How
does [Muhammad’s] medical condition progress based on your
observations?” Garcia-Quintero answered, “Once we were . . . on
the floor, . . . [Muhammad] just was not talking okay. Like, he
was just, like, ‘Bro, tell my mom I’m good. Love you. This might
be the last day.’” At that point, defendant’s trial counsel objected
on section 352 grounds. The trial court responded, “Okay. Next
question.”
Later, during Officer Reyes’s testimony on the same topic,
she testified Muhammad was “in shock” while she was attending
to him. The prosecutor asked her, “What’s shock?” Officer Reyes
replied, “Lack of blood flow through the body. He had just went
through a traumatic event, so his condition was just—he wasn’t—

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at one point I honestly thought I lost him.” The following
exchange then occurred:
[Prosecutor]: When you say at one point I honestly
thought I lost him, what do you mean by that?
[Officer Reyes]: I thought he had passed away in my
arms because—
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, [section] 352.
[The Court]: I’ll overrule.
[Prosecutor]: You were saying?
[Officer Reyes]: So I thought he had passed away as
I’m applying the pressure to his neck because he just
looked at me like no reaction. He wasn’t moving, and
I was trying to just have him talk, the entire time
talk to me about his mom. I even asked him to—if he
wanted to say anything to his mom on my body worn
[camera] just in case he did pass away.
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, [section] 352.
[The Court]: Okay. Overruled. Next question.

2. Analysis
Defendant’s claim of evidentiary error as to Garcia-
Quintero’s testimony about Muhammad’s message for his mother
is forfeited. Defense counsel objected only after the jury had
heard the testimony in question, and there was no motion to
strike the testimony (nor even any attempt to clarify whether the
court had sustained or overruled the belated objection). (Tate v.
Fratt (1896) 112 Cal. 613, 619; People v. Glass (1954) 127
Cal.App.2d 751, 753 [“It is the general rule that when an
unexpected answer of a witness, which could not be anticipated
by objection to the question, contains inadmissible and

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prejudicial matter, a motion to strike it out is the proper
remedy”]; People v. Strider (1929) 96 Cal.App. 632, 636 [“It was
the duty of appellant, under these circumstances, to move to
strike the answer [citation], and, as he did not do so, the objection
which he now urges against the question is not available to him”];
see also People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 481 [“Failure to
press for a ruling on a motion to exclude evidence forfeits
appellate review of the claim . . .”].)
Defendant did adequately object to certain portions of
Officer Reyes’s testimony about her perception that Muhammad
suffered a near-death injury, so that issue is preserved. But it
does not warrant reversal. The testimony was relevant to
establish the grievous nature of Muhammad’s injury, which bears
on use of a deadly weapon and the infliction of great bodily
injury, and it was no more likely to elicit an emotional response
from the jury that would overcome their factfinding function than
the testimony about the neck stabbing itself—which obviously
was correctly admitted. (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612,
638 [“‘In applying section 352, “prejudicial” is not synonymous
with “damaging”’”]; see also People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th
346, 372 [“‘[T]he prosecution’s burden to prove every element of
the crime is not relieved by a defendant’s tactical decision not to
contest an essential element of the offense’”].) Insofar as Officer
Reyes also testified to additional details that were less relevant
(i.e., talking to Muhammad about his mother and asking if he
wanted to say anything to her on the officer’s body worn camera),
we do not believe the testimony contributed to the verdict
obtained. As we have explained, the jury properly heard
testimony that defendant grievously wounded Muhammad by
stabbing him in the neck, and the complained-of elaboration on

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the effects of that stabbing added virtually nothing to the undue
prejudice calculus—particularly when the defense at trial was
only one of mistaken identity.3

B. Defendant Has Not Shown His Attorney Was
Constitutionally Deficient by Not Requesting CALJIC
Nos. 2.91 and 2.92
Defendant believes his trial attorney was constitutionally
ineffective because there was no reason not to request the court
instruct the jury with CALJIC Nos. 2.91 and 2.92 when his
identity as the culprit was “the only disputed issue” in this case.
On direct appeal, we presume that “‘counsel’s performance fell
within the wide range of professional competence and that
counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of
sound trial strategy. Defendant thus bears the burden of
establishing constitutionally inadequate assistance of counsel.’”
(People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1189.) A reviewing
court will therefore reject an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim “‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to
provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation.’” (Ibid.)
The record does not disclose why defendant’s attorney did
not request CALJIC Nos. 2.91 and 2.92, so the question becomes
whether there could be no satisfactory explanation for not

3
Our conclusion disposes of defendant’s related due process
contention that admission of the evidence rendered his trial
fundamentally unfair. (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611;
People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 58; see also People v.
Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229.)

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requesting the instructions. There are, however, easily
hypothesized satisfactory explanations. For one, counsel may
have believed (particularly as to CALJIC No. 2.91, but also as to
CALJIC No. 2.92) that the other instructions the court gave were
sufficient and provided all that was necessary to argue the
mistaken identity defense. Precedent so holds. (People v. Alcala
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 803; People v. Blair (1979) 25 Cal.3d 640,
663 [“[T]hese instructions were sufficient to inform [the jury] that
the prosecution had the burden of proof on [the issue of identity]
and that defendant should be acquitted if they had a reasonable
doubt on the matter”].) In addition, as to CALJIC No. 2.92,
defense counsel may have determined giving that instruction
would not have been helpful to the defense because the
prosecution could have emphasized several of the considerations
identified in that instruction (e.g., the opportunity of the witness
to observe the perpetrator, or the witness’s ability to
subsequently provide a description or identification of the
perpetrator) to argue the evidence showed defendant was the
assailant.

C. No Cumulative Prejudice Warrants Reversal
We have relied on a holding of no prejudice only in one
relatively minor respect regarding Officer Reyes’s testimony.
There is accordingly no possibility of cumulative prejudice
warranting reversal.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM (D.), J.

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