CourtListener 10641504•People v. Voravongsa CA1/4
Testo completo
Filed 7/25/25 P. v. Voravongsa CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170022
v.
BRIAN KHAMSOUK (Lake County
VORAVONGSA, Super. Ct. No. CR961937)
Defendant and Appellant.
Brian Khamsouk Voravongsa was convicted of being a felon
in possession of a firearm and sentenced to four years in state
prison. He contends that his conviction must be reversed because
it violates his Second Amendment right to possess a firearm
under New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022)
597 U.S. 1 (Bruen). We find no error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Voravongsa was charged by amended information with,
among other counts, being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen.
Code1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The information further alleged that
Voravongsa had been convicted of a prior serious and/or violent
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
felony (§§ 667, subd. (d)), and alleged several aggravating
sentencing factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2), (b)(1)–
(5)).
Following a trial, the jury found Voravongsa guilty of the
above offense and the court found true the prior serious felony
allegation as well as the allegations that his prior convictions
were numerous or of increasing seriousness, that he had served a
prior prison term, and that his prior performance on probation or
parole was unsatisfactory.2
The trial court denied Voravongsa’s request to strike his
prior conviction and sentenced him to four years in state prison.
DISCUSSION
Voravongsa contends that his conviction under section
29800, subdivision (a) violates his Second Amendment right to
possess a firearm. (U.S. Const., 2d Amend.) Because he raises a
facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, which
requires us to “ ‘consider “only the text of the measure itself, not
its application to the particular circumstances of an
individual,” ’ ” his “challenge may be raised and decided for the
2 Voravongsa was also charged with a second count of being
a felon in possession of a firearm, possession of
methamphetamine while armed with a loaded firearm (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)) and unlawful possession of
ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)), with various related
enhancement allegations, including that he was released on bail
or his own recognizance when he committed the offenses
(§ 12022.1). These counts and the on-bail enhancement
allegation were dismissed by the court under section 1118.1 or by
the prosecutor.
2
first time on appeal.” (People v. Anderson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th
577, 589 (Anderson).)
In Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 1, the Supreme Court held that
“when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s
conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.
To justify its regulation, . . . the government must demonstrate
that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is
consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court
conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second
Amendment’s ‘unqualified command.’ ” (Bruen, 597 U.S. at
p. 17.)
There is, as Voravongsa argues, “a split among California
Courts of Appeal as to whether the challenged conduct—
possession of a firearm by a felon—is covered by the Second
Amendment.” Several courts have held that “only law-abiding
citizens are included among ‘the people’ whose right to bear arms
is protected by the Second Amendment.” (People v. Alexander
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 478; People v. Odell (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 307, 317 [agreeing]; People v. Ceja (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 1296, 1301 [same].) In Anderson, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at p. 589, the court disagreed, holding that “the
Second Amendment applies to [the] defendant notwithstanding
his status as a felon, and presumptively protects his right to
possess a loaded firearm.” Nonetheless, in Anderson, the court
rejected the defendant’s facial challenge to section 29800,
subdivision (a)(1), based on its finding that California’s felon-in-
3
possession firearm regulation is “ ‘consistent with the principles
that underpin’ the nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation.” (Anderson, at p. 589.)
Voravongsa argues that this court should adopt the first
conclusion in Anderson—that the Second Amendment applies to
felons—but not its second. He suggests that the Anderson court
did not “properly apply the historical analysis Bruen requires and
has not shown that California’s felon dispossession statutes are
constitutional under Bruen.” We need not decide whether the
felons are excluded from the class of people protected by the
Second Amendment because we agree with the court in Anderson
that section 29800, subdivision (a)(1), is consistent with our
nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
In Anderson, the court detailed that historical tradition by
analyzing “sources from 17th-century England, colonial America,
and the early federal period” before concluding that “this nation’s
tradition of firearm regulation allows for a categorical ban on the
possession of firearms by persons who have been convicted of a
felony.” (Anderson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 589–595, 599.)
First, the court observed that early English legal history
included the adoption of the English Bill of Rights, which placed
limitations on who could bear arms based on, for example,
religion, ownership of property, and “ ‘as allowed by Law.’ ”
(Anderson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 589–591.) The court
concluded, “In short, English law required the legislature to
respect certain people’s liberties, but those liberties were still
subject to moderate and sensible regulation.” (Id. at p. 591.)
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Second, the Court observed that the “English tradition of
disarming those whom Parliament did not trust to be law-abiding
or loyal members of society carried over to the American colonies
and persisted as the colonies became new states.” (Anderson,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 591.) The court noted that one’s
race or religion, for example, was grounds for disarmament;
hence, Native Americans, African Americans, and Catholics had
no right to bear arms. But, in addition to these “odious” laws
which would today violate our state and federal constitutions, the
court cited evidence showing that “[d]isarmament was also an
accepted sanction for an individual’s criminal behavior in colonial
America.” (Id. at p. 592.)
Next, the court observed that, in the early federal period,
while Pennsylvania’s, North Carolina’s, Vermont’s, and
Massachusetts’s state constitutions gave the people the right to
bear arms, including for defensive purposes, those rights were
not unconditional. (Anderson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 593–
594.) Pennsylvania and North Carolina passed statutes
disarming citizens for refusing to take a loyalty oath, and
Massachusetts’s legislature “imposed disarmament as a sanction
for participants in Shays’ Rebellion.” (Anderson, at p. 594.) The
court explained, “The lesson we draw from this historical
evidence is that the founding generation did not consider the
constitutional right to arms inherited from the English legal
tradition to be inconsistent with legislative enactments
disarming individuals convicted of serious crimes or otherwise
dangerous to the community.” (Ibid.)
5
Finally, the court cited amendments to the United States
Constitution proposed, but not adopted, at ratifying conventions
in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts which sought to secure the
right to bear arms for “peaceable citizens” and precluded laws
“disarming the people or any of them unless for crimes committed,
or real danger of public injury from individuals.” (Anderson,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 594, 595.) The court reasoned that
its conclusion was “confirmed” by these “historical accounts of
deliberations over whether to ratify the federal Constitution.”
(Id. at p. 594.)
Initially, Voravongsa faults the court for applying a
“thematic approach” and combining “separate categories of
historical evidence.” He cites the court’s conclusion that “[t]aken
together,” the historical evidence “shows that individuals were
disarmed as a preventative measure when the law assessed they
were unwilling to respect sovereign authority, and they were
disarmed as a sanction for criminal conduct, whether or not
involving physical violence. California’s felon disarmament
measures are ‘ “relevantly similar” ’ in serving both of these
purposes.” (Anderson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.) He
argues that “bundling distinct regulations together,” neither of
which is sufficient on its own to serve as a representative historic
analogue, does not satisfy the inquiry required under Bruen. We
disagree.
In Bruen, the court held that in showing that a challenged
law is consistent with our nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation, the government need not identify a “historical twin”
6
to a challenged law. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 30.) Rather,
the government must only identify a “well-established and
representative historical analogue.” (Ibid.) Bruen directs courts
to use history as our guide in determining whether a present-day
firearm regulation was “unimaginable at the founding.” (Id. at
p. 28.) “When confronting such present-day firearm regulations,
this historical inquiry that courts must conduct will often involve
reasoning by analogy—a commonplace task for any lawyer or
judge. Like all analogical reasoning, determining whether a
historical regulation is a proper analogue for a distinctly modern
firearm regulation requires a determination of whether the two
regulations are “ ‘relevantly similar.’ ” (Id. at pp. 28–29.) Among
the metrics courts should consider in evaluating whether modern
and historic regulations are similar are “how and why the
regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-
defense.” (Ibid.)
In United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680, 690–691
(Rahimi) the court applied the Bruen standard to uphold the
constitutionality of section 922(g)(8) of title 18 of the United
States Code, which prohibits an individual subject to a domestic
violence restraining order from possessing a firearm under
certain conditions. The court offered additional guidance on how
to apply Bruen’s framework noting that “some courts have
misunderstood the methodology of” Bruen, which was not “meant
to suggest a law trapped in amber.” (Rahimi, at p. 691.) The
court clarified that “the appropriate analysis involves considering
whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the
7
principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” (Id. at p. 692,
italics added.)
Voravongsa also contends that “[e]ven if the Anderson
court’s approach is sound, its historical evidence is not relevantly
similar.” He argues that the categorical disarmament laws based
on race and religion are not comparable because they were based
on who were considered “the people” at that time and do not “say
anything about the colonial era views on the scope of the right to
bear arms.” The Anderson court disagreed. The court
acknowledged the limitations of this evidence but concluded that
“the point remains that these historical practices show the
generation that adopted the Second Amendment understood the
right it was enshrining in the Constitution to be limited” and that
“[t]he right to arms familiar to them allowed for . . . categorical
disarmament of groups that the legislature assessed as
threatening to the community.” (Anderson, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.) While this category of historical
evidence alone might not establish the constitutionality of
current felon-in-possession statutes, we disagree that these
regulations are irrelevant to the analysis.
Voravongsa also argues that the court’s reliance on historic
disarmament laws based on individual criminal conduct was
misplaced because many of the sources imposed only temporary
firearm bans and “[e]ven where the loss of the right was
permanent, . . . none of the Anderson court’s evidence shows that
sufficiently ‘serious’ crimes, comparable to a felony conviction,
resulted in disarmament. Rather, the evidence shows that the
8
common thread running through all the court’s purported
analogues, whether they involved the commission of a crime or
not, is at most that dangerous people can be disarmed, not those
who have broken sufficiently ‘serious’ laws.”
Initially, the court in Anderson rejected the argument that
the fact that “some of the statutes and criminal penalties
requiring a person to forfeit arms fell short of a lifetime ban on
possessing arms” compelled a different result. (Anderson, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 595–596.) The court explained that
“section 29800 imposes a similar burden on the right to arms as
do these historical analogues. As with the categorical
disarmament laws, section 29800’s deprivation of rights is
complete for those assessed unwilling to respect sovereign
authority, but the statute does not ‘restrict arms use by the
public generally.’ [Citation.] As with the criminal penalty of
disarmament, section 29800 deprives an individual of weapons
only after he or she has been convicted in a court of law, with all
the attendant protections of due process. And while defendant is
correct that, historically, disarmament as a criminal penalty was
sometimes temporary, this appears not always to have been the
case. [Citation.] In any event, categorical disarmament laws
imposed permanent prohibitions (at least while the laws
themselves lasted).” (104 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.) We find no
fault in the court’s reasoning.
The court also rejected the argument that, historically,
criminal disarmament turned on whether the criminal conduct
was violent rather than merely unlawful. The court cited
9
evidence showing that an individual could be “disarmed as a
sanction for criminal conduct, whether or not involving physical
violence.” (Anderson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 592–593,
598.) The court also noted, however, that given that the
defendant’s felony conviction was for a violent offense and he was
asserting a facial challenge to the statute, it was unnecessary to
differentiate between violent felonies and nonviolent felonies.
(Id. at pp. 595–596, fn. 2.) The court explained, “Because the
challenge before us is a facial challenge, ‘to prevail, the
Government need only demonstrate that [the statute] is
constitutional in some of its applications.’ ” (104 Cal.App.5th at
p. 600.) The court in that case had no trouble concluding that in
the founding era, the defendant could have been disarmed as
punishment for at least one of his crimes: maliciously and
intentionally shooting at an inhabited dwelling or motor vehicle
(§ 246); assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)); and being a felon in possession of a firearm
(§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). (Anderson, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 600.)
Here, given that Voravongsa also asserts a facial challenge and
that his prior strike conviction was for discharging a firearm in a
grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3), we too need not differentiate
between violent and nonviolent felonies and have no trouble
concluding that in the founding era, Voravongsa could have been
disarmed as punishment for his offense.3
3 Voravongsa’s prior strike offense is summarized in the
probation report as follows: “According to probation records, a
deputy responded to a reported drive-by shooting and was
10
Finally, Voravongsa argues that the court’s reliance on the
proposed constitutional amendments was misplaced. He argues
that relying on proposed provisions that were not adopted
provides no “support at all” for the court’s holding and that, to
the extent the proposed provisions sought to protect the rights of
law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms rather than to disarm
criminals, they are not relevant. The court expressly rejected
this argument in Anderson: “That argument misunderstands the
dynamic of those debates. What both states voted down in their
conventions was the idea that the federal Constitution should
only be ratified if amended to include a declaration of rights.
[Citation.] Among those rights was the right to arms we have
discussed, but there is no evidence that the precise formulation of
that right was itself controversial. Review the many pages of
records available from the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,
and you will find no disagreement with the articulated
proposition that the right to arms with which the delegates were
familiar had an exception, allowing disarmament for ‘crimes
informed by the 14-year-old victim three gunshots were fired
from the front of his residence as he slept. . . . It was learned the
victim’s current girlfriend (M.N.) had a prior relationship and a
child with the defendant. She was contacted and noted the
defendant previously called her, stating, ‘Come get the baby, I’m
going to kill [the victim].’ [W]hen M.N. went to pick up their
child, the defendant showed her a gun in his waistband. She
attempted to talk him out of it; however, he reported, ‘It had to be
done.’ M.N. drove alongside the defendant as he rode his bicycle
to the victim’s residence. She drove ahead and once at the
victim’s residence, told the defendant not to do it. The defendant
removed the firearm from his waistband and fired three shots at
the victim’s residence. He then rode away.”
11
committed’ or to protect the community against ‘danger of public
injury.’ [Citation.] And, of course, after the Constitution was
adopted the Pennsylvania Antifederalists won their declaration
of rights with the adoption of our Bill of Rights, including the
Second Amendment. [¶] We read the evidence from the
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts ratifying conventions as
confirming what the historical analogues have already
established: that this nation’s tradition of firearm regulation
allows for a categorical ban on the possession of firearms by
persons who have been convicted of a felony.” (Anderson, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at p. 599.) We find no error in the court’s
conclusion that the evidence is relevant.
Voravongsa argues that “[e]ven if such a proposal could
provide useful information about the scope of the right under
Bruen,” the founding generation would have understood the
criminal conduct that might lead to disarmament as referring not
“to all crimes but rather to those ‘of a deeper and more atrocious’
kind,” or those that pose a “ ‘real danger of public injury.’ ” As
with his argument above that historic provisions providing for
disarmament for criminal conduct were concerned with
dangerousness not unlawfulness, this argument also fails in a
facial challenge. Voravongsa’s prior strike conviction was both
serious under the law and reflects dangerousness. Accordingly,
even if the exception recognized in the proposed provisions was
addressed to dangerousness and not merely unlawfulness, it
supports the court’s conclusion that section 29800,
12
subdivision (a)(1), comports with the principles that underpin our
regulatory tradition.
Accordingly, we reject Voravongsa’s facial challenge to
section 29800, subdivision (a)(1), and affirm his conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, Acting P. J.
CLAY, J. *
STREETER, J., Concurring.
I join Justice Goldman’s opinion, except that, rather than
pass over the question whether felons are presumptively included
within the term “the People” in the Second Amendment, I would
agree with Presiding Justice Tucher’s opinion in Anderson, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th 577 on that point, and hold that they are.
*Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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