People v. Bennett CA2/1

CourtListener 10645567Calctapp31 lug 2025

Testo completo

Filed 7/31/25 P. v. Bennett CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B327373

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA446441)
v.

BRYANT BENNETT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Shelly Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed.
David W. Scopp, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________________
After using methamphetamine for five consecutive days
without sleep, 44-year-old Bryant Bennett stabbed 63-year-old
Cheryl Tyler to death. Bryant appeals from a judgment of
conviction for second degree murder, contending the court erred
by failing to hold a second competency hearing to update its
finding, made two years prior, that he was competent to stand
trial and by failing to instruct on heat of passion manslaughter.
He also contends that the prosecutor committed prejudicial
misconduct, and he requests that we review the transcript of a
Pitchess hearing on the possible bias of three investigating police
officers to determine whether the court abused its discretion by
1
failing to release relevant records.
We conclude the court did not err by declining to hold a
second competency hearing or to instruct on heat of passion
manslaughter, and further conclude the prosecution committed
no prejudicial misconduct. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Additionally, after reviewing the transcript of the in-camera
Pitchess hearing we find no abuse of discretion.

BACKGROUND
The pertinent facts are undisputed. Bennett and Tyler
shared an apartment in Los Angeles. On April 9, 2016, Bennett,
who had been using methamphetamines for five consecutive days
without sleep, stood in the apartment complex courtyard in the
rain for several hours, unresponsive to attempts by tenants to
communicate with him. Police were called and found a sheathed
knife with an eight-inch blade in Bennett’s waistband. They

1
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 532.

2
handcuffed him and then went to the apartment, where they
found Tyler, who had been stabbed 14 times, dead.

A. Bennett’s Delusions and Mental Health Evaluations
Bennett was charged with murder and initially pleaded not
guilty by reason of insanity, a plea he later changed to simply not
guilty.
During the preliminary hearing on October 17, 2016,
Bennett interrupted the prosecutor’s direct examination of a
police officer, demanding, “Leave me alone”; “Leave me the fuck
alone.” The court observed that no one had been touching,
speaking to, or making any gestures toward him. Bennett’s
counsel reported that back in the holding area, Bennett was
nonresponsive when she attempted to speak with him, making
statements that had nothing to do with her questions. The bailiff
reported Bennett was generally nonresponsive and screamed that
he heard voices in his head. The prosecutor and court observed
that this behavior was of recent advent, as Bennett had appeared
responsive and competent during proceedings four days earlier.
The court declared a doubt as to Bennett’s competency to stand
trial and ordered a mental health evaluation under Penal Code
2
section 1368.1.
Bennett was evaluated four times over the next two years
to determine his need for psychiatric treatment, competence to
stand trial, and ability to represent himself.

2
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3
1. Dr. Rad, 2017
In March 2017, Dr. David S. Rad, M.D., reported that
Bennett had a history of delusions, paranoia and use of
psychiatric medications, and had told him that “ ‘God revealed’ to
him that he was Jesus” by causing stars, clouds and UFOs to
follow him. Dr. Rad found that Bennett suffered only from a
stimulant-use disorder, not a psychopathology that could impair
his ability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings.
Bennett knew he had been charged with murder and stated the
victim had been his friend. He knew that she was stabbed to
death, that the charges were serious, and the consequences could
include prison. Bennett believed the role of the judge and court
personnel were to “judge” him, stating of the judge, “why else
would they call him a judge?” He also thought that the role of the
district attorney was to judge him and that his defense attorney
was not independent because the judge and defense counsel were
“being paid by the same hand.”
Dr. Rad reported that Bennett’s demeanor was serious and
his affect constricted but reactive to the topics being discussed.
He was able to discuss his mental health history cogently and
responsively and became purportedly confused and
nonresponsive only when the topic turned to his competency to
stand trial, an inconsistency that suggested pretense.
Dr. Rad opined that “while Mr. Bennett may have suffered
from psychosis in the past, his current presentation was
inconsistent with genuine psychosis, and more consistent with
malingered psychosis.” He found the nature of Bennett’s current
presentation of psychosis was atypical, as were his attempts to
draw attention to his deficits, the absence of objective findings of

4
genuine psychosis, and the lack of collateral data supporting
genuine psychotic presentation or disorder.
For example, although Bennett reported visual
hallucinations of such things as UFOs, clouds, angels and stars,
such dramatic visualizations are atypical of genuine psychosis.
And although he reported hearing voices, Bennett could not
specify their age or gender, which was atypical. Dr. Rad found
that Bennett made efforts to draw attention to his hallucinations
and to highlight his claimed deficits, both of which efforts were
atypical of genuine psychosis. Dr. Rad reported that although
Bennett reported a psychiatric history of mental illness, no
collateral observations confirmed these reports—for example
there were no reports of him talking to himself or appearing
distracted—and his medical records reflected only a series of brief
emergency room visits for physical complaints and distress
associated with loss of housing, with no resulting psychiatric
diagnoses or treatments.
Dr. Rad concluded that Bennett reported psychiatric events
that were inconsistent, atypical, and uncorroborated by
independent observation; fabricated his psychiatric history to
portray himself as mentally ill; and selectively feigned
incompetence when the topic turned to his ability to understand
trial proceedings, all of which suggested he was malingering
psychosis. Dr. Rad opined Bennett was able to assist in his
defense in a rational manner if he chose to do so.
Based on this report, the court found Bennett competent to
stand trial.

5
2. Dr. Markman
In a June 21, 2017 motion to appoint a medical expert,
defense counsel declared: “Mr. Bennett has expressed a firm and
unwavering belief that he is Jesus Christ.”
In July 2018, Dr. Ronald Markman, M.D., assessed Bennett
to determine his “sanity . . . at the time of the alleged offense . . .
his current psychiatric condition and his need for treatment and
or hospitalization.” Dr. Markman reported that Bennett had a
history of long-term methamphetamine abuse, use of
psychotropic medications, and psychiatric hospitalizations. He
opined that Bennett demonstrated no underlying psychotic
process or thought disorder but suffered from paranoid disorder
secondary to methamphetamine abuse, adjustment disorder with
anxious and depressed moods, and personality disorder with
antisocial, impulsive, and dependent features. Dr. Markman
reported that Bennett had stated he used methamphetamine
“earlier that week—went to the apartment—afraid of being
stabbed with a knife—roommate was yelling and screaming—
thought she was attacking me.” Dr. Markman found “no clinical
data that would support an insanity defense . . . , as [Bennett]
had the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions and
to distinguish between right and wrong, notwithstanding his
substance abuse.”

3. Dr. Knapke, November 2018 Report
On August 15, 2018, Bennett submitted a handwritten
letter to the court in which he discussed his delusions and
addictions. He stated: “The defendant understands that the so-
called alien phenomenon is taboo to talk about but we must now
break the silence. Millions of lives are at stake and they won’t go

6
away. Please hear me. The fires that we are experiencing will
only get worse. The fires are going to hit the inner cities as well.
They are the cause of the so-called brush fires, sink holes[,] dying
marine life, global warming, hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes,
heat wave[s], water droughts, pestilence, plagues[,] etc. [¶]
Before they manifest[ed] themselves to me[,] I had gone through
a lot of suffering . . . . People tried to kill me, my mom was killed,
my family dispersed, my people rejected me and scorned me and
law enforcement followed me and harassed me everyday. It
would be this affliction that would prepare me for my meeting
with them. I wanted so bad to leave this world that I would have,
even if it meant flying away on the back of a winged 8 legged
monster. [¶] They have shown me a lot of things[,] and I’m sure
they don’t want me to keep them to myself. We are endangered,
please help me! . . . . I don’t know why they chose me. . . . I never
wanted to hurt anyone.”
Bennett submitted another handwritten letter, dated
August 20, 2018, in which he stated he was “the one who the
world had been waiting for.” He had visions of clouds and angels,
and believed he would “ascend” and go through a
“transfiguration.” He further believed that Tyler was “in on the
plot to kill him,” and stated, “I just lost my mind that morning.”
In September 2018, Bennett was assessed by Dr. Kory
Knapke, M.D., to determine whether he suffered from a major
mental illness, understood the nature of the crime he was
charged with, and knew that stabbing Tyler was morally wrong.
In November 2018, Dr. Knapke reported that during the
interview, Bennett “was calm and cooperative and . . . also logical
and coherent in his thought processes.” He “presented himself

7
very well during th[e] interview,” he “voic[ed no] overt delusions,”
and “his thoughts were organized and tight.”
Dr. Knapke reported that Bennett claimed he started
having paranoid, delusional thoughts as early as 2007. Following
his release from prison in 2014, Bennett started using
methamphetamine again, which can cause long-term or
permanent psychotic symptoms that can mimic schizophrenia
and bipolar mania, including paranoia and delusions. He
believed stars and clouds were following and guiding him and
angels were descending onto him. He believed he was Jesus
Christ and the “one who the world had been waiting for,” for
which people wanted to kill him. Suffering these delusions,
Bennett had committed himself to the Harbor UCLA Hospital,
where he stayed for three days.
Dr. Knapke reported that Bennett, who claimed he had
been paranoid and actively used methamphetamine for several
years prior to the crime, “believed that the victim was trying to
kill him . . . and . . . described her as being very hostile towards
him on the day of the instant offense. At one point, the victim
knocked the knife out of his hand[,] and he then retrieved it and
stabbed the victim multiple times.” Dr. Knapke reported Bennett
was experiencing a drug-induced psychosis when he killed Tyler.
Despite Bennett’s delusional claims, Dr. Knapke stated there
were “no other signs or symptoms of any current psychosis, [and]
it is unknown whether [his] claim about believing that he is
Jesus is authentic or not.”
Dr. Knapke stated that the psychoses Bennett claimed
usually began to manifest themselves in the late teens or early
20s, resulting in a lifelong history of psychiatric treatment

8
services, but there was no evidence that Bennett had that type of
history.

4. Dr. Knapke, February 2019 Report
Dr. Knapke interviewed Bennett a second time in February
2019 to address whether he was competent to represent himself.
He reported that Bennett’s statements during this interview
“were very consistent” with the statements he made during the
September 2018 interview. Dr. Knapke reported that Bennett
“continue[d] to harbor grandiose and persecutory delusions,” and
wanted to represent himself in order to tell the jury he was Jesus
Christ, for which the victim and others had been trying to kill
him. Dr. Knapke reported that although Bennett claimed he
continued to see angels and stars following him because he was
Jesus Christ, and was infused with the Holy Spirit and
undergoing a transfiguration, he “was not responding to any
internal stimuli and appeared to be able to focus on th[e]
examination.” Dr. Knapke reported, “The defendant feels he
needs to make this known during his trial and he does not believe
any of the attorneys or doctors involved in his case believe him
that he is Jesus Christ.” Dr. Knapke observed that these
statements were consistent with the statements Bennett made
during the September 2018 evaluation. He concluded Bennett
was unable to represent himself at trial.
In sum: In March 2017, Dr. Rad opined Bennett was
competent to stand trial; in June 2017, Dr. Markman found no
clinical data that would support an insanity defense; in 2018, Dr.
Knapke found no evidence and no history of psychosis; and in
2019, Dr. Knapke found that Bennett was unable to represent

9
himself at trial. None of the three evaluators concluded Bennett
was incompetent to stand trial.
Defense counsel nevertheless requested that the court
declare that a doubt existed as to whether Bennett was
competent to stand trial. The court declined to do so, finding that
although Bennett was incompetent to represent himself, he was
competent to stand trial.

B. Trial
At trial, Bennett admitted he killed Tyler but claimed that
he did so in imperfect self-defense while under the influence of
methamphetamines.
Dr. Vadims Poukens, a deputy medical examiner in the Los
Angeles County Department of the Coroner, testified that Tyler
suffered 14 stab wounds, several being more than five inches
deep and seven of which were potentially fatal.
Bennett testified that on April 3, 2016, he began a five-day
drug binge in celebration of his 44th birthday, during which he
smoked methamphetamine while Tyler smoked crack cocaine and
methamphetamine. As a result of his suffering from
methamphetamine-induced paranoia, he missed a hearing to
receive a Social Security disability payment that he had promised
to share with Tyler. When she learned he could not pay her,
Tyler became upset and “hostile,” slamming doors, throwing
dishes into the sink, and deliberately bumping into Bennett.
Bennett testified he went out to the apartment courtyard to wait
for her to “cool off,” where he remained from April 5 to April 9,
with only infrequent, brief visits to the apartment to see whether
she was still upset. While in the courtyard he saw stars
ascending and descending upon him and clouds forming various

10
UFOs, including one that looked like a giant purple pumpkin
with a menacing face.
Bennett testified that when he went back to the apartment
the final time, Tyler punched him in the head from behind,
knocking his glasses off, and struck him four or five more times
“pretty hard,” yelling “You stupid motherfucker. You gonna get
me kicked out of my apartment.” When Bennett hit her back,
Tyler “drew” Bennett’s knife “from somewhere,” whereupon he
“took her to the floor and . . . wrestled the knife out of her hand.”
Tyler “somehow . . . got on top of [Bennett] and had [him]
pinned down,” however, and tried to “gouge out” his eyes.
Because she was too heavy to dislodge, Bennett stabbed her in
the buttock.
When asked why he stabbed Tyler to “get her off” him,
Bennett replied, “I just wanted her off me. . . . I believe that she
was—I didn’t want her to gouge out my eyes and be blind or
possibly, you know, kill me or anything like. I was just fearful.”
Bennett testified that the first stab wound “didn’t phase” Tyler,
“like she didn’t feel it or anything, she still remained over me.”
He testified that because she continued attacking and he “just
wanted her off” him, he stabbed her several more times, even
though he did not want to hurt her.
After the fight, Bennett testified, he wiped the knife clean
on the carpet, sheathed it, and went back to the courtyard,
anticipating that a UFO would rescue him. Bennett testified he
had not slept in a week, “couldn’t really . . . think,” and “had
never been that high before . . . .”
Bunia Mae Watts, Bennett’s ex-girlfriend, testified that
Tyler “always needed” to use a walker and a cane, and before the

11
incident Bennett started carrying a knife and displayed bizarre
and paranoid behavior.
A deputy medical examiner testified Tyler was 63 years old
when she died. She was five feet six inches tall and weighed 235
pounds. Tyler was stabbed 14 times, and seven of the inflicted
injuries were fatal or potentially fatal.
A police officer testified that Bennett, who was five feet
eleven inches tall and weighed around 205 pounds, had no
observable injuries when he was arrested.
Homicide Detective Oscar Villarreal testified that he saw
Bennett in a holding cell just before he was booked at the jail. He
was lying down with his eyes closed. Detective Villarreal opined
that Bennett appeared to be pretending to sleep. Villarreal,
accompanied by two other detectives, attempted to interview
Bennett but he gave no response to their questions.
Dr. Ryan O’Connor testified that prolonged use of
methamphetamine and crack cocaine can cause side effects such
as paranoia, delusions, and psychosis, which can be permanent.
During closing argument, Bennett’s counsel argued
Bennett acted in imperfect self-defense when he killed Tyler
because “he honestly believed he needed to use deadly force but
he was wrong about it, it was unreasonable for him to do it given
the circumstances.” Counsel argued, “She’s 63 year[s] old, she
has bad knees, he could have pushed her away, he could have
done things other than what he did. But he acted unreasonabl[y]
given the circumstances. His actions were irrational given the
circumstances.” Counsel did not argue that Bennett killed Tyler
in a heat of passion.
The court instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense as
follows: “The difference between complete self-defense and

12
imperfect self-defense depends on whether the defendant’s belief
and the need to use force was reasonable. The defendant acted in
imperfect self-defense if one, the defendant actually believed that
he was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great
bodily injury; and two, the defendant actually believed that the
immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against
that danger; but three, at least one of those beliefs was
unreasonable. . . . In evaluating the defendant’s beliefs, consider
all the circumstances as they were known to appeared to the
defendant.” The court instructed the jury, “[Y]ou may not
consider evidence of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication in
determining whether the defendant . . . believed it was necessary
to act in self-defense . . . .”
Defense counsel did not request heat of passion
instructions or attempt to argue that theory to the jury. The jury
convicted Bennett of second degree murder and found true that
he used a weapon (a hunting knife) to commit the murder. The
trial court sentenced him to 16 years to life in prison.

DISCUSSION
Bennett contends the trial court erred by declining to hold
a second competency hearing and by failing to instruct on a heat-
of-passion manslaughter theory. He also contends the prosecutor
committed prejudicial misconduct and requests that we review
the trial court’s Pitchess proceedings.

A. Denial of a Second Competency Hearing
Bennett contends the court erred by failing to order a
second competency evaluation after Dr. Knapke, reporting on his

13
second evaluation of Bennett, stated that Bennett “continue[d] to
harbor grandiose and persecutory delusions.” We disagree.

1. Legal Principles
A defendant is incompetent to stand trial who lacks a
rational and factual understanding of the proceedings or a
sufficient ability to consult with his or her attorney with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding. (People v.
Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 464.) Federal and state law
prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal defendant
while he or she is mentally incompetent. (Ibid.)
Section 1368 sets out the conditions under which a trial
court must suspend trial proceedings and conduct a competency
hearing. In short, “ ‘ “a trial judge [must] suspend trial
proceedings and conduct a competency hearing whenever the
court is presented with substantial evidence of incompetence,
that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt
concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial. [Citations.]
. . . Evidence of incompetence may emanate from several sources,
including the defendant’s demeanor, irrational behavior, and
prior mental evaluations.” ’ ” (People v. Sattiewhite, supra, 59
Cal.4th at p. 464.) When faced with conflicting evidence
regarding competence, the trial court’s role under section 1368 is
not to resolve the conflict but to decide whether the evidence
supporting incompetence is substantial. (People v. Rodas (2018)
6 Cal.5th 219, 234 (Rodas).) “Resolution must await expert
examination and the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing.”
(Ibid.)
If, after a defendant has been found competent to stand
trial, new evidence casts serious doubt on the validity of the

14
finding or a substantial change of circumstances occurs, the trial
court must suspend proceedings and hold a new competency
hearing under section 1368. (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 234
[new competency hearing required when defendant started
speaking incoherently following cessation of medication]; People
v. Tejeda (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 785, 795 [new competency
hearing required when defendant could no longer keep delusion
separate from defense]; People v. Easter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
226, 243 [new word-salad symptom necessitated another
competency proceeding].) This duty to suspend proceedings and
conduct another hearing “is not triggered by information that
substantially duplicates evidence already considered at an
earlier, formal inquiry into the defendant’s competence; when
faced with evidence of relatively minor changes in the defendant’s
mental state, the court may rely on a prior competency finding
rather than convening a new hearing to cover largely the same
ground.” (Rodas, at pp. 234-235; In re Sims (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 762, 783.)
“Counsel’s assertion of a belief in a client’s incompetence is
entitled to some weight. But unless the court itself has declared
a doubt as to the defendant’s competence, and has asked for
counsel’s opinion on the subject, counsel’s assertion that his or
her client is or may be incompetent does not, in the absence of
substantial evidence to that effect, require the court to hold a
competency hearing.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986,
1033.)
We review for substantial evidence a trial court’s finding of
no substantial change of circumstances or no new evidence
casting serious doubt on the validity of an initial competency
determination. (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 220.)

15
We review for an abuse of discretion the court’s decision not to
reinstate competency proceedings. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15
Cal.4th 1, 33.) A “trial judge’s decision not to order a competency
hearing is entitled to great deference, because the trial court is in
the best position to observe the defendant during trial.” (People
v. Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1033.)

2. Application

a. Dr. Knapke’s 2019 Report did not Cast
Serious Doubt on the 2017 Competency
Finding
Bennett argues that Dr. Knapke’s February 2019 finding
that Bennett “continued” to harbor grandiose and persecutory
delusions demonstrated that his delusions were consistent and
therefore sincere, which constituted new evidence that
undermined Dr. Rad’s 2017 conclusion that Bennett was
malingering, which in turn cast serious doubt on the court’s 2017
competency finding. We disagree.
Dr. Rad reported in March 2017 that although Bennett had
a history of claimed paranoia and delusions, including that God
revealed to him that he was Jesus Christ by causing UFOs, stars,
and clouds to follow him, he was merely malingering psychosis,
and was competent to stand trial. Based on this report, the court
found him competent.
None of the three subsequent evaluations offered anything
new. In July 2018, Dr. Markman reported that Bennett
demonstrated no underlying psychotic process or thought
disorder. This tracked Dr. Rad’s conclusion that Bennett was
malingering psychosis.

16
In November 2018, Dr. Knapke reported that despite
Bennett’s delusional claims, there were “no other signs or
symptoms of any current psychosis, [and] it is unknown whether
[his] claim about believing that he is Jesus is authentic or not.”
This duplicated Dr. Rad’s finding that none of the expected
collateral observations, for example of Bennett talking to himself
or appearing distracted, corroborated his claim that he suffered
even from delusions, much less psychoses. Dr. Knapke further
stated that the psychoses Bennett claimed usually began to
manifest themselves in the late teens or early 20s, resulting in a
lifelong history of psychiatric treatment services, but there was
no evidence that Bennett, who was 46, had such a history. This
duplicated Dr. Rad’s finding that Bennett’s medical records
reflected only a series of brief emergency room visits for physical
complaints and distress associated with loss of housing, not any
psychiatric diagnoses or treatments.
In February 2019, Dr. Knapke interviewed Bennett a
second time, and reported that Bennett made statements “very
consistent” with the statements he had made during the first
interview indicating that he “continue[d] to harbor grandiose and
persecutory delusions.” But Dr. Knapke reported that Bennett
“was not responding to any internal stimuli” during the
interview, and “appeared to be able to focus on th[e]
examination.” This finding substantially duplicated Dr. Rad’s
finding that the expected collateral indicia of Bennett’s claimed
psychoses were absent.
Bennett argues that his long history of mental health
issues and bizarre statements provided the “objective findings”
and “collateral data” that Dr. Rad had found lacking in 2017,

17
which cast doubt on his conclusions and thus on the court’s 2017
competency finding. We disagree.
Dr. Rad reported that objective findings of Bennett’s
psychosis were lacking because no medical records supported his
claims about his psychiatric history, as they reflected only brief
emergency room visits for physical complaints and distress
associated with loss of housing, with no resulting psychiatric
diagnoses or treatments. Nothing in Dr. Knapke’s 2019 report
improved this record.
Dr. Rad found that collateral data of psychosis was lacking
because no collateral observations confirmed Bennett’s reports of
hallucinations. For example, there were no reports of him
talking to himself or appearing distracted during the interview.
Nothing in Dr. Knapke’s 2019 report provided the missing data.
On the contrary, Dr. Knapke too found “no other signs or
symptoms of any current psychosis.”
That Bennett continued to evince delusions and claim he
suffered from hallucinations, substantially duplicated evidence
provided by Dr. Rad in 2017. The court was therefore entitled to
rely on its prior competency finding. (See Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th
at pp. 234-235 [“when faced with evidence of relatively minor
changes in the defendant’s mental state, the court may rely on a
prior competency finding rather than convening a new hearing to
cover largely the same ground”].)

b. Dr. Knapke’s 2019 Report Revealed No
Substantial Change in Circumstances
Bennett nominally argues that Dr. Knapke’s 2019 report
revealed a substantial change in circumstances from those
existing in 2017, but he makes no attempt to adduce any changed

18
circumstance. On the contrary Bennett supports this argument
with evidence of only unchanged circumstances, for example,
“that appellant has had consistent symptoms of paranoia and
delusions since years prior to the incident.”
Bennett likens himself to the defendant in Rodas, who was
entitled to a new competency hearing after he expressed
paranoia, discussed Biblical characters, and started speaking
incoherently following cessation of medication. (Rodas, supra, 6
Cal.5th at p. 231.) Rodas is distinguishable.
There, the defendant had a history of diagnosed
schizophrenia and substance abuse and had been declared
incompetent to stand trial and confined at a psychiatric facility.
An expert reported that if he took psychotropic medication, the
defendant “likely would regain competence, but without it, likely
would not.” (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 232.) Our high court
concluded circumstances had so deteriorated when the defendant
went off his medication and began speaking in what counsel
described as a “word salad,” i.e., “ ‘polysyllabic words that go
around in a circle and don’t really make sense’ ” (id. at p. 227),
that the trial court erred in not holding a new competency
hearing. (Id. at pp. 236-237.) Bennett identifies no material
change in his behavior subsequent to the 2017 competency
finding remotely comparable to that in Rodas. There being no
evidence casting serious doubt on the court’s 2017 finding that
Bennett was competent to stand trial, and no substantial change
in circumstances since that finding, we see no basis for second
guessing the court’s judgment in declining to order a second
competency hearing.

19
B. Instruction on Heat of Passion Voluntary
Manslaughter
Bennett contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct
on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter.
We disagree.

1. Legal Principles

a. Homicide Categories
Homicide is divided into murder, which requires malice
aforethought, and manslaughter, which does not. (People v.
Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 941.)
A killing without malice but induced by a sudden quarrel or
heat of passion is voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included
offense of murder. (People v. Williams (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d
469, 475; People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 108.)
Voluntary manslaughter on a heat of passion theory has
both subjective and objective components. (People v. Moye (2009)
47 Cal.4th 537, 549 (Moye).) “To satisfy the subjective
element . . . , the accused must be shown to have killed while
under ‘the actual influence of a strong passion’ ” induced by the
victim’s provocation. (Id. at p. 550.) The passion aroused may be
any “ ‘ “ ‘violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion’ ” ’
[citations] other than revenge.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19
Cal.4th 142, 163 (Breverman), disapproved on other grounds in
People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7 (Schuller).)
To satisfy the objective element, the heat of passion must
be a result of sufficient provocation—that is, conduct by the
victim “sufficiently provocative that it would cause an ordinary
person of average disposition to act rashly or without due

20
deliberation and reflection.” (Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 549-
550.) “To be adequate, the provocation must be one that would
cause an emotion so intense that an ordinary person would
simply react, without reflection.” (People v. Beltran, supra, 56
Cal.4th at p. 949.) Both heat of passion and adequate
provocation “must be affirmatively demonstrated.” (People v. Lee
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 60.)
Malice aforethought may also be negated by an actual but
unreasonable belief in the need to defend oneself or another from
imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, reducing a
killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter. (People v.
Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 990, 994, overruled on other
grounds in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201.) This
doctrine is commonly known as imperfect self-defense or defense
of another. (Randle, at p. 994.) Self-defense against an assault
requires an actual and reasonable belief in the need to defend
against an imminent danger of bodily injury. (People v.
Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082.) The trier of fact “must
consider what ‘would appear to be necessary to a reasonable
person’ ” in the position of appellant, with the appellant’s
knowledge and awareness. (Id. at pp. 1082-1083.)

b. Jury Instruction
A trial court must instruct on general principles of law
relevant to the issues raised in a criminal case. (Breverman,
supra 19 Cal.4th at p. 162.)
But “the court is not obliged to instruct on theories that
have no such evidentiary support.” (Breverman, supra, 19
Cal.4th at p. 162.) The “existence of ‘any evidence, no matter how
weak’ will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense,

21
but such instructions are required whenever evidence that the
defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is ‘substantial
enough to merit consideration’ by the jury. [Citations.]
‘Substantial evidence’ in this context is ‘ “evidence from which a
jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude” ’ that
the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.” (Ibid.)
We review de novo a trial court’s failure to instruct on a
lesser included offense, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the defendant. (People v. Millbrook (2014) 222
Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.)
When there is substantial evidence of heat-of-passion
manslaughter, the trial court’s failure to instruct on that theory
precludes the jury from making a factual finding that is
necessary to prove the malice element of murder. The error
therefore amounts to a violation of the federal Constitution and is
subject to the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for
evaluating prejudice. (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 260, fn.
7.)

2. Application
Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
on a heat-of-passion theory turns on whether the record contains
substantial evidence that, if believed by the jury, would raise a
reasonable doubt as to whether Bennett was aroused to passion,
and his reason was thus obscured, by a provocation sufficient to
produce such effects in a person of average disposition. (See
Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 163-164.)
Here, there was no evidence that Bennett acted while
under the actual influence of any “violent, intense, high-wrought
or enthusiastic emotion” when he stabbed Tyler. (Breverman,

22
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 163.) Granted, Bennett testified that
Tyler punched him in the head, hit him again four or five times,
called him a “stupid motherfucker” and, after he hit her back,
“drew” a knife, but Bennett did not say that Tyler attacked him
with the knife or that her actions up to this point caused him to
feel any particular emotion.
Bennett testified that after he wrestled Tyler to the ground
and took the knife away, she got on top of him and attempted to
gouge at his eyes, and he was “fearful” that she would do so. He
therefore stabbed her to “get her off” him. Bennett did not testify
he experienced any violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic
emotion, and no evidence showed that he did.
We grant that Tyler’s attack when she and Bennett were on
the ground (he with the knife) was “sufficiently provocative that
it would cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act
rashly or without due deliberation and reflection” (Moye, supra,
47 Cal.4th at p. 550), even though she was unarmed and even
though Bennett sustained no injuries. But no evidence suggested
Bennett was actually provoked to act rashly or without due
deliberation. (See ibid. [“To satisfy the subjective element of this
form of voluntary manslaughter, the accused must be shown to
have killed while under ‘the actual influence of a strong passion’
induced by such provocation”].) For example, nothing suggested
his reason was obscured or he panicked or lost control. On the
contrary, Bennett admitted he stabbed Tyler deliberately because
he was unable to dislodge her and feared she would injure or kill
him. (Cf. People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 649
[“ ‘anger or other passion must be so strong that the defendant’s
reaction bypassed his thought process to such an extent that
judgment could not and did not intervene’ ”].)

23
We conclude no substantial evidence raised a reasonable
doubt that Bennett stabbed Tyler in a heat of passion. The court
therefore properly declined to give a heat of passion instruction.

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Bennett argues the prosecutor committed prejudicial
misconduct by arguing to the jury that Bennett “sat for six years,
seven months and 14 days on the fact that he was attacked
allegedly by Cheryl Tyler.” He argues that the prosecutor thus
used his silence as substantive evidence of guilt, which violated
his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. In a related
vein, Bennett argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by
arguing that Bennett “told no one that Cheryl Tyler had allegedly
attacked him. . . . [H]e told absolutely no one that she attacked
him,” even though the prosecutor knew that (1) Dr. Markman
reported that Bennett had stated that on the date of the incident
he was “afraid of being stabbed with a knife—roommate was
yelling and screaming—thought she was attacking me”; and (2)
Dr. Knapke reported that Bennett “believed that the victim was
trying to kill him . . . and . . . described her as being very hostile
towards him on the day of the instant offense. At one point, the
victim knocked the knife out of his hand[,] and he then retrieved
it and stabbed the victim multiple times.”

1. Relevant Proceedings
Responding to a reported disturbance, police found Bennett
standing alone in his apartment complex’s second-floor courtyard.
He responded to some questions but not others. For example, he
motioned to his waistband when asked whether he had a weapon

24
but said nothing when asked whether he lived in the complex and
in which apartment.
Prior to booking Bennett, police placed him in a holding jail
cell in a police station. Three detectives tried to interview him in
the holding cell, but he lay down with his eyes closed and did not
respond to any questions.
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Bennett,
“Who was the first person that you told about Cheryl Tyler
attacking you and trying to gouge out your eyes?” The court
sustained defense counsel’s objection that that question would
theoretically force Bennett to reveal he told his attorney Tyler
attacked him, which would violate Bennett’s attorney-client
privilege. The prosecutor rephrased the question, asking, “Who
was the first person, other than any of your attorneys, that you
told about Cheryl Tyler trying to gouge your eyes out?” After the
court overruled defense counsel’s objections on the grounds that
the question assumed facts not in evidence and the answer would
be unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352, Bennett
responded, “I don’t remember. I don’t know.”
Prior to argument, the trial court asked if defense counsel
wanted to lodge an objection regarding any comment on Bennett’s
3
post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence. Counsel stated: “Yes, your
Honor. So it’s my understanding that Mr. Ford intends to
comment on that in some way. I believe that would be a violation
of my client’s 5th Amendment right to remain silent. And to
comment on it I know that the prosecution is not allowed to
comment on such things. And I would submit on that, but this is
for the record.” The trial court overruled the objection.

3
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

25
During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury: “We
know the defendant told no one that Cheryl Tyler had allegedly
attacked him.” “[H]e told absolutely no one that she attacked
him. The evidence shows us silence. And sometimes what
someone doesn’t say is just as important as what they do. He told
no one about this except his attorney until you fin[e] folks heard
[it]. [T]his man sat for six years, seven months and 14 days on
the fact that he was attacked allegedly by Cheryl Tyler.” Defense
counsel objected and requested a sidebar. During the sidebar,
the following discussion ensued:
“[Defense counsel]: I believe [the prosecutor] said that he
did [not] tell anyone except his attorney.
“[Prosecutor]: I said[, ‘]maybe her [sic] attorney.[’]
“[Defense counsel]: That’s not evidence. I specifically made
the objection for attorney-client privilege.
“The court: And I sustained it to my knowledge.
“[Prosecutor]: Then I asked the follow-up question[,]
[‘E]xcepting your attorney, did you tell anyone else[?’] And
he said[, ‘]I don’t know.[’]
“The court: The objection is overruled. And I will give an
admonishment to the jury. Thank you.”
Then, back in open court, the court gave an admonishment
to the jury: “All right. Ladies and gentlemen, once again . . . the
statement of the attorneys is not evidence. Are you to abide by
your recollection of the facts and evidence presented during the
case and abide by [the] court’s instructions regarding application
of the jury instruction.”

26
2. Prejudice
We will assume for the sake of argument that the
prosecutor inappropriately used Bennett’s silence during a
custodial interrogation as evidence of guilt and mischaracterized
the facts by arguing Bennett never told anyone that Tyler
attacked him. We discern no prejudice.
A prosecutor’s misconduct is prejudicial if “ ‘it is reasonably
probable that without such misconduct, an outcome more
favorable to the defendant would have resulted.’ ” (People v.
Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 679.)
Bennett admitted he killed Tyler and, as discussed above,
no evidence suggested he did so in a heat of passion. Bennett
testified that Tyler punched him in the head, hit him again four
or five times, called him a “stupid motherfucker” and, after he hit
her back, “drew” a knife. He did not testify that Tyler attacked
him with the knife. Bennett testified that he took the knife away
and wrestled Tyler to the ground, but she somehow got on top of
him and threatened to gouge out his eyes. He testified that
fearing she would injure or kill him, he deliberately stabbed Tyler
to dislodge her. His theory was imperfect self-defense.
It is not reasonably probable that without the prosecutor’s
alleged misuse of Bennett’s silence while in custody and
mischaracterization of the evidence the jury would have accepted
Bennett’s self-defense theory. The only facts pertinent to that
theory were that after Bennett obtained control of the knife,
Tyler got atop him, he feared she would gouge out his eyes, and
he could not dislodge her without stabbing her 14 times.
Whatever negative inference the jury drew from the prosecutor’s
misrepresentation that Bennett never told this story before trial
was dwarfed by the unlikelihood that a 44-year-old man who was

27
able to disarm a 63-year-old woman with limited mobility (she
used a walker and a cane) and “take” her to the ground actually
believed he needed to stab her 14 times to dislodge her from atop
him.
Accordingly, if an error occurred, it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

D. Cumulative Error
Bennett contends the cumulative error that occurred
during trial compels reversal. Consistent with our review of his
individual claims, we find no cumulative error occurred. (People
v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 458.)

E. Pitchess Hearing
Pitchess motions have been used to screen law enforcement
personnel files in-camera for evidence potentially relevant to a
criminal defendant’s defense. (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005)
35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019.) Where the defendant has shown good
cause, the trial court holds an in-camera hearing to determine
whether the evidence should be disclosed to the defense. (Ibid.)
Bennett sought discovery pursuant to Pitchess, asking
whether there was discoverable information in the files of the
testifying police officers, Detective Kouri, Detective Villarreal,
and Officer Estrada. The trial court held in-camera hearings,
after which it ordered the files sealed and disclosed one complaint
to Bennett, subject to a protective order.
Bennett requests that we review the in-camera proceedings
to determine whether the trial court incorrectly withheld any
discovery pertaining to the testifying officers when it denied his
Pitchess motion.

28
We may do so by reviewing a transcript of the in-camera
proceedings. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1286.) We
review a trial court’s decision on the discoverability of material in
police personnel files for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
Here, the record is adequate to permit meaningful
appellate review. It includes a full transcript of both segments of
the in-camera hearing, where the court adequately stated for the
record the contents of the three officers’ personnel files, which
were supplied and certified by the LAPD’s custodian of records.
The court stated its reasoning for finding that Bennett was
entitled to only one of the complaints that had been filed against
one of the officers. (See People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp.
1285-1286 [in some circumstances it suffices for the court to state
for the record what documents it examined].)
We have reviewed the record under seal and independently
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its
ruling upon the Pitchess motion.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.

29

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.