People v. Campbell CA2/2

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Filed 7/31/25 P. v. Campbell CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B335706

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. TA101790)

CHRISTOPHER CAMPBELL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kelvin D. Filer, Judge. Affirmed.

Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
Defendant and appellant Christopher Campbell appeals
from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95)1 following an
evidentiary hearing.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
On August 25, 1999, teenager Kenneth Colter (Colter)
damaged the tire of defendant’s son’s bicycle. Defendant’s son
was upset, but Colter said he would get him new rims. Colter
left, accompanied by Damon C. (Damon). A few minutes later,
defendant arrived. He appeared very angry and was yelling and
cursing. Defendant asked where Colter had gone and drove off.
Defendant found Colter and Damon, “jumped out of the
car” “kind of mad[,]” and asked them why they had “mess[ed] up
his son’s bike.” Defendant demanded that they get his son
another rim and said, “‘Well, if you don’t get a rim, I[‘m] going to
beat your behind.’” Defendant “jumped in [Colter]’s face” and

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no substantive change. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10; People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 880,
fn. 4.) For simplicity, we refer to the section by its new
numbering.
2 We draw these facts from the trial record in defendant’s
direct appeal from his conviction (People v. Campbell (Jan. 7,
2002, B146172) [nonpub. opn.] (Campbell)), which we have
judicially noticed at defendant’s request.

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said in a threatening manner, “‘Do you know I’ll knock you out?
I’ll knock you out.’” Defendant got back into his car.
Damon later saw Colter arguing with defendant and
defendant’s brother, Sidney Campbell (Sidney),3 on a basketball
court. Sidney asked Colter to come back and talk. Colter
responded, “‘What kind of person that would come up to another
person and speak to that person that has a gun?’” The argument
got louder, and Colter backed up. Damon heard shots fired and
ducked. Damon’s mother took him inside his house. Through the
window, Damon saw Colter, defendant, and Sidney shooting
guns. Defendant and Sidney fired their guns at Colter at the
same time.
Shortly after the shooting, defendant asked Jorge D.
(Jorge) if he had been involved in damaging defendant’s son’s
bicycle. Defendant said “that he would kill for his son.”
Gerrina Hawes (Hawes) testified that, prior to the shooting,
Sidney said to her, “‘Bitch, what you doing over here. Take your
mother f**king ass home because we’re right in the middle of
s**t.’” Hawes saw Colter backing up with his hands behind his
back. Sidney and defendant walked toward Colter. While
holding a semiautomatic gun, Sidney said, “‘Come here, [Colter].
Man, come here. Let’s talk about it.’” Hawes heard gunshots and
saw Sidney shooting his gun. After the shooting, Colter left the
scene. Hawes eventually found Colter trying to get up from the
ground. Blood squirted from his mouth and then he laid still.

3 Because defendant and his brother share the same last
name, we refer to Sidney by his first name for clarity. No
disrespect is intended.

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According to the deputy medical examiner who performed
the autopsy, Colter died as a result of a gunshot wound to the
neck that entered his lower jaw.
II. Procedural History
A. Conviction and sentencing
A jury found defendant guilty of the second-degree murder
of Colter. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The jury found true the allegations
that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and personally used a firearm during the
commission of the crime (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53,
subd. (b)). The jury found not true the allegation that defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately
causing great bodily injury or death to Colter. (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d).)
The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 35 years to life
in state prison. We affirmed the judgment on direct appeal.
(Campbell, supra, B146172.)
B. Section 1172.6 petition and evidentiary hearing
In January 2023, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel to
represent defendant in connection with his petition. Finding that
defendant had made a prima facie showing for relief, the court
held an evidentiary hearing on October 3, 2023, where the court
heard argument from the People and defense counsel but neither
side presented new evidence.
C. Trial court’s ruling
On October 31, 2023, the trial court issued a memorandum
of decision denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition. The court
found that the People had established beyond a reasonable doubt

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that defendant was ineligible for resentencing, based on two
different theories.
First, although the trial court found that “the evidence does
not establish that [defendant] was the actual killer, it clearly
establishes that he aided and abetted the commission of the
murder.” The court explained: “This entire case resulted from an
incident where [defendant]’s son’s bicycle had been damaged by
the murder victim, . . . Colter. [Defendant] found out about the
incident, got upset and went looking for the victim, Colter.
[Defendant]’s younger brother, [Sidney], went with him.
[Defendant] was upset and referenced that he would ‘kill for his
son.’ Sidney . . . was holding a semi-automatic gun as [defendant]
was yelling at the victim. There was arguing between the parties
which ultimately resulted in multiple gunshots being fired.
There was evidence that [defendant] and . . . [Sidney] both fired
shots at the victim. It was not established who fired the fatal
shot killing the victim, but the jury found ‘true’ that [defendant]
personally discharged a firearm in the commission of the offense.
There was evidence that the victim, during the course of the
argument, may have pulled out a gun. However, the jury
rejected . . . [defendant]’s claim of self-defense.”
The trial court concluded that “[t]hese facts clearly show
that [defendant] could be convicted on an aider and abettor
theory. [Defendant]’s words and conduct aided and abetted the
commission of the shooting[]s[;] . . . it was [defendant] who got
upset about what happened with his son. It was [defendant]’s
idea to go and find the victim. [Defendant] was the main
instigator of the argument and acknowledged that he would ‘[k]ill
for his son.’ Clearly, [defendant] fired his weapon and . . .
[Sidney] also fired his weapon, . . . [defendant] ‘instigated,

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prompted and encouraged’ the use of deadly force. [Defendant]
fired multiple shots—some clearly after Sidney had fired which
clearly facilitated the homicide. It is a very reasonable inference
to presume that [defendant] could have influenced his younger
brother’s conduct. Yet, [defendant] did nothing to discourage
Sidney . . . from shooting and he did not make any attempt to
prevent the shooting.”
Based on the “totality of the evidence in this case,” the trial
court found that defendant “by his conduct was, in essence,
telling his brother to shoot the victim[,]” which supported the
court’s finding that defendant “acted with implied malice directly
aiding and abetting the murder[.]”
Second, the trial court found that defendant “was ‘a major
participant’ in the shooting and acted with ‘reckless indifference
to human life.’” The court emphasized that it was defendant’s
“idea to confront the victim”—“a young boy . . . by himself.”
Defendant “ultimately obtained a gun and fired his gun multiple
times at the victim. He did this at the same time that his
younger brother was firing multiple shots at the victim.”
D. Appeal
Defendant timely appealed from the denial of his
section 1172.6 petition.
DISCUSSION
I. Background Legal Principles
A. Senate Bill No. 1437
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) substantively amended sections 188 and 189 to
“eliminate[] natural and probable consequences liability for
murder as it applies to aiding and abetting[] and limit[] the scope
of the felony-murder rule. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2021)

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11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) “Now, a conviction for . . . [murder]
requires proof that the defendant (1) was the actual killer (who
acted with the requisite express or implied malice), (2) directly
aided and abetted the actual killer while acting with the intent to
kill, or (3) was a major participant in a felony who acted with
reckless indifference to the value of human life.” (People v.
Duran (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 920, 927.) “[A] principal in a
murder, including an aider or abettor, may still be criminally
liable if that individual personally possesses malice aforethought,
whether express or implied. [Citations.]” (People v. Harris (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 623, 631.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also added what is now section 1172.6,
which provides a procedural mechanism for defendants who could
not be convicted of murder under the amended laws to petition
for retroactive relief. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) Upon
the filing of a properly pleaded petition for resentencing, the trial
court must conduct a prima facie analysis to determine the
defendant’s eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3) & (c);
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708; Lewis, at pp. 957,
960.) If the court determines that the requisite prima facie
showing has been made, it must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v. Wilson
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869.)
“At the evidentiary hearing following issuance of an order
to show cause, the superior court acts as an independent fact
finder, and the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under California law following Senate Bill
No. 1437’s amendments. [Citations.] The petitioner and the
prosecutor may offer new or additional evidence, and the court

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may consider evidence ‘previously admitted at any prior hearing
or trial that is admissible under current law,’ including witness
testimony. [Citations.]” (People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
1055, 1065–1066 (Hill).)
B. Aiding and abetting implied malice murder
“Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought but without the additional
elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation,
that would support a conviction of first degree murder.
[Citations.]” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151.)
Malice can be either express or implied. (§ 188.) Express malice
requires an intent to kill; implied malice does not. (People v. Soto
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 976.) “Murder is committed with implied
malice when ‘the killing is proximately caused by “‘an act, the
natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act
was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his
conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with
conscious disregard for life.’”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).)
To be liable for implied malice murder as an aider and
abettor, a defendant “‘must, by words or conduct, aid the
commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act.
The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct
aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to
commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of
the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and
acting in conscious disregard for human life.’ [Citations.]”
(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.)
Aiding and abetting implied malice murder remains a valid
theory after Senate Bill No. 1437. (People v. Gudiel (2024)

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107 Cal.App.5th 848, 859 (Gudiel); People v. Maldonado (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1263 (Maldonado).)
II. Standard of Review
On appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition
following an evidentiary hearing, we review the trial court’s
findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Vargas (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951 (Vargas).) “In conducting our review, we
consider the whole record in the light most favorable to the . . .
court’s findings [citation], and we presume “‘“every fact in
support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably
deduced from the evidence.”’” [Citation.] We ask ‘whether
substantial evidence, defined as reasonable and credible evidence
of solid value, has been disclosed, permitting the trier of fact to
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] And based on
this whole record review, we ‘“determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.”’ [Citation.]” (Hill, supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1066.)
III. Analysis
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant is guilty of directly
aiding and abetting implied malice murder, a theory unaffected
by Senate Bill No. 1437.4 (Gudiel, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at
p. 859; Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1263.)

4 Because we may affirm on this basis alone, we do not
address whether the trial court erred in finding defendant guilty
of murder based on the alternate theory that he was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
(People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1239 [“We

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Factors to consider in determining aiding and abetting
liability include presence at the scene of the crime,
companionship with other perpetrators, conduct before and after
the crime, and motive. (People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
437, 443 (Schell); Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 955.) All of
these factors support the finding that defendant “‘aid[ed] the
commission of the life-endangering act’” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 991)—the fatal shooting of Colter by Sidney.5
Defendant was very angry at Colter for damaging his son’s
bicycle; he went looking for Colter and threatened physical
violence if Colter did not replace the rim. Sometime later,
defendant and Sidney argued with Colter on the basketball court.
Defendant, Sidney, and Colter each brandished a gun and gunfire
ensued. Not only was defendant present when Colter was fatally

‘“review the [trial court’s] ruling, not the court’s reasoning, and, if
the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm[]”’”].)
5 The jury found not true the allegation that defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately
causing great bodily injury or death to Colter. (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d).) Accordingly, we disregard any evidence incompatible
with that finding. (See People v. Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
393, 398 [holding “that a trial court cannot deny relief in a
section [1172.6] proceeding based on findings that are
inconsistent with a previous acquittal when no evidence other
than that introduced at trial is presented”]; see also People v.
Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 391 [remanding for new
§ 1172.6 evidentiary hearing in which “the court shall not make
any finding or rely on any evidence which contradicts the jury’s
finding that the personal use of a knife sentencing enhancement
was not true”].) We can and do consider evidence that defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (c)), as the jury found that allegation to be true.

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shot, but he actively participated in the attack by shooting at
Colter at the same time as Sidney. Following the shooting,
defendant said “that he would kill for his son.” As his brother,
defendant shared a close companionship with the actual killer,
Sidney.
Urging reversal, defendant insists that “[n]o evidence
showed [defendant] provided the gun to Sidney[;] asked,
encouraged or told Sidney to shoot[;] struck or beat . . . Colter as
part of the shooting[;] or chased . . . Colter trying to shoot him.”
Defendant essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence. That is
not our role. (People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1090
[“Under a substantial evidence review, . . . we do not reweigh the
evidence”].) Having already identified substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s finding, “it is of no consequence that
the . . . court believing other evidence, or drawing other
reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.
[Citations.]” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874,
italics omitted.)
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in basing
its decision on his pre-shooting argument with Colter rather than
his knowledge of a life endangering act. We disagree. The court
expressly recognized that the life-endangering act was the
shooting—not just the preshooting argument. The court found
that defendant’s “words and conduct aided and abetted the
commission of the shooting[]” and that it was defendant who
“‘instigated, prompted and encouraged’ the use of deadly force.”
(Italics added.)
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by making
factual findings that “conflict with and are unsupported by the
record, especially as shown by the [original] court’s findings and

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the trial prosecutor’s concessions.” Again, we are unpersuaded.
As discussed above, we have identified ample substantial
evidence that defendant aided and abetted implied malice
murder. Tactical decisions and arguments made by the
prosecutor at trial and procedural rulings by the original trial
court do not constitute findings that bind the court at a
section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. (See Hill, supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1065 [“the superior court acts as an
independent fact finder” at a § 1172.6 evidentiary hearing].) The
prosecution may “present different theories of guilt at the
evidentiary hearing” without “implicat[ing] constitutional
concerns.” (Schell, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 444; see also
People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 813 [“By allowing
new evidence and providing for an evidentiary hearing, the
Legislature plainly intended that the issues concerning whether
the defendant was guilty under theories of murder not previously
or necessarily decided would be resolved anew”].)6
Finally, defendant makes a cumulative error argument for
reversal. “Cumulative error is present when the combined effect
of the trial court’s errors is prejudicial or harmful to the
defendant. [Citations.]” (People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989,
1017.) This contention fails because defendant has not
established multiple errors to cumulate.

6 The California Supreme Court has yet to express a “view on
whether a court may deny a section 1172.6 resentencing petition
based on a theory of murder not argued by the prosecution at
trial.” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 987.)

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DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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