Salute v. Siminski CA2/4

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Filed 7/24/25 Salute v. Siminski CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

PATRICIA M. SALUTE, B327416

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LC105088)
v.

CAMERON SIMINSKI,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Valerie Salkin, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Jay W. Smith and Jay W. Smith for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Hayden & Kassel, Glenn M. Hayden for Defendant and
Respondent.
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a
Tarzana home. Respondent Cameron Siminski inherited the
home when she was a young child. Siminski’s mother, appellant
Patricia Salute, told Siminski that Salute owned the home.
Salute also behaved as though the home were hers, using it as
collateral for six-figure loans beginning while Siminski was still a
minor. When Siminski was 19 and experiencing mental health
challenges, Salute got her to sign “tax paperwork” that was in
fact a grant deed transferring the property from Siminski alone
to Salute and Siminski as joint tenants. Salute subsequently
used the home as collateral for two sizeable loans without
Siminski’s knowledge; one of the loans led to the recordation of a
$405,000 deed of trust against the property.
Six years later, Salute filed the instant action against
Siminski, asserting causes of action for partition of the property,
breach of oral contract, and declaratory relief. Siminski promptly
filed a cross-complaint against Salute, asserting causes of action
for quiet title, cancellation of instrument, and declaratory relief.
The lender holding the deed of trust, PennyMac Loan Services,
LLC, intervened in the proceedings, and Siminski asserted claims
against it. Siminski and PennyMac ultimately settled on the first
day of trial; pursuant to that settlement, Siminski agreed that
PennyMac’s deed of trust was a valid first position lien against
the property.
After a bench trial of Salute’s and Siminski’s claims against
each other, the trial court found that Salute was not credible and
that she obtained Siminski’s signature on the grant deed through
fraud and undue influence. It further found that Siminski
rebutted the presumption that she knew or should have known
what she was signing, and had neither actual nor constructive

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notice of Salute’s malfeasance until Salute filed the action
against her. The trial court accordingly concluded that
Siminski’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitations.
It also rejected Salute’s contention that Siminski’s claims were
precluded by her settlement with PennyMac. The trial court
found the grant deed voidable, declared the transfer void, and
entered judgment in favor of Siminski.
Salute now contends the court should have partitioned the
property and entered judgment in her favor. She argues that
Siminski was a legally competent adult when she signed the
grant deed and therefore had actual or inquiry notice of the
alleged fraud long before she filed her claims, which are barred
by the statute of limitations. Salute alternatively contends that
Siminski’s pretrial settlement with PennyMac constitutes a
judicial admission that the deed of trust is valid, and therefore
that the grant deed preceding it is also valid. We reject Salute’s
contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Although Salute “does not concede” that she defrauded or
unduly influenced Siminski, she does not meaningfully challenge
the trial court’s factual findings. We accordingly draw the
following facts largely from the trial court’s statement of decision.
Siminski is the daughter of Salute and the late James
Siminski, who never married. James died in 1994, when
Siminski was four years old. James left the Tarzana home to
Siminski; at the time, it was encumbered only by a $3,633 lien.
The probate court named Salute as Siminski’s guardian and
authorized her to live in the home with Siminski and her older
children from a previous relationship until Siminski turned 21.

3
Salute never told Siminski that Siminski was the owner of
the home. Instead, she told Siminski that James had left the
home to both of them, and Siminski would inherit the property
upon Salute’s death. Salute also referred to the house as “her
house” around others, including her sister Barbara Cody. After
Cody corrected Salute and said it was “Cameron’s house,” Salute
prevented Cody from seeing Siminski. Salute told Siminski that
Cody “hated her” and did not allow Siminski to have a
relationship with Cody. The trial court found Cody’s testimony to
this effect “chilling,” and characterized Salute’s actions as “a
decades-long effort to wrongfully withhold ownership of the
[home] from Defendant Siminski.”
In March 2007, while Siminski was still a minor, Salute
“obtained a $250,000.00 line of credit, secured against the
Property and pocketed over $100,000.” “Thereafter, Salute used
the Property as a security to back four subsequent loans on
September 27, 2007, October 3, 2007, April 13, 2009, and
January 12, 2010. Salute used the proceeds of each loan to pay off
the previous loan and either kept the additional proceeds or gave
the money to her older children. Siminski received none of the
proceeds.” The court found that Salute treated Siminski
“differently from her half-brothers” in other ways as well,
including giving them their own bedrooms while Siminski
“needed to share her space,” and requiring Siminski to park on
the street “because the driveway was reserved” for them. Salute
also rented out rooms of the home to “various third-party
tenants,” including a college professor who testified that Salute
“became visibly upset” when anyone but her retrieved or
distributed the mail and “made clear that no one else was allowed

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to collect and distribute the mail.”1 Siminski also testified she
was not allowed to get the mail.
On October 3, 2007, Salute “arranged for transfer of the
[home]’s title from Siminski to Salute.” After the transfer
triggered a property tax reassessment, Salute transferred the
property back to Siminski via quitclaim deed in 2008. Siminski
was not aware of either transfer.
In late 2008, when Siminski was 19, she attempted suicide
and was hospitalized in a psychiatric ward. “When she was
released, no one from her family, including her mother, Salute,
was willing to pick her up from the hospital.” “Both before and
after the suicide attempt, Salute consistently belittled Siminski,
both to Siminski directly and in conversations, at least one of
which Siminski overheard, with Salute’s other children.” Salute
also isolated Siminski from extended family members who
desired relationships with her, including Cody and Siminski’s
paternal half-sister. The trial court found that Salute “engaged
in an extended pattern of behavior designed to isolate Siminski”
and “ensure that Siminski would have no social support system
other than Salute.” The court further found that these efforts
were effective, giving Salute a deep “hold” on Siminski “during a
vulnerable time in Siminski’s life.”
It was against this backdrop that in February 2009, shortly
after Siminski’s release from the hospital, “Salute directed
Siminski to sign a grant deed, which gifted the Property from
Siminski alone to Salute and Siminski as joint tenants (the 2009
transfer). Salute falsely told Siminski that Siminski was signing

1 Siminski testified that after Salute moved out of the home
in 2018, she found some of the professor’s bank statements that
Salute had hidden and failed to give him.

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something for taxes.” The trial court found that Siminski signed
the 2009 grant deed, though it also credited Siminski’s testimony
“that she does not recall signing this document and that to the
best of her recollection, she was only told to sign documents ‘for
taxes.’” It expressly found that “Siminski was unaware of what
she was signing,” and that “Siminski has proven that Salute took
advantage of Siminski’s delicate mental state, youth, and trust in
Salute in cunningly manipulating Siminski to sign the 2009
grant deed and misleading her as to what it was. . . . Siminski,
while not legally incompetent, clearly lacked awareness and
wherewithal to question Salute’s machinations.”
In January 2010, armed with the 2009 grant deed, Salute
obtained a $405,000 mortgage loan from PennyMac’s predecessor
in interest. The trial court found that Siminski signed some of
the loan documents, but also found that her signature was
“forged in at least one document therein.” The court further
found that Siminski’s signature was missing from the original
2010 deed of trust, and that her name appeared to have been
added to the recorded copy after it was executed by Salute and
notarized. The trial court concluded it was “not a stretch to infer
that Salute misled Siminski as to the nature of the transaction
and that Salute added Siminski’s signature and wrote in
Siminski’s name” after the recorded deed of trust was notarized.
Salute used approximately $220,000 to pay off the previous loan
and received the remainder as loan proceeds. “No money from
the remaining loan proceeds was given to Siminski.” The parties
stipulated that the loan was in default as of August 2017.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 2, 2016, after Salute and Siminski’s
“relationship deteriorated,” Salute filed a complaint against
Siminski. She asserted causes of action for partition of the
property, breach of an alleged oral contract pursuant to which
Salute agreed to pay all expenses of the property in exchange for
Siminski obtaining a college degree, and declaratory relief.
Siminski filed a cross-complaint on December 27, 2016. She
asserted causes of action for cancellation of the 2009 grant deed,
accounting, conversion, and declaratory relief.
In early 2018, PennyMac sought and obtained leave to
intervene “to protect its security interest” in the property. It
asserted causes of action for quiet title, declaratory relief, and
imposition and foreclosure of equitable lien.
The trial court held a bench trial in September 2018.
Notably, this court also expressly found Salute not credible.
While the final statement of decision was pending, the matter
was reassigned to a different judge, who granted PennyMac’s
motion for new trial in December 2019. In August 2020,
Siminski filed a first amended cross-complaint. It retained the
causes of action for cancellation of the 2009 grant deed and
declaratory relief against Salute, and added causes of action for
cancellation of deed of trust, quiet title, and declaratory relief
against PennyMac.
PennyMac moved for summary judgment or summary
adjudication of its claims. It argued, among other things, that
Siminski’s claims were barred by the applicable three-year
statute of limitations, because she sued PennyMac more than six
years after the deed of trust was recorded. Salute filed a “non-
opposition” and joined PennyMac’s statute of limitations

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arguments. Siminski opposed the motion. The court denied
summary judgment, finding there were triable issues of material
fact. It also noted, however, that “it is likely that PennyMac is
entitled to equitable relief in this action.”
The matter proceeded to a second bench trial before a third
judge on August 15, 2022. As Salute’s counsel began his opening
statement, the parties agreed to conduct further settlement talks.
Upon their return to the courtroom, PennyMac announced that
Siminski had accepted a settlement offer pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 998.2 Under the terms of the deal,
Siminski agreed that PennyMac’s deed of trust “constitutes a
valid, first position lien against the Property.” She also agreed
that judgment would be entered against her and in favor of
PennyMac on both PennyMac’s complaint in intervention and her
first amended complaint. For its part, PennyMac agreed to pay
Siminski $260,000, “which, if applied to the Loan, would reduce
the balance of the Loan to $217,282.15 as of August 3, 2022.” The
settlement further provided that it was “not to be construed
either as an admission that any party is liable in this action or
that any party has suffered any injury or damage.” The court
later entered judgment in accordance with the settlement. After
agreeing to the settlement, PennyMac dismissed Salute from its
complaint in intervention, with prejudice.
The court then presided over a bench trial to resolve
Salute’s and Siminski’s remaining claims. Salute and Siminski
gave competing testimony, and each called other witnesses. The
parties stipulated to the admission of numerous exhibits,
including the grant deed and deed of trust documents. The

2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

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record reflects no argument by Salute that trial was unnecessary
or improper in light of Siminski’s settlement with PennyMac.
After trial, at the court’s request, the parties submitted
supplemental briefing on the statute of limitations issue.
The court issued a written statement of decision in which it
made the factual findings summarized above. It further found
that Siminski did not discover and reasonably could not have
discovered Salute’s wrongdoing before Salute filed suit in 2016,
and Siminski’s claims therefore were timely. The court also
rejected Salute’s contention, raised in her post-trial briefing and
objections to the tentative statement of decision, that Siminski’s
settlement with PennyMac constituted a judicial admission that
the 2010 deed of trust was valid for all purposes. The court
declared the 2009 grant deed void, but declined to award either
Salute or Siminski a monetary judgment. It entered judgment in
favor of Siminski and against Salute on all causes of action.
Salute timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
Salute contends that Siminski’s causes of action against
her are barred by the three-year statute of limitations in section
338, subdivision (d) or precluded by Siminski’s settlement with
PennyMac. We disagree on both points.
I. Statute of Limitations
A. Legal Principles
Statutes of limitations “prescribe the periods beyond which
a plaintiff may not bring a cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-
Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (Fox).) The relevant
statute of limitations in this case is section 338, subdivision (d),

9
which prescribes a three-year statute of limitations for causes of
action “for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake.”
Statutes of limitation begin to run when a cause of action
“accrues,” or when all the elements of the cause of action are
complete. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 806.) “An important
exception to the general rule of accrual is the ‘discovery rule,’
which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff
discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” (Id. at
p. 807.) The discovery rule is codified within the text of section
338, subdivision (d): “The cause of action in that case is deemed
not to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of
the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (§ 338, subd. (d).)
The discovery rule “delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or
should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action.” (Fox, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 807.) A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of
action when he or she has reason to at least suspect a factual
basis for the elements of the cause of action. (Ibid.) Thus,
“suspicion of one or more of the elements of a cause of action,
coupled with knowledge of any remaining elements, will
generally trigger the statute of limitations period.” (Ibid.) To
encourage the diligent pursuit of claims, “plaintiffs are charged
with presumptive knowledge of an injury” and are “required to
conduct a reasonable investigation after becoming aware of an
injury, and are charged with knowledge of the information that
would have been revealed by such an investigation.” (Id. at p.
808.) To obtain the benefit of the discovery rule, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that “despite diligent investigation of the
circumstances of the injury, he or she could not have reasonably
discovered facts supporting the cause of action within the
applicable statute of limitations period.” (Id. at p. 809.)

10
On appeal from a judgment based on a statement of
decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de
novo and questions of fact for substantial evidence. (Pearce v.
Briggs (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 466, 473.) “Resolution of a statute
of limitations issue is normally a question of fact.” (Id. at p. 474.)
Accordingly, “‘[t]he trial court’s finding on the accrual of a cause
of action for statute of limitations is upheld on appeal if
supported by substantial evidence.’” (Ibid.)
B. Additional Background
The trial court concluded that the 2009 grant deed was
voidable “due to Salute’s undue influence, misrepresentations,
and other improper actions in manipulating Siminski to sign.”
The court also concluded that “Salute’s fraudulent concealment of
the true facts is a good answer to the defense of the statute of
limitations.” It found “as a factual matter that Siminski did not
discover Salute’s fraud until 2016,” and that “the truth was not
reasonably discoverable by Siminski until her mother filed the
partition action in 2016.” It explained, “[r]egardless of what
names appeared on the various grant deeds and deeds of trust,
until Salute filed her partition lawsuit in 2016, Siminski had no
reason to investigate and no notice that anything was amiss.”
Moreover, it found that “any documents that might have been
sent to Siminski by a financial institution were intercepted by
Plaintiff Salute, who exercised absolute control over the mail.”
The court rejected Salute’s contention that Siminski
“should have gone to the registrar’s office or sought to obtain
information as to title,” finding that Siminski “is neither a real
estate professional nor an attorney, nor a person purchasing a
home who might look into title. She had been manipulated and
emotionally abused for years by Salute, and she loved and

11
trusted her mother. A person of Siminski’s age and in Siminski’s
position would not reasonably be expected to conduct the type of
investigation suggested by Salute. And even if Siminski had done
so, perhaps by filing a request for documents, Salute would have
intercepted the documents.” The court added, “Siminski should
not suffer, and Salute should not benefit, where the
circumstances of Siminski’s ongoing ignorance were created and
maintained by Salute’s wrongdoing.” The court “emphasize[d]
that the fraud in this case is not limited to irregularities in the
recorded deeds. It is also the long-term misrepresentation by
Salute of the terms of James Siminski’s will and probate
proceedings. . . . Under the unique circumstances of this case,
the Court finds Siminski had neither actual nor constructive
notice of the fraud until 2016.”
C. Analysis
Salute argues that “the evidence is undeniable, even as a
matter of law, that Ms. Siminski was on notice of the 2009 Grant
Deed in 2009 and the 2010 Deed of Trust in 2010.” She points to
Siminski’s signing of the 2009 grant deed and some documents
related to the 2010 deed of trust, and the testimony of a notary
and a mortgage broker who claimed they explained the
documents to Siminski. She also points out that both the grant
deed and deed of trust were recorded, which she claims put
Siminski “on inquiry notice that there were issues being raised
regarding the Property,” “even assuming Ms. Salute defrauded
Ms. Siminski into signing the 2010 Loan documents and the 2010
Deed of Trust (which Ms. Salute does not concede).”
Substantial evidence amply supports the trial court’s
conclusion that Siminski did not discover and reasonably could
not have discovered Salute’s malfeasance until this suit was filed

12
in 2016. From the time Siminski inherited the home as a small
child, Salute falsely told her that the home belonged to Salute.
Salute also prevented Siminski from having contact with family
members who may have told her otherwise. Salute
misrepresented the nature of the documents she asked Siminski
to sign, and the trial court found the mortgage broker who
testified about the circumstances of the signing to be “not an
entirely objective witness” due to her friendship with Salute’s son
and embrace of Salute in the courtroom.
Salute repeatedly emphasizes that Siminski was a legal
adult who was mentally competent when she signed the 2009
grant deed and the 2010 loan documents. She also asserts that
Siminski “has provided no evidence (because there is none) that
she was legally incompetent at the time she signed the
documents.” Therefore, she contends, Siminski “is held to have
legally known and understood what she was signing when she
signed the documents, and . . . her cause of action for cancellation
of instrument must fail.”
We agree with Salute that “it is well established that a
party who signs a document is presumed to have read it and to
understand its contents.” (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1162, fn. 6.) However, it is equally
well established that this presumption is rebuttable. (See ibid.)
Salute does not cite any authority for the proposition that the
presumption may be rebutted only by evidence showing a formal
declaration of incompetence.3 One of the cases she does cite,

3 She also does not acknowledge that competency has long
been a distinct issue from fraud. (See, e.g., In re Benton’s Estate
(1901) 131 Cal. 472, 475.) Competent adults may nevertheless
fall victim to fraud, undue influence, or misrepresentations.

13
Parsons v. Tickner (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1513 (Parsons),
undermines this notion.
In Parsons, the court observed that the discovery rule “‘is
applied to types of actions in which it will generally be difficult
for plaintiffs to immediately detect or comprehend the breach or
the resulting injuries. . . . Even when the breach and damage are
not physically hidden, they may be beyond what the plaintiff
could reasonably be expected to comprehend.’” (Parsons, supra,
31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1526.) Parsons further recognized that
“‘courts have relied on the nature of the relationship between
defendant and plaintiff to explain application of the delayed
accrual rule,’” and that “‘there is an underlying notion that
plaintiffs should not suffer where circumstances prevent them
from knowing they have been harmed. And often this is
accompanied by the corollary notion that defendants should not
be allowed to knowingly profit from their injuree’s ignorance.’”
(Ibid.) Applying these principles at the demurrer stage, Parsons
held the discovery rule applied where the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant concealed a key fact from her, used false
representations to do so, and it was not unreasonable under the
circumstances for the plaintiff to trust the defendant’s
representations. (See id. at p. 1527.)
Here, the trial court found that Siminski rebutted the
presumption by proving she “had not, and reasonably could not,
discover the fraud, which includes Salute’s hiding from Cameron
Siminski the terms of James Siminski’s will.” It found that “the
circumstances of Siminski’s ongoing ignorance were created and
maintained by Salute’s wrongdoing”; that Siminski “credibly
testified that in 2009-2010, as a teenager, she had no idea what a
grant deed, deed of trust, or mortgage was”; and Siminski “had

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recently attempted suicide, had no access to mail, and relied
completely on Salute.” It also found there was a power imbalance
between Salute and Siminski, as Salute had “manipulated and
emotionally abused” Siminski for years and yet Siminski “loved
and trusted her mother.” These circumstances and findings
amply support application of the discovery rule, particularly since
they were predominantly of Salute’s creation. They also
demonstrate that the court did not rely exclusively or even
primarily on Siminski’s age, as Salute repeatedly suggests.
Salute nevertheless contends that Siminski should have
been on inquiry notice after signing the grant deed and
documents related to the deed of trust, because they were
recorded with the county recorder. She points to Civil Code
section 1213, which states, “Every conveyance of real property . . .
acknowledged or proved and certified and recorded as prescribed
by law from the time it is filed with the recorder for record is
constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent
purchasers and mortgagees. . . .” (Civ. Code, § 1213.) A deed of
trust is a “conveyance” for purposes of Civil Code section 1213.
(Civ. Code, § 1215.) However, Siminski was not a “subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee” of the property. She was instead an
unknowing gifter and mortgagor. Salute asserts that Civil Code
section 1213 applies generally to “a party in interest,” but the
single case she cites for that proposition does not support it. (See
Cady v. Purser (1901) 131 Cal. 552, 555.) Salute also has no
answer to the trial court’s well-supported factual finding that she
interfered with Siminski’s receipt of mail and “would have
intercepted” any documents Siminski attempted to obtain
through reasonable inquiry.

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In short, Salute has failed to carry her burden of showing
that the trial court committed reversible error in finding
Siminski’s claims timely under the delayed discovery rule.
II. Settlement and Stipulated Judgment
Salute alternatively contends that Siminski’s acceptance of
PennyMac’s section 998 offer and resultant stipulated judgment
against Siminski estop her from making “any further arguments
that the 2010 Deed of Trust was actually procured through fraud
or any other means,” because the judgment constitutes a “finding
on the merits that the deed of trust is valid and enforceable.” In
her view, if the deed of trust is valid, “the vesting of the title, i.e.,
that the title was held in 2010 in joint tenancy by both Ms. Salute
and Ms. Siminski, is as valid and enforceable as is the amount
owed, the interest rate, and the maturity date,” and therefore the
2009 grant deed establishing that joint tenancy must be valid.
Salute argues that Siminski impermissibly “attempts to have it
both ways,” as she “judicially admits through her Stipulated
Judgment that as to PennyMac the 2010 Deed of Trust is valid
and enforceable but as to Ms. Salute it is not. This was not the
Judgment entered, this was not the Judgment to which the
parties stipulated, and this is not the plain reading of the
language included in the Stipulated Judgment.” Siminski
responds that the “998 Offer is not a judicial admission of the
validity of the 2010 Deed of Trust,” and even if it were, “title to
the property was still held by Ms. Siminski and Ms. Salute, and
the enforceability of the 2009 Grant Deed was the primary issue
to be determined at trial.” She asserts that the settlement and
judgment were not “an admission that the 2009 Grant Deed
remained in effect even after the trial.”

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We conclude that Salute has not demonstrated that the
settlement and judgment between Siminski and PennyMac
preclude the trial court’s ruling that the 2009 grant deed was
voidable and void.
A. Additional Background
As described above, Siminski and PennyMac settled their
claims against one another on the first day of trial. The court
entered judgment in accordance with that settlement on October
21, 2022. The judgment, cited nowhere in Salute’s briefing,
provides that “Judgment is entered against Siminski and in favor
of PennyMac on PennyMac’s complaint in intervention . . . and
the loan in the original principal amount of $405,000.00 secured
by the deed of trust recorded against the [home] . . . constitutes a
valid, first position lien against the Property.” It further provides
that “PennyMac is to pay Siminski a total of $260,000.00,” that
“[j]udgment of dismissal is entered in PennyMac’s favor and
against Siminski on Siminski’s first amended cross-complaint,”
and that “[e]ach party shall bear its own respective attorneys’
fees and costs.” The order of dismissal concerning Salute states
only that PennyMac’s action is dismissed with prejudice as to
her.
After trial, Salute argued that the trial court “must draw a
legal conclusion that ‘all parts of the 2010 deed of trust, including
vesting and title, are valid and enforceable,” such that Salute
would necessarily prevail on her claims. The trial court rejected
this argument in its statement of decision, reasoning that trial
would have been entirely unnecessary “if the Court adopted
Salute’s rationale,” because the “only reason” trial “went forward
after the acceptance of the 998 offer was to determine whether
the 2009 Grant Deed transfer was void or voidable.” The trial

17
court observed that “Siminski and PennyMac entered into a
compromise agreement that mitigated each of their risks in going
forward.” Specifically, “PennyMac risked losing its investment
entirely if the 2010 deed of trust was declared void by the Court,”
and accordingly “agreed to pay $260,000 to Siminski in exchange
for Siminski agreeing that the loan would be secured by the . . .
property regardless of the outcome of the case.” Likewise,
“Siminski also wanted to mitigate her risk” in light of the court’s
indication at summary judgment “that an equitable lien in
PennyMac’s favor was reasonably likely, although not certain.”
The court concluded that “[n]o one interpreted the offer and
acceptance of the 998 offer in the manner Salute belatedly
requests,” and that “Siminski never intended, nor does the 998
acceptance document state, that she was conceding to the validity
of the wrongfully-obtained 2009 Grant Deed, particularly when it
was abundantly clear that she was not.”
B. Legal Principles and Analysis
“In a stipulated judgment, or consent decree, litigants
voluntarily terminate a lawsuit by assenting to specified terms,
which the court agrees to enforce as a judgment.” (California
State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Superior
Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658, 663.) A stipulated judgment “may
properly be given collateral estoppel effect, at least when the
parties manifest an intent to be collaterally bound by its terms.”
(Id. at p. 664; see also Kerley v. Weber (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th
1187, 1194 [“Findings on issues that are ‘actually and necessarily
included’ in a judgment may be given collateral estoppel effect,
regardless of whether the judgment is the result of a
stipulation.”].) Collateral estoppel, for which the preferred term
is now issue preclusion, “prevents ‘relitigation of previously

18
decided issues.’” (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326-
327.) “It applies only ‘(1) after final adjudication (2) of an
identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in
the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the
first suit or one in privity with that party.’” (Id. at p. 327.) The
determination whether collateral estoppel or issue preclusion
applies is a question of law that we review de novo. (Jenkins v.
County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 598, 618.)
To the extent the court’s ruling indicates a refusal to apply
issue preclusion, we find no error. First, and most
fundamentally, issue preclusion could not apply because there
was no subsequent suit. The litigation among PennyMac,
Siminski, and Salute was part and parcel of the same
proceedings. Second, the 2009 grant deed and 2010 deed of trust
are two distinct transactions, not an identical issue. Resolution of
issues concerning the 2010 deed of trust did not necessarily
resolve issues concerning the validity of the 2009 grant deed.
Indeed, the settlement and judgment said nothing about the 2009
grant deed, and, as discussed below, no party behaved as though
they did. Regardless of the validity of the 2009 grant deed,
Siminski held title to the property and was potentially on the
hook to PennyMac for the entirety of the loan obligation. As the
trial court recognized, the settlement mitigated both Siminski’s
and PennyMac’s risks in this regard.
Third, as Siminski argues and the trial court concluded, the
record gives no indication that any party to the action, including
Salute, intended the judgment to resolve issues concerning the
2009 grant deed. To the contrary, litigation involving the 2009
grant deed continued immediately following the settlement, and
there is no indication in the record that Salute made any

19
argument regarding issue preclusion until after the trial was
complete. Issue preclusion may be waived or forfeited if not
proved in the trial court. (Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps &
Phillips, LLP (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 313, 332.) And “‘[w]here a
party joins issue on a question previously litigated or voluntarily
opens an investigation of matters which he might claim to be
concluded by a prior judgment, he will be held to have waived his
right to assert the benefit of the former adjudication and the case
will be determined without regard therefor.’” (Rodgers v. Sargent
Controls & Aerospace (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 82, 89, quoting
Dillard v. McKnight (1949) 34 Cal.3d 209, 219.) Although Salute
raised the issue, she did not do so until the multi-day bench trial
regarding the 2009 grant deed had concluded. The trial court did
not err by rejecting what it characterized as Salute’s “belated”
request to interpret the settlement as precluding the need for
trial.
Salute also argues that the settlement and judgment
amount to a “judicial admission” by Siminski that the deed of
trust is enforceable for all purposes. “A judicial admission is a
party’s unequivocal concession of the truth of a matter, and
removes the matter as an issue in the case.” (Gelfo v. Lockheed
Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 48.) Here, the
settlement and judgment provide only that the deed of trust
“constitutes a valid, first position lien against the Property.” This
is not on its face an admission or concession that the property
rightfully belonged to both Salute and Siminski or that the 2009
grant deed creating the joint tenancy was valid. It removed only
consideration of the 2010 deed of trust from the case; Salute and
Siminski subsequently spent days trying the validity of the 2009
grant deed. Salute appears to assert that the deed of trust vested

20
title to the property in both herself and Siminski independently
of the grant deed, but she cites no authority for that proposition.
We accordingly do not consider this point further. (See Holden v.
City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418.)
Finally, Salute cites Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 793 in support of a contention that
PennyMac’s dismissal of its intervenor complaint with prejudice
as to her is “a finding on the merits in Ms. Salute’s favor.”
However, she fails to develop this argument beyond a single
sentence repeated multiple times. “‘Issues do not have a life of
their own: if they are not raised or supported by [substantive]
argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues
waived.’” (Holden v. City of San Diego, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at
p. 418.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Siminski may recover her costs
of appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, ACTING P. J.

We concur:

MORI, J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

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