In re Allen B. CA2/2

CourtListener 10644621Calctapp30 lug 2025

Testo completo

Filed 7/30/25 In re Allen B. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re ALLEN B., a Person B338857
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP01166)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LUIS B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Philip L. Soto, Judge. Affirmed.
Nicole Kronberg, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Luis B. (father) appeals from a juvenile court judgment
ordering informal supervision of his child Allen B. (born February
2024) under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 360,
subdivision (b).2 Father argues the evidence was insufficient to
support the juvenile court’s findings under section 300,
subdivision (b) that father failed to protect Allen or that Allen
was at risk at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. Viewing the
record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s decision,
we find substantial evidence in the record supports the decision,
we therefore affirm the judgment.3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Referral
In February 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received an immediate
response referral from a mandated reporter stating father and
Sonia U. (mother) brought three day-old Allen to the emergency

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 Section 360, subdivision (b) provides, “If the court finds
that the child is a person described by Section 300, it may,
without adjudicating the child a dependent child of the court,
order that services be provided to keep the family together and
place the child and the child’s parent or guardian under the
supervision of the social worker for a time period consistent with
Section 301.”
3 The order of a juvenile court for informal supervision under
section 360, subdivision (b) is a disposition order. In dependency
proceedings, it is a final judgment and thus an appealable order.
(In re Adam D. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1261.)

2
room.4 The parents reported being sleep-deprived, and father
accidentally mixed Mezcal into the baby’s formula.
Father reported mother was concerned she was not
producing enough breast milk, prompting them to buy formula.
On the day of the referral, at 11:00 a.m., father made a bottle for
the child, explaining there were two water bottles on the kitchen
table, both of which had no labels. One of the bottles contained
Mezcal. Father did not know how the bottle ended up on the
table. Father expressed having been so tired he did not even
notice he poured from the wrong bottle. He gave the bottle to
mother to feed the child. Shortly thereafter, the child spit out the
milk, and the parents opened the bottle and smelled it. It was
then the parents realized father poured from the Mezcal bottle
instead of the water bottle. The parents immediately took the
baby to the hospital. Father denied being intoxicated.
The baby’s toxicology report showed he had an ethanol
alcohol level of 56 milligrams per deciliter. The normal range is
less than 13 milligrams. Both parents were visibly worried.
During risk assessment, mother disclosed use of marijuana.
The last time she used marijuana was one year before pregnancy.
Father reported a history of methamphetamine use. The last
time he used methamphetamine was five years earlier. Father
also reported having another child and a history with DCFS.
Investigation
The social worker interviewed mother at the home where
she lived with maternal grandparents on February 23, 2024.
Mother said she and father were romantically involved for over a
year. She denied having a criminal history. Mother worked
fulltime as a campus aide at an elementary school. Mother

4 Mother is not a party to this appeal.

3
denied using or having a history of drug or alcohol use, and was
willing to test.
Regarding the incident, mother reported father made the
baby a bottle of formula, and there were multiple water bottles on
the table. Father grabbed one of the bottles and was unaware it
contained Mezcal. After a couple of minutes of feeding the baby,
the baby was spitting up and there was an odor of alcohol.
Father opened the baby bottle, smelled it, and realized he used
the bottle that contained Mezcal rather than water. When the
parents realized the bottle had been made with Mezcal instead of
water, they immediately rushed the baby to the hospital
emergency room. Once the alcohol was completely out of the
infant’s system, he was cleared to go home. A few days later, the
parents took the baby to a follow-up appointment with his
pediatrician. Mother stated the water bottle containing Mezcal
was left over from her baby shower and was mixed up with other
water bottles that were in her room on the table.
The baby was doing well and had another follow-up
appointment on March 11, 2024. The previous social worker
provided mother with referrals for parenting classes, which she
and father planned to join. Mother was quite worried when the
incident occurred, crying and being emotional at the hospital and
for a few days after the incident. Mother and father were
remorseful about the baby having accidentally ingested liquor
and were willing to do anything DCFS asked of them, as they did
not want the baby removed from their home.
The social worker observed mother to be attentive to Allen’s
needs and observed no safety issues. The social worker did not
observe any marks or bruises on the child’s body.
The social worker spoke with father on March 21, 2024,
regarding a record of driving under the influence of alcohol or

4
drugs (DUI), reckless driving and possession of an open container
of alcohol in San Bernardino County from February 2022. Father
claimed someone must have used his identity and denied having
a DUI or having been in San Bernardino County. Father
intended to go to the police department to clear the error. Father
admitted to using methamphetamines when he was younger but
stated he had changed his life and no longer uses such
substances. He admitted previous criminal convictions, however,
not for DUI. Father said he drinks once in awhile at social events
but never to the point of intoxication.
Father reported mother and baby were discharged
following Allen’s birth. Mother was breastfeeding and was not
producing enough milk. They returned to the hospital to see if
they could get formula but were denied because they had already
been discharged. They left the hospital around 2:00 a.m. and
found an open drug store where they purchased formula for the
baby. When they arrived home, they made a bottle for the baby
and went to sleep. When the baby woke up for his next feeding,
father, who stated he was half asleep, got up to prepare the
baby’s bottle. There were multiple water bottles on the table. He
grabbed one that was half empty to make the baby’s bottle.
Mother was trying to feed the baby who would not take the
bottle. Then father tried. The baby threw up on father, and the
odor of alcohol prompted father to open the bottle and realize his
mistake of making the bottle with Mezcal instead of water. He
and mother immediately took the baby to the hospital.
Father said he and mother were sleep deprived and it was
an honest mistake. The water bottle containing alcohol was left
in the bedroom after a baby shower. The bottle was sitting
behind the television on a stand. When relatives cleaned the

5
room, they were unaware the bottle contained alcohol and moved
it to the table with the other water bottles.
Father and mother had attended parenting classes and had
not missed any classes. They would receive certificates upon
completion of the 12-week program. Father and mother were
willing to comply with DCFS’s recommendations. They did not
want the baby removed.
At follow-up interviews on April 8 and 10, 2024, father said
he did not have a driver’s license until March 25, 2024. He
obtained his Department of Motor Vehicles record, which did not
reveal any DUI. He then went to the police department and was
told nothing showed on his driving record, but they suggested
father go to the California Highway Patrol (CHP) for more
information. Father went to CHP, and nothing showed on their
database. A CHP officer offered it was not uncommon for there to
be a mix-up because father’s driver license contained a number
seven, which is often mistaken for a number one. The CHP in
San Bernardino also had no record of father having a DUI and
suggested he go to the court for paperwork. At the San
Bernardino Superior Court, father was informed there was no
record of him having a DUI and issued him a “Certification Of No
Record.” Father provided the social worker the certificate and a
copy of his driver’s license.
The medical clerk at White Memorial Hospital reported the
baby had a follow-up appointment for alcohol ingestion on
February 20, 2024, at which time the baby was asymptomatic
and doing well. Safety precautions were discussed with the
parents. The social worker also spoke with two staff members at
Project Impact, where the parents had enrolled in weekly
parenting classes. The parents were attending regularly and
would receive a certificate after their last class.

6
Mother had no prior DCFS history. Father was the alleged
perpetrator in a 2017 child welfare investigation concerning his
older child Luis. The reporting party said father and his
girlfriend fought constantly with the child present. Law
enforcement had been to the home three times in the prior
month. The child could be heard crying and was often left inside
the home while father was outside with friends. It was believed
father sold drugs from the home. The referral was closed as
inconclusive.
Petition and initial hearing
DCFS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of Allen on
April 15, 2024. The petition alleged a single count under section
300, subdivision (b), that the parents “placed the child in a
detrimental and endangering situation in that the child ingested
alcohol. On or about 2/10/24, the father mixed tequila with the
baby formula in the child’s bottle, resulting in the child ingesting
alcohol. The child tested positive for alcohol and required
medical treatment. The detrimental and endangering situation
established for the child by the parents endangers the child’s
physical health and safety, creates a detrimental home
environment, and places the child at risk of serious physical
harm, damage, and danger.”
At the initial hearing on April 29, 2024, DCFS provided the
mother’s and father’s drug and alcohol tests taken on March 16
and 23, respectively. Both were negative. The juvenile court
found DCFS had set forth prima facie evidence that the child was
described by section 300 and ordered the child released to the
parents under DCFS’s supervision. The court ordered father to
provide two clean, consecutive random drug tests and for the
mother to drug test on reasonable suspicion. DCFS was ordered
to provide the parents with low or no-cost referrals and to

7
evaluate for a section 301 contract or section 360, subdivision (b)
voluntary resolution.
Jurisdiction/disposition report
DCFS submitted its jurisdiction/disposition report on
June 10, 2024.
Due to the prior referral of father’s older child, paternal
aunt Ana S. became that child’s legal guardian through family
law court in January 2018. Luis remained with the paternal
aunt, and father had occasional contact with the child.
Father had a criminal history from 2013 through 2022,
which included a conviction for possession of a controlled
substance, car theft, domestic violence, and battery.
In interviews with the dependency investigator, mother
and father repeated their previous statements about the incident.
Mother provided additional information about how the Mezcal
ended up in a water bottle, stating, “The alcohol was in our room
because we had a baby shower and it was a little tequila left and
not enough to leave in a big bottle so it was poured into the water
bottle. I know better now. . . . It was an honest mistake that we
both regret.” Father expressed it was his fault.
On May 22, 2024, the program administrator at Project
Impact reported the parents had been actively participating and
attending the 12-week parenting class via Zoom. The parents
had been told to sign a release of information so a report could be
provided to DCFS. In addition, mother needed to sign a release
of information so the social worker could speak with the staff at
White Memorial Hospital.
Father drug tested three times: March 16, 2024, he was
turned away because he did not have proper identification.
March 25, 2024, he drug tested negative. May 24, 2024, his
sample returned “Cancel Rejected Fatal Flaw No Sample.”

8
Mother had not drug tested because there was no reason to
suspect she was under the influence.
Father said he last used methamphetamine five years ago.
He was “not in a good place” at the time and admitted domestic
violence with the mother of his older child, for which he was
incarcerated. While he was in jail, the mother of his older child
left the child with the paternal aunt and never came back.
Father said he was now a better man.
DCFS reported the parents had been properly caring for
the baby and were willing to participate in programs. The
parents shared a loving attachment to the baby, who was
comfortable with them. The baby was socially and emotionally
on target, and the parents had family support. The maternal
grandparents allow the parents to live in their home and permit
paternal grandmother to come to the home daily to babysit while
the parents were working. However, given the severity of the
circumstances and the baby’s very young age, DCFS
recommended the court take jurisdiction of the child while family
maintenance services were provided.
Jurisdiction hearing
The adjudication took place on June 10, 2024. DCFS had
amended the petition to strike mother from the petition. The
court received into evidence DCFS’s reports with attachments.
The court then heard argument from father’s counsel, who asked
the petition to be dismissed, and DCFS’s counsel, who asked the
petition to be sustained.
Following argument, the court found count b-1 true as to
father. The court noted, “[T]his is a close one.” The court felt
there were some concerning things in father’s history, but stated,
“if he continues to do the parenting classes and drug testing as
suggested by [DCFS], in six months the case should go away on

9
its own.” The court ordered a dispositional plan pursuant to
section 360, subdivision (b). The court made its decision over the
objections of father and DCFS.
The court ordered DCFS and the parents to meet and
develop a case plan under section 360, subdivision (b).
On June 20, 2024, father filed his notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
Father challenges the juvenile court’s decision to sustain
the allegations under section 300, subdivision (b). He asserts
insufficient evidence existed to support the court’s finding.
I. Applicable law and standard of review
To sustain a jurisdictional finding under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), the trial court must find that a child has
suffered, or is at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical
harm or illness due to a parent’s (1) failure or inability to
adequately supervise or protect the child; (2) failure to
adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of a
custodian; (3) failure to provide the child with adequate food,
clothing, shelter, or medical treatment; or (4) inability to provide
care due to mental illness, developmental disability, or substance
abuse. DCFS must prove a failure or inability to protect the
child; causation; and serious physical harm or illness to the
minor, or a substantial risk of such harm or illness. (In re R.T.
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 628–629.)
In assessing whether there is a substantial risk of serious
physical harm or illness to the minor, the juvenile court looks to
whether such a risk is apparent at the time of the jurisdictional
hearing. (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 607.) “‘Thus
the past infliction of physical harm by a caretaker, standing
alone, does not establish a substantial risk of physical harm;

10
“[t]here must be some reason to believe the acts may continue in
the future.”’” (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1023.) In
assessing risk based on a single incident, the court should
consider “the nature of the conduct and all surrounding
circumstances.” (Id. at p. 1025.) “‘The court need not wait until a
child is seriously abused or injured to . . . take the steps
necessary to protect the child.’” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766,
773.)
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence in light of the whole record. (In re I.C.
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892.) Under this standard, we are not
permitted to “evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the
evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” (In re L. Y. L. (2002)
101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) We must “draw all reasonable
inferences in support of the findings, consider the record most
favorably to the juvenile court’s order, and affirm the order if
supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports
a contrary conclusion.” (Ibid.)
II. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)
Father argues the evidence did not support the juvenile
court’s decision to sustain the allegations concerning the bottle
feeding incident. Father asserts the incident was purely
accidental, and there was an absence of evidence that, at the time
of the jurisdictional hearing four months later, Allen was at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.
Thus, father contends, the juvenile court’s finding that Allen was
a child described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1), was not
warranted.
The facts regarding father’s act of putting Mezcal in the
newborn’s bottle are undisputed. Father insists this was a one-

11
time incident and Allen was not at risk of future harm. However,
in determining whether the evidence supports the juvenile court’s
decision, we must look at the record as a whole. (In re I.C., supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 892.) Father admitted to using methamphetamine
in the past. He also had a criminal record, which included
possession of a controlled substance and domestic violence, for
which he was incarcerated. Father had a child welfare history
and did not have custody of his older child.
Significantly, at the initial hearing on April 29, 2024,
father was ordered to produce two consecutive clean drug tests.
At the time of the June 10, 2024 adjudication, father had not
done so. Father tested negative once. On another occasion, he
was turned away because he did not have proper identification,
and a third drug test was rejected due to “Fatal Flaw No
Sample.” The juvenile court was entitled to consider father’s
failure to provide two consecutive clean drug tests, as ordered.
In addition, while the parents were regularly attending
parenting classes, they had not completed the program at the
time of the adjudication hearing. Nor had the parents signed a
release of information that would have allowed DCFS to gather
information about their progress.
Finally, there remained questions about the DUI on
father’s record from February 2022. Father denied ever having
received a DUI, insisting someone must have been using his
identification. When the social worker first asked father about
this on March 21, 2024, father denied the charge but did not deny
having a driver’s license. Later, in April 2024, father said he had
just obtained his driver’s license on March 25, 2024. Father
never explained how someone could have used his identification
prior to his obtaining a driver’s license.

12
The juvenile court noted there were concerning aspects of
father’s history at the time it sustained the allegation under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1). In reviewing the evidence before
the juvenile court, we must draw all reasonable inferences in
support of the findings and consider the record most favorably to
the juvenile court’s order. (In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th
at p. 947.) Although evidence in the record also supports a
contrary conclusion, sufficient evidence supports the juvenile
court’s determination that Allen was at substantial risk of
serious harm at the time of the adjudication hearing without
informal supervision from DCFS.
III. The cases cited by father are distinguishable
Father cites several cases in support of his position that the
juvenile court erred. All are distinguishable. In In re J.N.,
supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, a petition was filed following an
isolated incident. The father was driving under the influence of
alcohol with the mother and their three minor children in the car.
The father struck another vehicle before losing control of the
vehicle and crashing into a traffic signal pole. (Id. at pp. 1015–
1017.) The father attempted to flee the scene with one of the
children, and both parents were agitated and uncooperative.
Both also appeared under the influence of alcohol. (Ibid.) The
J.N. court reversed the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction on
the ground that there was no current risk to the children. (Id. at
p. 1026.) The appellate court emphasized it was necessary to
consider all surrounding circumstances, including “evidence of
the parents’ current understanding of and attitude toward the
past conduct that endangered a child, or participation in
educational programs, or other steps taken, by the parent to
address the problematic conduct in the interim, and probationary
support and supervision already being provided through the

13
criminal courts that would help a parent avoid a recurrence of
such an incident.” (Id. at pp. 1025–1026.) The mother remained
under probation supervision at the time of the hearing, and was
required by the criminal court to complete substance abuse and
parenting programs. The father was incarcerated. In addition,
there was no evidence either parent had a substance abuse
problem. (Ibid.)
The matter before us is different. Neither parent is under
the supervision of the criminal court, and father has a possible
history of substance abuse. In addition, at the time of the
adjudication hearing, father had failed to provide two consecutive
clean drug tests. Under these circumstances, the juvenile court
could properly find a current risk of harm.
In In re Gilberto G. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 52, 55, the
mother “had too many beers and injured her leg when she fell on
a bus while she was taking her three children to see their father.”
The juvenile court sustained a petition and placed the family
under the supervision of DCFS pursuant to section 360,
subdivision (b). Under those circumstances, the Gilberto G. court
found substantial evidence did not demonstrate a substantial risk
the mother’s failure or inability to supervise or protect her
children would recur. (Gilberto G., at p. 66.) Notably, the “single
incident of intoxication in this case did not result in harm to the
children, and there [was] no evidence they were at risk of serious
physical harm while riding the bus with their mother to meet
their father.” (Id. at p. 65.) The children in the Gilberto G.
matter were aged 10, eight, and six. (Id. at p. 55.) Here, in
contrast, Allen was a newborn when father put alcohol in his
bottle. Allen was extremely vulnerable and was harmed by
father’s actions. Again, father had not provided two consecutive
negative drug tests, and had not completed parenting classes, at

14
the time of the adjudication hearing. These facts differentiate
the case before us from Gilberto G.
Father also argues he took proper actions following the
incident, thus demonstrating he did not neglectfully fail to
supervise or protect Allen. Father cites In re Jonathan B. (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 115 in support of his argument. In Jonathan B.,
the mother argued she should be stricken from the petition
alleging domestic violence because she drove straight to the
police station following the incident and obtained a restraining
order against the father. Mother was not the perpetrator of the
violence. The appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s
findings against mother because there was no evidence she would
nonaccidentally expose her children to father’s violence or fail to
protect them from it. (Id. at pp. 119–120.) Here, father was the
perpetrator of the event causing newborn Allen to ingest alcohol.
While the evidence shows it was accidental, there is also evidence
of father’s substance use, and his failure to provide two
consecutive clean drug tests. While his actions of taking Allen to
the emergency room immediately are commendable, the evidence
supports the supervision order imposed by the juvenile court in
this matter.
Father asserts the juvenile court improperly relied on his
past struggles with substance abuse and criminal history. Father
cites In re Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1, 15, for the
proposition that “[w]hile evidence of past conduct may be
probative of current conditions, the question under section 300 is
whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the
child to the defined risk of harm.” In Emily L., the family came
to the attention of social services because the minor and the
mother got into a physical altercation. The minor was a teenager
who was out of control, acting out and skipping school. “By the

15
time of the hearing in Emily’s case, familial circumstances had
undergone epic changes. Simply put, Emily had turned her life
around. As of December 1, 2020, there was no evidence Emily
was still quick to anger, prone to violence, smoking marijuana,
ditching school, staying out overnight without permission, or
disrespecting her parents and their rules. Rather, Emily was
attending school, getting good grades, making up her class
credits, communicating with and respecting the home rules of her
two parents, turning in homework assignments, and,
importantly, not fighting verbally or physically with her family
members, including her mother.” (Id. at pp. 15–16.) The
Emily L. court noted the juvenile court must have “recognized yet
glossed over the absence of risk of future harm” given Emily’s
transformation. (Id. at p. 16.)
Father argues similarly, between the bottle-feeding
incident in February 2024 and the jurisdictional hearing in June,
there was not a single report that father had used drugs,
consumed alcohol, or was in any way negligent in caring for
Allen. In short, father argues, there was no evidence from which
to infer father’s behavior would recur. (Citing In re M.R. (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 101, 109 (M.R.).)
However, the juvenile court was entitled to rely on father’s
past conduct in determining the present risk to Allen. As in
M.R., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at page 109, “the incident that led to
the filing of a dependency petition in this case was quite serious.”
Also as in M.R., father had not yet completed the parenting
program, and father had drug and domestic violence incidents in
his past that provided “further reason why the court could

16
justifiably conclude there remained a risk” to Allen. (Id. at
p. 110.)5
Given the severity of the incident and father’s substance
abuse history, criminal history, and prior involvement with
DCFS, the juvenile court was justified in concluding informal
supervision was warranted to help mitigate the risk of harm to
Allen.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:

LUI, P. J. ASHMANN-GERST, J.

5 In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, cited for the first time
in father’s reply brief, is distinguishable. There, the father
admitted he used to abuse crack cocaine and alcohol but was
about two years sober. (Id. at p. 717.) The S.F. court found the
agency presented no evidence father’s reported sobriety was false,
let alone that any prior or current drug use presented a
substantial risk of harm to the minor. (Ibid.) However, in S.F.,
the father was a noncustodial parent who was in New York at the
time the child came to the attention of the court. The father did
not cause the child to ingest a harmful substance. Similarly, in
In re Destiny S. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 999, also cited for the
first time in father’s reply brief, the appealing parent was not the
cause of serious harm to the child. These cases differ from the
present matter, where the father’s act of giving his newborn baby
alcohol created the serious risk of harm to the child.

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