People v. Pavon CA4/1

CourtListener 10638785Calctapp22 lug 2025

Testo completo

Filed 7/22/25 P. v. Pavon CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084221

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD298604)

RENE CABRERA PAVON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded
with instructions.
Michaela Dalton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Eric A. Swenson and Monique Myers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Rene Cabrera Pavon appeals four probation conditions the trial court
imposed. He claims these conditions are unreasonable under People v.
Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481. The People concede error as to three conditions,
which concessions we accept. We conclude the court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing the fourth condition—a warrantless search condition.
Thus, resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v.
Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we reverse in part, affirm in part, and
remand with instructions.
I.
From December 2018 to May 2022, Pavon owned and operated a
company with payroll totaling over $4.6 million, yet Pavon reported $0.
Consequently, he benefited from reduced premiums, rates, and costs of
required workers’ compensation insurance, resulting in State Compensation
Insurance Fund losses of $1,161,100. Pavon also failed to file tax returns,
resulting in California Franchise Tax Board losses of $847,385.
Pavon’s fraud led to various charges. Pavon eventually pled guilty to
making false statements regarding workers’ compensation insurance (Ins.
Code, § 11880, subd. (a); count 1) and failure to file tax returns (Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 19706; counts 4 and 5). He was sentenced to 365 days of local custody
and two years of formal probation.
The trial court imposed several probation conditions. Relevant to this
appeal, Pavon’s counsel objected to four conditions, arguing a lack of nexus to
the case. They are (1) treatment, therapy, and counseling conditions
(Nos. 7(b), (c) & (d)); (2) alcohol conditions (Nos. 8(b), (c) & (f)); (3) drug
conditions (No. 9(c)); and (4) a Fourth Amendment waiver condition. The last
requires Pavon to “[s]ubmit [his] person, vehicle, residence, property, [and]
personal effects . . . to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with
or without reasonable cause, when required by” a probation or law
enforcement officer (No. 6(n)).

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II.
A sentencing court has “broad discretion” in deciding what probation
conditions to impose. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) On
appeal, we review the court’s decision for abuse of discretion. (In re
Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118.) A probation condition is invalid only
if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the defendant was convicted,
(2) relates to noncriminal conduct, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which
is not reasonably related to future criminality. (People v. Lent (1975)
15 Cal.3d 481, 486.)
Pavon argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
conditions for therapy (Nos. 7(b), (c) & (d)), alcohol (Nos. 8(b), (c) & (f)), and
drugs (No. 9(c)) because there is no relationship between those conditions, his
crimes, and future criminality. The People concede these three conditions
should be stricken because there is “no evidence in the record” Pavon “used
alcohol, drugs, or suffered any mental health issues, took any medication for
such issues, or has any condition requiring such treatment.” We agree these
conditions were improperly imposed. (See People v. Burton (1981)
117 Cal.App.3d 382, 390 [invalidating alcohol conditions because defendant
had no personal history of alcohol abuse and alcohol use was unrelated to any
offenses]; People v. Cruz Cruz (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 707, 711–713 [striking
marijuana conditions because there was no indication defendant was
predisposed or more likely to commit crimes when under influence of
marijuana]; In re Bushman (1970) 1 Cal.3d 767, 777 [noting, absent any
evidence defendant needed psychiatric care, imposing required psychiatric
treatment as probation condition was improper].)

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Pavon contends the warrantless search condition—No. 6(n)—is
similarly invalid under Lent. The People counter the court did not
improperly impose this condition. We agree with the People.
As an initial matter, the warrantless search condition relates to
noncriminal conduct; prong two of Lent is thus satisfied and our focus is on
Lent prongs one and three.
To be invalid, the probation condition must be unrelated to the crime
for which Pavon was convicted. (Lent, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Pavon admits
there is a factual basis to support a warrantless search condition for
documents or records relevant to tax liability and workers’ compensation
insurance obligations. Yet Pavon claims the business’ operations were
primarily electronic; thus, any related records would be electronic, too. As
the trial court found no nexus to support an electronic search condition, he
argues there cannot be a nexus for a nonelectronic search condition either.
The People argue these types of documents could be revealed through
physical searches of Pavon’s personal records and documents, as this could
have been a “paper case” involving cash and hardcopy documents. The trial
court, given its broad discretion, could have reasonably concluded as much,
which would justify its finding of a lack of nexus for electronic records but not
hardcopy ones. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a
relationship between the warrantless search condition and Pavon’s crimes.
Because the Lent “test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be
satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term”—Pavon’s
failure to satisfy the first prong is dispositive. (People v. Olguin (2008)
45 Cal.4th 375, 379.)
Yet the third prong further supports the conclusion the probation
condition is valid. As the People argue, the third prong fails because the

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warrantless search condition is reasonably related to deterring future
criminality. This prong requires “a degree of proportionality between the
burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served
by the condition” and more than an abstract or hypothetical relationship.
(Ricardo P., 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1121–1122, 1129.) Pavon asserts that he neither
owns nor plans to start another business, so the relationship is too abstract to
satisfy prong three. He fails, however, to cite any relevant authority to
support his claim, thereby forfeiting it. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th
835, 845.)
Forfeiture aside, that Pavon perpetrated a years-long fraud shows
sophistication in concealing his crimes. Accordingly, the relationship
between a warrantless search and preventing Pavon from storing fraudulent
materials is neither abstract nor hypothetical. (Contra Ricardo P., 7 Cal.5th
at pp. 1121–1122 [invalidating electronic search condition based on tenuous
inference that minor used marijuana while committing crime and
generalization that teenagers brag about drug use online].) Neither is it
excessively burdensome in light of Pavon’s substantially underreported
payroll and the potential for documents to be stored in many different areas.
(See People v. Gallegos (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 612, 626.) We therefore
conclude there is a reasonable relationship between the warrantless search
condition and deterring future criminality.
As an alternative to striking the warrantless search condition, Pavon
requests the condition be limited in scope. Because this request was raised
for the first time in the reply brief, it is forfeited. (People v. Rangel (2016)
62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218.)

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In sum, the trial court improperly imposed the drug, alcohol, and
therapy probation conditions, but it did not abuse its discretion in imposing
the warrantless search condition.
III.
We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand. On remand, the trial
court shall amend the probation order to strike conditions 7(b), (c), and (d);
8(b), (c), and (f); and 9(c). In all other respects, we affirm.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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