CourtListener 10645564•People v. Watkins CA2/2
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Filed 7/31/25 P. v. Watkins CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B334370
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. MA060163)
RUSSELL DEAN WATKINS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed.
Sharon Fleming, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Stefanie Yee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
In 2014, defendant and appellant Russell Dean Watkins
pled no contest to kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a))1 and
was sentenced to serve 17 years in state prison. In 2023,
pursuant to section 1172.75,2 the trial court struck a one-year
prior prison term enhancement (former § 667.5, subd. (b)) and
resentenced defendant to serve 16 years. On appeal from his
resentencing, defendant argues that the court erred by
reimposing the high term on the kidnapping charge and by
declining to dismiss his prior “strike” conviction within the
meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
1170.12).
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts3
On July 8, 2013, defendant grabbed his girlfriend, S.C., by
the arm and told her to get into his car. S.C. pleaded with
defendant to let her go. S.C. managed to pull her arm away from
defendant, but defendant regained control. Grabbing S.C. by her
hair and arm, defendant threw her into the front seat of his car.
S.C. attempted to get out of the car, but defendant drove off
before she could.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1171.1 was renumbered
section 1172.75, with no substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 12; People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 378, fn. 2.) For
simplicity, we refer to the section by its new numbering.
3 We draw these underlying facts from the probation report.
2
II. Conviction and Sentencing
Defendant pled no contest to one count of kidnapping
(§ 207, subd. (a)) and admitted that he had suffered one prior
strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and one prior
prison term (former § 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced
defendant to an aggregate term of 17 years in state prison,
comprised of the high term of eight years for the kidnapping,
doubled to 16 years for the strike conviction, plus one year for the
prior prison term enhancement.
III. Section 1172.75 Proceedings
A. Defendant’s motion for resentencing
In 2022, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation identified defendant as being potentially entitled
to resentencing relief under Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.). Represented by appointed counsel, defendant filed a
motion for resentencing, asking the trial court to strike the prior
prison term enhancement, dismiss the strike conviction, and
resentence defendant to the low term of three years for the
kidnapping.
Defendant attached a social history report prepared by a
paralegal at the Alternate Public Defender’s Office, which stated
that defendant was abused as a child and had “suffered from
diagnosed mental illness since he was in high school.” Defendant
also attached a probation report prepared in October 2013 and
various prison records documenting his educational and mental
health program achievements.
B. The People’s opposition
The People, represented by the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office, filed an opposition. Although conceding that
the one-year prior prison term enhancement should be stricken,
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the People “oppose[d] any other reduction in sentencing.” The
People attached a list of prison rule violations committed by
defendant, including a “[s]erious” violation for fighting.
C. Trial court’s ruling
At the resentencing hearing on September 26, 2023, the
trial court struck the one-year prior prison term enhancement
pursuant to section 1172.75.
After entertaining oral argument regarding further
reductions of defendant’s sentence, the trial court explained that
it took defendant’s statements regarding his childhood trauma
“at face value . . . because we have nothing to support that.” The
court noted “a long history to support that [defendant] suffered
from mental health illness” and that defendant was being treated
in the prison’s Enhanced Outpatient Program (EOP) for his
“bipolar condition.” The court stated that defendant’s mental
health was “a factor in mitigation that” it was “greatly
considering.”
The trial court noted that defendant had three prior
domestic violence-related convictions. The court also found it
significant that, despite his mental health treatment and the
knowledge that he would have an opportunity for resentencing,
defendant was found guilty of fighting, a serious prison rule
violation, just two months before the hearing. This showed that
defendant “still could not control [him]self with respect to
physical violence with others.”
The trial court declined to dismiss the prior strike
conviction, finding that doing so would not be “in the interest of
justice or within the spirt of the law under” People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) or section 1385,
subdivision (c). Rather, the court found that dismissing the
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strike would “endanger the public safety,” including “physical
injury or other serious danger to others . . . .”
With respect to the applicable term for the kidnapping, the
trial court concluded that “[i]n no way, shape, or form is this a
low term case.” In justifying imposition of the high term, the
court found that defendant’s prior convictions were numerous
and of increasing seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(2)); defendant served a prior prison term (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)); defendant was on parole when the
current crime was committed (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(4)); and defendant’s prior performance on probation
or parole was unsatisfactory (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(5)). The court found “that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh[ed] the mitigating circumstances[.]”
The trial court resentenced defendant to serve 16 years,
comprised of the high term of eight years, doubled for the strike.
IV. Appeal
Defendant timely appealed from his resentencing.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards of Review
We review the trial court’s sentencing decisions for an
abuse of discretion. (People v. Moseley (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
870, 874.) To the extent that we must interpret relevant
statutes, we do so de novo. (People v. Terwilligar (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 585, 595.)
II. Relevant Law
A. Section 1172.75
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 added
section 1172.75, which renders “legally invalid” any former
section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement
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imposed before January 1, 2020, except for a prior conviction for
a sexually violent offense. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) A defendant
who qualifies for the recall of his sentence under section 1172.75
is entitled to “a full resentencing” at which the trial court may
reconsider all of its prior sentencing decisions. (People v. Monroe
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 (Monroe).)
The statute provides “specific instructions” for the trial
court to exercise broad resentencing authority. (People v. Carter
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966.) The trial court must “apply
any . . . changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for
judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) The
court “may consider postconviction factors, including, but not
limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of
the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether
age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
“Unless the court originally imposed the upper term, the
court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term,
and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(4).)
B. Section 1170, subdivision (b)
Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 124 and
Senate Bill No. 567 made changes to section 1170 regarding
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determinate sentencing. (See People v. Jones (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 37, 44, fn. 11.) Now, when three possible terms of
imprisonment can be imposed for a crime, the trial court may
only impose the high term “when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term[,] and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(2).)
Additionally, “unless the [trial] court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice,” the court is required to
impose the lower term if any one of several factors “was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense[.]” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6).) These “contributing factor[s]” include
“experienc[ing] psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,
including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or
sexual violence.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A); see also People v.
Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 241 [“psychological trauma
based on mental illness may be a circumstance qualifying for the
lower term presumption in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)”].)
III. Analysis
As required by section 1172.75, the trial court struck
defendant’s former section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison
term enhancement. And, as required, the court conducted a full
resentencing (Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402), during
which the court reimposed the high term on the kidnapping
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charge and declined to dismiss the strike conviction. We find no
abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
A. The trial court did not err by reimposing the high term
Defendant raises three challenges to the trial court’s
selection of the high term for the kidnapping. Each lacks merit.
First, defendant contends that the trial court used an
incorrect legal standard in departing from the low term.
Specifically, defendant argues that, rather than assessing
whether defendant’s trauma-related mental illness “was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6)), the court imposed a higher standard by requiring
defendant to demonstrate that it was “a ‘controlling’ factor, which
was ‘tightly correlated’ to the underlying offense.”4
We disagree. That the trial court used the phrases
“controlling factor” and “tightly correlated” in explaining its
decision does not mean that the court misunderstood
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), as requiring a mitigating factor
to be controlling or tightly correlated to the underlying offense.
Rather, the court recognized that defendant’s mental illness was
a mitigating circumstance and stated that it was “greatly
considering” it.
Nevertheless, even with its “great[] consider[ation]” of
defendant’s mental health history, the trial court expressly found
“that the aggravating circumstances outweigh[ed] the mitigating
4 Defendant points to two comments made by the trial court
at the hearing. First, the court found that, although defendant’s
“mental health illness . . . is a factor amongst many,” it was not
“tightly correlated in any way to his behavior here.” Later, the
court again confirmed “that mental health is a circumstance in
mitigation” but explained that it did not “think it was a
controlling factor in this case.”
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circumstances, and that, in fact, the imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interest of justice.” This justified the
court’s departure from the low term. (See People v. Knowles
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 766 (Knowles) [“Section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) plainly states that the court may sentence
above the low term if the aggravating circumstances ‘outweigh
the mitigating’ ones such that ‘imposition of the lower term would
be contrary to the interests of justice[]’”]; see also People v. Bravo
(2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1158 [trial court “‘“affirmatively”
show[ed] compliance with a statutory sentencing mandate’”
where it “expressly referred to section 1170(b)(6) and found
imposing lower terms ‘would be contrary to the interest of
justice[]’”].)
Second, defendant argues that, in reimposing the high
term, the trial court erred by not affording sufficient weight to
evidence of defendant’s mental illness and trauma. Defendant
essentially invites us to reweigh the evidence and to substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court. We are precluded from
doing so. “Weighing [the aggravating and mitigating]
circumstances is the province of the trial court. We may not
reverse a sentencing decision ‘“merely because reasonable people
might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor
warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the
trial judge.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Knowles,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 770.) Where, as here, “[t]he court’s
analysis . . . of the evidence before it along with the applicable
sentencing factors was neither irrational nor arbitrary, . . . we . . .
will not disturb it.” (Ibid; see also People v. Mathis (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 359, 370 (Mathis).)
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Third, defendant contends that imposition of the high term
was erroneous because the trial court improperly relied on
aggravating factors not admitted or proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, as required by section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). Defendant
is incorrect. The unambiguous language of “section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4) carves out an exception to the general rule that
all ameliorative changes to the law must be applied at a
section 1172.75 resentencing and does not require aggravating
factors to be found true beyond a reasonable doubt if the upper
term was previously imposed.” (People v. Brannon-Thompson
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 458 (Brannon-Thompson); accord
Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 371–374; see also People v.
Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265 [when interpreting a
statute, “[t]he plain meaning controls if there is no ambiguity in
the statutory language”].)
Here, defendant was originally sentenced to the high term
for the kidnapping. The trial court could, therefore, reimpose the
high term at resentencing without the relevant aggravating
factors being admitted by defendant or proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. (See Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 374
[“the new, heightened factfinding requirements for aggravating
factors do not apply where the defendant was originally, lawfully
sentenced to an upper term”]; Brannon-Thompson, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th 455 at pp. 466–467 [“the new burden of proof
amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) apply only if the
trial court is imposing the upper term for the first time at a
section 1172.75 resentencing”].)
Defendant urges us to follow People v. Gonzalez (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 312 (Gonzalez), which disagreed with Brannon-
Thompson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 455. The Gonzalez court
10
concluded that “reading an exemption into section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4) . . . and thereby allowing a court to resentence a
defendant to an upper term sentence without proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of aggravating factors, would run afoul of the
Sixth Amendment . . . . [Citation.]” (Gonzalez, supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 330.)5
We respectfully disagree with Gonzalez and detect no
violation of the Sixth Amendment. “When [defendant] was
[originally] sentenced, in 201[4], his sentence was imposed
pursuant to the version of section 1170, subdivision (b), that
granted the trial court broad discretion to select any of the three
applicable prison terms. . . . [U]nder that sentencing scheme,
there was no requirement for the judge to find a particular fact to
justify imposition of the upper term. [Citation.] As a result, the
court’s selection of an upper term at [defendant]’s 201[4]
sentencing did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment.
[Citations.] [¶] The same statutory scheme under which
[defendant] was sentenced had long been in effect at the time
that the Legislature established the [section 1172.75]
resentencing procedures applicable here. As a result, it was not
necessary for the Legislature to impose the heightened
factfinding requirements for defendants . . . who originally
5 The California Supreme Court has granted review in a
nonpublished case to resolve the split regarding “whether
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), allows a trial court to
reimpose an upper term sentence where the facts underlying one
or more aggravating circumstances were neither stipulated to by
the defendant nor found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the
factfinder. (See People v. Eaton[, 2025 WL 814818] (Mar. 14,
2025, C096853) [nonpub. opn.], review granted May 14, 2025,
S289903.)” (Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 373, fn. 6.)
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received upper term sentences under the prior version of
section 1170, subdivision (b).” (Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at
p. 373.)
B. The trial court did not err by declining to dismiss
defendant’s strike
Defendant also challenges the trial court’s refusal to
dismiss his prior strike conviction within the meaning of the
Three Strikes law.
We reject defendant’s contention that the trial court was
required to dismiss the strike under section 1385, subdivision (c).
Section 1385, subdivision (c), provides that “the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do
so” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)) and that, “[i]n exercising its discretion”
to dismiss an enhancement, “the court shall consider and afford
great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove” the
presence of nine enumerated “mitigating circumstances” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)). We join the numerous cases holding that
section 1385, subdivision (c), “applies only to an ‘enhancement,’
and the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement.” (People v.
Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 244; accord People v. Dowdy
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1, 9–10; People v. Dain (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 399, 411, review granted May 29, 2024, S283924.)
Accordingly, the criteria for dismissing an enhancement set forth
in section 1385, subdivision (c), did not apply.
We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to dismiss defendant’s strike pursuant to
section 1385, subdivision (a), and Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497.
In determining whether to take such action, the court was
required to “consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
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violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, . . . defendant may be deemed outside
the [Three Strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence
should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted
of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
The trial court expressly found that dismissing the strike
would not be “in the interest of justice or within the spirit of the
law under Romero . . . .” The court noted defendant’s “pattern of
behavior” involving domestic violence. The court found it
particularly significant that defendant, only shortly before his
resentencing hearing, had been found guilty of fighting, a serious
prison rule violation. (See § 1172.75, subd. (d)(3) [permitting the
resentencing court to consider “the disciplinary record . . . of the
defendant while incarcerated”].) The court reasonably
interpreted this as evidence of defendant’s lack of self-control and
that he continued to present a danger to others.
Where, as here, “the record demonstrates that the trial
court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial
decision in conformity with the spirit of the law” (People v. Myers
(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310), we will affirm its ruling.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s September 26, 2023, order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
________________________, J.
RICHARDSON
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