CourtListener 10645539•Yazdi v. Robles CA2/2
Testo completo
Filed 7/31/25 Yazdi v. Robles CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MOHAMMADREZA YAZDI, B338386
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23SMCV02618)
v.
GABRIEL ROBLES,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Elaine W. Mandel, Judge. Affirmed.
Neufeld Marks and Paul S. Marks for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Law Offices of Martin S. Kovalsky and Martin S. Kovalsky
for Defendant and Respondent.
____________________
Plaintiff Mohammadreza Yazdi appeals the trial court’s
order granting Defendant Gabriel Robles’s Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.161 special motion to strike and dismissing
his action against Robles. We perceive no error, and we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In a previous case filed in 2015 (case No. BC597357),
Robles sued Yazdi for dental malpractice.2 The parties proceeded
to arbitration, and the arbitrator ultimately awarded Robles
$132,773.29 against Yazdi. Robles petitioned the trial court to
confirm the award, and Yazdi moved to vacate it. The court
confirmed the award and entered judgment in June 2018. That
judgment was later affirmed on appeal. (Gabriel R. v. Yazdi
(May 16, 2019, B292125) [nonpub. opn.].)
Yazdi commenced this action (case No. 23SMCV02618) in
June 2023 against Robles and two dental professionals involved
in Robles’s care–Dr. Gary Baum and Dr. Parvaz Mizrahi.3 Yazdi’s
cause of action against Robles was for “Equitable Relief from
Judgment” because “Yazdi committed no malpractice” and
Dr. Baum’s testimony was “false and untrustworthy.” Yazdi
alleged Robles sued him for orthodontic malpractice and
recovered an award in arbitration in the 2015 case, which was
confirmed by the superior court and the Court of Appeal case
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2 Robles sued through his guardian ad litem because he was
then a minor.
3 The trial court sustained without leave to amend
Dr. Baum’s and Dr. Mizrahi’s demurrers. Yazdi did not appeal
those rulings.
2
No. B292125, “[d]espite there being no persuasive evidence of
negligence, causation, or damages.” Yazdi also alleged Robles
“partially collected on the judgment.” According to Yazdi, entry of
judgment against him in the 2015 case was “non-meritorious and
inequitable” because Dr. Baum was later unable to effectively
treat Robles.
Robles moved to strike the cause of action against him
pursuant to section 425.16–a motion widely known as an “anti-
SLAPP motion.” (See Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048,
1055 (Rusheen) [defining anti-SLAPP].) The trial court
determined the cause of action against Robles arose from Robles’s
protected litigation activity in pursuing, seeking to confirm, and
protecting his judgment against Yazdi in the 2015 case. It
granted the motion to strike and dismissed the cause of action
against Robles.
The order of dismissal was entered on February 15, 2024. It
was amended nunc pro tunc on February 23, 2024, to correct the
disposition of Robles’s request for sanctions. Yazdi timely
appealed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1).)
DISCUSSION
I. We Decline Robles’s Request to Dismiss This Appeal
Before we consider the merits, we address Robles’s request
to dismiss this appeal pursuant to the disentitlement doctrine.
We “ ‘ha[ve] the inherent power . . . to dismiss an appeal by a
party that refuses to comply with a lower court order.’ ” (In re
Marriage of Cohen (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 574, 580; see
Stoltenberg v. Ampton Investments, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
1225, 1230 (Stoltenberg) [the doctrine is “ ‘ “a discretionary
tool” ’ ”].) We will not do so here.
3
First, we already denied Robles’s earlier motion to dismiss
the appeal on the same ground. Robles has provided no reason for
us to change our decision.
Second, the record indicates Yazdi’s purported obstructive
behavior did not occur in the case before us, but rather in
different civil cases (e.g., the 2015 case and case
No. 22SMCV01167). To be sure, one of the cases (the 2015 case)
resulted in the judgment affirming the arbitration award for
dental malpractice, which Yazdi is collaterally attacking through
this lawsuit. However, the disentitlement doctrine is invoked
when misconduct arises in the case on appeal. (See In re
Marriage of Hearn (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 380, 389 [declining to
dismiss where the appellant did not “willfully obstruct[] or fail[]
to comply with the trial court orders at issue in this appeal”];
cf. Stoltenberg, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1234 [dismissing
where the appellant “repeatedly . . . frustrated the enforcement of
the California judgment being appealed”].)
We therefore decline Robles’s invitation to invoke the
disentitlement doctrine due to conduct in different, even if
related, cases.
II. The Trial Court Properly Took Judicial Notice of the
Documents Presented With the Motion to Strike
Yazdi requests we “not . . . consider[]” the request for
judicial notice filed in connection with Robles’s anti-SLAPP
motion. We construe that as an argument the trial court abused
its discretion in taking judicial notice of the documents.4 (See In
4 The documents were submitted to the trial court, but Yazdi
has not identified a court ruling on that request. In any event,
the documents are part of the record on appeal, and we assume
4
re Social Services Payment Cases (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1249,
1271 [judicial notice ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion].)
In the trial court, Yazdi conceded the court could notice the
proffered documents, and he objected only “to the extent [Robles]
seek[s] to introduce or argue the truth of what is contained in”
them. That simply restates the familiar standard that “a
document may be judicially noticeable, [but] the truth of
statements contained in the document . . . are not subject to
judicial notice if those matters are reasonably disputable.”
(Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113.)5 Yazdi’s failure to object to the trial
court’s taking judicial notice has forfeited that argument for
appeal. (See Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 262,
the trial court considered them. (See Kinsella v. Kinsella (2020)
45 Cal.App.5th 442, 449 (Kinsella) [“Because the record on appeal
does not contain any evidentiary objections (or rulings denying
the admission of any proffered evidence), we consider all of the
evidence submitted to the trial court”]; see also Brosterhous v.
State Bar (1995) 12 Cal.4th 315, 325 [“a reviewing court will
ordinarily look only to the record made in the trial court”].)
Even though the documents are part of this record, we do
not rely upon those relating to apparent disciplinary proceedings
or other alleged misconduct, which are not relevant to this
appeal.
5 Here, the trial court did not mention the documents when
it ruled on the anti-SLAPP motion, let alone suggest it
improperly considered them for their truth. (See Kinsella, supra,
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 464 [“ ‘[T]he burden is on an appellant to
demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate
court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies
reversal.’ ” (Italics omitted.)].)
5
264–265 [failure to object in the trial court forfeited party’s right
to assert error on appeal]; Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap
Meet, Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 482, 512 [“ ‘ “An appellate court
will ordinarily not consider . . . erroneous rulings . . . where an
objection could have been but was not presented to the lower
court . . . .” ’ ”].)
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Anti-
SLAPP Motion to Strike
Yazdi argues the trial court erred in granting Robles’s anti-
SLAPP motion to strike because that law does not apply to
arbitration proceedings. We disagree: the trial court correctly
determined Yazdi’s cause of action against Robles arose from
Robles’s protected litigation activity.
A. Standard of Review
“We review a trial court’s ruling on a special motion to
strike under section 425.16 de novo.” (Zhang v. Jenevein (2019)
31 Cal.App.5th 585, 592 (Zhang).)
B. A Cause of Action Arising from Protected
Activity Is Subject to an Anti-SLAPP Motion
“The Legislature enacted . . . section 425.16 . . . to provide a
procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill
the valid exercise of constitutional rights.” (Rusheen, supra,
37 Cal.4th at pp. 1055–1056.) There are two components to
evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion to strike. (See Navellier v.
Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88 (Navellier) [describing two-step
process].) Only the first part is relevant in this appeal.6
6 As to the second part of the test, the trial court determined
Yazdi did not provide any admissible evidence showing a
probability of prevailing on his claim. (See Rusheen, supra,
6
“In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court first
determines whether the defendant has made a threshold showing
that the challenged cause of action arises from protected
activity.” (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056; see also
Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89 [“a court considers ‘the
pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the
facts upon which the liability . . . is based’ ”].) The appropriate
focus of that inquiry is on “the defendant’s activity that gives rise
to his . . . asserted liability.” (Navellier, at p. 92.) The California
Supreme Court has already explained that “ ‘[a] cause of action
“arising from” defendant’s litigation activity’ ” is protected.
(Rusheen, at p. 1056.) The specific litigation conduct entitled to
protection “includes communicative conduct such as the filing . . .
and prosecution of a civil action.” (Ibid.) In that regard, a petition
seeking to confirm an arbitration award “is in the nature of a
complaint in a civil action.” (Walter v. National Indem. Co. (1970)
3 Cal.App.3d 630, 634; see also Sheppard v. Lightpost Museum
Fund (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 315, 323 (Sheppard) [“Complaints
. . . and petitions are pleadings, which are filed in courts to
initiate judicial proceedings.”].)
C. Yazdi’s Cause of Action Arose from Robles’s
Protected Activity
Yazdi’s operative first amended complaint plainly shows
his cause of action against Robles for “Equitable Relief From
Judgment” arose from Robles’s protected litigation activity. The
37 Cal.4th at p. 1056 [second part of the test is “determin[ing] . . .
whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on the claim”].) Yazdi has not challenged that aspect of
the trial court’s order.
7
operative complaint alleges Robles “sued [Yazdi] for orthodontic
malpractice.” (Fn. omitted.) It also asserts Robles “partially
collected on the judgment, through actions taken under the
California Enforcement of Judgment Act.” The operative
complaint further alleges Robles’s conduct was wrongful because
“Yazdi committed no malpractice, and . . . the testimony of
Dr. Baum [at the arbitration] was proven false and
untrustworthy,” thus meriting “relief from the judgment in its
entirety.”
The gravamen of Yazdi’s cause of action against Robles is
based upon Robles’s 2015 case against Yazdi, the “confirmation”
of the arbitration award by the superior court and Court of
Appeal case No. B292125, and Robles’s efforts to collect on the
resulting judgment. Those are all instances of “communicative
conduct” protected by the anti-SLAPP law. (Rusheen, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 1056; see § 425.16, subd. (e)(1) [a “written . . .
statement . . . made before a . . . judicial proceeding” is protected
activity]; Sheppard, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 323; cf. Freeman
v. Schack (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 719, 732 [no protected activity
where “the principal thrust of the conduct underlying the[] causes
of action is not [the] filing or settlement of litigation”].) Indeed,
our Supreme Court has already held that “ ‘ “ ‘the basic act of
filing litigation’ ” ’ ” is protected by the anti-SLAPP law.
(Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 90.) Yazdi is suing Robles here
specifically because of Robles’s court filings–be they his
malpractice complaint, his petition to confirm the arbitration
award, or his subsequent filings to defend and enforce the
judgment. (See ibid. [“[the defendant] is being sued because of
the affirmative counterclaims he filed in federal court”].) “This
8
action therefore falls squarely within the ambit of the anti-
SLAPP statute’s ‘arising from’ prong.” (Ibid.)
Yazdi essentially argues that because the parties
participated in arbitration, his cause of action is related to
arbitration proceedings and is insulated from the application of
the anti-SLAPP law. That may be true for causes of action
arising from arbitration. For example, causes of action arising
from a defendant’s “arbitration demand” do not “arise from
protected activity.” (Century 21 Chamberlain & Associates v.
Haberman (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1, 7.) “[T]he anti-SLAPP
statute does not protect the act of initiating private contractual
arbitration.” (Id. at p. 5.) That is because “ ‘[a]rbitration claims
. . . are not filed in courts and they do not initiate judicial
proceedings.’ ” (Id. at p. 8.) Century 21 is inapposite here because
Yazdi’s complaint does not allege Robles initiated arbitration or
filed an arbitration demand, let alone allege that his cause of
action against Robles is based upon any of that supposed conduct.
As we have already explained, Yazdi’s cause of action against
Robles is based upon Robles’s 2015 case against Yazdi, his efforts
to collect on the resulting judgment, and his efforts to confirm
and collect the arbitration award.
Likewise, Yazdi’s reliance on Zhang, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th
585, is misplaced. In that case, the defendant had recorded
conversations with the individual plaintiff and others to gather
evidence in anticipation of arbitration. (Id. at p. 590.) The
defendant’s company thereafter filed a demand for arbitration
against the plaintiff company, used the recordings as evidence in
the arbitration, and was awarded over $65 million. (Ibid.) The
plaintiffs later filed suit against the defendant in Los Angeles
Superior Court, alleging two causes of action against him for
9
recording confidential communications and invasion of privacy.
(Id. at pp. 590–591.) The defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion
to strike, arguing plaintiffs’ causes of action arose from his
protected activity “in connection with an arbitration proceeding.”
(Zhang, at p. 591.) The court concluded the anti-SLAPP law did
not apply to the causes of action at issue because an arbitration is
not “a ‘judicial proceeding’ or an ‘official proceeding authorized by
law’ ” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Zhang, at
pp. 593–594.)
The causes of action at issue in Zhang squarely arose from
the defendant’s conduct in collecting and presenting evidence in
an arbitration, which is plainly not a judicial proceeding for
purposes of the anti-SLAPP law. (Zhang, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 593–594.)
By contrast, as the trial court explained, “the first cause of
action [here] is not [based upon] a statement made during
arbitration, or either party’s initiation of contractual arbitration.”
Rather, it is premised upon Robles’s “pursuit of the entry of
judgment and subsequent appellate proceedings” in court, which
“constitute ‘litigation-related activities.’ ” Those activities,
undertaken in court proceedings, are quintessentially conduct
protected by the anti-SLAPP law. (See Navellier, supra,
29 Cal.4th at p. 90.)
“Critically, ‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s
cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the
right of petition or free speech.’ ” (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063.) Thus,
whatever conduct other third parties allegedly engaged in during
the arbitration proceedings is irrelevant to the analysis of the
anti-SLAPP motion as it relates to Yazdi’s cause of action against
10
Robles. The trial court did not err in dismissing that cause of
action.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Robles is entitled to costs on appeal.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)–(2).)
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
11
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.