In re M.S. CA1/3

CourtListener 10642583Calctapp28 lug 2025

Testo completo

Filed 7/28/25 In re M.S. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re M.S., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

LAKE COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172076
v.
D.S., (Lake County
Super. Ct. No. JV320663)
Defendant and Appellant.

D.S. (Mother), mother of minor M.S., appeals from an order of the
juvenile court terminating her parental rights. Mother contends the court
erred in concluding the beneficial relationship exception to termination of
parental rights did not apply because the Lake County Social Services
Agency (Agency) failed to provide the court with objective, disinterested
information about the nature and quality of visits between Mother and M.S.
We find no prejudicial error and affirm.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prior Dependency Case
M.S. was born in January 2012, testing positive for opiates. In a prior
dependency matter, then-three-month-old M.S. was removed from the care of
his parents, Mother and B.S. (Father), and placed into foster care at the
home of family friends. The charging petition alleged that Mother had
mental health instability, unpredictable behavior, and ongoing prescription
drug abuse and mental health issues, and that Father was unable to care for
the child due to a temporary no-contact order issued in a parallel family court
proceeding.
By the time of the 12-month review hearing in November 2013, Father
had successfully reunified with M.S. Mother, however, failed to make
sufficient progress on the problems that led to the dependency, and the
juvenile court terminated reunification services as to her. Mother was
granted supervised in-person visitation with M.S.
B. Continued Referrals (2018–2020) and the July 2020
Restraining Order
The Agency continued to receive referrals related to M.S., including
allegations in 2018 and 2019 of general neglect, emotional abuse, and sexual
abuse.1 Most of these referrals were found to be inconclusive or to not meet
the criteria for investigation.

1 For instance, the Agency received reports in 2018 that the parents were
constantly fighting and speaking negatively about each other in front of M.S.;
that M.S. “complains that he is hungry at mother’s house and he is left in a
dark room at the end of the hallway” and “never gets to go out and play”; and
that Mother took baths with M.S. and slept with him naked, during which
M.S. was allowed to touch Mother’s breasts and buttocks. In 2019, the
Agency received referrals of general neglect related to Mother’s act of
smoking in the bedroom where M.S. sleeps, and M.S.’s discovery of a gun in
Mother’s home. Another referral alleged that Father emotionally abused

2
On February 7, 2020, Father called the Lakeport Police Department
and requested a welfare check on M.S. at Mother’s residence. According to
Father, M.S., who was eight years old at the time, had sent him text
messages, stating “ ‘Mommy want’s to go bye bye’ ” and “ ‘Should I escape?’ ”
Over the next 24 hours, Lakeport Police officers conducted four welfare
checks at Mother’s residence. On February 8, 2020, officers went to the home
and found all of M.S.’s clothes and toys in a dumpster. Neighbors reported
hearing Mother screaming at 2:00 a.m., and officers observed her to be
“hysterical.” M.S. reported that Mother spat in his face and drove him into
the couch by putting her fist on his head, saying “ ‘I’m never gonna see you
again.’ ” When M.S. attempted to leave, Mother locked him in a closet before
throwing his clothes and toys in the dumpster. Mother admitted to yelling
and cursing at M.S. from Friday evening until Saturday morning, spitting in
his face, saying “ ‘fuck you’ ” to him, and throwing his belongings away. She
explained her “love for her son changed” after a family court hearing because
“she felt betrayed by her son,” whose statements and lies to the court resulted
in the denial of her request for increased time with him.
Father applied for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). At
the DVRO hearing, Mother told the family court she was suffering from a
nervous breakdown during the February 8 incident, and she asked the court
to grant her supervised visitation with M.S.2 On July 29, 2020, the family

M.S. by telling him Mother “is a ‘sexual predator’ and a ‘bitch,’ ” and that
Father physically abused M.S. by whipping him with a fly swatter.
2 Here we note the Agency appears to take some of Mother’s statements
out of context. The Agency reports Mother made the following “concerning”
remarks during the DVRO hearing: “When I’m alone with my son, I knew
the minute that I got overnight visits, Your Honor, that I was going to be a
sexual predator. I already knew that one was coming”; and “I know having
my son alone is not going to work.” Though the statements may seem

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court issued a DVRO prohibiting Mother from having any contact with M.S.
and requiring her to stay at least 50 yards from him for a period of three
years. The family court granted sole legal and physical custody to Father and
ordered no visitation for Mother until further order of the court.
C. The Instant Dependency Case
In June 2023, the Agency filed another dependency petition on behalf of
M.S., then 11 years old, alleging he came within the provisions of Welfare
and Institutions Code3 section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (c), due to both
parents’ histories of mental illness, drug use, and domestic violence.
In its detention report, the Agency reported Father had significant
untreated mental health issues, unstable housing, and a history of criminal,
domestic violence, and substance abuse issues. Believing he was being
stalked by gangs and drones, Father intended to “ ‘live off the grid’ ” with
M.S. and “protect themselves with firearms if necessary.” M.S. reported that
Father believed others were stalking and pointing “ray guns” at them, but he
accepted some other of Father’s beliefs. As for Mother, the Agency reported
that she had not had contact with M.S. for three years due to the active
DVRO, and that M.S. “reported he does not wish to see his mother because
‘she hit me over and over and over all over my body with her hand, her ring
and a hot heating pad.’ ” M.S. also said he “did not feel safe when he was
living with her.”
In August 2023, the juvenile court ordered that M.S. be detained and
placed in the care of his prior foster family. At the jurisdiction hearing in

troubling on their face, when read in context they appear to reflect Mother’s
anticipation that she would be falsely accused of sexual abuse after she was
granted overnight visits with M.S., and her belief that the presence of a third
party during supervised visits would protect her from such accusations.
3 Further unspecified statutory references are to this code.

4
October 2023, the juvenile court found the allegations of the petition to be
true by a preponderance of the evidence.
In its November 2023 disposition report, the Agency asked that M.S. be
declared a ward of the court and that reunification services be given to
Father, but not to Mother. The Agency concluded it was not in M.S.’s best
interest to reunify with Mother as he “continues to refuse to have visits with
his mother, and there is no evidence that his position will change.” Mother
“does not currently have a relationship with her son after a 3-year no-contact
order and [M.S.] does not currently want to engage with his mother.”
Regarding visitation, the Agency noted the DVRO was “now expired, but
[M.S.] does not want to visit with his mother currently. [Social worker]
Martinez discusses the possibility of visiting with his mother often and his
response has been that he does not want to visit.”
On January 10, 2024, the juvenile court held a contested disposition
hearing. Minor’s counsel told the court that she had just spoken to M.S. and
“his stance has been very consistent throughout this case; he does not want
the mother to receive any services, he hasn’t had any visits, does not want to
visit the mother. He’s been put through a lot. There’s molestation
allegations and he does not feel comfortable.”4 Mother testified she had been
under the care of a therapist for four years and was prescribed psychotropic
medication for bipolar disorder and anger problems. She regularly tested
negative for drug use and was maintaining a stable home. Mother further
testified that beginning in July 2023, after the DVRO expired, she began

4 The reporter’s transcript of the disposition hearing was not included in
the record of the instant appeal. On our own motion, we take judicial notice
of this transcript, which is part of the appellate record in Mother’s prior
appeal, case No. A169688. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)

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regularly sending letters and gifts to M.S. A social worker gave the letters to
M.S., who “seemed indifferent” to them but read them and said, “thank you.”
In its January 24, 2024 disposition order, the juvenile court granted
family reunification services to Father but bypassed them for Mother. In so
ruling, the court explained: Mother “was subject to a restraining order until
July of last year. The mother has no relationship with the child at this point.
The child does not want a relationship with his mom. And the issues that led
up to the restraining order, though mitigated at this point, were in an acute
stage just a few months ago, meaning her mental health issues. [¶] And
while I applaud the mother for the steps she has taken to deal with her
mental health, we’ve already terminated the services that were being offered
based on her lack of compliance with them. And so, at this point, I believe
she qualifies . . . for bypass.” The court ordered that Mother was to have no
in-person or telephone contact with M.S. but permitted her to have “[w]ritten
communication sent to the social worker.”
Both parents appealed from the disposition order. However, Father
unexpectedly passed away before his appeal could be decided, and his appeal
was dismissed in June 2024. Mother’s counsel filed a no-arguable-issues
brief pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, and after Mother
failed to file a supplemental brief, her appeal, too, was dismissed.
In the meantime, the juvenile court set the matter for the six-month
review hearing. In an addendum report, the Agency told the court that
despite the limited contact permitted by the disposition order, M.S. kept
“ ‘running into’ his mom out in the community on multiple occasions,” and
that “Mother has been pushing the boundaries of the existing orders for no
in-person visitation. On one recent occasion, Mother called [M.S.] over and
asked him to make a ‘pinky promise’ that he would ask [the Agency] to

6
arrange a visit. [The Agency] had concerns about the manner in which this
request was made, but did facilitate a Zoom visit at [M.S.’s] request. [M.S.]
appears to be open to Zoom visitation at this time.”
In a July 2024 addendum report, the Agency reported that two virtual
visits in June had gone “well, but there are still concerns” because Mother
would ask M.S. “to make promises during the visit to ask [the Agency] for
other visits and in the recent visit, ask for in-person contact.” Mother would
also offer to buy things for M.S. even though the visitation rules prohibited
making or extracting promises. The Agency noted that M.S. had “a desire to
live with his father, but now that [Father] is deceased, [M.S.] has made it
clear he is open to visiting with his mother but would like to remain with his
foster parents and reside with them.”
At the six-month review hearing, minor’s counsel advised the juvenile
court that M.S. had requested in-person visits with Mother. The Agency’s
counsel agreed to in-person visitation, subject to the Agency’s discretion and
M.S.’s comfort level. The court ordered supervised in-person visitation and
set the matter for a permanency planning hearing on December 2, 2024.
In October 2024, Mother filed a motion for the juvenile court to
authorize a bonding study. At the hearing on the motion, Mother’s counsel
explained that Mother and M.S. had a few “really good” virtual visits, but
that the Agency “doesn’t even have the Zoom visits delivery service [or
visitation] logs. They didn’t log them, Your Honor. So I don’t have adequate
evidence to show there is a bond between the child without this study.”
Counsel further explained that in-person visits had only just begun that
September, and there were indications that M.S. loved Mother and wanted
visits, as “he ran to her and embraced her” at the last meeting.

7
Minor’s counsel reported there were “some issues with the mother
making certain remarks to [M.S.] in the visits that were inappropriate, just
some physical touching that’s just made him uncomfortable as well. . . . And
he actually doesn’t really want that much contact with her. But he does feel
a little bit sad, you know, that his father died. And so he feels sad because
the mother sort of guilt trips him into wanting these visits.” Minor’s counsel
emphasized that M.S. “has made it very, very clear that he wants to be
adopted by his current placement. I believe the agency asked him, adoptions
asked him, I asked him. . . . He’s very bonded to that family, and he’s been
there since the inception of this case. He barely wants any visits with his
mom. They just started visiting after there was like a two- or three-year
restraining order.”
The juvenile court denied Mother’s request for a bonding study, finding
that it was “too late in the . . . process at this time”, and that in light of M.S.’s
stated desire to be adopted, it was in his best interest to go forward with
permanency planning.
In its section 366.26 report, the Agency recommended terminating
Mother’s parental rights and selecting a permanent plan of adoption. The
Agency noted M.S. had been placed with his prospective adoptive family since
August 2023 and was likely to be adopted. The Agency submitted an
adoption assessment completed by adoptions specialist Jennifer Heiss of the
California Department of Social Services. Heiss found that M.S. was “not
interested in having any unsupervised contact with his mother and has
expressed feeling uncomfortable at times in her presence, due to things she
has said or done during their visitation time.” Heiss further found M.S. had
a developmentally appropriate understanding of adoption and, when given a
choice between legal guardianship and adoption, stated he was interested in

8
being adopted. Heiss also addressed the statutory elements of the beneficial
relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) and explained why she did
not believe the exception should preclude termination of Mother’s parental
rights.
The Agency further informed the juvenile court that the in-person
visits with Mother, which had occurred twice per month since June 2024, had
caused M.S. “some distress. He’s had to work through those questions with
his therapist.” M.S. “specifically asked the social worker, please don’t step
out of the room during those visits because he has concerns about . . . being
alone with his mother even for a brief moment.” The Agency convened a child
and family team meeting “where the team discussed what the problems were
with visitation.” The Agency concluded no beneficial relationship existed
between M.S. and Mother that should prevent the termination of parental
rights.
Mother argued the beneficial relationship exception applied because
she had maintained regular visitation after the first dependency case closed
in 2013 until February 2020, which amounted to most of M.S.’s life. She
further noted that M.S. wanted to have visits with her, and that a bonding
study was necessary because the social worker could not provide a fair
representation of the parent-child bond. Mother’s counsel complained that
the Agency had not provided any delivery service logs to the juvenile court;
that she had received only one log in advance of the hearing; and that after
asking the Agency for delivery service logs, “they just came in” that morning.
Counsel received no logs of the June 2024 virtual visits. The Agency’s
counsel explained that there were no logs of the June 2024 virtual visits
because the social worker who supervised those visits “left without having
entered those” and was no longer employed with the Agency.

9
Minor’s counsel argued that M.S. wanted to be freed up for adoption,
that none of the exceptions to termination of parental rights applied, and that
the incidental benefits of visits did not outweigh the permanency of adoption.
According to counsel, M.S. “feels that he sort of has to . . . visit with his mom.
There has been some guilt around that, and that’s something he has to work
through in therapy as well.”
The section 366.26 hearing was held on December 2, 2024, but Mother
did not appear. The juvenile court found there was “no real evidence of a
beneficial parental bond as it applies to [M.S.] Meaning that [M.S.] isn’t
getting any benefit out of it. Maybe mom is, but [M.S.] isn’t. And seeing no
evidence that there is that bond—also mom isn’t here, so I can’t get her take
on it directly.” The court further noted that there had been a three-year gap
in the relationship due to the DVRO, and that M.S. was likely to be adopted
and had asked to be adopted. The court expressed its belief that M.S.
“understands the circumstances and what is appropriate for him.” Based on
these findings, the court found the parental benefit exception did not apply,
and it terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court may order one of three
alternative permanent plans: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster
care. (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224 (B.D.).) If the juvenile
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be
adopted (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)), the court shall terminate parental rights to
allow for adoption, subject to several statutory exceptions (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi), (4)(A).) It is the parent’s burden to show that
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of

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the exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). (In re S.B. (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296–297.)
At issue here is the beneficial relationship exception, which applies
when “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination
would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following
circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and
contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
A parent must prove three elements to establish this exception:
“(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of
which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,
631 (Caden C.), italics omitted.) The first two elements are factual
determinations reviewed for substantial evidence, while the third element
involves both factual determinations reviewed for substantial evidence, as
well as the juvenile court’s weighing of the harm of losing the relationship
against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home, which is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 639–641.)
In evaluating whether the beneficial relationship exception applies, we
do not consider the possibility that visits will continue after adoption.
Rather, we “must assume that terminating parental rights terminates the
relationship. [Citations.] What courts need to determine, therefore, is how
the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect,
what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent
in the child’s life.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) If severing the
natural parent-child relationship would deprive a “child of a substantial,
positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed,

11
the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are
not terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (Autumn
H.).)
B. Analysis
1. Regular Visitation and Contact
As to the first Caden C. element, there is no dispute that Mother
consistently visited M.S. to the extent permitted by court orders. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.)
2. Benefit from Continuing the Relationship
A beneficial parent-child relationship “ ‘ “ ‘characteristically aris[es]
from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. Day-to-
day contact is not necessarily required, although it is typical in a parent-child
relationship.’ ” ’ ” (B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225.) “[T]he focus is the
child. And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he
age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody,
the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and
the child’s particular needs.’ [Citation.] . . . . [C]ourts often consider how
children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.
[Citations.] Doing so properly focuses the inquiry on the child, even as courts
must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child relationships’ conform to
an entirely consistent pattern. [Citations.] Certainly, it is not necessary—
even if it were possible—to calibrate a precise ‘quantitative measurement of
the specific amount of “comfort, nourishment or physical care” [the parent]
provided during [his or] her weekly visits.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632.)
Here, the juvenile court found that there was “no real evidence of a
beneficial parental bond” or “any evidence of a beneficial relationship,” and

12
that M.S. was not “getting any benefit out of” his visits with Mother. Mother
insists the court did not have a sufficient record to make this determination
because the Agency failed to provide objective, disinterested information
about the nature and quality of M.S.’s relationship with Mother, including
delivery service logs of their visits. She relies on a trio of decisions, In re
Dy.P. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 153 (Dy.P.), In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833
(J.D.) and In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261 (D.M.), which we address
below.
In Dy.P., the appellate court reversed an order terminating a mother’s
parental rights because the juvenile court “performed no specific analysis on
the beneficial parental relationship exception, instead finding only that the
parents presented inadequate evidence to justify any exception.” (Dy.P.,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) The court highlighted evidence in the
record supporting the second Caden C. element, as the mother testified that
her children (ages 16, 15, 14, 3, and 2) had lived with her their entire lives,
were “very close” to her and said they “loved her, called her mom, ran to her
when they started the visits, routinely asked when they would be coming
home with her, and . . . were happier with her than with the caretakers.” (Id.
at p. 167.) The Dy.P. court observed that the mother’s testimony was
supported by “[t]he available visitation logs, drafted by a social worker and
included with the disposition,” which showed that “the children did
immediately hug the parents or run towards them at the beginning of at least
some of the visits” and “called mother ‘mom’ or ‘mommy,’ ” and that “the
parents parented the children during the visits.” (Ibid.) The logs also
indicated no concerns were noted at the visits. (Ibid.)
In J.D., our colleagues in Division Two of this district reversed a
decision of the juvenile court terminating a mother’s parental rights because

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it could not “be certain the juvenile court did not consider factors disapproved
of in Caden C.,” such as the child’s attachment to the foster parent, the
mother’s failure to occupy a “parental” role, and the possibility of
postadoption contact. (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 863–864.)
Additionally, the J.D. court criticized the child welfare agency for providing
“very little information in its prior reports during the case about the quality
of mother’s relationship with J.D. or even the nature of her interactions with
him during visitation. That was not appropriate and did a disservice to not
just mother and J.D. but also the juvenile court.” (Id. at p. 860.)
Highlighting the “critical role that social workers play in our dependency
scheme, and the objectivity they must bring to the task,” J.D. held that by the
time of the section 366.26 hearing, a child welfare agency’s reports should
have “provided objective, disinterested information about the quality of [the
child’s] attachment to [the parent], which would have assisted the court in
evaluating the beneficial relationship exception.” (J.D., at p. 861.)
Finally, D.M. found the juvenile court there erroneously focused on
factors disapproved of in Caden C. (e.g., whether the father occupied a
parental role), and failed to adequately address the degree of attachment
between the father and the dependent children. (D.M., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 270–271.) On the latter point, the D.M. court observed the child
welfare agency’s “reports gave the court little evidence about the quality of
the visits between father and the children, or how the children felt about
father. The children were rarely, if ever, asked how they felt about father or
whether they enjoyed visits with him.” (Id. at p. 270.)
Although these decisions generally support Mother’s contention that
the Agency had a duty to provide detailed information to the juvenile court
regarding Mother’s visits and relationship with M.S., the instant matter is

14
distinguishable in a critical respect. Specifically, at the time the second
dependency petition was filed in June 2023, Mother was still subject to a
DVRO that had prohibited her from all contact with M.S. for nearly three
years. Even after the DVRO expired in July 2023, M.S. continued to refuse
visitation with Mother for nearly a year, and he only began to change his
mind around the six-month review period. Thus, for most of the duration of
this dependency case, there was simply no occasion for the Agency to observe
and document the quality of the parent-child relationship.
True, once visits began in June 2024, the Agency was required to report
to the juvenile court on “the amount of and nature of” the contacts between
Mother and M.S. (§§ 366.22, subd. (c)(1)(B), 366.21, subd. (i)(1)(B).)
Moreover, the cases discussed above establish that the Agency’s role in this
regard is to provide objective, disinterested information in sufficient detail to
assist the juvenile court in evaluating whether the beneficial relationship
applies. (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 861; D.M., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 270–271.) Here, the Agency’s addendum reports and section 366.26
report5 indicated the visits went “well,” but there were no detailed
descriptions of the interactions between Mother and M.S. during the review
periods that might have informed the court’s analysis on the existence of
substantial and positive parent-child bond.

5 As the J.D. court observed, “there is tension in the case law concerning
the extent to which the agency must address facts pertinent to the beneficial
relationship exception in the section 366.26 report itself,” and the court
expressed no opinion on the adequacy of the section 366.26 report before it.
(J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 861.) Nevertheless, J.D. noted that “by the
time the juvenile court scheduled the section 366.26 hearing, the agency’s
prior reports should have already provided objective, disinterested
information about the quality of J.D.’s attachment to his mother, which
would have assisted the court in evaluating the beneficial relationship
exception when mother asserted it.” (J.D., at p. 861.)

15
We also agree with Mother that the Agency should have provided all
available delivery service logs to her in advance of the section 366.26 hearing
rather than on the morning thereof. As the cases show, visitation logs can be
highly relevant to the court’s analysis of the beneficial relationship exception.
(See Dy.P., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 167 [visitation logs were included with
disposition report and supported mother’s testimony at permanency planning
hearing]; J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 856 [visitation logs provided “an
extremely telling glimpse of how” child felt and interacted with parent].) The
Agency did not deny that Mother’s counsel requested production of the
visitation logs in advance of the hearing or explain why available logs were
not produced earlier.
That said, even if we assume the juvenile court should have received
more detailed information from the Agency on the 2024 visits before making
a factual determination on the beneficial relationship exception, we
ultimately conclude Mother has not demonstrated the error was prejudicial.
“In determining whether an error is harmless in a juvenile dependency
proceeding, we must decide whether the error caused a miscarriage of
justice,” meaning “we must decide whether it is reasonably probable the
result would have been more favorable to the appellant but for the error.” (In
re M.S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 568, 591, citing In re Celine R. (2003) 31
Cal.4th 45, 59–60.)
Here, Mother eventually obtained (albeit belatedly) a number of
visitation logs from 2024, but she did not request additional time to review
them and made no claim that the logs she received were inadequate or
incomplete. Critically, Mother does not contend the logs contained any
evidence that would have assisted her in demonstrating a substantial parent-
child bond, and she did not include the logs as part of the record on appeal.

16
(See, e.g., J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 856 [detailed visitation log entries
provided “intimate, personal and touching” details on parent-child bond].)
Meanwhile, Mother does not dispute the Agency’s assertions that during
some of the visits, M.S. experienced distress, discomfort, and unwelcome
physical contacts, and that M.S. specifically told a social worker he did not
want to be left alone with Mother. Thus, even assuming the logs might have
documented certain positive interactions during the visits with Mother, the
juvenile court could still reasonably conclude that the record of visits was
mixed at best, and that M.S.’s statements of discomfort and distrust belied
the existence of a positive, emotional attachment to Mother. (See Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [courts often consider how children feel about
parents in assessing benefits of relationship]; In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
683, 694 [child’s statements “powerfully demonstrate the child did not have
the type of attachment with mother that would cause the child to suffer
detriment in the event of a termination of parental rights”].)
We must also emphasize that “[t]he kind of parent-child bond the court
may rely on to avoid termination of parental rights under the [beneficial
relationship] exception . . . does not arise in the short period between the
termination of services and the section 366.26 hearing.” (In re Richard C.
(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1196.) Thus, even assuming the Agency had
provided reports and visitation logs showing moments of bonding between
Mother and M.S. during the 2024 visits, we are not convinced this brief
period of engagement would have likely caused the court to find that a
beneficial relationship existed given the circumstances as a whole, including
the nearly four-year period in which the two had no relationship to speak of
and the evidence of M.S.’s post-DVRO indifference and concerns about
Mother.

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Mother nevertheless insists she and M.S. had a preexisting bond
“which simply would not have vanished within a couple of years.” We
acknowledge that a multi-year gap in a parent-child relationship due to a
restraining order should not categorically preclude a beneficial relationship
finding. But our difficulty in assessing Mother’s argument stems from her
failure to cite to any evidence in the record on the nature and quality of her
relationship with M.S. prior to the issuance of the DVRO in July 2020, let
alone evidence from which it is reasonably probable that the court would
have found “a substantial, positive emotional attachment” (Autumn H.,
supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575) or “a strong, positive, and affirming
relationship” between Mother and M.S. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 634).
As recounted above, M.S. was first detained by the Agency at three
months of age, and only Father reunified with him during the first
dependency case. Thus, for M.S.’s entire life, Mother was never his primary
caretaker. Although Mother was granted supervised visitation with M.S.
from 2013 to 2020, she cites no evidence in the record regarding the nature
and quality of those visits.6 Moreover, during this time, the Agency
continued to receive concerning referrals regarding M.S., including a 2018
referral that M.S. “is hungry at mother’s house and he is left in a dark room
at the end of the hallway” and “never gets to go out and play.” Then, after
the February 2020 incident of physical and verbal abuse, the two had no
relationship for three years while the DVRO was in effect, and even after the

6 Mother does not argue the Agency had a legal duty to provide the
juvenile court in the second dependency case with visitation records from the
first dependency case in order to assist the court in determining whether a
beneficial relationship existed. We accordingly express no opinion on that
question.

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DVRO expired, M.S. refused visitation with Mother for nearly a year, citing
the physical abuse he had sustained from Mother and stating “he did not feel
safe when he was living with her.” Although Mother sent letters and cards to
M.S., he was “indifferent” to them.
We acknowledge the existing record may not adequately capture the
nature of Mother and M.S.’s relationship over the years. And while it is true
the Agency has an independent responsibility to provide objective
information to the juvenile court regarding visitation—and the Agency could
have done more in this case—it ultimately remains the parent’s burden to
show the applicability of the beneficial relationship exception and the
juvenile court’s prejudicial abuse of discretion on appeal. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 636–637.) The record before us reflects that Mother did
little in attempting to sustain her burden.7 As such, we conclude any error by
the juvenile court in making its ruling without receiving more information
from the Agency on visitation was ultimately harmless.
3. Detriment from Termination of Relationship
For the third Caden C. step, the juvenile court must determine
“whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and
the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ [Citation.] ‘If severing the
natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial,
positive emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the benefits of a
new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[]’ the child, the court should

7 The record does not indicate why Mother did not attend or testify at the
section 366.26 hearing. Such testimony could have provided the court with
specific details and examples of Mother’s relationship with M.S. and their
interactions during the visits that took place both before and after the DVRO.
As the juvenile court pointed out, Mother’s absence left the court unable to
“get [Mother’s] take on” her relationship with M.S.

19
not terminate parental rights. [Citation.] That subtle, case-specific inquiry
is what the statute asks courts to perform: does the benefit of placement in a
new, adoptive home outweigh ‘the harm [the child] would experience from the
loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]’
[Citation.] When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child
that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss,
termination would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s beneficial
relationship with a parent.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–634.)
As the Supreme Court explains, this is “a subtle enterprise—sometimes
depending on more than just how beneficial the relationship is. In many
cases, ‘the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship’ will
substantially determine how detrimental it would be to lose that relationship,
which must be weighed against the benefits of a new adoptive home.
[Citation.] A child would benefit from continuing a strong, positive, and
affirming relationship, and it would be destabilizing to lose that relationship.
Sometimes, though, a relationship involves tangled benefits and burdens. In
those cases, the court faces the complex task of disentangling the
consequences of removing those burdens along with the benefits of the
relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Moreover, we cannot
assume visits may continue after adoption; instead, the pertinent question is
what life will be like for M.S. in an adoptive home without Mother’s
involvement. (Id. at p. 633.)
Mother insists the circumstances of this case, including the death of
Father during the proceedings and M.S.’s stated desire to visit Mother even
after years of not seeing her, required the juvenile court to conduct a “deeper
dive into the emotional consequences to M.S. of depriving him of his Mother’s
association.”

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Mindful of the governing principles, and granting that Father’s death
may have impacted M.S.’s decision to renew visitation with Mother late in
the proceedings, we nonetheless conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights would
not be detrimental to M.S. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) As the
record reflects, by the time of the section 366.26 hearing, M.S. and Mother
had not maintained much of a relationship at all for nearly four years due to
Mother’s abusive conduct, the resulting DVRO, and M.S.’s unwillingness to
visit her. Mother did not attend or testify at the section 366.26 hearing, and
here she cites to no evidence of a significant, positive, and emotional
attachment on M.S.’s part, either before or after the expiration of the DVRO.
Meanwhile, M.S. was reportedly doing well in his prospective adoptive home
and was likely to be adopted. And when asked, M.S. specifically chose a plan
of adoption over legal guardianship. Despite M.S.’s willingness to begin
visiting with Mother at the six-month review phase, the juvenile court could
reasonably conclude this late development was insufficient to outweigh the
benefits of permanency in a new adoptive home. Indeed, M.S. remained
uncomfortable and unwilling to be left alone with Mother, and there was also
evidence from which the court could infer that Mother exerted improper
influence on M.S. to request the visits in the first place.
In sum, on the record before us, we conclude the juvenile court
reasonably found that any harm of severing Mother and M.S.’s relationship
did not outweigh the security and stability that M.S. stands to receive in his
new adoptive home.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

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_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Petrou, J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

Lake County SSA v. D.S. (A172076)

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