CourtListener 10638789•People v. Gallardo CA2/7
Testo completo
Filed 7/22/25 P. v. Gallardo CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B335192
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA134117)
v.
ANGEL JESUS GALLARDO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kelvin D. Filer, Judge. Affirmed.
Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Blake Armstrong,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Angel Jesus Gallardo appeals from the superior court’s
order resentencing him under Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess., Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3), codified as Penal Code
section 1172.75 (formerly section 1171.1).1 The court struck
Gallardo’s one-year prior prison term enhancement under
section 667.5, former subdivision (b), reducing his aggregate
sentence by one year, and reimposed the original sentence of 15
years. Gallardo’s sole contention is that the court improperly
relied on defense counsel’s “hearsay representation” regarding
Gallardo’s postconviction record in declining to further reduce his
sentence. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In 2015, a jury convicted Gallardo of second degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)), and shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246). The jury
found that the attempted murders had been willful, deliberate,
and premeditated (§ 664, subd. (a)), and that all the crimes had
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Effective January 1, 2022, section 1171.1 was renumbered to
section 1172.75 with no change in text. (Assem. Bill No. 200
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess., Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12).)
2 Aside from arguing section 1172.75 required the court to
personally review Gallardo’s prison file prior to deciding Gallardo
was not entitled to a further sentence reduction, Gallardo does
not argue that the court abused its discretion in declining to
resentence him. We do not recite the facts of Gallardo’s
underlying offenses because the issue Gallardo has raised is
purely a legal question. The facts of Gallardo’s case are set forth
in our prior opinion on his direct appeal. (See People v. Gallardo
(Dec. 6, 2017, B269034) [nonpub. opn.].)
2
been committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The jury also found that, as to one of
the attempted murder counts, a principal personally used a
firearm and a principal personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (e)(1).) In a bifurcated
proceeding, Gallardo admitted he served a prior prison term
within the meaning of section 667.5, former subdivision (b).
The trial court sentenced Gallardo to an aggregate term of
16 years to life in state prison, consisting of 15 years to life for
second degree murder (§ 190, subd. (a)) plus a consecutive term of
one year for the prior prison term enhancement, and concurrent
terms of 15 years to life for each attempted murder count
(§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5), 664, subd. (a)). The court also imposed
but stayed a 15-year sentence for shooting at an occupied vehicle
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)(B)). We affirmed the judgment on appeal.
(People v. Gallardo (Dec. 6, 2017, B269034) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2021, the Legislature invalidated all section 667.5,
subdivision (b), prior prison term enhancements that were
imposed before January 1, 2020, and did not arise from
convictions for sexually violent offenses. The Legislature enacted
section 1172.75, which provides a procedure for resentencing
inmates serving terms that include those now-invalid
enhancements. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
In early 2023, the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified the superior court that
Gallardo was serving a term for a judgment that includes the
now-invalid enhancement. The court reviewed the judgment,
verified that it includes a now-invalid enhancement, and
appointed counsel.
3
Neither defense counsel nor the People submitted any
briefing. At the resentencing hearing in August 2023, defense
counsel stated, “[The People have] pointed out . . . that . . .
Gallardo’s C-file[3] is not conducive to resentencing. He has an
attempted murder on an inmate in 2023. I don’t know if the
court would be interested in exercising its discretion to reduce the
sentence based on that, but I think the law is clear that the court
does need to strike his one-year prior.” The court “accept[ed]
counsel’s representation as to what is contained within the C-
file,” struck Gallardo’s one-year prior prison term enhancement,
and reimposed “[a]ll other terms and conditions previously
imposed.”
Gallardo timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Gallardo argues that his defense counsel’s “hearsay
representation cannot serve as a justification to fail to conduct a
full resentencing where the trial court did not review [Gallardo’s]
disciplinary record.” Not only did Gallardo forfeit any objection,
but the court was entitled to accept and rely on the
representation by defense counsel.
A. Section 1172.75 and Standard of Review
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 added
section 1172.75 to the Penal Code. (People v. Christianson (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 300, 310, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189
3 The C-file refers to the “confidential correctional inmate
file[]” maintained by the CDCR. (People v. Landry (2016)
2 Cal.5th 52, 71.)
4
(Christianson).) Section 1172.75 provides that “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense . . . is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (b), instructs the CDCR or
county correctional administrator to “ ‘identify those persons in
[its] custody currently serving a term . . . that includes an
enhancement’ ” for a prior prison term under section 667.5,
subdivision (b), and “ ‘provide the name of each [such] person . . .
to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.’ ”
(Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 310, review granted,
quoting § 1172.75, subd. (b).) The sentencing court “shall review
the judgment” and verify that the judgment includes a prior
prison term enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) “If the court
determines that the current judgment includes [such] an
enhancement . . . the court shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (Ibid.; see Christianson, at p. 310.)
Section 1172.75 outlines “specific instructions” for
resentencing. (People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966.)
“First, the resentencing ‘shall result in a lesser sentence than the
one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the
repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety. . . .’ [Citation.] Second, the trial court
‘shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply
any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for
judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
Third, the court ‘may consider postconviction factors, including,
5
but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that
reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.’ [Citation.]
Fourth, ‘[u]nless the court originally imposed the upper term, the
court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
unless there are circumstances in aggravation that . . . have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . .’ [Citation.] Finally, the court ‘shall
appoint counsel’ for the resentencing.” (Carter, at pp. 966-967;
accord, People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855-856,
fn. 12; People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399.)
“[S]ection 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that
the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (Monroe,
at p. 402; accord, Garcia, at p. 855.)
We review questions of law and statutory interpretation de
novo. (See People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 712; People v.
Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 366.) “ ‘When interpreting a
statute, a court’s role “is to determine the Legislature’s intent so
as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” [Citation.] “We begin as
always with the statute’s actual words, the ‘most reliable
indicator’ of legislative intent, ‘assigning them their usual and
ordinary meanings, and construing them in context. If the words
themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature
meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning governs.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Davenport (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1157-58.)
6
B. Gallardo Forfeited His Argument
We agree with the People that Gallardo forfeited his
argument by raising it for the first time on appeal. Defense
counsel did not provide the court with Gallardo’s inmate file or
ask the court to review it. Moreover, defense counsel did not
object when the superior court explicitly relied on his oral
representation regarding Gallardo’s inmate file. Gallardo
therefore forfeited the challenge on appeal. (See In re Sheena K.
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880 [“Ordinarily, a criminal defendant who
does not challenge an assertedly erroneous ruling of the trial
court in that court has forfeited his or her right to raise the claim
on appeal.”].)
C. The Court Did Not Err by Relying on Defense Counsel’s
Representation
Even if the issue is not forfeited, the superior court did not
“abdicate[] its responsibility under section 1172.75,” as Gallardo
contends, by accepting defense counsel’s representation that
Gallardo’s inmate file showed he had recently attempted to
murder another inmate.4
Gallardo primarily relies on People v. Gallardo (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 296 (Gallardo),5 to argue that section 1172.75
“requires the trial court itself to review the [postconviction
disciplinary] record.” In Gallardo, the defendant appealed the
superior court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under
4 We exercise our discretion to reach the merits of the issue.
(See In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887, fn. 7 [“an
appellate court may review a forfeited claim—and ‘[w]hether or
not it should do so is entrusted to its discretion’ ”].)
5 The defendant in Gallardo is not the same defendant here.
7
section 1172.6. The superior court summarily denied the petition
based on the People’s oral representation regarding the jury
instructions from the defendant’s trial. (Gallardo, at p. 302.)
The record did not indicate “the court reviewed any documentary
evidence at all.” (Ibid.) The Gallardo court concluded that the
superior court failed to adequately perform its “statutorily
mandated task” under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), which
requires the court to examine the record of conviction, including
the jury instructions, to assess whether the defendant made a
prima facie case for relief. (Gallardo, at p. 302.)
Gallardo is inapposite. It addressed a substantially
different statute (§ 1172.6) and held that the superior court erred
by failing to follow the specific procedure mandated by that
statute. (Gallardo, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 299.) By
contrast, the issue before us is the application of section 1172.75.
Section 1172.75 states the court “may consider” the
defendant’s postconviction disciplinary record, not that it must.
(Compare § 1172.75, subd. (d)(3) [“The court may consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
disciplinary record,” (italics added)] with § 1172.1, subd. (a)(5)
[“[i]n recalling and resentencing pursuant to [§ 1172.1], the court
shall consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited
to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the
defendant while incarcerated,” (italics added)].) And once the
superior court elects to rely on the postconviction record, nothing
requires the court to itself study the petitioner’s post-conviction
records as opposed to relying on the representation of defense
counsel with respect to those records. The superior court could
reasonably determine that Gallardo’s defense counsel would not
misrepresent that his client had a recent serious felony charge,
8
and the court could safely rely on such a representation about
Gallardo’s recent criminal conduct.6
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
6 If Gallardo believes that defense counsel’s representation
regarding the content of Gallardo’s inmate file was inaccurate,
and in fact he was not accused of a 2023 attempted murder on
another inmate, he could file a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in the superior court, relying on the inmate file.
9
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.